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On New Year’s Eve 2001, fourteen youngsters were killed and more than two hundred
got injured by a fire in a bar in the municipality of Volendam in the Netherlands.After
this tragic event, the Dutch government intensified the administrative law enforce-
ment of the fire safety regulation, especially in the catering industry. From an econo-
mic and social perspective important questions can be raised on this response to the
‘Volendam disaster’.Are the costs and benefits of enforcement properly balanced?
What effects on compliance can be expected from administrative law enforcement? Is
private enforcement by liability claims of victims considered as an alternative?
The main question of this thesis is:What is an effective and efficient enforcement
policy for fire safety in the catering industry? In particular, this thesis discusses
whether the use of informal, cooperative enforcement through warnings, per-
suasion and advice (a so called compliance strategy) is effective in inducing com-
pliance with the fire safety regulation.The standard economic model of compliance
and enforcement stresses the importance of immediately punishing individuals and
firms for non-compliance (a deterrence strategy). In practice many administrative
law enforcement officials do not impose the strict sanctions economists promote.
Part I of this thesis analyzes the economic literature to discuss whether and when a
compliance strategy can be beneficial. It discusses which enforcement method (priva-
te, administrative or criminal) is effective and efficient to enforce safety standards.
Definite conclusions on the optimal enforcement policy can only be drawn by analy-
zing the actual data.Therefore, part II of this thesis analyzes which enforcement poli-
cy is effective and efficient for the case of fire safety in the catering industry in the
Netherlands. Enforcement officials have been interviewed to examine the use of a
compliance strategy.The benefits and costs of the enforcement efforts after the Volen-
dam disaster are estimated to see whether these efforts have been a desirable invest-
ment.Also, the compensation of the victims of the Volendam disaster is investigated
to analyze the incentive to take precautions. Finally, a simulation of different enforce-
ment policies in a representative municipality examines which policy is efficient.
This is a volume in the series of the E.M. Meijers Institute for Legal Research
of the Faculty of Law at Leiden University.This thesis is part of the research
program Security and Law.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Enforcement deficits
On New Year’s Eve 2001 a fire occurred in café “’t Hemeltje” in the municipal-
ity of Volendam , the Netherlands. As a result of the Christmas decorations 
catching fire, fourteen youngsters died and approximately 300 people were 
wounded. It appeared that the fire safety in the café was far below standard. 
The proprietor (Mr. Veerman ) was responsible for inadequate emergency 
exits, decorations that cause a fire hazard, too many people present and not 
being in possession of the prescribed license for the use of the establishment. 
Although the primary responsibility rested with the proprietor, the govern-
ment was also to blame for failing to grant and/or inspect the necessary licens-
es. The municipality of Edam-Volendam was consciously not granting the use 
licenses. They did not employ personnel for inspecting bars or restaurants on 
compliance with fire safety regulations. The national and provincial govern-
ment failed to supervise the municipality. Put differently, since several gov-
ernmental agencies had failed to supervise the licenses, the proprietor did not 
feel the responsibility to take the regulations seriously and an accident could 
therefore end in a disaster. This weak enforcement practice of municipalities 
was common at the time in most municipalities. The use licenses had been 
granted for less than 30% of all buildings (IOOV, 2002*). Moreover, inspec-
tion of the licenses was exceptional. Where violations were found, enforce-
ment hardly ever took place. These observations caused a major increase in 
municipal effort concerning fire safety enforcement. Municipalities began to 
eliminate the backlogs in use licenses and to carry out regular inspections in 
the licensed buildings. Due to the Volendam disaster, bars and restaurants 
were labeled as having the highest priority.
Other countries have similar experiences. For example, on 30 October 
1998, 63 youngsters died in a great fire in a discothèque in Goteborg (Swe-
den). In December 1994, 15 people died and 164 were wounded at a New 
Year’s Eve party in the Switel-hotel in Antwerp (Belgium), because a candle 
set fire to a Christmas tree. In Buenos Aires (Argentina), a fire in a discothèque 
caused the death of 193 persons in December 2004. In February 2003, a fire in a 
nightclub in Warwick, Rhode Island in the United States killed 100 people. In 
these accidents, similar problems to those identified above arose with respect 
to the fire safety of the building and the enforcement of the fire safety by the 
municipality. A report by the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA, 2000, p.1) men-
tions that, in response to the Rhode Island nightclub fire, “many local jurisdic-
tions across the country reviewed their fire safety codes or increased inspec-
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tions of local nightclubs to enforce existing codes. These typically included 
sufficient egress, illuminated exits signs, occupancy limits, and requirements 
for sprinkler systems for clubs based on size and occupancy. (…) Several local 
news stories reported cases of clear disregard for safety on the part of some 
nightclub owners. Examples often include exit doors that were blocked by 
equipment or storage, locked exit doors (often to keep patrons from sneak-
ing in to avoid cover charges or entrance lines), exit hallways used as stor-
age, missing or unlit exit signs, or owners who routinely allowed the club to 
exceed occupancy limits.” These observations are much in line with those for 
the Netherlands following the Volendam disaster.
Before the Volendam disaster, there was already academic and govern-
mental concern about inappropriate enforcement – accumulated in the report 
of the Michiels Committee (1998*). This committee pointed out that there are 
serious enforcement deficits  in many domains, including fire safety. With the 
help and pressure of the national government, municipalities began to pro-
fessionalize administrative enforcement. A program such as “High Quality 
Enforcement ” was launched, expert centers were formed, policy instruments 
developed and national Inspectorates professionalized.
The need for a professionalization of enforcement also arose because 
of the large increase in regulation. New problems such as the environment, 
occupational health and customer safety, have led to much new regulation 
for firms and require corresponding enforcement efforts. As a result, there 
has been a major increase in enforcement efforts. It is estimated that the costs 
of administrative enforcement by national regulatory agencies in the Nether-
lands has risen from €280 million in 1989 to €800 million in 2005.1 At the same 
time, there is a constant pressure to reduce the burden of regulation for firms 
by withdrawing contradictory or unnecessarily burdening regulations.
The question is which ideas and theories underlie these initiatives. Is 
there any attention for properly balancing the costs and benefits of enforce-
ment? The double trend to both intensify and reduce regulatory enforcement 
requires an economic perspective that analyzes the effectiveness and desir-
ability of enforcement.  Are the recent enforcement efforts able to improve 
compliance with the regulations, and thereby to reduce harm to citizens? 
Does the magnitude of this effect justify its costs? Is it possible to improve 
enforcement policies and instruments by reducing their costs or increasing 
their effects? For instance, should we emphasize inspections or sanctions? 
Which sanctions or which magnitude of sanctions should we impose? Should 
we rely on enforcement after harm has been done or on enforcement of activi-
ties prior to harm? Should we apply a strategy of strict punishment or a strat-
egy of cooperation and negotiations?
I will consider these questions by analyzing the case of the enforcement of 
fire safety in bars and restaurants in the Netherlands.
1 Leeuw and Willemsen (2006*).
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1.2 Main question
The main question of this thesis is: What is an effective and efficient enforce-
ment policy for fire safety in the catering industry?
I generally take the law and the regulation as given, and concern myself 
with their enforcement. The enforcement of fire safety can basically be orga-
nized in three ways (or a combination of these). With private enforcement, 
enforcement is left to the victims of the harm. Liability rules enable customers 
to require compensation after damage has occurred. Under administrative 
enforcement, regulation is enforced by municipalities through the granting of 
licenses, inspections, the imposition of administrative sanctions, etc.2 These 
administrative actions are based on the expected harm. Municipalities check 
whether proprietors satisfy the requirements before actual harm takes place. 
Finally, public prosecutors can prosecute an offense, so that a criminal law 
sanction can be imposed on proprietors who fail to meet the requirements.
The question for each of the enforcement methods is whether and when 
it is effective in inducing compliance with the fire safety standards. Further-
more, I investigate whether enforcement results in a higher level of social 
welfare: what is an efficient enforcement policy? Most attention will be given 
to administrative enforcement. What are the benefits of a policy of advice, 
persuasion and warnings? How should the recent attention for administra-
tive enforcement be evaluated? However, it is important to study not only 
administrative or public law enforcement, but also private enforcement. First, 
for enforcing fire safety, all three enforcement methods are observed in prac-
tice. All three are a potentially interesting alternative. Whether an enforce-
ment policy is efficient, can only be decided by considering the relevant 
alternatives. Secondly, the enforcement of safety regulation is often, as in case 
of fire safety, combined with private enforcement. Therefore, their joint use 
has to be examined. This requires that the effects of private enforcement are 
understood.
In answering the main question I will apply the theoretical strengths of 
the law and economics literature to a real enforcement problem. This enables 
me to show that the law and economics perspective is useful in analyzing 
actual enforcement policies. But it also enables me to contribute to the devel-
opment of law and economics by confronting it with seemingly paradoxical 
enforcement policies and with criticism expressed in other social sciences.
2 I define administrative enforcement broadly as every action by a governmental agency 
that is directed towards compliance of the rules it has laid down. As such the enforcement 
process covers granting permits, public campaigns, inspections, agreements, sanctions, 
etc. This definition corresponds to definitions by Hoitink and Michiels (1993*, p.3) and 
Blomberg and Michiels (1997*, p.29). It contrasts with definitions of enforcement in which 
enforcement is understood to only cover actions following a detected violation. Here, the 
detection of violations is also seen as part of the enforcement process.
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1.2.1 The state of the art in the literature
The economics of law has outgrown its childhood. There is now a large branch 
of literature on the economics of contracts, torts, property rights, crime etc.3 
This thesis is concerned with the economics of law enforcement, both pri-
vate and public. The enforcement of crime began with the analysis of Becker 
(1968). Calabresi (1970) initiated the analysis of liability rules. Both inspired 
many scholars to further extend the analysis, so that by now many aspects of 
these legal problems have been analyzed.
In short, the analysis inspired by Becker (1968) goes as follows. Because 
obedience of law is not taken for granted, public and/or private resources 
are required to prevent offenses and apprehend offenders. Moreover, pun-
ishment, sometimes severe punishment of convicted offenders is needed 
because conviction itself is generally considered an insufficient solution. This 
raises the important (normative) question of how many resources are optimal 
to spend on enforcing legislation. An activity is inefficient if it causes more 
harm to the victims and society than benefits to the criminal. If enforcement is 
costless and harm is always larger than the gain, eliminating crime is socially 
desirable. Generally, enforcement is costly so that the costs of enforcement 
should be balanced with the benefits of deterrence.
If the individual is risk-neutral, an expected fine equal to the personal 
gain will deter him from committing the crime. If apprehension is costly and 
imposing a sanction is not, enforcement costs are minimized by a probabil-
ity of apprehension arbitrarily close to zero and a maximal fine sufficient to 
deter. Fines are far less costly than imprisonment because they merely involve 
a wealth transfer (income redistribution from the fined individual to the tax 
payers or other beneficiaries), while under imprisonment, socially impor-
tant time is lost and resources are spent on prisons and guards. Therefore, 
imposing fines is preferred above imprisonment. Under a system of fines, 
it is optimal to impose the highest possible fine (constrained by for example 
the wealth of an individual) and realize a probability of apprehension that 
suffices to induce compliance. If the costs of imposing a sanction are non-
negligible, it should be considered whether these costs, if realized, justify the 
deterrence that is gained by imposing this sanction.
This analysis has also been applied to the enforcement of administrative 
regulation, such as regulation of markets, the environment, occupational 
health, customer safety, etc. There exists a huge body of theoretical research 
into these areas as well as a lot of empirical studies. However, the analysis of 
3 For an extensive summary, see Shavell (2004). See also the New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law (Newman, 1998) and the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
(Bouckaert and De Geest, 2000). The economic literature on law enforcement is summa-
rized in Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2004*).
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administrative law enforcement4 as a distinct method of enforcement has so 
far been rather limited.5 The existing literature usually studies criminal law 
enforcement of the regulation, or at least the imposition of fines. It mainly 
considers cases of the United States or other Anglo-Saxon countries. And it 
concerns national regulatory agencies. But many regulations are enforced 
by lower level governments like municipalities who are not empowered to 
impose fines. The (empirical) literature usually concerns the most serious 
violations that firms commit. Of course, this is of interest, but it neglects 
important elements of the enforcement problem. Less serious offenses are the 
bulk of violations and may, in fact, impose non-negligible threats to citizens. 
In addition, before regulatory agencies impose sanctions, (especially in the 
field of social regulation) there is often a time consuming process in which 
the regulatory agency tries to make violations undone. Only a small and non-
representative part of the violations ends up in sanctions.
The neglect of administrative enforcement in the economic literature 
is unfortunate in view of the fact that the practice of administrative law 
enforcement remains quite puzzling. The standard economic model of law 
enforcement stresses the importance of punishing individuals and firms in 
order to deter them from committing a violation. However, in many (Euro-
pean) countries the sanctions that administrative bodies like municipalities 
are empowered to impose, do not include fines or imprisonment, but penal 
sums, administrative coercion and withdrawal of licenses, which grant firms 
time to restore compliance. Usually sanctions are preceded by (informal) 
warnings. From an economic perspective these practices seem to harm the 
deterrent effect of enforcement. However, the non-economic literature in par-
ticular argues that such an enforcement style, also called a compliance strategy , 
is much more effective than the deterrence strategy promoted by economists. 
Under a compliance strategy the enforcement official does not act as a ‘police-
man’ but as an ‘advisor’. Enforcement is carried out not by sanctioning, but 
by persuading the individual or firm to comply and by bargaining about the 
level of precautions. Compliance is the result of cooperative behavior on both 
sides. Formal sanctions are reserved for persistent violators. A compliance 
strategy does not assume that firms or individuals make conscious decisions, 
but instead recognizes that non-compliance is often the result of mistake or 
misinformation. People are willing to comply, but possibly incompetent to do 
so or of the opinion that compliance is unreasonable.
4 By administrative enforcement I mean enforcement by governmental (administrative) 
bodies like municipalities, Ministers, regulatory agencies, etc. In the Netherlands, admin-
istrative enforcement is a separate method of law enforcement, empowered in a special 
law (the Algemene Bestuurswet). The term should not be confused with administrative law 
and economics, which deals with the position of the government (the administration) rela-
tive to that of courts, with the optimal level of discretion etc.
5 Michiels (2006*, p.50) points to the fact that there are only 8 pages of bibliographical infor-
mation on administrative law in the 4196 pages of the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
(Bouckaert and De Geest, 2000). Similar conclusions hold for other encyclopedic works.
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The challenge is to examine whether these policies are really puzzling. Can 
the economic model explain the observed enforcement policies in the field of 
regulatory compliance of firms? Why do enforcement officials choose a coop-
erative enforcement style, and are they right in doing so? What are the effects 
of administrative law enforcement on compliance? 
1.2.2 The contribution of the theoretical part
In part I of this thesis I analyze the economic literature on enforcement of safe-
ty standards, especially public enforcement of public regulation. It describes 
the conditions from the literature under which private, administrative and 
criminal law enforcement are effective and efficient for fire safety in the cater-
ing industry. This provides a framework for the empirical analysis in part II.
In particular, I examine the desirability of the compliance strategy 
described above. There are few systematic economic analyses of the debate on 
enforcement strategies. However, various articles and contributions contain 
arguments that can be related to this discussion. Therefore, in the first place, 
this literature review integrates the literature on public enforcement by con-
sidering the question whether and when a compliance strategy can be favor-
able. What are the benefits of an enforcement policy of advice, persuasion and 
warnings? By doing so, I provide an extensive review concerning the enforce-
ment of regulatory crime from an economic perspective. To my knowledge, 
such a review is not available.6 As said, the literature is rather fragmented in 
articles in different journals. Most theories concern common crime by indi-
viduals or crimes such as fraud, tax evasion and antitrust. Instead, I focus on 
non-compliance with safety standards by firms. The  theoretical part results 
in a general description of the optimal enforcement method that can be used 
for analyzing any specific sector in this area.
It is important to analyze the enforcement strategy from an econom-
ic perspective for two reasons. First of all, in practice, many enforcement 
agencies seem to apply a compliance strategy. Therefore, it is important to 
know whether and when this can be beneficial. It is important to understand 
what explains the discrepancy between the economic model and the actual 
enforcement policies: the unrealistic nature of the economic model or the 
inefficiency of enforcement authorities? Secondly, studying the enforcement 
strategies may narrow the gap between economics and other social sciences 
on the recommended enforcement policies. Adding the economic analysis 
may improve our understanding of the enforcement strategies. I do not claim 
to provide a definitive and full answer on the optimal enforcement strategy. 
However, I want to address some important elements of the discussion from 
an economic perspective.
6 Heyes (2000) offers the most important, yet limited, overview. 
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1.2.3 The contribution of the empirical part
In part II (empirical analysis) I address the question of this thesis by consid-
ering the actual data on the enforcement of fire safety in the catering indus-
try in the Netherlands. This is necessary because the optimal enforcement 
policy depends on the relevant cost functions. What is the optimal enforce-
ment budget in the concrete? Part I shows that there are arguments in favor of 
both a deterrence and a compliance strategy. Which strategy, or: which mix of 
strategies, should be applied can only be answered by considering an actual 
case. Similarly, the literature presents several conditions for an effective use 
of private enforcement by liability rules or of criminal enforcement by fines 
and imprisonment. Whether these conditions are satisfied can only be deter-
mined by considering the facts and the actual costs and consequences. In part 
II I analyze whether the optimal enforcement policy derived in part I is prop-
erly applied in the enforcement policy of fire safety in the catering industry.
Such an empirical analysis is relevant because it improves our under-
standing of actual enforcement policies and its effects.7 Theories are only use-
ful if they enable us to explain or investigate the real world. Examining the 
enforcement of fire safety in the catering industry opens up part of this real 
world. This is the more important since by now the theoretical economic anal-
ysis of law is rather well developed. Today, the challenge is to demonstrate 
that this theory is useful in practice, in studying actual social problems. 
The field of fire safety in the catering industry is a useful case to study. 
First, it is an important social problem that received much attention of both 
citizens and the government due to the Volendam disaster. Secondly, the 
catering industry is a properly defined group of firms, which is large enough 
to be a relevant study group and to allow for data collection. Thirdly, fire 
safety is a problem that can be mitigated by different enforcement methods 
and thus allows comparing these methods. It is also a field in which, on first 
view, compliance strategies seem to be applied and justified. Moreover, fire 
safety is a field that is not often studied in the literature.
1.2.4 The economic perspective
In my analysis I adopt the perspective of an economist. The literature on 
enforcement and compliance is much broader. Regulatory compliance by 
firms has also been examined in several other disciplines, such as criminol-
ogy, (organizational) psychology and sociology, and the science of law and 
7 The knowledge of actual effects is limited as Leeuw and Willemsen (2006*) and the 
National Court of Audit (2005*) conclude for the Netherlands, and Macrory (2006b) for the 
United Kingdom.
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public administration (also known as socio-legal studies).8 I do not discuss 
these branches of literature.
At this point in time, it is in my view more important to demonstrate the 
relevance of the economic perspective on compliance and enforcement than 
to try to integrate the different disciplines. Often, critics have made few efforts 
to offer a clear picture of the economic model of enforcement, but instead 
immediately begin to criticize, for instance because of the rational choice 
approach. A usual argument is that a deterrence strategy applies to rational 
offenders and a compliance strategy to non-rational offenders. I regard it as 
my task to show that the economic theories involved are much broader and 
more nuanced than the standard models usually referred to. Moreover, they 
are able to explain the use of both administrative law enforcement and of 
compliance strategies.
In addition, I hope to demonstrate that adding the economic perspec-
tive to both the academic and the policy debate on enforcement makes for 
an interesting analysis. It requires attention for the constant balancing of the 
benefits and costs of enforcement. In addition – as opposed to most other dis-
ciplines – it systematically focuses on the enforcement policy. It does not stop 
at examining which factors play a role in deciding to comply, but questions 
how these affect the (optimal) enforcement policy.
That this thesis is written for non-economists too, implies that the analy-
sis assumes that the reader is not an expert in the economic analysis of law 
enforcement. If necessary I summarize arguments that may be well-known 
for this expert, but may help the uninformed reader to catch on. To be sure, 
as discussed above, the analysis of administrative law enforcement and of an 
enforcement style that is different from systematically punishing offenders, 
is also of interest for economists themselves. Moreover, this thesis examines 
the practical relevance of the economic models. What are the actual effects 
of enforcement actions? Studying a concrete, actual enforcement problem 
enables me to show that economic analysis is not only of academic interest, 
but also an important guide for dealing with real enforcement problems. 
Ultimately, the objective is not to provide theories, but to explain and solve 
problems in the real world. This is, or should be, the common interest of both 
economists and non-economists.
8 See Huisman and Beukelman (2007*) for an overview. An example of an interdisciplinary 
approach to compliance and enforcement is Elffers et al. (2006).
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1.3 Methodology
The main question of this thesis is: what is an effective and efficient method of 
enforcing fire safety in the catering industry?
1.3.1 The analysis of the economic literature
Part I of this thesis provides an overview of the economic literature on law 
enforcement as it applies to the enforcement of social regulation of firms. The 
leading question in this part of the thesis is whether the economic theory pro-
vides an optimal economic policy for the enforcement of fire safety regula-
tion in the catering industry. I discuss the conditions for efficient enforcement 
through private, administrative or criminal law enforcement. I only outline 
the analysis of safety standards through private law enforcement, because 
this analysis is well-known, at least for law and economics scholars.9 In detail 
the optimal public enforcement policy is examined, especially in relation-
ship to the optimal enforcement strategy. The literature discussed is selected 
by considering whether it provides an argument for the imposition of small 
sanctions, or even for the use of advice, persuasion and warnings or other 
enforcement tools. This selection covers many different themes. I do not, and 
do not intend to, analyze all the literature on themes such as intrinsic motiva-
tion, legal procedures or discretion. The literature is selected and discussed in 
relationship to the question how it affects the optimal enforcement policy, in 
particular the enforcement strategy.
This literature review only concerns the theoretical literature. To limit the 
scope of this thesis, I pay only limited attention to the empirical literature 
concerned with testing the theories. Furthermore, I focus on the literature 
on the optimal enforcement policy and do not broadly examine the social 
and economic factors that explain non-compliant behavior by firms.10 More-
over, as mentioned above, I only review the economic literature, although I 
do attempt to relate it to the general debate on deterrence and compliance 
strategies.
Since the focus of this thesis lies on the analysis of optimal enforcement 
of fire precautions in the catering industry, I will focus on the enforcement of 
safety standards for firms, i.e. so-called regulatory crime . Regulatory or busi-
ness crime differs from organized crime.11 Organized crime is crime commit-
ted by illegal organizations with a criminal motive, and aimed at supplying 
illegal goods or services (such as drugs, prostitution, gambling, or human 
9 Shavell (1987) is the most well-known textbook. See also Shavell (2004).
10 For the explanation of criminal behavior, interested readers are referred to the reviews in 
Eide (2000) or Ehrlich (1996). See further Heineke (1978), Eide (1994) and Van Velthoven 
(1994*). For firms overviews can be found in Lott (2000) and Huisman and Beukelman 
(2007*).
11 A readable introduction to economic crime is found in Sjögren and Skogh (2004).
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trafficking). Business crime is crime by corporations in order to gain extra 
profit within an otherwise legal business (such as environmental or occupa-
tional violations). Society does not want to restrain the activity or the level of 
activity. Contributions on business crime tend to focus on (tax) fraud, anti-
trust and environmental non-compliance. In common crimes by individu-
als, as well as in fraud, tax evasion or antitrust violations, the standard often 
concerns a forbidden activity. In fire safety regulation the standards concern 
a level of precautions that must be satisfied. If the firm chooses a level of 
precautions lower than the standard, it can be punished. There are costs of 
compliance instead of benefits of violation. The literature I discuss mainly 
originates from the analysis of the enforcement of environmental, safety and 
health regulation for firms.12
1.3.2 Methodology of the empirical part
Part II of this thesis focuses on analyzing the enforcement policy for fire 
safety regulation in the catering industry in the Netherlands with the actual 
data. I evaluate the currently observed enforcement policies, in particular the 
administrative enforcement efforts following the Volendam disaster, and try 
to determine which enforcement policy is efficient. Several methods are used 
to carry out this evaluation. The problem with analyzing actual enforcement 
policies is to find or collect the right data on compliance and compliance ben-
efits. I try to do so in a number of ways.
First, I conduct interviews with enforcement officials in thirteen munici-
palities to acquire insight into actual enforcement policies. These interviews 
provide mainly qualitative data. These data, together with the available infor-
mation in policy documents, in (management) reports, on websites and the 
like, are used to examine whether the theoretical predictions on the optimal 
enforcement strategy are applied. This analysis yields insight into the ques-
tion whether the administrative enforcement policy that is currently applied 
in almost all municipalities, is the most effective enforcement policy.
Secondly, I combine bits and pieces of available evidence into a cost-bene-
fit analysis of the enforcement policies following the Volendam disaster. This 
information is obtained from national government agencies and the branch 
organization of the catering industry. A cost-benefit analysis tries to list all 
effects of a policy intervention. Monetizing these effects allows them to be 
compared and to evaluate whether the intervention leads to a positive or 
negative contribution to social welfare. I use a cost-benefit analysis to answer 
the question whether the increase in administrative enforcement efforts due 
to the Volendam disaster has been a socially desirable investment. This yields 
12 So called social regulation. Different types of regulation are categorized in Faure (2000), 
den Hertog (2000) and Ogus (2001).
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insight into the question whether administrative law enforcement is an effi-
cient enforcement method for fire safety in the catering industry.
Thirdly, I analyze the available information about the settlement of claims 
for compensation of victims following the Volendam disaster. This case study 
is of particular interest since it received relatively much attention and is there-
fore likely to have a relatively large influence on proprietors’ future expectations. 
Moreover, there are simply not enough compensation claims and not enough 
knowledge concerning compensation claims to carry out a more general analysis. 
Information about the case of the Volendam disaster can be found in reports and 
messages of victim interest groups, the municipality and other relevant organiza-
tions, in parliamentary documents and in newspapers. With these sources it is 
possible to reconstruct the payments that the different parties have made to the 
victims. The main question in this context is: who is actually paying for the harm 
caused? I analyze these payments by considering whether they provide a suffi-
cient incentive to take precautions. This yields insight into the question whether 
private enforcement through liability rules is effective.
Finally, I carry out a simulation of different enforcement policies for a 
representative, hypothetical municipality. The construction of this munici-
pality is based on all available data. Assuming that the proprietor of a bar or 
restaurant is a risk-neutral wealth maximizer I analyze the effects of different 
enforcement policies. Not only are the currently observed policies examined. 
This simulation allows me to analyze alternative enforcement policies and 
to examine which policy might lead to the highest level of social welfare. Of 
course, the disadvantage of such an analysis is that it abstracts from reality. 
However, without it, it becomes impossible to further analyze the effects and 
the social welfare consequences of enforcement on compliance.
The available data and the methods applied with these data do not pro-
vide unambiguous answers to the question of the efficient enforcement pol-
icy. There are no ‘hard’, quantitative data on the effects of enforcement. This 
is not a good reason to refrain from an empirical analysis. Precisely because 
these data are absent, the methods used are necessary to improve our under-
standing of actual enforcement policies.
1.4 Definitions and concepts
It may be helpful for non-economic readers to describe the meaning of sev-
eral concepts that are used. I also introduce the outlines of the case study 
analyzed.
1.4.1 Enforcement as social welfare maximization
The main question of this thesis refers to the (economic) concepts of effec-
tiveness and efficiency. Enforcement is effective if it leads to a higher level 
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of compliance. Efficiency refers to the desirability of enforcement. From an 
economic point of view, the social objective is to maximize social welfare , 
which is an aggregate of the welfare of all individuals involved. I assume that 
all individuals (and firms) are equally important, and thus ignore the income 
distribution. Income distribution is not the objective of the regulation of fire 
accidents. Society may, in fact, be interested in the (income) position of actual 
victims. However, there are better measures to help these victims than regula-
tion and enforcement, such as the social security system, public health care, 
and/or a collective damage fund (Kaplow and Shavell, 2001; Shavell, 2004).13 
Moreover, people can insure themselves against potential losses.
So, the social objective is the maximization of total well-being of all indi-
viduals in society. Because in regulation and enforcement the interests of the 
injurers and victims are generally opposed, the different effects of enforce-
ment have to be compared. Put differently, because we are unable to find 
actual Pareto improvements, we have to look for potential Pareto improve-
ments (Hicks-Kaldor criterion). According to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, wel-
fare is improved if the gain in utility of the winning party exceeds the decline 
in utility of the losing party. Therefore we must be able to compare the utility 
of the different parties, for example by estimating utility in income or wealth. 
Utility can be measured in monetary expressions by determining the willing-
ness to pay for and/or to accept changes in starting positions.14
Enforcement is called efficient if social welfare is maximized. Spending an 
extra euro on enforcement is efficient, if it leads to an at least equal reduction 
in the monetary value of expected damage and compliance costs. Judging 
the efficiency of enforcement implies that the effectiveness of enforcement is 
known. After determining the extent to which enforcement increases compli-
ance, it is possible to determine the benefits of this increase in compliance 
and to compare it with its costs. In this respect, analyzing efficient enforce-
ment includes analyzing effective enforcement. For clarity both are explicitly 
included in the main question.
1.4.2 Rationality
 In economics, it is assumed that individuals and firms behave rationally, i.e. 
they make choices in ways that maximize their expected utility. They evalu-
ate the expected outcomes of the relevant alternatives and choose the most 
promising one, given the available information and the constraints of wealth, 
time and other relevant factors.
This notion of rational behavior can easily be misunderstood. Therefore, 
it seems useful to shortly describe what the meaning of the rational choice 
13 See also Van Velthoven and Suurmond (2003*) on a discussion of the social welfare (effi-
ciency) criterion and the possibilities to include the income distribution.
14 E.g. Shavell (1987).
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approach is.15 It means that behavior is purposeful, intended to fulfill the 
ends with the available means. An individual reaches a decision by system-
atically balancing the costs and benefits. Rationality only deals with the ‘pro-
cedure’ of making a decision (choosing the alternative that seems to fit the 
personal goals best), not with the ‘rationality’ of preferences itself. Accord-
ing to economic theory individuals pursue their own interest, but the nature 
of an individual’s interest is not restricted in any way. Genetic endowment 
may influence both preferences and constraints. Someone who pities hungry 
people in Africa behaves rationally by becoming a relief worker. Someone 
who is jealous of his neighbor and cannot stand the differences in income, 
may behave rationally by rejecting an offer in which he is granted €100 and 
his neighbor €200.
In the same way, since Becker (1968), criminal behavior is studied in terms 
of purposeful behavior, without imposing restrictions on the purposes. Since 
rationality means nothing more or less than choosing the alternative which 
serves the preferences of an individual best, complying with the rules on 
social or moral concerns (voluntary compliance) can be viewed as a rational 
choice. Hence, voluntary, spontaneous compliance is also possible. Similarly, 
non-compliance due to a preference for unlawful behavior or the influence of 
group behavior does not necessarily imply that an individual is irrational. It 
is only when an individual is not influenced by any risk of sanctions at all that 
we can say that this individual is irrational, since he does not take all costs 
and benefits into account.16
A better founded criticism on rational choice theory is that individuals 
do not (always) make conscious, well-considered, well informed decisions, 
and do not always choose what is in their own best interest. Information is 
not necessarily perfect, and hence ‘incorrect’ decisions may occur, because 
information and deliberation costs are too high. Individuals may have impor-
tant cognitive problems to update and process all available information. This 
is incorporated in the research founded by Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon 
on bounded rationality. Because maximization is sometimes too difficult, indi-
viduals choose an alternative that is ‘good enough’.17 They are sensitive to 
the way alternatives and information is presented (framing) and the process 
15 A clear exposition of rational choice is given in Schäfer and Ott (2004, chapter 4). Eide 
(1994) in particular provides a handsome discussion of the use of rational choice theory for 
crime. “The norm-guided rational choice model, comprising personal norms and wants, 
feasible sets of activities, environmental characteristics, and individual outcomes, pro-
vides a suitable framework for discussing various theories of crime, including character-
istics of individuals and circumstances. The framework allows for a simultaneous consid-
eration of many possible determinants of crime. The abstract model is a means of gaining 
insight into the elements of rational behavior, and it permits filling bits of information into 
a broader context” (p.45). Elffers (2005*) also discusses how rational choice theory can be 
used to analyze crime.
16 Although even this might be a rational choice if the gains of non-compliance are regarded 
as infinitely large for the individual concerned.
17 See Schäfer and Ott (2004, p.59 and further).
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of decision-making is based on simple rules (anchoring). Individuals have 
a status quo bias (reference effect). They have trouble estimating the correct 
outcome associated with an alternative. For instance, individuals tend to 
overestimate their own abilities and have difficulties assessing the correct 
opportunity costs. They also have difficulties estimating the correct probabil-
ity of events. Individuals have difficulties assessing the ordered sequence of 
events, so that they underestimate unlikely scenarios. More generally, they 
have problems estimating small probabilities; they tend to set them to zero. 
But if large losses are involved, the impact of the event is over-estimated. 
People also make use of hindsight (i.e. overestimate a probability if an event 
has (recently) happened), because it influences the availability heuristic. The 
consequences of bounded rationality for public enforcement will be shortly 
discussed in section 3.1.4.
1.4.3 The case of fire safety in the catering industry
The enforcement of fire safety regulation in the catering industry in the Neth-
erlands serves as my case study. It is therefore useful at this point to describe 
this case study’s most important characteristics.
Horeca establishments
The catering industry will be labeled ‘horeca’. Horeca usually stands for hotels, 
restaurants and cafés, as well as all similar establishments where food and 
drinks are supplied. The term is sometimes used in a wider sense, includ-
ing all tourist and/or recreational businesses. In this study, I use the term 
horeca to indicate a limited group of these businesses, namely those where 
food and/or drinks are served that are consumed on the premises: restau-
rants, cafés, bars, pubs, discothèques and party centers. Similar prescriptions 
apply to all these establishments. Not included are hotels, which have to ful-
fill stronger requirements (like sprinklers) because they offer the opportunity 
to spend the night, a time when people are more vulnerable to fire. Moreover, 
in contrast to cafés and restaurants, hotel guests are spread over many rooms. 
Snack bars and other small take-away restaurants are also excluded because 
they do not have to take precautions to help people escape in case of fire since 
there are only few people present.
All these horeca firms are characterized by a rather simple organization 
with few hierarchy levels. The manager is usually the person who receives 
the profits of exploiting the horeca establishment and who can directly moni-
tor the behavior of his (limited number of) personnel.18 As a consequence, 
principal agency problems are ignored. 
18 There are a few larger chains, notably fast-food restaurants, hotel-restaurants or road-
houses (e.g. McDonald’s), which are characterized by a professional and more complex 
organization.
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The use requirements
 Fire safety prescriptions are divided in requirements with respect to construc-
tion, installations, and use. I focus on the requirements concerning the use 
of an establishment. These requirements include that (1) escape-routes and 
emergency exits should be kept free; (2) furnishings and decorations should 
be correctly hung and impregnated; (3) escape-route signs should be clearly 
visible and burning; (4) fire extinguishers should be clearly indicated, ready 
to hand and annually certified; (5) candle lights, trash, ash-trays etc. should 
be used safely; (6) the maximum number of persons allowed should not be 
exceeded; (7) remaining use requirements, for example those concerning 
technical devices or evacuation plans, should be obeyed.
With respect to fire safety, two important developments were recently ini-
tiated by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment. First, 
a process of simplifying regulations was initiated. In this context, unneces-
sary regulations have been abolished and other regulations harmonized and 
nationalized. This includes the harmonization of all building and fire safety 
regulations into one national Use Decree (now planned for mid 2008). As a 
consequence, exploiters of a building no longer have to possess a use license. 
However, they still have to satisfy the requirements described above. Under 
the Use Decree, these requirements can be enforced directly. Moreover, a 
general duty of care will be introduced, so that the exploiter of a building is 
responsible for its sound use. Secondly, a single spatial permit will be intro-
duced in 2008, which will replace all licenses in the field of physical safety, 
such as the environmental license, building license, use license etc. Firms 
have to apply for a single license at a single governmental agency. The Fire 
Departments are expected to play an important role in granting the license 
and inspecting fire safety.
International comparison
The regulation and enforcement practice of the Netherlands is similar to 
that in most other (Northern) European countries.19 Most European coun-
tries have established national fire safety standards in a Building Code or 
specific Fire Code. Local government officials are generally responsible for 
enforcement. Local fire brigades or building officials have the opportunity 
to inspect buildings and are entitled (if necessary) to carry out enforcement 
measures, such as a notice to comply, closure of the business, and – if viola-
tions are severe – fines or the start of criminal proceedings.20 The major differ-
19 See Meijer and Visscher (2004*) and the reports on which their article is based. The authors 
have compared the system of building control in eight European countries, to name: Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, England (and Wales), France, Netherlands, Norway and Swe-
den. The comparison is based on the formal description of the systems, not on what the 
systems bring about in practice.
20 This information can be found on www.feucare.org (25-07-2006), a website that provides 
information on legislation of fire safety, including prevention, for most European coun-
tries.
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ence is that in the Netherlands exploiters of a property require a use license, 
whereas most other countries enforce this type of regulations directly. In the 
near future, this will also be the case in the Netherlands. As mentioned above, 
other countries have experienced disasters similar to the one in Volendam 
and have observed similar enforcement failures.
1.5 Plan of this thesis
This thesis consists of two parts. In part I, I will provide an overview of the 
economic literature on law enforcement as it applies to the enforcement of 
social regulation of firms. In part II, I analyze the enforcement policy of fire 
safety in horeca establishments empirically.
1.5.1 The structure of the theoretical part
The main question of this thesis concerns the effective and efficient enforce-
ment of fire safety in horeca establishments. Before considering enforcement 
actions, the question is why these actions are necessary at all. What actually 
is the problem that enforcement has to solve? Can’t we expect proprietors to 
comply with the regulations by themselves? Can’t we expect that the market 
will solve the problem of fire accidents? In chapter 2 I address these questions. 
I first describe the accident problem. I explain why I focus on the analysis of 
the incentive to take precautions and do not concern myself with compen-
sation. I provide arguments why we can not expect that proprietors choose 
compliance voluntarily or that they are forced to comply by their customers. 
Therefore we have to rely on regulation of the market, and as a consequence, 
we have to consider the optimal enforcement policy for this regulation. A 
first alternative is private enforcement through liability. Section 2.3 provides 
a summary of the conditions for effective and efficient private enforcement 
through liability rules. As such, chapter 2 does not provide new analyses but 
relies on the standard literature available in textbooks and tries to relate this 
to the case-study of fire safety in horeca establishments. This is useful for the 
empirical analysis of private enforcement in part II.
The remainder of the theoretical part is devoted to public law enforce-
ment (both criminal and administrative). I study the question which public 
enforcement policy provides an adequate incentive to take precautions. In 
particular, I consider the difference between a compliance and a deterrence 
strategy. My goal is to show that the economic literature has more to offer than 
simply recommending sufficiently severe sanctions, aimed at deterrence, and 
that it is able to provide the conditions under which a compliance or deter-
rence strategy would be the optimal enforcement policy. In order to be able 
to participate in this debate, I first survey the literature, which enables me to 
reflect on the discussion about the enforcement strategy later on.
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The analysis starts from the standard economic model of law enforcement, as 
founded by Nobel Laureate Becker (1968) and further extended by a number 
of scholars. This model implies: (1) a higher expected sanction decreases the 
level of non-compliance, (2) costly non-monetary sanctions should only be 
used when costless monetary sanctions have already been used to the max-
imum, (3) decreasing the probability of detection and increasing the mag-
nitude of the sanction might ensure deterrence but save enforcement costs, 
hence it is socially desirable. However, important questions remain, in partic-
ular with regard to the empirical challenge resulting from the fact that these 
results are not commonly observed in practice. The analysis evaluates the 
extent to which the trade-off between detection and sanctions is indeed the 
optimal enforcement policy. Is it efficient to let enforcement authorities pun-
ish all violations with relatively severe, extreme sanctions? Or are compliance 
strategies more effective than deterrence strategies? What is the level of com-
pliance that the enforcement authority is trying to achieve? To answer these 
questions I undertake the following steps.
First of all, it is necessary to study the enforcement problem in more 
detail. In chapter 3 I consider how the efficient enforcement policy depends 
on the information available to the enforcement authorities, on the apprehen-
sion technology and on the nature of the sanction. This is a review of the most 
conventional economic literature on enforcement following Becker (1968). I 
show that the trade-off between the probability of detection and the magni-
tude of the sanction is only possible if the level of detection is determined for 
every single offense separately. Otherwise, the possibilities of lowering the 
probability of detection are limited and extreme sanctions must be reserved 
for the most severe offenses; while minor offenses should be punished mildly, 
or even not enforced at all.
Thereafter, in chapter 4, I extend the analysis to offenses that can be com-
mitted more than once. Will compliance be continued? Two important con-
clusions follow. First of all, it may sometimes be optimal to punish repeat 
offenders more severely. In that case, the possibilities of trading-off sanc-
tion and detection are limited for earlier offenses. Secondly, the objective 
of enforcement may include remediation, which might require sufficiently 
high probabilities of detection. Remediation might require other enforcement 
actions than fines or imprisonment. Moreover, I consider how enforcement is 
affected when offenses occur both accidentally and deliberately. Generally, it 
is optimal for firms to report their (accidental) violations themselves, which 
requires non-extreme penalties.
At this stage in the discussion, it has become clear that it is often impos-
sible to induce full compliance with the standards. Generally, there will be a 
certain degree of underdeterrence. Chapter 5 shows that if underdeterrence 
is rather severe, it might be optimal to focus or target enforcement instead of 
uniformly enforcing a standard. The best targeting strategy – one that maxi-
mizes the partial compliance rate – is one in which enforcement depends on 
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past compliance (for example through a warning), extending the previous 
chapter’s discussion on repeated offenses.
Chapter 6 focuses on the influence of the standards on enforcement. This 
influence can be twofold. First, some uncertainty about the application of the 
rules to a specific offense may be unavoidable. This in turn might require 
that the enforcement authority follows an enforcement process in which 
this application is made clear and/or bargains with the firm about compli-
ance, which might thwart an enforcement policy such as proposed by Becker 
(1968). Secondly, in cases of uncertainty about the norm and its application, 
firms may challenge an enforcement authority’s decisions, thereby hamper-
ing the effectiveness of enforcement. Because higher sanctions provide higher 
incentives to contest enforcement, it may be optimal to impose non-extreme 
sanctions. Flexible compliance and enforcement might be required.
Finally, it is important to consider that firms are not only motivated by 
pecuniary costs and benefits, but also by non-pecuniary ones. In chapter 7, I 
no longer assume that a firm’s decisions only follow from the (direct) cost of 
compliance and the costs of enforcement actions, but also from its social envi-
ronment and/or its moral intentions to comply. Compliance might evolve 
voluntarily or spontaneously. This may yield complicated interactions with 
public enforcement.
Once these points have been examined, it is possible to return to the 
debate about the deterrent effect of enforcement in chapter 8. In particular, I 
discuss why enforcement agencies should adopt a deterrence or a compliance 
strategy of enforcement.
Chapter 9 focuses on the structure of incentives for enforcement officials. 
This is important for two reasons. First, the fact that enforcement officials 
are not necessarily maximizing social welfare, limits the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the enforcement policies described before and may affect the 
optimal enforcement policy. Secondly, in particular, incentives are of interest 
for the discussion on the optimal enforcement strategy because they explain 
why enforcement officials might choose an inefficient enforcement strategy. 
On the other hand, incentives can be structured. The analysis explains that 
creating incentives for one-sided enforcement objectives and strategies (for 
instance strict punishment of all violations) can be more welfare-enhancing 
than the discretion to act in society’s best interest.
Chapter 10 concludes the theoretical part by summarizing the conditions 
for the optimal enforcement policy. In discussing the optimal enforcement 
policy for a specific problem, it should be verified whether these conditions 
are satisfied. There are several important elements of the enforcement policy. 
First, I describe the conditions for the optimal timing of enforcement (ex ante 
or ex post). Secondly, I describe whether public law enforcement should be 
through criminal or through administrative law. Thirdly, I describe the fac-
tors that determine the choice between private and public enforcement. I 
also investigate the joint use of private and public enforcement. I provide the 
conditions for the use of a deterrence or compliance strategy, related to the 
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objective of the enforcement actions. I conclude by summarizing the condi-
tions for an effective and efficient use of private, administrative and criminal 
enforcement and discussing their relevance for the case of fire safety in horeca 
establishments.
1.5.2 The structure of the empirical analysis
Further conclusions can only be drawn once the analysis is filled in with spe-
cific, empirical data. In the second part, I apply the analysis to the enforce-
ment policy for fire safety regulation in horeca establishments in the Neth-
erlands. I evaluate the currently observed enforcement policies, in particular 
the administrative enforcement efforts following the Volendam disaster, and 
try to determine which enforcement policy is effective and efficient.
I begin by analyzing the policy and enforcement actions that have been 
adopted following the Volendam disaster. First, in chapter 11, I provide a 
more detailed description of the case-study of the enforcement of fire safety 
in horeca establishments. I will discuss the context and the recent pressure to 
professionalize enforcement.
Secondly, in chapter 12, I describe the current administrative law enforce-
ment policies in 13 municipalities. I describe the interviews I carried out to 
obtain information on these policies. I interpret these policies in light of the 
economic literature described in part I. Are these policies effective? Particular 
attention is given to the evaluation of the use of a compliance strategy.
The third step, in chapter 13, is to question whether the enforcement actions 
are efficient. I conduct a cost-benefit analysis to answer the question whether the 
increase in administrative enforcement efforts due to the Volendam disaster has 
been a socially desirable investment. Chapters 12 and 13 thus analyze the ques-
tion whether the currently used administrative enforcement policy for enforcing 
fire safety in the catering industry is effective and efficient.
A further step, in chapter 14, is to consider whether private actions by 
victims, such as those of the Volendam disaster, may, through filing and set-
tling damage claims, be expected to be (more) effective. Therefore, I study the 
settlement of the compensation to victims of the Volendam disaster.
The analysis of the actual enforcement actions following the Volendam 
disaster reveals that important conclusions can be drawn but that many ques-
tions remain unanswered. This is due especially to a lack of information on 
the relationship between enforcement and expected fire damage. Therefore, 
in chapter 15, I take a different approach. I carry out a simulation of different 
enforcement policies for a hypothetical but representative Dutch municipal-
ity. I no longer examine only currently observed policies, but examine which 
enforcement policy is most welfare-enhancing. 
Finally, chapter 16 concludes. After summarizing the most important 
findings, I try to answer the main question. Which policy is recommended for 
the enforcement of fire safety in horeca establishments?

Part I
Theory
In part I of this thesis I discuss the economic literature on the optimal 
solution to the enforcement problem of fire safety regulations in horeca 
establishments. I therefore first (chapter 2) generalize the problem of fire 
safety to a general accident problem to fit the model from the literature. 
I provide the socially optimal solution to the accident problem and 
discuss why this solution requires enforcement. Finally, in chapter 2, 
I examine the conditions under which private enforcement by victims 
(through the liability system) is efficient. Next I examine public law 
enforcement (chapters 3 to 9) according to the steps described in the 
Introduction (section 1.5.1). Most attention is given to act-based 
enforcement, particularly through administrative law enforcement. 
Attention is especially drawn to the question how a system of advice, 
persuasion and warnings (so-called compliance strategies) may be 
beneficial from an economic perspective. Chapter 10 concludes part I 
by discussing the optimal structure of law enforcement.

2 The social problem and the optimal 
solution: Why enforcement is needed
This chapter discusses why enforcement of fire safety precautions is neces-
sary. In section 2.1 I first describe the general accident problem examined in 
part I of this thesis. This leads to an analysis of the social problem and the opti-
mal solution of the accident problem. In section 2.2, I discuss why this socially 
optimal solution cannot be obtained without enforcement of the rules. This 
conclusion builds a bridge to the study of enforcement methods. In section 
2.3 I examine whether private enforcement through liability rules solves the 
accident problem. The next chapters are concerned with public enforcement 
policies.
2.1 The accident problem
The social objective is the maximization of total well-being in society, where 
social well-being depends only on the well-being of individuals.21 The opti-
mal solution to the problem of fire safety in horeca establishments can thus be 
found by studying the consequences of more or less safety for the well-being 
of horeca proprietors and visitors. The fire safety problem can be formulated 
to a general version of the accident problem that is studied in the literature: a 
firm, also called the injurer, can take precautions to reduce expected harm to 
some unknown potential victims. These precautions prevent accidents from 
occurring and/or limit the harm when it does. Of course, taking these precau-
tions and complying with the regulations is costly for the firm.22
2.1.1 The utility of victims and injurers
The expected harm to victims
When victims are more or less severely injured or even killed in an accident, 
the consequences for them are threefold. First, a victim being injured or killed 
leads to monetary costs from medical expenses, costs of decease, and lost 
earnings from labor participation. These costs are born either by the victim 
himself and/or his relatives, or by his insurance company.
Secondly, an injury or fatality leads to pain and suffering, to forgone joy 
of life, by both the victim and his relatives. This non-monetary damage is 
21 Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
22 A formal presentation can be found in for instance Shavell (1987).
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characterized by its irreplaceability as this pain and suffering can never be 
recovered by receiving similar ‘goods’ or money, although money can some-
what soften the pain (see Cook and Graham, 1977; Arlen 2000).
Besides these direct damages, an injury or fatality may also influence the 
value of money, or: the marginal utility of income, for the victim or his rela-
tives (Friedman, 1982, 2000; Viscusi, 1997). Particularly in the case of perma-
nent injuries, the value of money may decrease after an accident, because due 
to the injuries the victim can derive less utility from his income. Someone 
who is paralyzed or in a coma, cannot enjoy holidays or visiting a restaurant. 
In the most extreme case, money has no value for a dead person (apart from 
the value of bequests).23
Besides the expected monetary and non-monetary losses, the utility of a 
victim depends on his initial level of wealth. A potential victim is generally 
risk-averse so that his utility is increasing in his level of wealth, but at a decreas-
ing rate. In addition, (potential) victims bear the costs of enforcement, either as 
actual victims for private enforcement or as tax-payers for public enforcement. 
On the other hand, they may receive part of the monetary value of the sanction 
that is imposed on the injurer, in the form of a fine or damage compensation. 
What firms care about
The firm must decide on the level of precautions intended to limit the expect-
ed harm from accidents. He does so by comparing the relevant costs and ben-
efits. Of course, these involve the (direct) costs of taking precautions (compli-
ance costs) , such as the time or money spent on taking precautions, or the extra 
profit that can be made from violating the rules. The firm also considers the 
sanctioning risk  that follows from the enforcement activities of the govern-
ment or the victims. These may lead to costs such as damage compensation, 
a formal sanction (the payment of a fine or the costs of a (temporary) closing 
of the establishment), and/or the costs in terms of time and money (paper-
work) spent on inspections or on objection and appeal procedures. These 
costs should be discounted by the probability that a firm has to make these 
costs. The product of this probability and the magnitude of the ‘sanction’ is 
labeled as the sanctioning risk. So the sanctioning risk reflects the expected 
costs for the firm in case of non-compliance due to enforcement activities. 
This sanctioning risk depends on the level of precautions taken by the injurer. 
If the injurer takes more precautions, it is more likely to escape sanctions.
Large firms may be neutral to the risks they face . Since they have large 
assets they can bear large losses. However, small firms, including most horeca 
proprietors, are probably risk-averse. Firms face two types of uncertainty which 
are relevant if they are risk-averse. First of all, it is uncertain whether an acci-
dent will occur. Secondly, it is, in general, uncertain whether a sanction will be 
imposed.
Of course, the injurer such as a proprietor may not only be motivated by 
23 Empirical evidence is presented in Viscusi and Evans (1990) and Sloan et al. (1998).
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the direct costs of taking precautions, but also by other compliance-enhancing 
concerns. There may be, for instance, personal concerns that reflect that taking 
precautions more or less directly increases the benefits from exploitation of 
the establishment. These benefits include the reduced probability that the 
proprietor himself or his establishment will be harmed in a fire accident, the 
reward for taking precautions offered by the consumers, or a benevolent sta-
tus with government agencies which might be helpful in the context of other 
activities. Social concerns reflect the fact that the injurer may be concerned about 
(dis)approval of his behavior by others for other than economic motives. The 
injurer may be concerned about the evaluation of their behavior by friends or 
relatives, neighbors, or colleagues . Moral concerns reflect independent, intrinsic 
motivation s for taking precautions. The proprietor may be concerned with the 
safety of his customers, because of (altruistic) regard for other people. Or he 
may feel the need to obey governmental prescriptions as a civic or moral duty.
A comment
The description above of the accident problem contains some simplifications 
that are worth noting. I consider so-called unilateral accidents (Shavell, 1987) 
in which only the injurer can take precautions to prevent and limit expected 
harm. The role of victims is neglected as they are no part of the described 
regulations.24 Furthermore, there is no concern for the activity level. This is 
justified because the level of activity may be part of the standard, as is for 
example the number of visitors allowed. Moreover, the level of activity is not 
a social problem if the activity is always desirable given that efficient pre-
cautions are taken (the benefits of the activity are constant per period). The 
production level will be efficiently determined by the market. I assume that if 
the proprietor complies, exploiting the establishment is privately and socially 
beneficial. The visitor is always able to enjoy the benefits of a horeca visit.
2.1.2 The socially optimal solution to the accident problem
The socially optimal solution to the fire safety problem should satisfy two 
requirements25:
1. Optimal risk-spreading: The wealth of a potential victim should be opti-
mally distributed between the “no-accident state” and the “post-accident 
state”. This objective is labelled compensation.
2. Optimal precautions: Injurers should choose a socially optimal level of pre-
cautions. This objective is labelled deterrence.
24 Although the way visitors deal with candles, ashtrays or (as in the Volendam disaster) 
sparklers do affect harm, it can be argued that this behavior is also the responsibility of the 
proprietor as he and his personnel are able to control the extent to which it is possible or 
allowed.
25 The analysis in this section is described in Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2005*), particu-
larly in relation to the optimal magnitude of compensation damages.
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Optimal compensation and the demand for insurance
The well-being of a potential victim depends on whether or not there is an 
accident.26 The maximization of someone’s well-being, and hence that of 
society, implies that his wealth should be optimally spread between the “no-
accident state” and the “post-accident state”. This implies that compensa-
tion for losses (in the “post-accident state”) should be at the optimal level.27 
This objective is therefore labeled compensation and is defined as the demand 
for insurance, as it equals the level of monetary compensation that a victim 
wants to receive in case of an accident. Remember that monetary losses are 
replaceable, so monetary compensation allows replacing these losses. Non-
monetary losses are irreplaceable, so compensation is only possible in the 
form of monetary benefits with which other goods or services can be bought, 
through which the pain may be softened. 
Risk spreading is optimal if an individual does not want to transfer mon-
ey from the state of the world in which no accidents happen, into the other 
state in which accidents do happen, or vice versa.28 Transferring money to the 
other state is not worthwhile if receiving additional money has the exact same 
value in both states of the world, i.e. if the individual can not make himself 
better off by giving up €1 in one state of the world to receive it in the other. If 
an accident does not affect the value of money, risk-averse victims will always 
want to have the same level of wealth and they will want to eliminate all 
uncertainty about their level of wealth. Hence, victims will want to insure 
themselves against all monetary losses. If, however, money is less valuable 
to victims after an accident than before, they will want to have less money in 
case an accident occurs than in case no accident occurs. Money that is given 
up when no accident occurs is relatively expensive. The individual would 
have to give up pleasant activities (such as holidays or visiting a restaurant) 
in good health, while being unable to undertake these activities when in bad 
health. Therefore he will want to insure himself against less than the mon-
etary losses. If the monetary losses are relatively small, an individual might 
even want to obtain ‘negative’ insurance, i.e. he might wish to buy an insur-
ance contract that pays out in case no accident occurs.29
26 The same argument applies to the risk spreading of the injurer when he faces uncertainties 
like sanctions or compensation damages. In the next chapters this problem is not further 
dealt with, except for the consequences of insurance for the incentive to take precautions 
(section 2.3.2).
27 See for instance Shavell (1982, 1987, 2004), Friedman (1982, 2000), Arlen (2000), Schäfer and 
Ott (2004). Note that the objective of compensation does not imply concern about the income 
distribution (Shavell, 1987). We are not considering whether wealth is optimally distributed 
between the injurer and the victim. However, we are considering whether the wealth of the 
victim (or the injurer) is optimally distributed between his possible states of the world.
28 See the aforementioned references.
29 Such insurance contracts are problematic as individuals would have to pay once an acci-
dent occurs, creating possible credit constraints and potentially high administrative costs 
because of the frequency of pay-out and the lack of incentives to report accidents (Fried-
man, 1982, p. 91; Arlen, 2000, p. 700). Negative insurance is not observed in reality.
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The potential victim would never want to insure himself for the non-mone-
tary loss of pain and suffering, as this loss is irreplaceable. Suppose someone 
might loose his child in an accident, which occurs with a probability of 1%. 
There are no monetary losses. He can buy an insurance contract that will pay 
out €100,000 in case of an accident. Without insurance, the individual will 
have a certain wealth of for instance €25,000 and a probability of 1% of suf-
fering the severe pain of losing his child. If he insures himself, he will have a 
wealth of €25,000 - €1,000 (the actuarially fair insurance premium) = €24,000 
if no accident takes place, and €25,000 - €1,000 + €100,000 = €124,000 if there 
is an accident, on average €25,000. However, this does not prevent the pos-
sible loss of his child. So the individual faces an uncertain expected wealth of 
€25,000 as well as a probability of 1% of the severe pain and suffering of losing 
his child. For a risk-averse individual this can never be beneficial. If all other 
things remain equal, he would want to have certainty about his wealth.
That potential victims are left with uncertainty about their level of wealth 
as a result of a potentially severe monetary loss is thus an important element 
of the accident problem. However, as Shavell and others have argued, it is not 
something we should worry about when analyzing enforcement problems.30 
The reason is that an individual can provide himself with the desired level of 
compensation through buying insurance. If insurance is freely available on 
the private market, the optimal level of compensation can always be obtained. 
Insurance is available on the private market if (among others) the following 
conditions are satisfied :
– Administrative costs are small enough to prevent refraining from risk-
spreading, and insurance premiums are sold in a competitive market, 
hence actuarially fair.
– The insurance market is not characterized by adverse selection, i.e. insur-
ance companies are as informed about risks as the insured parties. For fire 
safety in horeca establishments, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
– The insurance market is not characterized by moral hazard, i.e. insured par-
ties do not take fewer safety precautions once insured. For victims, this is not 
a problem as they are assumed to be unable to influence expected damage.31
If these conditions are not satisfied, an individual obtains no compensation 
or a suboptimal level of compensation in the private insurance market. How-
ever, even if this is the case, compensation should not be the objective of regu-
lation and enforcement, as other government actions might be more effective 
or efficient in providing compensation, such as regulation of the insurance 
market or providing public compensation by means of the social security and 
tax system, public health care, or a compensation funds.
Therefore, I focus on the importance of enforcement in creating deter-
rence, the second element of the accident problem. 
30 See for instance Shavell (1987, 2004, 1984a), Friedman (2000), Schäfer and Ott (2004) and 
Arlen (2000).
31 For injurers this may prove to be a severe problem, as discussed in section 2.3.2.
28 Chapter 2
Efficient precautions
The second problem is that the level of precautions taken by the firm should 
be efficient. It is not efficient to prevent harm at all costs but to balance the 
costs of taking precautions against the reduction in expected harm, both mon-
etary and non-monetary. As a consequence, it is not necessarily efficient to 
fully comply with the regulations. Spending €1 more on precautions is only 
efficient if it reduces the expected harm by more than €1. The efficient level of 
precautions is obtained once the marginal costs of taking precautions equal 
the marginal benefits of taking precautions.32 Therefore we have to compare 
the costs of precautions with the costs of expected harm.
The monetary losses can be estimated relatively easily, based on the costs 
of replacement or recovery. Market prices are often available. For non-mone-
tary losses , there are no markets, but they can be based on the ex-ante willing-
ness of potential victims to pay for higher precautions, or on the willingness 
to accept higher accident probabilities.33 With such an approach, we are not 
estimating the value of an identifiable life, but the so-called statistical value 
of life or injury. This value estimates the amount of money and time society 
wants to spend on preventing accidents.34 Suppose the simple case in which 
parents can lose their child in an accident without any monetary losses and 
without any effect on the value of money. Suppose that parents want to pay 
€100 maximally for a decline in the probability of a fatal accident of 0.0001 (1 
in 10,000). Then the statistical value of the life of their child can be estimated 
to equal €100 / 0.0001 = €1 million.
The willingness to pay can be derived from common implicit or explicit 
decisions involving accident risks. For example, some employees are willing 
to work in dangerous jobs (such as maintenance of roads and railways) in 
exchange for higher salaries. In buying a car, one balances the benefits of car 
safety against the price and the looks and status of the car. In driving a car, 
one balances the benefits of mobility with the possibility of an accident. From 
such choices, we can derive how reducing (the probability of) non-monetary 
losses is valued by potential victims.
2.2 Voluntary compliance will be insufficient
This section discusses that the efficient level of precautions is not automatically 
obtained. First, the incentive for the proprietor to take precautions voluntarily, 
because of personal concerns, or because of social and moral concerns, is insuf-
ficient. Secondly, there is no market for precautions, where victims can buy 
deterrence. 
32 See Shavell (1987) for a formal presentation.
33 E.g. Shavell (1987).
34 See Viscusi (1993 and 1998) on valuing life and risks to life.
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2.2.1 The proprietor’s personal interest
Compliance with the fire safety regulation, or more generally: choosing pre-
cautions to prevent fire damage is not always conflicting with the propri-
etor’s payoff. A clear example is the maximum number of visitors allowed in 
case of fire safety in the horeca. For many establishments, the optimal number 
of visitors for a profit maximizing proprietor is lower than this maximum. 
When there are too many people present, they cannot find their way to the 
bar and hence the proprietor’s turnover will be low. However, this argument 
does not apply to the majority of the regulations. Keeping emergency exits 
free or guaranteeing that escape-route signs burn are costly for the propri-
etor because money is paid on equipment, time is lost on maintenance or his 
establishment is less burglar-proof.
Similarly, a proprietor is inclined to choose some precautions because 
these will reduce the probability that he, his relatives or his personnel are hurt 
in a fire accident, that his property is destroyed or his establishment is closed. 
The damage to the proprietor himself is part of his costs and he will hence 
take them into account. However, from a social point of view, he should not 
only try to prevent damage to himself, but also to the visitors. The regulations 
are precisely intended to focus the attention of the proprietor to the interests 
of the visitors, because he is not naturally doing so.
In addition, the insurance company of the proprietor might stimulate 
precautions, but is primarily interested in limiting the insured damage. This 
includes the monetary loss of the proprietor, but not, or not necessarily, the 
damage to visitors. Moreover, the efforts of the insurance company to induce 
the proprietor to take precautions are costly. Therefore, insurance companies 
are helpful in improving the structural state of the building and its technical 
devices, but they have difficulty to control the daily behavior of the propri-
etor, like keeping emergency exits free, being attentive, etc. 
Another problem arises if proprietors do not have sufficient information 
about the expected damage and its relationship with compliance costs. In 
such cases, even if they are somehow concerned with providing precautions, 
they simply lack the information required to do so. In general, if a propri-
etor is concerned about the expected damage, he also has a perfect incen-
tive to obtain the optimal amount of information about the expected damage, 
and no failures would occur. This however may not be the case if the costs 
of obtaining information are borne by an individual proprietor, but the ben-
efits are publicly available. Since the information on expected fire damage is 
quite technical and is learned in technical laboratories, the costs of acquiring 
information are characterized by decreasing returns to scale. This causes a 
threat of free-riding by proprietors, so that they obtain insufficient informa-
tion about the possibilities and necessities of reducing expected fire damage, 
which may in turn result in a suboptimal level of precautions. Moreover, cog-
nitive failures may lead the proprietor to underestimate the harm, and hence 
the importance of taking precautions.
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2.2.2 Social or moral concerns
As mentioned in the previous section, the proprietor might care about his 
reputation and/or might have an intrinsic motivation to reduce harm to his 
customers . This will induce the proprietor to take some precautions. How-
ever, these social and moral concerns are unlikely to induce the proprietor to 
take efficient precautions, especially when there are no regulatory or enforce-
ment activities. A proprietor will, in general, not be fully altruistic. Moreover, 
the importance of reputational concerns and intrinsic motivation is likely to 
vary among proprietors. While some will be motivated to take precautions, 
others are not. There are always some ‘bad apples’ who will not voluntarily 
comply with the regulations. Therefore, precautions are not first-best effi-
cient, although they are larger than zero.
Furthermore, without enforcement activity, social or moral concerns 
may be weak.35 For example, reputational concerns are only relevant if non-
compliance is revealed. This could be carried out by for example the branch 
organization. However, this is not the primary goal of this organization, so 
it is unlikely that they will exert sufficient effort in publicizing non-compli-
ance. What’s more, no initiatives of such activities are observed. Visitors are 
also unable to detect (non)compliance and punish or reward the proprietor 
accordingly (this argument will be further developed below). Therefore, 
without enforcement the detection of non-compliance is very infrequent and 
the proprietor does not have to worry about his reputation.36 Only if an acci-
dent with injuries occurs, this is likely to affect the proprietor’s reputation.
Similarly, moral concerns may only be important if it is clear that some-
thing is forbidden and if the government propagates that it is important to 
follow the rules. If there is no enforcement, this may signal to the proprietor 
that compliance with the regulation is not important. Hence, the proprietor 
will not be motivated to comply.
2.2.3 The problem of transaction costs and limited information of visitors
So, in the absence of any laws or regulations, or more specifically in the 
absence of any enforcement activity of these laws or regulations, the propri-
etor does not efficiently consider the expected damage to visitors when decid-
ing about the level of precautions. It can even be argued that, in the complete 
absence of enforcement, he will not choose any precautions to prevent harm 
to the visitors. His personal interests concern his personal damage. Reputa-
tional losses are absent. And intrinsic motivation to comply will break down. 
35 There is some support for this argument in the literature, for example Axelrod (1984) and 
Sugden (1989). The interaction between enforcement and social or moral concerns is dis-
cussed in chapter 7.
36 See for a summary of the general argument Posner and Rasmusen (1999, p.380).
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In economics, this is to say that there is a problem of externalities. The injurer, 
here the proprietor, does not consider the negative consequences of his behav-
ior to another party, here the harm to visitors. Coase (1960) demonstrated 
that nonetheless efficient precautions will result if transaction costs are suf-
ficiently low. If transaction costs are sufficiently low, visitors and proprietors 
are able to negotiate about the level of precautions. If there is no regulation, 
or if the regulation is weak (i.e. the proprietor has the right to cause damage), 
well-informed visitors will pay the proprietor to choose the efficient level of 
precautions. They are willing to compensate the costs of precautions as long 
as these costs are smaller than the damage these precautions prevent. On the 
other hand, if visitors have the right to be refrained from any harm from fire, 
they will sell this right for a price that compensates sufficiently for the dam-
age. The proprietor is willing to pay this price as long as it is cheaper than 
taking precautions. So, in both cases the costs of precautions and the expected 
damage are efficiently balanced. However, transaction costs in the fire dam-
age problem are too large for such negotiations. There are too many potential 
victims, creating high costs and also free-rider problems.
However, even if transaction costs are high, an efficient outcome would 
result if visitors were sufficiently aware of the risks involved in a horeca visit. 
The relationship between the proprietor and the victim is a market relation-
ship between producer and consumer. Competition in the market would 
guarantee that customers only visit establishments that take optimal precau-
tions. Proprietors that do not take optimal precautions would go bankrupt, 
effectively forcing them to take optimal precautions (e.g. Shavell, 1987). How-
ever, visitors do not have sufficient information about expected fire damage. 
This information is of an expert, technical nature and it is not freely avail-
able. Furthermore, fire damage does not occur frequently, so learning is dif-
ficult, and the expected damage varies from one establishment to the next. 
As discussed, human beings have much trouble estimating low probabilities 
and high damages. The impression is (in the eyes of fire experts) that peo-
ple underestimate the expected fire damage in horeca establishments. They 
therefore cannot force the horeca proprietors to take an optimal level of fire 
safety precautions. Moreover, given the underestimation of fire damage and 
the free-rider problem, visitors do not have an optimal incentive to obtain 
information about fire damage. 
2.3 Liability for damages
 The enforcement and information costs of property rights are too high to be an 
effective and efficient alternative. The next alternative is to induce precautions 
by enforcing liability rules. Liability rules allow the victim, ex post, to claim 
damages. For that, the victim has to show that the injurer behaved negligently 
by taking insufficient precautions. Whether precautions are insufficient can be 
determined in different ways, such as whether it violates the victim’s rights 
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or is improper social conduct because of a rule of unwritten law. But also an 
act or omission violating a statutory duty is deemed unlawful. There are also 
cases of strict liability where, according to law or common opinion, the injurer 
is liable for damages irrespective of the precautions he has taken.
Liability rules provide the injurer with an incentive to take into account 
any damages he may cause, so that he will try to prevent such damage against 
reasonable costs. However, private enforcement by victims is only effective if 
injurers are really forced to internalize the harm they inflict. If the injurer can 
somehow escape liability, fully or partially, liability for damages does not pro-
vide the socially optimal incentive to take precautions. Let me briefly discuss 
the conditions under which liability leads to the efficient level of precautions.37
2.3.1 The incentive to take precautions and standard-setting
Under the negligence rule, the injurer only has to pay damages if the level of 
precautions that were taken is below the level of due care determined by the 
court. Therefore it is important what courts consider to be due care.38
Efficient standard-setting
Suppose that courts consider due care to equal the efficient level of precau-
tions because they require that benefits and costs of taking precautions are 
balanced. If the magnitude of liability is large enough, this will induce the 
proprietor to choose this level of precautions. Choosing (little) less precau-
tions will render him liable, paying damages. Choosing higher precautions 
only increases his costs of taking precautions.
Inefficient outcomes will result if courts have difficulty with determining 
the socially optimal level of precautions. If courts miscalculate the efficient 
level of care or are unwilling to enforce this level, it will usually still be optimal 
for the firm to choose the level of due care and, hence, to choose a suboptimal 
level of precautions. By taking this level of care, the firm completely avoids 
the costs of being held liable. If standard setting by the courts is systematically 
too low, firms can escape liability by choosing less than efficient precautions. 
If standard setting is too high, they take excessive precautions.39
37 The analysis in this section only covers the major results of the functioning of liability 
rules. For more detailed analyses I refer to the literature. There are several good literature 
overviews available. See for example Shavell (1987, 2004), Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) 
and Schäfer and Ott (2004). An extensive (economic) review of Dutch tort law can be found 
in Visscher (2005*).
38 The economic theories of liability are introduced in Shavell (1987, 2004) and Schäfer and 
Ott (2004).
39 If the standard becomes very high, the injurer is better off being negligent, taking efficient 
precautions and paying the associated damages. See Ott and Schäfer (1997) for a some-
what different way of determining negligence, which requires less information by courts.
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Uncertainty about the level of due care
 Another problem is that courts might set due care at the efficient level of pre-
cautions, but do so with a margin of error, so that injurers are uncertain how 
their behavior will be evaluated by the court.40 Suppose that the injurer is 
not certain about the due standard, but only knows the distribution of the 
standard, for instance because the predictive power of the courts’ rulings (e.g. 
reasonability and fairness) is imperfect. For example, it may be uncertain for 
a proprietor whether the court values the removal of decorations as sufficient 
fire precautions, because it is uncertain how the court will assess the costs 
or the effectiveness of this precaution. In deciding about taking precautions, 
the proprietor only knows that such precautions will increase the probability 
that he escapes liability, instead of being certain about it. Such uncertainty 
has two opposing effects. On the one hand, the injurer may increase the level 
of precautions in order to reduce the probability that he will be found negli-
gent. On the other hand, the injurer may choose a lower level of precautions 
because the benefits of taking more precautions are smaller as the precautions 
only reduce the probability of being found negligent. Which of these effects 
dominates is undetermined. Hence, uncertainty about the level of due care 
might create both under- and overdeterrence.41 Underdeterrence results if 
the uncertainty about due care is very high. Because the injurer will be found 
liable over a wide range of precautions, a higher level of precautions will only 
result in a marginally reduced likelihood of being held liable.
Uncertainty about actual care
A second type of uncertainty is that courts encounter difficulties in verifying 
the facts. It might be uncertain whether or not a court will be able to observe 
the precautions taken by an injurer. For example, after a fire accident, a propri-
etor may be unable to demonstrate the number of visitors that were present or 
whether escape-route marks were visible. This may lead to two possible errors. 
An injurer may be found negligent even though he took sufficient care. Or he 
may escape liability despite having taken insufficient care. When courts mis-
perceive facts in an unpredictable way, the injurer may exert either too much 
or too little care according to the same logic as above. He may be induced to 
take too few precautions because there is a probability that courts will find this 
level of precautions sufficient. However, he also has a high incentive to take 
too many precautions because he wants to increase the probability of escaping 
liability.
Strict liability
Under strict liability, the injurer always has to pay damages, irrespective of 
40 See Miceli (1997, pp.44-59) for a general overview and analysis of the relevant uncertain-
ties.
41 Shavell (1987, p.80 and 94-96) argues that in most relevant cases the injurer will take more 
than due care. See also Kolstad et al. (1990). 
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his level of precautions. Therefore the abovementioned problems of stan-
dard-setting are absent. Under strict liability the injurer balances the costs 
of precautions and the magnitude of liability. If the injurer must always pay 
damages in the event of an accident and it must pay in full the harm done, 
he will be forced to balance the costs of taking precautions and the expected 
damage, which will lead to the efficient level of precautions. The expected 
damage is internalized in the decision of the injurer and he will weigh social 
costs and benefits efficiently.42
2.3.2 Risk aversion and insurance
 If the injurer is risk-averse, he will wish to insure himself against the risk of 
having to pay damages to victims (liability insurance).43
Strict liability and cost-free observing of precautions
Under strict liability, the injurer always has to pay damages; hence he will 
want full insurance against these losses. If the injurer is fully insured, he will 
not directly benefit from taking precautions (the moral hazard problem). Tak-
ing precautions will reduce the expected magnitude of liability, but this will 
benefit the insurance company, while the injurer himself bears the costs of tak-
ing precautions. Suppose insurance companies are able to observe the level 
of precautions taken by the injurer at no cost. For instance, insurers can easily 
observe whether a proprietor has installed and maintained fire extinguish-
ers. They can, therefore, require that fire extinguishers be installed before an 
insurance contract is accepted. Alternatively, insurers can contract that no 
benefits are paid if it appears that the proprietor does not possess or maintain 
fire extinguishers. This is not necessarily an expensive procedure, especially 
if the proprietor is required to submit maintenance certificates.
If it is possible for insurance companies to observe the levels of precau-
tions without costs, they can fully control the level of precautions taken. The 
level of precautions will directly affect the insurance premium and/or insur-
ance coverage. Therefore both the injurer and the insurance company will 
have an incentive to minimize the costs of precautions plus the expected mag-
nitude of liability. Therefore, if the magnitude of liability includes all dam-
42 In the next subsections the analysis of several complications is always developed by con-
sidering first strict liability and by arguing thereafter how it will apply under negligence. 
This line of reasoning is common in the literature because the analysis of strict liability is 
more straightforward, thus avoiding different complications to happen simultaneously. 
43 This section is largely based on Shavell (1987), Schäfer and Ott (2004), Shavell (1979, 1980, 
1982) and Spence (1977). The most readable and accessible introduction is (as always) 
found in Shavell (2004, part II). This section supposes that the injurer is only concerned 
with wealth, that insurance premiums are actuarially fair (perfect competition), and that 
there are no administrative costs of insurance.
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ages, the injurer internalizes the full degree of expected harm and will choose 
the efficient level of precautions.
Strict liability and costly observing of precautions
In some cases, insurance companies have no opportunity to monitor the 
injurer’s behavior at all. For instance, many aspects of fire regulations include 
rules about the proprietor’s daily behavior, such as opening and keeping 
free the emergency exits and escape routes, limiting the number of people 
admitted, and more generally ‘being attentive’. It may be difficult for insur-
ance companies to control this behavior. In this situation, it is optimal for the 
injurer to partially insure himself. For the part of the damages for which he 
is insured, he has no incentive to prevent harm. For the part of the damages 
for which the injurer is not insured, he has an appropriate incentive to take 
precautions. On balance, too few precautions result.
Usually, insurance companies are able to observe precautions, but only 
at some cost. For example, an insurance company can invest in costly ex-ante 
inspections of horeca establishments to control whether or not the establish-
ments have been furnished in a fire-proof manner. Ex-post, i.e. after an acci-
dent has occurred and a claim has been filed, the insurance company can 
invest in (technical) investigations into the cause of the fire and the amount of 
damage, to verify whether or not the proprietor had taken appropriate care. 
If not, they can refuse to pay in full. If the costs of observing precautions are 
not too high, observation is socially beneficial, because both deterrence and 
compensation are more efficient under observation of precautions. In gen-
eral, investigation ex-post is less expensive because it needs only be done 
if an accident has occurred (and resulted in damage). However, the costs of 
such an investigation may be higher than a (quick) inspection ex-ante, or the 
information gathered ex-ante may be of higher quality.44
More generally, the choice is not between no observation and perfectly 
accurate (although costly) observation, but the accuracy of monitoring 
depends on the amount of money insurance companies invest in monitoring 
precautions. The more an insurance company invests in monitoring, the more 
accurate its observations will be and the more possibilities there are to make 
the insurance premium and/or benefits conditional on the level of precau-
tions. The injurers will then choose to partly insure themselves. Whether or 
not the injurer takes too many or too few precautions depends on whether 
or not the insurance company under- or overestimates the necessary precau-
tions.
So, it is possible to obtain a reasonable outcome under strict liability. If 
insurance companies can observe the level of precautions without incurring 
costs, optimal precautions will result. If insurance companies have to spend 
money on monitoring, the outcome will be ‘reasonable’, but not first-best. 
Monitoring costs directly decrease social welfare. Indirectly, the injurer will 
44 Shavell (1979).
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choose partial insurance45 and his level of precautions will be higher than 
under no enforcement, but less than the first-best level of precautions.46
Negligence and risk-aversion
If a risk-averse injurer is non-negligent , he will not have to pay any damages, 
and he will therefore not want to buy any insurance. If he is negligent he will 
face the risk of being held liable and he will want to insure himself against this 
risk. If courts enforce the socially optimal level of precautions, it will always 
be beneficial for the injurer to choose this level of precautions, and hence not 
to insure himself. The analysis becomes more complicated if the negligence 
rule does not function perfectly. If the injurer is sometimes found liable, he 
will have an incentive to insure himself. The results from strict liability apply 
to the situations in which he may be found liable. Moreover, a risk averse 
injurer might choose higher levels of precautions to reduce the uncertainty of 
being found liable when courts set standards of negligence with error.
2.3.3 The optimal magnitude of liability and non-monetary damages
 The next step in the analysis is to examine the optimal amount of damages, 
especially as relating to non-monetary losses. Moreover, because under liabil-
ity victims actually receive compensation, the effects of liability on the alloca-
tion of risk cannot be ignored.47
Strict liability
Under strict liability, a socially optimal solution to the accident problem can 
generally not be achieved, because the optimal award for compensation 
diverges from the optimal award for deterrence. The optimal compensation 
45 Partial insurance implies that the injurer does not obtain a first-best level of risk-spread-
ing. This highlights the condition of the absence of moral hazard for obtaining optimal risk 
spreading through private insurance.
46 I have assumed that injurers are identical. This analysis is relevant either when differences 
between individuals are unimportant or when these differences are somehow recogniz-
able. If this is not the case and if there is asymmetric information between the injurer and 
the insurance company about the (individual) expected damage, there might be a prob-
lem of adverse selection. Those injurers that cause relatively limited expected damage might 
choose not to insure themselves against the relatively high ‘average’ premium. The insur-
ance company can try to differentiate between injurers by offering different amounts of 
coverage. Due to the possibility of ex-ante monitoring, the existence of credible signals of 
the risk level, the availability of differentiating insurance contracts and the fact that injurers 
themselves have only limited information about expected harm, I expect that the problem 
of adverse selection is not severe in the case of liability of proprietors for fire accidents 
in the horeca. The problem of adverse selection can also be solved by making insurance 
obligatory.
47 See for example Shavell (1987, pp. 186-235), Arlen (2000), Friedman (2000; pp. 95-102) 
and Calfee and Rubin (1992). This problem is analyzed in relation to the Dutch debate on 
hedonic damages in Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2005*).
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for a victim depends on the monetary losses and on the extent to which an 
accident affects the value of wealth for the victim. As discussed in section 
2.1.2, the optimal amount of compensation (insurance) is not expected to 
exceed the monetary losses. Therefore, in order to provide the victim with 
optimal compensation, the magnitude of the liability should equal the mon-
etary losses or be lower. 
However, in order to induce the injurer to take the efficient level of pre-
cautions, a damages award is required that exceeds the monetary losses. We 
also want to prevent the non-monetary losses of the pain and suffering of 
losing relatives and friends, of becoming disabled, etc. as these also constitute 
a decrease in welfare. It is desirable to prevent the accidental killing of teenag-
ers in a fire, even if it does not involve any monetary loss and parents do not 
want to insure themselves for this non-monetary loss. To induce the injurer to 
spend costs on taking precautions to reduce these non-monetary losses, the 
magnitude of liability should include both monetary and non-monetary loss-
es. The optimal magnitude for non-monetary damages can be based on the 
ex-ante willingness of potential victims to pay for higher precautions (section 
2.1.2). If the injurer has to pay damages based on this willingness, he will take 
precautions in order to balance the social costs and benefits of taking precau-
tions. Consider the simple example of section 2.1.2 in which parents can lose 
their child in an accident. Suppose these parents want to pay €100 maximally 
for a decline in the probability of a fatal accident of 0.0001 (1 in 10,000), so that 
the statistical value of the life of their child can be estimated to equal €1 mil-
lion. The rule that potential injurers have to pay this €1 million for each child 
they accidentally kill will be efficient. Taking precautions to prevent accidents 
completely will be beneficial for the injurer if it costs less than €100, because 
it will reduce their expected liability payment by 0.0001 * €1 million = €100 – 
precisely the maximum amount the parents want to pay themselves.
Thus, it is clear that an efficient solution is impossible without addition-
al arrangements, because the optimal awards for compensation and deter-
rence diverge. Monetary losses should be awarded for both compensation 
and deterrence. For deterrence, injurers should also be held liable for non-
monetary losses. But awarding non-monetary damages leads to undesirable 
compensation of victims. Of course the victim will not oppose higher dam-
ages. But the (potential) victim could be better off if the expected money is 
available ex-ante, before an accident occurs. Optimal deterrence and optimal 
compensation cannot be achieved simultaneously.
One solution is ‘negative’, countervailing insurance contracts.48 Then the 
damages award can be used to induce the injurer to take the efficient level of 
precautions, and the victim can use insurance to provide himself with opti-
mal compensation. The victim will want to conclude an insurance contract 
in which he agrees to give away any damages above the optimal compensa-
tion amount, in exchange for a payment of the expected value of that amount 
48 Friedman (1982) and Arlen (2000).
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irrespective of the occurrence of an accident. This will remove the uncertainty 
about his wealth. There are two important problems with such contracts. 
First, the administrative costs of such contracts are relatively large. Pay-out is 
very frequent. For example, the victim receives €1 every month in exchange 
for paying the insurance company €1 million in the very unlikely event that 
he is injured in a fire (and receives such an amount of money from the liable 
proprietor). Such contracts also require that search and transaction costs be 
sufficiently low. Secondly, the incentive for victims to report damages is small 
as they have to pay in case of damages. Therefore, insurance companies have 
to spend large amounts of money on finding actual victims and forcing them 
to pay. This problem is mitigated if insurance companies arrange the mon-
etary damage compensation of the victims and if victims actually sell their 
right to non-monetary damages to their insurance companies.
An alternative system involves a damages award that is given to victims in 
order to provide them with optimal compensation and a fine which is paid to the 
state in order to induce the injurer to take efficient precautions (Shavell, 1987). The 
state can use the benefits so that they become available to potential victims ex-ante 
(like a tax reduction or subsidy fund). However, such a system lacks the incentive 
for victims to report and obtain the damages award as described above.
In short, in the case of strict liability, a socially optimal solution is only 
achieved either if insurance markets work perfectly, so that victims can always 
acquire the optimal level of compensation, or if damages for compensation 
and deterrence are decoupled. Otherwise, we have to balance the award that 
is optimal for deterrence with the award that is optimal for compensation.
Negligence
 If liability is based on negligence, it is possible to provide both optimal com-
pensation and optimal deterrence even if ‘negative insurance’ is impossible. 
As discussed above, if due care is properly set and the magnitude of liability 
involves both monetary and non-monetary losses, this will induce the effi-
cient level of precautions. However, given that due care is taken, no dam-
ages will be paid and hence over-compensation does not occur. Victims will 
receive no compensation from the injurer but can obtain compensation by 
insuring themselves.
2.3.4 Limited assets
Under strict liability, the firm will choose an inefficient level of precautions if its 
assets are insufficient to pay the damages to which it is convicted (the so-called 
judgment proof problem ).49 If the magnitude of liability exceeds an injurer’s 
assets, the assets of the liable injurer will be completely seized and, in the case 
of firms, the injurer will go bankrupt. The injurer only considers to which extent 
49 E.g. Shavell (1987, 2004), Schäfer and Ott (2004).
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taking precautions reduces the probability that he will lose his assets in paying 
damages. Imposing liability above his assets will not further increase the incen-
tive to take precautions.50 Four remarks are relevant in this context:
1. Under the negligence rule the judgement proof problem is weaker because 
taking due care entirely relieves the injurer from liability and thus from pos-
sible bankruptcy. This advantage may be large enough for the injurer to 
choose due care, even if the damages for negligence exceed assets.51
2. If the costs of taking precautions are monetary, they reduce the level of as-
sets available for paying damages. Therefore (Miceli and Segerson, 2003), 
under strict liability, if the assets are only slightly smaller than the damages 
the injurer has to pay, it may be benefi cial for the injurer to increase his pre-
cautions above the effi cient level, in order to lower the probability of being 
liable for damages and losing all assets (and going bankrupt).
3. A possible solution to the judgement proof problem is to make full insur-
ance for damages compulsory. That garantuees that the injurer, or rather 
his insurance company, can always pay the required level of damages. 
However, whether the injurer will take effi cient precautions depends on 
the possibility for insurance companies to monitor precautions.52
4. Having to pay damages might create an incentive to lower or conceal the 
assets invested in a fi rm in order to avoid damages, for example by divid-
ing assets over multiple fi rms, holdings or establishments. This has two 
important consequences (Ringleb and Wiggins, 1990; Boyd and Ingeber-
man, 1999).53 First, if capital investment is determined partly by the need 
to limit liability, production costs will not be minimized. Secondly, wealth 
reduction reduces the incentive to invest in safety precautions.
2.3.5 Uncertainty about expected harm
If the injurer is not well informed about expected damage, imposing liabil-
ity may not induce him to take efficient precautions.54 Moreover, the firm 
might be uncertain as to how to exercise care. Especially in technically and 
legally complicated settings, firms may not end up taking precautions until 
they determine how precautions can and should be applied, by for instance 
50 See however the comment by Innes (1999a).
51 Cooter (1984) discusses the different incentives following from negligence and strict liability.
52 Note that if injurers have insufficient assets, it may be more difficult (or: costly) for insurance 
companies to monitor the levels of precaution that are taken. One way to monitor precautions 
is to contract the condition that the insurance company can recoup the damages from the 
injurer if he has taken insufficient precautions. However, if the injurer has insufficient assets 
he will not care (or care less) about such threats since he would not be able to pay anyway. 
Therefore it is more costly for insurance companies to handle the moral hazard problem.
53 See also Mason (2004).
54 See Miceli (1997, pp. 44-59) for a discussion.
40 Chapter 2
hiring an expert for advise, asking colleagues, investing in R&D etc. (Pfaff 
and Sanchirico, 2000).
Under strict liability the injurer internalizes all social costs of accidents. 
Because the injurer is liable regardless of the level of precautions taken or of 
his level of information, the injurer will make the socially optimal decisions 
about both information acquisition and precautions. The injurer will mini-
mize the harm he causes, the costs of obtaining information and the costs of 
taking precautions, i.e. the social costs. Under a negligence rule, an efficient 
result is only obtained if the optimal acquisition of information is incorpo-
rated into the level of due care. This includes situations in which the injurer is 
held liable if he failed either to choose efficient precautions or to acquire infor-
mation when it was efficient to do so; or situations in which the injurer is held 
liable if he failed to take efficient precautions assuming optimal information 
acquisition (the injurer “knows or should have known” the facts).55
Therefore, if the liability rules are determined efficiently, the injurer can 
not claim to be uninformed about effective precautions. Being held liable 
gives the injurer the optimal incentive to be well-informed concerning pre-
cautions. However, problems might arise if the acquisition of information has 
characteristics of a public good, so that it creates free-rider problems. The 
analysis above assumes that the costs and benefits of information are private, 
only for the firm itself. If the information about precautions and expected 
harm is quite technical, expert information that has non-rival benefits, the 
injurer may not have the optimal incentive to obtain information. This prob-
lem will be further discussed in section 6.1.56
2.3.6 Vicarious liability
If liability concerns a firm as the injurer, another remark is relevant. So far, I 
have assumed that the firm acts as a single person. However, ‘firms’ do not 
act, their agents do. Offenses are committed by individuals acting on behalf 
of the firm.57 Often, an employer is (strictly) liable for any misconduct of his 
employees committed in furtherance of their employment, so-called ‘vicari-
ous liability’, or the principle of respondeat superior. This subsection shortly 
55 These results are extensively described in Shavell (1992a). 
56 Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) point at a second problem associated with obtaining infor-
mation. Obtaining information might increase the probability that a firm is found liable, 
because this information may be used against them by governments, victims or other 
adverse parties in prosecution or a tort case. By investigating their own compliance status 
and the possibilities of taking precautions, firms are effectively aiding their own pros-
ecution or adverse suit. Therefore the firm’s incentive to obtain information may be too 
weak.
57 Kramer and Sykes (1987), Kraakman (2000), Alexander (2004), Faure and Visser (2004).
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points at the consequences of different individuals who are responsible for 
precautions.58
In general, we can distinguish between three different types of individu-
als related to the firm. The first type covers lower-level managers or employ-
ees who take day-to-day decisions that affect the level of precautions and 
hence expected harm. For example, a waiter in a café or restaurant may decide 
to place a beer-crate in front of an emergency exit. The second type consists 
of upper managers who set overall safety policies and make decisions about 
safety investments. These people also decide on the production level. Finally, 
there are the shareholders, or the owners, of the company. They receive the 
profits made by the firm, which depend on the costs of taking precautions and 
on sanctions. The party bearing the costs and consequences of taking precau-
tions (either monetary or non-monetary) may be different from the one decid-
ing about taking precautions. The important question is how the enforcement 
approach should be structured to ensure that all parties face efficient incen-
tives to reduce the expected harm (Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992).
Generally, shareholders have some control over the firm because they are 
able to designate incentives for the upper managers, to ensure that the firm 
is trying to maximize profit. It is generally not efficient to extend the liability 
of the firm to its shareholders (Shavell, 1987). In small firms, the shareholders 
(one or two) are usually the managers themselves and they will have invested 
all their assets in the firm. In other cases, the shareholders are not clearly able 
to observe and control the behavior of individual actions by employees in 
such a way as to reduce accidents, because they lack the expertise to do so 
and because of the free-rider problem arising if every shareholder only has a 
limited share. Liability of the firm implies the liability imposed on the assets 
of the firm with which the upper managers are concerned. The most relevant 
agency problem is the relationship between the lower level employee and the 
upper manager who represents the firm. 
There are several situations in which corporate and/or vicarious liability 
suffices to induce precautions, even if employees are responsible for precau-
tions. If there are no transaction costs, it is not important who is sanctioned for 
an offense as the sanctions are freely transferable. This is a direct application 
of the Coase theorem. If the firm is held liable for the actions of its employees, 
it will charge the damages or fine it paid to the liable employee. Vicarious 
liability may thus be efficient if the firm is either able to monitor the actions of 
its employees at no cost (ex-ante) or if the wage rate can be made dependent 
on sanctions (ex-post). However, in many cases such shifting of sanctions is 
58 More extensive analyses, which underlie this subsection, can be found in Segerson and 
Tietenberg (1992), Kraakman (2000), Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (1993). See 
also Lott (2000), Alexander (2004) and Faure and Visser (2004). This section does not intend 
to provide a full analysis of vicarious liability, but rather to explain which principal-agen-
cy problems might be present in organizations more complex than the simple hierarchies 
I analyze. The remarks apply to both civil and criminal liability.
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imperfect. Firms may not be able to vary wages directly or indirectly with 
the actions of its employees or with the size of the penalties it is issued. At 
least in the short run, wages are set by contract, and transaction costs prohibit 
continually bargaining over the contract. Or the wages might be governed 
by a process of collective bargaining with unions. The firm might have dif-
ficulty observing the daily behavior of their employees. The consequences 
of actions might only become apparent in the long run or the responsibility 
of employees might be diffused. Hence, if only the firm is held liable for all 
the actions of its employees, insufficient precautions will result, and welfare 
may be improved by making employees personally liable for their actions. 
In addition, the state might be able to control the employees’ behavior more 
effectively or at lower costs, because the state can impose imprisonment as an 
alternative or supplement to the fine.
On the other hand, vicarious liability might improve deterrence if the 
individual employee is unable to pay for the harm done (while the firm is 
not), if it is hard for victims to identify the responsible employee (while the 
firm is not) or if upper managers are able to reduce accident risks by reorga-
nizing the production process (which is hard to judge by courts).
For fire safety in horeca establishments I assume that the proprietor is 
both the shareholder and the manager of the horeca firm and that he is able to 
control the behavior of his personnel. Therefore, it suffices to provide the pro-
prietor with an efficient incentive to take precautions, and I simply describe 
the firm as the injurer of an accident. If, however, these assumptions cannot 
be made, solving the accident problem would be more complicated. If the 
firm is unable to observe and control employees’ precautions, corporate and/
or vicarious liability will not lead to harm reduction. If the upper managers 
and shareholders are different persons, shareholders face the problem of pro-
viding the managers with incentives to maximize the firm’s profit. 
2.3.7 Litigation
Liability rules are only an effective mechanism in inducing injurers to take 
precautions if victims are actually able to enforce a claim for damages. Oth-
erwise, the injurer will not be inclined to prevent accidents. However, the 
litigation process is not without problems because the court system is costly, 
both privately and socially.59
The decision to bring suit and deterrence
A victim will bring suit if the amount he can claim from the injurer (the loss 
suffered) exceeds the costs of a claim. Therefore, a victim is less likely to claim 
damages if his costs of litigation are high, if his estimate of winning a trial is 
59 The results of this subsection can be found in Miceli (1997) and Shavell (1987 and 2004). 
See also Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).
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low, or if the expected magnitude of the award is small. These conditions are 
more likely to be satisfied if harm is widely dispersed over a large number 
of victims, if the harm from an activity becomes apparent after a long time, 
if the injurer is untraceable, or if it is difficult to find the causal relationship 
between act and harm. 
If, due to the costs of litigation, the victim might not always bring suit, this 
implies that the injurer is not always forced to pay damages. Or, even if the 
victim brings suit, but the costs of litigation are high, the victim might accept 
a relatively low settlement amount, and hence the injurer will not be forced to 
face the full harm he caused. This has a negative effect on the incentive to take 
precautions. On the other hand, there is also no danger that injurers might 
choose excessive precautions in order to reduce the probability that they will 
incorrectly be held negligent (section 2.3.1). If the proprietor behaved non-
negligently, a victim’s failure to bring suit is not a problem.
The efficient levels of precautions and of litigation
If accidents lead not only to losses for the victims, but also to litigation costs, it 
means accidents are socially more expensive, so precautions should be high-
er. Generally, however, an injurer only considers the extent to which taking 
precautions reduces expected damages plus his own litigation costs, instead 
of considering the full social costs of litigation. Victims do not naturally make 
efficient use of litigation either. From a social point of view litigation is desir-
able if the costs of litigation are lower than the deterrence that is gained from 
the procedure, i.e. the reduction in expected harm plus compliance costs. 
However, victims make a different consideration: they tend to balance their 
own costs of litigation with the private benefits obtained from the wealth 
transfer. As a result, a victim may choose for too many or too few lawsuits.
Litigation costs may differ under strict liability and under negligence. 
Negligence can induce optimal precautions while avoiding a lawsuit, where-
as strict liability requires a lawsuit plus its costs for injurers to take precau-
tions. However, given a claim negligence is costlier because the courts have 
the additional tasks of determining the due standard and actual care.
Settlement
Settling the damages claim allows parties to save on trial costs. There are sev-
eral reasons why parties might fail to reach an agreement (Kobayashi and 
Parker, 2000). First, a settlement will not be reached if parties over-estimate 
their chance of trial victory, making them unwilling to accept a settlement. 
Secondly, the existence of external effects may cause trials, such as the prec-
edential and preclusive effect of the underlying case, which will determine 
the parties’ payoff in similar future cases. Thirdly, a settlement may not be 
reached if information about the expected trial outcome differs among par-
ties. Information problems can be solved through costly trials. Costly trials 
are a signal of the strength of the case, which improves the bargaining posi-
tion. Finally, agency costs, such as costs of hiring a lawyer, can give rise to the 
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occurrence of trials. For example, an attorney may receive a higher compen-
sation in a trial because that requires more hours of work. 
This shows that litigation is a complex process. The existence of a settle-
ment, or bargaining, range is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
settlements. The outcome of the litigation process also depends on the amount 
of money and time parties spend on it. Generally, the private and social incen-
tive to settle and the incentive to spend money on litigation diverge.60
Legal aid
 If the legal costs are too high in relation to the expected judgment, victims will 
not bring suit even if it is socially desirable to do. Moreover, even if a victim 
estimates that the expected judgment exceeds his legal costs, he will have 
to advance the legal costs. If the victim has limited (liquid) assets or a low 
income, this might be a problem. If these credit constraints are sufficiently 
high, the victim will be unable to bring suit. A system of public legal aid may 
overcome credit constraints, thereby enhancing deterrence and justifying the 
use of public resources – although legal aid also has some negative effects on 
litigation.
Credit constraints are absent under contingent fees or under legal cost 
insurance. Under these systems the outcome depends on who has control 
over the claim and the settlement decision. Accident or liability insurance 
may also imply that the claim is no longer in the hands of the parties them-
selves but in those of the insurance companies. The interests of the insurance 
company or attorney are not necessarily in line with those of the parties them-
selves.
Besides financial buffers, claiming damages also requires social and com-
municative skills that will enable the victim to know how to claim damages 
and how to bargain for the highest possible settlement amount.
Standardization
Uncertainty concerning the outcome of a trial may be caused by differences 
among judges or districts, by uncertain or open-ended norms, by uncertainty 
about the way in which harm will be compensated, etc. Such uncertainty may 
create under- or overdeterrence (section 2.3.1), it may induce victims to inef-
ficiently refrain from litigation and it may prevent parties from settling the 
claim.
This uncertainty can be reduced by standardizing or harmonizing litiga-
tion outcomes. One of the clearest examples is the computation of damages. 
It might be an unduly hard task for the victim to show his precise level of 
losses, especially when these losses are still unrealized future events (such 
as the loss of earning capacity) or difficult to measure (such as non-monetary 
60 An overview of the relevant literature (and further references) on this bargaining process 
can be found in Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Kennan and Wilson (1993) and Daughety 
(2000).
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damages) . It might be efficient to introduce a classification of losses paired 
with appropriate compensation amounts, so that the victim will only have to 
prove to which class he belongs. This might save the time and costs spent on 
a trial (such as hiring medical experts), or even induce settlement by reduc-
ing the uncertainty and the possibility of disagreement. If the classification is 
done properly, so that it approximates a victim’s average losses, deterrence is 
not lost: injurers will choose their precautions based on expected, rather than 
actual damages.61
Joint litigation and class actions
In the case of severe accidents, multiple victims suffer damage. In such cases, 
there are some ways to save litigation costs.
First, courts have the possibility to route similar cases to a single court 
for coordinated management. Moreover, it is possible to unite similar ques-
tions into one case. For example, victims can file a case to determine wheth-
er or not the injurer was negligent. If he was, individual victims can try to 
claim their damages from the injurer in individual procedures. Secondly, an 
interest group can represent the plaintiffs, and negotiate on behalf of all vic-
tims, so that victims settle their case collectively . This might prove difficult 
when many victims are unknown or widely spread geographically, making 
it impossible, or at least very costly, to unite all claims into one settlement. 
The most far-reaching system is the class action. The class action implies that a 
victim, or an injurer, can ask the court to bind all persons with related claims 
(a class) to the settlement or trial outcome, even if these persons are no parties 
at the proceedings (Silver, 2000).
The main advantages of class actions for victims are that litigation costs 
are saved because common questions about facts or law have to be decided 
only once. So long as the benefits of litigation are non-rival, as is the case with 
document preparation, expert witness testimony, computer simulations, etc., 
costs are decreased as a result of being shared. This is also socially worth-
while. Especially when the damage is spread among many victims, so that 
an individual trial might not be worthwhile for a victim, class actions may 
increase deterrence. The benefits of class actions for the defendant lie in the 
certainty he receives about the (financial) consequences of a settlement. He is 
sure that no more litigation actions will follow and that the case is closed. This 
certainty might also be socially beneficial.62 
61 The only disadvantage is that compensation only approximates first-best, because a vic-
tim is seen as a member of a class rather than an individual receiving individual compen-
sation. In general, the savings in litigation costs are expected to exceed the (minor) loss in 
optimal compensation.
62 Class actions, however, have also disadvantages. A more extensive summary and discus-
sion of the system and its (dis)advantages can be found in Silver (2000) and Miller (1997).
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2.3.8 Conclusion on the efficiency and effectiveness of liability
This section investigates the extent to which private enforcement by victims 
can result in efficient precautions. Generally, the injurer is induced to take 
efficient precautions if the expected magnitude of the liability equals the 
expected harm. This induces him to balance the social costs and benefits of 
accidents. This in turn leads to several requirements, which have been dis-
cussed: (1) Courts should enforce socially optimal levels of precaution in a 
predictable way; (2) If necessary, insurance companies should be able to con-
trol moral hazard problems; (3) The magnitude of liability should involve full 
awards for both monetary and non-monetary losses; (4) The injurer should 
be able to pay all damages; (5) The injurer should know or should ought to 
know how to prevent liability; (6) (a) The victim should be willing and able 
to file a claim, (b) The injurer should be forced to offer compensation not only 
for harm done, but also for all other accident-related costs, such as litigation 
costs, (c) Litigation costs harm social welfare and should therefore be mini-
mized given the incentive to take precautions.
If these conditions are not satisfied, the injurer will choose less than effi-
cient precautions. In order to maintain efficient precautions, the incentive to 
take precautions must be adjusted, for instance through punitive damages, 
obligatory insurance, public legal aid , public apprehension and accident 
investigation. For the case of fire safety in horeca establishments it is not clear 
whether or not all requirements are satisfied. For that an empirical analysis 
of actual data is required, for instance to determine whether litigation costs 
are a barrier, whether proprietors are able to pay for damages, what the actual 
amount of damage compensation is, etc. For now, it suffices to conclude that 
private enforcement by liability rules might be a relevant method to obtain 
efficient precautions, but that there are also sufficient reasons to believe that it 
might fail. Then, public regulation and enforcement is an alternative method 
of creating deterrence. 
2.4 Conclusion: The need for public enforcement
This chapter starts with identifying the relevant accident problem. The prob-
lem is that the proprietor must be provided with an incentive to take precau-
tions. I discussed several reasons why the proprietor will choose an ineffi-
cient level of precautions, or even no precautions at all, when nothing else 
is regulated or enforced. Contracting between proprietors and visitors will 
fail because of the high transaction costs. Therefore, the externality problem 
should be solved in a different way, by making the injurer pay a price for the 
harm he inflicts on others. If the injurer fully internalizes all harm he inflicts, 
he will have an efficient incentive to take precautions. He will be forced to 
balance the costs of precautions and the benefits of harm reduction. The exter-
nality problem will thus be solved. For instance, victims can force the injurer 
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to pay compensation for the harm done. Thus the enforcement of liability 
rules by actual victims induces the proprietor to take precautions. But this 
will only result in the desired level of precautions if several important con-
ditions are satisfied. Hence, it is necessary to consider another alternative. 
This alternative is the introduction of public regulation, or more precisely, of 
public enforcement of the regulation. The next chapters consider whether the 
imposition of fines, imprisonment and other public sanctions on violation of 
the regulation, is efficient.
Given that firms do not voluntarily comply with the regulation, maxi-
mizing social welfare implies a third requirement next to compensation and 
deterrence: the minimization of enforcement costs.63 Before, I argued that the 
efficient level of precautions is determined by a balance of the costs of com-
pliance and the reduction in expected harm. Given the need for enforcement 
activities, this balance should be adjusted. The enforcement costs of obtain-
ing a higher level of precautions should be weighed against the balance of 
compliance costs and expected damage. Even if the reduction in expected 
damage resulting from taking more precautions is higher that the compliance 
costs, it is not necessarily efficient to obtain that higher level, due to the costs 
of enforcement. If there are (unavoidable) costs of enforcement, it is efficient 
to enforce a level of precautions that is lower than the first-best.
63 Calabresi (1970).

3 Introduction to public law enforcement: 
detection and sanctions
This chapter introduces the economic analysis of public law enforcement. I 
examine the conventional literature on efficient enforcement policies. The 
following chapters further investigate optimal public enforcement actions 
involving more complex problems. This review provides the arguments for 
chapter 8 on the distinction between a deterrence and a compliance strategy.
In this chapter I analyze the optimal probability of detection and the 
optimal magnitude of the sanction. In addition, the optimal nature of detec-
tion and of sanctions is examined. These depend on the information that is 
available to the enforcement authority: does it know whether a violation 
is desirable and which sanction will deter? The available information also 
determines the nature of detection. Detection might be perfectly certain or 
the enforcement authority has to invest in detection. Such investments might 
depend on information following reports of victims or following self-reports 
of firms.
First of all, I start with a description of the enforcement problem that 
is analyzed. In section 3.2, I consider how the efficient enforcement policy 
depends on the information available to the enforcement authorities, on the 
nature of detection (apprehension technology) and on the nature of the sanc-
tion. In section 3.3 I discuss how the probability of detection might depend 
on the compliance rate. In section 3.4 I consider detection by means of self-
reporting.
3.1 The model of public enforcement
3.1.1 The description of the enforcement policy
The enforcement problem examined here is as follows. A risk-neutral firm has 
to decide about its level of precautions, where some standard level of precau-
tions is prescribed (in some law, regulation, license etc.). Taking precautions 
reduces the expected harm from its business. Compliance with the standard 
is costly for the firm. A public enforcement authority is able to enforce compli-
ance by imposing sanctions. There is a probability of inspection of p. If there 
is an inspection, the enforcement authority perfectly detects the level of com-
pliance. A level of compliance lower than the standard may be sanctioned 
with either a monetary or a non-monetary sanction or a combination of these, 
denoted f and s respectively with s as the personal disutility of an imprison-
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ment time t, s= s(t).64 The magnitude of the sanction is limited to some upper 
bound, f max and smax respectively. The fine is limited by the assets of the firm. 
Non-monetary sanctions are limited by for instance life expectancy (age), 
time horizon etc. Sanctions are also constrained by the unwillingness of soci-
ety, courts and prosecutors to impose large sanctions. The limits to sanctions 
such as the withdrawal of licenses and imprisonment depend on the gain lost 
once the activity can no longer be pursued.
We can distinguish between two cases. The simplest case involves a firm 
which has to make a binary choice about either taking no precautions, which 
causes harm h but costs nothing, or choosing the standard, which leads to 
costs of compliance c but prevents harm. This is similar to choosing an activ-
ity that is forbidden. Examples include locking an emergency exit, failing to 
check fire extinguishers etc. This is therefore referred to as the binary case or 
single act model. A more complicated case is the one in which the firm has 
to choose a level of precautions x that costs c(x) with c'(x) > 0, and leads to 
harm h(x) with h'(x) < 0 (which is similar to choosing one of multiple acts). 
Examples include overcrowding in horeca establishments, incorrectly hang-
ing decorations in a café, or making a decision regarding several precautions 
simultaneously, such as only locking an emergency exit versus locking an 
emergency exit and choosing dangerous decorations. In these decisions, the 
issue of  marginal deterrence (Stigler, 1970) is important, i.e. individuals who are 
not deterred must be induced to choose less harmful offenses.65
Assume that imposing a fine does not lead to social costs. Fines merely 
involve a transfer of wealth. It is costly for the penalized individual, but the 
benefits from the fines can be used in socially beneficial projects or tax reduc-
tions. For simplicity’s sake, I refrain from including the administrative costs of 
collecting fines as well as costs of prosecution. With imprisonment, important 
social time is lost and resources are spent on prisons, guards, parole officers 
etc., which costs are denoted as k(t).66 Until chapter 6, I assume that courts 
make perfect decisions, i.e. they convict firms if and only if they are guilty 
given the rules and actual behavior and according to the enforcement policy. 
In cases of conviction, sanctions are always carried out.
64 ‘The firm’ cannot be sent to prison, only the responsible manager or employee can. I 
assume that the proprietor is equal to the firm and has full control over its employees. He 
can be imprisoned.
65 I do not distinguish between harm-based enforcement (such as investigating a fire acci-
dent) and act-based enforcement (such as taking fire prevention measures). The analysis 
here starts with h as expected harm including both accidental and certain harm. Chapter 
11 discusses whether harm-based or act-based enforcement is optimal.
66 Of course, in real life, prosecution and enforcing the payment of fines is costly. The reader 
can infer the influence of these costs from the results of imposing costly non-monetary 
sanctions.
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3.1.2 The trade-off between sanctions and detection
The (modern) economic approach to law enforcement is based on the seminal 
article by Becker (1968). According to this analysis of the binary case, a ratio-
nal and risk-neutral firm will comply with the rules if the costs of compliance 
exceed those of violation. An expected sanction equal to or larger than the 
costs of compliance will deter the firm from violating the standard. Under 
a system of fines, it is optimal to use extreme sanctions and low probabili-
ties of apprehension. If inspection is costly and imposing a sanction is not, 
enforcement costs are minimized by a probability of inspection arbitrarily 
close to zero and a maximal sanction sufficient to deter. This conclusion still 
holds, according to Becker, if punishment is costly, as with imprisonment. If 
all activities are undesirable, the threat of severe imprisonment suffices to 
deter, and hence costly imprisonment will never have to be carried out. Even 
if not all activities are undesirable and deterred, the probability of detection 
can be decreased and the prison time increased, so that the expected time in 
prison remains constant. The same level of deterrence is achieved by lower 
costs of detection and the same level of costs of imprisonment. This has a ben-
eficial effect on social welfare.
In sum: (1) a higher expected sanction decreases the level of non-compli-
ance, (2) costly non-monetary sanctions should only be used when costless 
monetary sanctions have already been used to the maximum, (3) decreas-
ing the probability of detection and increasing the magnitude of the sanction 
might ensure deterrence but save enforcement costs, hence it is socially desir-
able. Therefore, the sanctions should be at the maximum level with a prob-
ability of detection that suffices to deter.
3.1.3 Risk attitude and the costs of imprisonment
I will generally adhere to the assumption of a risk neutral firm. However, it 
is useful to shortly describe how the risk attitude may influence the optimal 
enforcement policy. Because of the probability of detection, non-compliance 
is a risky choice (Becker , 1968). Risk aversion with respect to imprisonment 
refers to cases of increasing marginal disutility of imprisonment, so that four 
years in prison is more than twice as bad as two years. A risk preference for 
imprisonment implies that the marginal disutility of imprisonment decreas-
es, so that serving four years in prison once is valued less badly than serving 
two years in prison twice. 
If the firm is risk-averse with respect to wealth or imprisonment, a small-
er probability of detection increases the risk costs, and hence increases deter-
rence. Therefore a lower expected sanction will be sufficient to deter non-
compliance. The benefits from a decrease in the probability of detection and 
a proportional increase in the magnitude of the sanction are higher. How-
ever, if there is a risk preference for wealth or imprisonment, a decrease in 
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the probability of detection increases the risk of committing a violation, and 
hence makes non-compliance more attractive to the firm. This means that the 
sanction should increase more than proportionally in order to retain deter-
rence. This is no problem under costless monetary sanctions. However, under 
imprisonment, this implies that the expected man-years in prison increase, so 
that it is not necessarily beneficial to impose extreme sanctions. That might 
lead to large costs for carrying out imprisonment. It might therefore be desir-
able to choose for a higher probability of detection and a smaller sanction.67
The results depend on the marginal costs of imprisonment. The social 
costs of carrying out imprisonment consist of the private disutility of impris-
onment plus the public costs of imprisonment. If the marginal social costs 
of imprisonment are constant (i.e. k"(t) = 0) and if there are no fixed costs of 
imprisonment, imprisoning a single man for four years is as costly as impris-
oning two men for two years. For example, a decrease in the probability of 
detection from 10% to 5% and a corresponding increase in the imprisonment 
sanction from two to four years will both lead to an expected imprisonment 
sanction of 0.2 years. Unless the firm is a risk lover, deterrence remains at 
a constant level, the expected man-years in prison and hence the costs of 
imprisonment are constant, but the costs of detection decrease. This has a 
beneficial effect on social welfare. If the marginal costs are decreasing (i.e. 
k"(t) < 0) and/or there are fixed imprisonment costs, it will be less costly to 
imprison a single man for four years than to imprison two men for two years. 
On the other hand, if the marginal social costs are increasing (i.e. k"(t) > 0), it is 
less costly to imprison two men for two years. In that case, even if the firm is 
risk neutral, trading-off the probability of detection and the magnitude of the 
sanction might increase punishment costs. This increase should be balanced 
with the decreased costs of detection.
3.1.4 Subjective and objective sanctioning risk
 The firm bases his decision about compliance on its subjective perception of 
the probability of detection and conviction, and of the sanction. This might 
be different from the objective, actual sanctioning risk implemented by the 
enforcement authority. However, in general, the objective and subjective 
sanction risk are related. The subjective value of the probability of detection 
and the magnitude of the sanction depends on the information that the poten-
tial offenders possess, which in turn depends on, for instance, the visibility 
and predictability of enforcement. If there is uncertainty concerning the prob-
ability of detection or the magnitude of the sanction, firms will update their 
belief about the expected sanction if they observe enforcement actions against 
themselves or others (see section 4.1). Generally, it is not possible to try to 
67 If not all firms can or should be deterred, the realized risk costs or benefits should be incor-
porated into social welfare (Polinsky and Shavell, 1979).
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only threaten with high probabilities and sanctions – in the hope that people 
will believe it and comply – without actually imposing them. Such a threat 
would have no credibility, at least in the long run.68 If there is at least some 
positive relationship between the objective, actual sanctioning risk and the 
subjective, perceived sanctioning risk, a higher sanction or higher probability 
of detection will still result in increased compliance, even though effective-
ness may be decreased.
A step further is to argue that firms are not only imperfectly informed 
about the expected enforcement policy, but are also not perfectly able to 
update and process all available information. There are important limits on 
human cognition (section 1.4.2) . Jolls (2004) has sketched some important 
implications of bounded rationality  for public law enforcement. She mentions 
three important aspects of bounded rational behavior which affect the poten-
tial offenders’ comparison of the benefits and costs of committing offenses:
1. Optimism bias. Individuals make judgment errors because they underes-
timate the probability that a negative event will happen to them rather 
than to others. This implies for instance that potential offenders might 
think that the probability of arrest is lower for them than for others. Op-
timism bias might also involve an underestimation of the probability of 
detection relative to the actual probability.
2. Availability. The ease with which a given event comes to an individual’s 
mind affects the probability estimates. The estimated probability of arrest 
depends on the salience and vividness of observed arrests. This implies 
that it is important how arrests takes place. If it is carried out in such a 
way that everyone knows about it, this will increase others’ estimate of 
the possibility of arrest. Furthermore, the estimated probability of arrest 
depends on the observed number of arrests. Possibly, if this number is 
below a critical treshold, the probability of arrest simply disappears from 
the radar screen of potential offenders.
3. Prospect theory. The main point here is that people evaluate outcomes 
based on the change they represent from an initial reference point rather 
than based on the nature of the outcome itself. This implies, for example, 
that people exaggerate the difference between a small probability of ar-
rest and a zero probability of arrest. Another implication is that changes 
far from the reference point matter relatively little. For example, the deter-
rent effect of increasing the magnitude of the penalty will have a strongly 
diminishing effect. The difference between a fi ne of €10,000 or €11,000 is 
much less than the difference between a fi ne of €100 or €200, although in 
the fi rst case the fi ne increases with €1000 while in the second with only 
€100.
A different interpretation of this status quo bias is that the value function of 
individuals is concave for gains, but convex for losses, i.e. they are risk-averse 
with respect to gains, but risk-seeking with respect to losses. Evaluation of 
changes relative to an initial reference point follows from an “endowment 
68 See for example Shavell (2004, p.481 including references).
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effect”, i.e. the fact that the possession of a good implies some entitlement to 
that good.69
In the analysis hereafter I will ignore these complications and assume that 
the firm makes a fully rational decision about compliance.
3.1.5 Detection technology
There are two basic forms of detecting non-compliance. Apprehending 
offenders can be in a specific or general manner.70 Specific enforcement, also 
called investigation or inspection, implies that expenditures on detection are 
allocated (ex-post) to tracing the offender of a specific, known violation, such 
as when investigating a fire accident or the illegal dumping of waste. Under 
specific enforcement, resources for detection can be conditioned on the infor-
mation about the severity of the offense (for example from reports by vic-
tims). General enforcement, also called surveillance or monitoring , implies 
that expenditures are allocated as a fixed budget ex-ante to detect offenders 
and prevent several types of offenses, for instance surveillance police offi-
cers, flash guns and regular inspections by fire prevention and environmental 
protection officers. The main characteristic of monitoring is that it cannot be 
conditioned on the severity of an offense, because it is as yet unknown wheth-
er an offense has occurred. The enforcement authority must therefore spend 
resources before receiving information about the offense. Hence, a general 
probability of detection applies to the same type of offenses regardless of the 
harm done.
3.2 Basic efficient enforcement policy
This section extends the basic steps of Becker (1968) to verify whether the eco-
nomic analysis predicts high sanctions and low probabilities of detection.71 
The efficient enforcement policy is identified in steps. First, I assume that 
enforcement is certain because the offender is publicly known. This is some-
times a realistic assumption, for example in case of ex-post enforcement after 
an accident. Moreover, this case shows the optimal expected sanctions when 
costs of detection are absent. Secondly, I consider enforcement through moni-
toring where the probability of detection is fixed but less than one. Thirdly, 
69 It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss prospect theory. See Curran (2000) for a 
very brief introduction into ideas put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (for example 
1979, 1981, 1992).
70 See Mookherjee and Png (1992) and Shavell (1991, 1992b).
71 I provide only the most basic results, because several extensive literature reviews are 
available. See for example Polinsky and Shavell (2000a and 2000b). Shavell (2004, part V) 
provides the most extensive, recent and accessible theory of optimal enforcement. These 
references also provide or refer to formal analyses.
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I consider enforcement through investigation where detection can be condi-
tioned on the harm done. I then discuss the joint use of monitoring and inves-
tigation. Finally, I discuss the problem raised by the fact that the probability of 
detection (or sanctions) depends on the number of offenses.72
3.2.1 Certain enforcement
Let us assume first of all that all offenses are perfectly detected. The enforce-
ment authority can observe that an accident has occurred at no costs. Fur-
thermore, consider the binary case in which a firm must decide whether or 
not to comply with a standard. Under certain enforcement, the authorities 
know who committed an offense without allocating resources to detection. 
Without costs of detection, it is publicly known who caused damage. Hence, 
the important question is the optimal magnitude of the sanction.
Perfect information
If the enforcement authorities are also perfectly aware of the individual harm 
done and the costs of compliance, they know perfectly whether a violation 
is (in)efficient. Should they also know the magnitude of the maximal sanc-
tion, they will know whether the sanction can be made large enough to deter 
violation. The enforcement authority can then focus its resources on offenses 
that are inefficient (h ≥ c) and can be deterred by making the sanction large 
enough. A sanction at least equal to the costs of compliance will induce these 
firms to comply. The costs of imposing sanctions – if present – will never be 
realized. There are no costs of detection, no costs of imposing sanctions and 
the optimal level of deterrence is achieved; the best possible result.
Under monetary sanctions, another policy is also optimal. Because 
imposing sanctions is costless, it is also possible to sanction all offenses with 
a fine equal to the harm done (f = h). The firm will comply if the harm, hence 
the sanction, is larger than the costs of compliance. This leads to optimal 
deterrence of offenses as long as the firm is able to pay the fine. If the firm is 
not able to pay, that should be taken for granted. Again, there are no costs of 
detection, no costs of imposing sanctions and the optimal level of deterrence 
is achieved.
If the legal standard is efficient, for example because the standard is set at 
the individual level in licenses (so that inefficient offenses are exempted), the 
72 I do not distinguish between strict and fault-based liability (see Shavell, 2004 for a different 
approach). One reason is that strict liability may be seen as a form of negligence in which 
the level of due care equals the legal standard. Moreover, as follows from Shavell (2004), 
a fault-based system is optimal when authorities have perfect information. If authorities 
only have information about harm, then only strict liability is available. I discuss the opti-
mal enforcement policy given the available information. Comparing the optimal regimes 
under different information structures would yield a comparison of fault-based and strict 
liability.
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objective is simply to eliminate all offenses. If, for example, an imprisonment 
sanction of 10 years suffices to deter all offenses, there is no harm, no costs of 
detection and no costs of imprisonment, hence the first-best result.
Only harm is known
Now suppose that if an accident occurs, enforcement authorities only observe 
the damage to victims and property and not the costs of compliance. This 
implies that the enforcement authorities cannot distinguish the different 
types of offenses. Offenses that cause the same level of harm will be penalized 
identically. I argued that under perfect information and monetary sanctions, 
it is optimal to impose a fine equal to the harm done. Because this does not 
depend on information about the costs of compliance, the same enforcement 
policy is still possible and optimal.
The result is different for costly sanctions. Since it is not possible to distin-
guish between the different types of offenses, enforcement costs will be made 
for inefficient offenses or for offenses that cannot be deterred due to the maxi-
mum imprisonment sanction. Both under- and overdeterrence can be optimal. 
The efficient enforcement policy is summarized in the following points.
1. The optimal sanction includes the costs of imposing a sanction (Polinsky 
and Shavell, 1992). Assume for simplicity’s sake that these costs, k, are 
independent of the imprisonment time. Then sˆ = h + k. The reason is as 
follows: fi rms who comply are not prosecuted and punished. The social 
costs involve the compliance costs c. Firms that violate cause harm and 
are prosecuted and punished, leading to costs of harm done h and costs of 
imposing a sanction k. Hence, the socially optimal decision is to comply if 
the costs of compliance are lower than the costs of harm and punishment, 
c ≤ h + k. The optimal sanction equals sˆ = h + k. Note that this results in 
overdeterrence because some effi cient offenses will be deterred (if h < c ≤ 
h + k = s).
2. From the previous point it directly follows that it is optimal not to im-
pose any non-monetary sanction for minor offenses. If the costs of impo-
sition are relatively large and the benefi ts of deterrence relatively small, 
it is not worthwhile to spend resources on imprisonment. If authorities 
choose not to impose any sanction, all fi rms will violate, leading to costs 
h. Hence, not imposing imprisonment is benefi cial if h is suffi ciently small 
and k or the estimation of c suffi ciently large.
3. Under the more realistic assumption that the costs of imprisonment are 
larger for higher imprisonment sanctions (k'(t) > 0), either under- or over-
deterrence can be optimal. First, note that it is optimal to impose a sanc-
tion lower than  sˆ = h + k. Reducing the sanction has the benefi cial effect of 
reducing the costs of imposing a sanction, so the optimal sanction will be 
lower than it would have been under fi xed costs (Polinsky and Shavell, 
1992). Moreover, if these costs increase rather strongly, the optimal sanc-
tion may be below harm. Decreasing [increasing] the sanction sacrifi ces 
[strengthens] some deterrence leading to more [less] offenses, but reduces 
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[increases] costs of executing imprisonment for a given offense. Without 
specifying the cost functions, it is impossible to determine which effect 
will dominate. Underdeterrence by imposing a sanction lower than h can 
be favorable because it saves on the costs of imprisonment due to a shorter 
imprisonment time. Overdeterrence by imposing a sanction higher than 
h can be favorable because it saves on the costs of imprisonment since 
fewer offenses are committed, and therefore fewer sanctions imposed.
4. The same applies for the joint use of fi nes and imprisonment. It is always 
benefi cial to use fi nes fi rst, because they are costless. Whether it is optimal 
to supplement fi nes with imprisonment follows the same lines of reason-
ing and depends on the benefi ts of the gained extra deterrence and the 
realized costs of imprisonment.
Only costs of compliance are known
Suppose that the enforcement authority only observes the costs of compliance. 
As in the situation where only harm is known, the enforcement authorities 
will not know whether an offense is (in)efficient and should be deterred. The 
sanction can be made dependent on the observed level of compliance costs 
and on the estimated, perceived harm and its distribution. Consider a given 
expected harm. Low levels of compliance costs should be deterred because 
compliance costs will probably be lower than the harm and the offense is 
therefore expected to be inefficient. A sanction equal to at least the compliance 
costs suffices to deter. If the compliance costs increase, two things will hap-
pen. First, in order to deter firms with higher costs of compliance, the sanction 
will have to rise. Secondly, however, if the costs of compliance become larger, 
the offense is more likely to be efficient and should not be deterred. Therefore, 
above a certain threshold, no sanctions are optimal. Hence, there is no mono-
tonic relationship between compliance costs and the sanction.
No information
If the enforcement authority has no information at all about individual com-
pliance costs and harm, but it is able to observe whether a certain standard 
is violated (because it observes a fire accident or environmental spill), three 
options are available. First, if the average harm is rather high and average 
compliance costs rather low, it is optimal to enforce the standard maximally 
to ensure that everyone complies (if f max or s max are not binding). This will 
lead to costs of compliance but no harm. Secondly, in the reverse situation, if 
the average harm is low and average compliance costs high, it is optimal to do 
nothing, leading to harm but no compliance costs. In all intermediate cases, 
it is optimal to impose a sanction based on the estimated harm (and adjusted 
for costs of imposing sanctions as above). Then the firm will comply if its 
compliance costs are lower than the average harm. Firms with low compli-
ance costs will comply, which is in most cases efficient, and firms with high 
compliance costs will violate, which is in most cases efficient.
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3.2.2 Monitoring
 Above, detection was certain. Generally, authorities have to spend resources 
on tracing offenders, either through monitoring or through investigation. 
This subsection deals with general enforcement (monitoring): the authori-
ties have to spend resources before receiving information about the offense 
(Mookherjee and Png, 1992). 
Under monitoring, detection is costly and applies to all offenses of a cer-
tain type regardless of the harm done. Once an offense is detected, the impor-
tant question is the same as under certain enforcement, namely the optimal 
magnitude of the sanction dependent on the information that is available 
after detection. This implies that the results obtained under certain enforce-
ment are applicable, except that the sanction should be adjusted to the fact 
that the sanction is only imposed with a certain probability.73 The firm will 
comply if the expected sanction for non-compliance is higher than the costs 
of compliance, c ≤  p(f+ s). The first-best level of compliance is obtained when 
the expected sanction equals the harm. This forces the firm to balance the 
costs of compliance with the harm. Hence a fine equal to the harm inflated by 
the probability of being apprehended, f = h/p, implements efficient behavior. 
Compared to the case of certain enforcement, the magnitude of the sanction 
should be increased to correct for a lower probability of detection, so that the 
expected sanction will equal the harm. If the sanction exceeds the maximal 
available sanction, the firm will not comply, unless the probability of detec-
tion is increased.
Let me discuss this more extensively.
Multiple firms and monetary sanctions
Under monitoring authorities do not freely observe the (expected) harm that 
is inflicted. However, they may learn about the level of harm done, following 
detection. While detection cannot be made dependent on the level of harm, 
prosecution and punishment can. Consider the binary choice model with 
multiple firms who make a similar decision, but differ in the harm they inflict 
and in their private costs of compliance. This case is extensively discussed in 
Polinsky and Shavell (1992). See also Shavell (1991).
Let us begin with using only monetary sanctions. The firm will comply 
if the expected sanction exceeds the costs of compliance: pf ≥ c. The first-best 
level of compliance can be obtained when the expected sanction equals the 
harm. This forces the firm to balance the costs of compliance and the harm. 
Given the probability of monitoring p, a fine equal to the harm inflated by the 
73 From now on I only discuss the most realistic case, i.e. that the enforcement authority only 
has information about the harm done, and only briefly reflect on cases in which it has per-
fect information. I ignore cases where the authority only knows compliance costs or only 
knows that an offense or accident occurred. Results follow from the analysis under certain 
enforcement and the conclusions about detection as discussed in the main text.
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probability that an offense is detected, suffices to implement efficient compli-
ant behavior provided that the firm can pay the fine: f = h/p (hence pf = h) if 
h/p ≤ f max.
If it is optimal to have some positive monitoring, the probability of detection 
should be sufficiently large to deter more serious forms of harm. This implies, 
however, that firms who cause less harm, below the threshold h = pf max, are also 
detected with the same probability and  the fine can be adjusted to the harm, f = 
h/p, so that deterrence is first-best. The sanction rises with harm. For firms who 
cause harm above this threshold the fine is maximal, f max, and there is under-
deterrence. Of course, this underdeterrence can be prevented by increasing the 
probability of detection. However, because detection is costly, it is not beneficial 
to eliminate all offenses, but to sustain some degree of underdeterrence for the 
most harmful offenses. The optimal probability of detection follows from equat-
ing the marginal benefits of deterring firms who fail to comply because of the 
maximal available sanction, and the (marginal) costs of increasing monitoring 
(for all firms). This depends on the specific costs functions, but certainly implies 
some underdeterrence. It is optimal to have some firms for whom the maximum 
available sanction is binding.74 These are the firms that cause relatively much 
harm.
Multiple firms and non-monetary sanctions
Now suppose that costly non-monetary sanctions are imposed. First, the 
same conclusion applies as under certain enforcement with respect to the 
costs of imposition that should be included in the sanction. If the costs of 
imprisonment k are independent of the imprisonment time, the optimal sanc-
tion equals s = h/p + k.75 Generally, the costs of imposing a sanction increase 
with the imprisonment time (k'(t) > 0).
Because the enforcement authority only knows the harm, it is not able to 
punish only inefficient offenses so that the costs of imprisonment are realized. 
Given the costs of detection and imprisonment, the optimal enforcement pol-
icy is as follows (see for example Shavell, 1991; Polinsky and Shavell, 1984):
74 As under certain enforcement, we can identify three types of firms and offenses. (1) Firms 
for whom compliance is efficient (h ≥ c) and who can afford to pay the fine (f = h/p ≤ f max). 
They will efficiently choose to comply. (2) Firms for whom compliance is efficient, but 
who cannot afford the fine and will not comply (pf max< c ≤ h = pf). (3) Firms for whom 
compliance is inefficient (h < c) and who will efficiently incur violations either because 
they cannot pay the fine or because they do pay but still incur the violation. Increasing the 
probability of detection increases the costs of detection for all firms. It increases deterrence 
for some type 2 firms, converting them to type 1. Deterrence for types 1 and 3 remains 
unchanged, as the fine f = h/p is costlessly adjusted in order to prevent overdeterrence. 
Under monitoring it is optimal to choose the probability of detection in such a way that 
there will be some firms of type 2. It is only optimal to trade-off the probability of detec-
tion and the magnitude of the fine if the maximal fine is not binding for a sufficiently large 
number of firms.
75 Hence, ps = h + pk, or the expected sanction equals the expected costs of harm and sanc-
tions, Polinsky and Shavell (1992).
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1. For low levels of harm the optimal sanction is zero. If the harm is low, 
the benefi ts of deterrence are also low and it is not worthwhile to spend 
resources on imprisonment.
2. If harm becomes more important imprisonment becomes socially benefi -
cial. As under monetary sanctions, the expected sanction should rise with 
harm, by increasing the sanction (the probability is fi xed under monitor-
ing).
3. As under certain detection, there can be both over- and underdeterrence 
for these intermediate levels of harm. A higher sanction implies that more 
fi rms will comply, so fewer sanctions have to be carried out. However, 
the costs of punishment increase for fi rms who do not comply and are 
inspected.
4. For serious levels of harm, above a second treshold, the optimal sanc-
tion exceeds the maximum imprisonment, hence the fi rms in question are 
sanctioned with the maximal sanction and the result is underdeterrence.
5. Compared to the decision under costless monetary sanctions, the opti-
mal probability of detection should also take into account the costs of 
prosecution and punishment. A higher probability of detection increases 
the number of imprisonments that must be carried out for non-compliant 
fi rms, hence the costs of imprisonment. On the other hand, since more 
fi rms comply, fewer fi rms are found to be in violation and so the costs 
of imprisonment are decreased. As under point 3, the specifi c result de-
pends on the costs and distribution functions.
6. When both fi nes and imprisonment are used, it is optimal to impose a 
monetary sanction equal to the harm infl ated by the probability of detec-
tion (f = h/p) if the fi rm can pay this fi ne, hence if harm is small enough 
(below the treshold, f ≤ f max, or h ≤ pf max). Deterrence for these fi rms is op-
timal. Above this treshold, the maximal fi ne is imposed. In the beginning, 
optimal imprisonment is zero because the costs of imposing imprison-
ment are not worth the benefi ts of higher deterrence, so that some under-
deterrence develops. If this underdeterrence becomes severe enough, it 
becomes optimal to supplement the sanctions with costly imprisonment. 
For very severe levels of harm, the maximum monetary and non-mone-
tary sanction may be insuffi cient to deter.
Remarks on monitoring and multiple firms
Before continuing, some general remarks are relevant concerning the results 
obtained above.
1. It is important to stress that generally, a sanction equal to the harm done 
(as required under proportionality) is ineffi cient, especially if imposing a 
sanction is costly. Under uncertain enforcement, such a sanction will fail 
to enforce the most effi cient level of precautions. Moreover, since fi rms 
non-comply, costs are made for prosecution and punishment. Hence, 
fi rms fail to comply (no deterrence is obtained), while enforcement costs 
are made. This is probably the socially worst outcome.
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2. If the enforcement authorities learn of the magnitude of the compliance 
costs c (after detection), they will know whether compliance and violation 
is effi cient. This has an important advantage: the authorities can choose 
to punish only ineffi cient violations, which saves the costs of imposing 
sanctions.76 It is even possible to not punish fi rms who cannot be deterred 
because the maximal available sanction is too low. Moreover, the sanc-
tion no longer has to be adjusted to the level of harm in order to induce 
an effi cient balancing of compliance costs and harm. Ineffi cient offenses 
can be deterred by pS ≥ c. Since in the case of ineffi cient offenses h ≥ c, this 
means that a lower expected sanction is suffi cient and can be used to save 
enforcement costs by lowering S or possibly by lowering p (this, however, 
will affect all offenses).
Monitoring and heterogeneous wealth
In the above analysis, it was assumed that the enforcement authority knows 
the maximal available sanction (before and after detection) and that this is 
identical for all firms. The optimal probability of monitoring depends on 
this maximum. However, generally, the maximal fine or imprisonment dif-
fers among individuals and firms . Suppose that the enforcement authority is 
not informed about this maximum before detection, but only learn of it after-
wards (Polinsky and Shavell, 1984). First, consider fines. If firms differ with 
respect to wealth, it remains optimal to impose a sanction equal to f = h/p
as long as a firm can afford this fine. If this maximal fine becomes binding for 
the firms with the lowest wealth, it is optimal for firms with higher wealth to 
still have f = h/p, a fine that increases with harm. Therefore, firms are pun-
ished differently. Because the probability of detection is equal for each firm 
(independent of wealth), fines for firms with higher wealth should be higher 
than for low wealth firms. If wealth is binding for low wealth firms, they 
are underdeterred. However, for firms with higher wealth, deterrence can be 
increased at no cost by increasing the fine. The fine for the higher wealth firms 
should not necessarily be extreme, because that might create overdeterrence 
given the fixed probability of detection.
If only imprisonment is used, the results may differ and cannot be stated 
in general terms. They depend on the relationship between wealth and the 
value of imprisonment (Polinsky and Shavell, 1984). Since a higher wealth 
indicates a higher income and hence a greater opportunity cost of imprison-
ment, imprisoning higher wealth individuals is more cost-effective. This may 
result in higher imprisonment sanctions for higher wealth groups, since it 
might be desirable to achieve a higher level of deterrence. However, it may 
also result in smaller imprisonment sanctions, because a smaller sanction will 
suffice to create the same level of deterrence.
76 See also Malik (1990). It may be optimal for enforcement authorities to invest in screening in 
order to learn about the magnitude of the compliance costs, because learning might reduce the 
costs of imposing sanctions or the costs that firms make avoiding enforcement (section 6.2).
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Under the joint use of fines and imprisonment, it becomes optimal 
to impose imprisonment on firms with low wealth if the underdeterrence 
of these firms becomes severe enough. In such cases, it is optimal to pun-
ish wealthier firms with fines alone, and less wealthy firms with fines and 
imprisonment.
Polinsky (2006) discusses the situation in which wealth remains unob-
servable for the enforcement authority after detection. In this case, it might be 
optimal for the enforcement authority to offer a choice between two possible 
sanctions. Either a high fine or a low fine supplemented with imprisonment, 
with the latter as the overall most severe sanction.77 This will induce high 
wealth firms to choose the high fine. Since low wealth firms cannot afford the 
high fine, they necessarily choose the combination of fine and imprisonment. 
The reason that the sanction for low wealth firms is higher is that deterring 
low wealth firms is more beneficial, because this saves the costs of imprison-
ing them. Note that, as discussed, such a policy is also optimal if wealth is 
observable and the enforcement authority uses both imprisonment and fines, 
so that it does not matter whether wealth is observable or not.
Of course, not only wealth, but also the maximum available imprison-
ment sanction can vary, due to such factors as differences in age, health, time 
discounting etc. The effect of these differences is similar to the effect of differ-
ences in wealth on fines.
Marginal deterrence – multiple offenses
So far, I have discussed a situation in which the same probability of monitoring 
applies to multiple firms each of which can choose whether to commit a single 
offense. A somewhat different situation arises when each firm must decide on 
a level of compliance or precautions. The monitoring system detects all levels 
of precautions and harm at the same rate. If harm is learned of after detection, 
offenses of differing severity may be prosecuted and punished at different 
rates. The penalty scheme is bounded by the maximum available sanctions. 
If the maximal sanction is imposed on low levels of harm, firms which still 
fail to comply have no incentive to choose minor levels of offenses, but will 
choose for the most harmful offense. The expected sanction for more serious 
offenses should be higher. Since the probability of detection is given, a higher 
expected sanction must be obtained through a more severe punishment. This 
case is extensively discussed in Mookherjee and Png (1994). Shavell (1992b) 
discusses a similar model in which an individual can choose between two acts 
that differ in the level of harm. Let me summarize their results.
1. First note that the wealth limit constrains how much deterrence can be 
provided by costless penalties. If this maximum is not binding for even the 
highest levels of harm, any desired pattern of deterrence can be achieved 
at minimal cost by trading off the monitoring probability and suffi ciently 
77 The high fine could also be supplemented with imprisonment if necessary. It is essential 
that the imprisonment sanction and the overall sanction on low wealth firms be higher.
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large penalties. If the maximum fi ne is binding, the next points provide 
the optimal enforcement policy. 
2. Under costless monetary sanctions, it is optimal to let the penalty rise 
with the harm in order to obtain marginal deterrence, with the highest 
available fi ne reserved for the most harmful offenses.
3. Under costless monetary sanctions, it is optimal to set marginal expected 
penalties everywhere at a point lower than the marginal harm (i.e. less 
than fi rst-best deterrence). As before, since detection is costly, some un-
derdeterrence is benefi cial.
4. Under costless monetary sanctions, it is optimal not to punish minor lev-
els of non-compliance, i.e. offenses that only cause relatively low levels of 
harm. The reason is that reducing expected penalties for minor offenses, 
reduces the costs of deterrence for larger offenses, because expected pen-
alties should increase with the level of harm. The penalty for the highest 
level of harm equals wealth. For lower levels of harm, the sanction should 
be smaller or even, for the lowest levels of harm, zero. This allows the 
expected sanction to rise suffi ciently steeply, so that the highest levels of 
harm need not be deterred by a large and costly probability of detection. 
It is optimal to permit some non-compliance, although the marginal costs 
of compliance are lower than the marginal harm, in order to reduce the 
costs of deterring greater harm.78
5. Under costly non-monetary sanctions, the results under 3 and 4 are 
strengthened for minor offenses. Since enforcement costs are higher, the 
marginal expected penalties will be even lower and more offenses will go 
unpunished. On the other hand, the marginal expected penalties for more 
serious offenses should be stiffer. This will induce fi rms to commit fewer 
serious offenses, which involve lower costs of imposing sanctions. The 
marginal expected penalties for serious offenses might possibly exceed 
the marginal expected harm (overdeterrence) if the costs of prosecution 
and punishment are high in relation to the costs of monitoring.
6. There is a remarkable difference between the case involving multiple 
fi rms committing a single offense (as discussed above, and referred to 
here as model A) and the case in which a fi rm is deciding about mul-
tiple offenses (this paragraph, referred to as model B). Consider only 
monetary sanctions. In both models, the optimal sanction for the most 
harmful offenses equals wealth and the sanction for offenses with lower 
levels of harm is lower (and rises with harm done). The highest degrees of 
harm are underdeterred because of the costs of enforcement. However, in 
78 Heyes (2002) obtains a similar result in an otherwise completely different model for pol-
lution emissions. Moreover, he considers the threshold as an either exogenous or endo-
genous policy variable. He shows that an increase in the threshold (the informal standard 
above which no penalties are imposed) induces non-serious violators to reduce their pol-
lution, while it induces serious violators to increase their pollution if the penalty function 
is not steep enough. Therefore, more stringent enforcement might increase environmental 
damage and reduce social welfare.
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model A, deterrence for lower degrees of harm is perfect, while in model 
B, all offenses are underdeterred, including the less important ones. In 
both models, one probability of detection applies to all offenses. This im-
plies that in model A, fi rms that cause relatively small degrees of harm 
can be optimally deterred by a higher (costless) sanction. This does not 
affect other compliance decisions (by other fi rms). In model B, however, 
underdeterrence of less harmful offenses by choosing for a lower sanc-
tion is benefi cial because this induces fi rms to choose less harmful offens-
es. This leads for instance to the following differences. In Polinsky and 
Shavell (1992, model A) the (marginal) expected penalties should always 
exceed the (marginal) harm because the expected penalty should equal 
the expected harm plus the fi xed costs of imposing a sanction. Only when 
the costs of imposing sanctions increase rather steeply is some underde-
terrence favorable. Moreover, the expected penalty should be indepen-
dent of the monitoring costs, and if the prosecution/punishment costs 
are higher, the expected penalties should be raised for all acts. In model B, 
the marginal penalties are below the marginal harm. Moreover, there is a 
treshold below which violations are not prosecuted even under monetary 
sanctions. And higher prosecution/punishment costs increases penalties 
for some acts, but decreases for other acts. 
3.2.3 Investigation
Suppose that spending resources on detecting offenders is necessary in order 
to catch them, and that information about the severity of the harm becomes 
available once an offense is committed (for example as a result of reports by 
victims), so that the probability of detection (the allocated resources) can be 
made dependent on this information. Then we can speak of specific enforce-
ment, i.e. investigation.
If enforcement takes place through specific investigation, detection can 
be made dependent on the level of harm done. An expected sanction that 
is equal to the harm done will implement the first-best level of precautions. 
As noted by Becker (1968), it is possible to maintain deterrence but save on 
enforcement costs by lowering the probability of detection and increasing the 
sanction. Hence, the following conclusions hold (Polinsky and Shavell, 1984; 
Shavell, 1991 and 1992b; Mookherjee and Png, 1992):
1. If monetary sanctions are used, they should, according to this logic, be 
increased to the maximum. This holds irrespective of whether single or 
multiple offenses are involved and whether there are one or more fi rms. 
For all offenses, if the sanction is less than maximal, welfare can be in-
creased by increasing the fi ne and decreasing the probability of detec-
tion, maintaining the same level of deterrence. Marginal deterrence (the 
expected sanction should rise with the level of harm) can be obtained by 
varying the probability of detection.
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2. For all offenses, some level of underdeterrence is benefi cial. The socially 
optimal probability of detection balances the marginal costs of detection 
and the marginal benefi ts of deterrence. If compliance approaches fi rst-
best behavior, the benefi ts of deterrence become very small and it is not 
effi cient to eliminate all offenses. Moreover, for very small offenses, it is 
benefi cial to refrain from spending any resources on detection. This rea-
soning is the same as used before for justifying underdeterrence.
3. If only non-monetary sanctions are used, they should be increased to 
the maximum if the marginal social costs are decreasing or constant to 
the imprisonment time (section 3.1.3) and if the private disutility of im-
prisonment is increasing or constant to the imprisonment time. Suppose 
that the probability of detection is lowered and the imprisonment time 
increased, so that the expected sanction, and hence deterrence, remains 
equal. The enforcement costs, however, do change: (1) the costs of detec-
tion decrease; (2) the costs of imposing sanctions on non-compliant fi rms 
increase; (3) since fewer fi rms are apprehended, fewer imprisonment 
sanctions have to be executed and the costs of imprisonment decrease. 
If both the marginal private and social costs are constant, the net effect of 
(2) and (3) is zero. If the marginal private costs are constant, the expected 
value of imprisonment, p * s, will not change, so the expected man-years 
in prison remain unchanged. If the marginal social costs are constant, the 
costs of imposing sanctions are constant. The effect of a decrease in p is 
only a decrease in the costs of detection. However, if the marginal social 
costs of imprisonment increase, the costs of prosecution and punishment 
increase, while the costs of detection decrease. In which case, no general 
statement can be made and extreme sanctions are generally not favorable 
since the costs of imposing sanctions also become extreme. Similarly, if 
the marginal disutility of imprisonment decreases for the individual, im-
posing higher sanctions becomes increasingly less costly for the individ-
ual. When detection is lowered, a more than proportional increase in the 
imprisonment time is needed in order to maintain deterrence. Therefore, 
the social costs of imprisonment rise (unless the marginal social costs de-
crease enough), and this increase in costs should be balanced with the 
decreased costs of detection.79
4. Furthermore, under non-monetary sanctions, the same remarks about 
79 This analysis with respect to the marginal social costs of imprisonment was not relevant 
before, as a trade-off between the probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanc-
tion was not possible at the individual level. Under monitoring and certain enforcement, 
the question was whether increasing the imprisonment sanction was beneficial, a question 
answered by comparing the costs of imposing sanctions (and detection) with the benefits 
of increased deterrence (and therefore only k(t)  and k'(t) were important). Under investi-
gation, it becomes possible to consider how increasing the sanction and simultaneously 
lowering detection affects the costs. Here deterrence, hence the number of offenses, is held 
constant and it is considered whether the enforcement costs decrease if the sanction is 
higher but executed less often (and therefore k"(t)  is important).
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underdeterrence apply due to the costs of detection (including no en-
forcement for small offenses).  However, as discussed in the previous 
point, the costs of imposing sanctions can give rise to both under- and 
overdeterrence.
5. If both monetary and non-monetary sanctions are used, it is optimal to 
use the monetary sanction to the maximum as this can be implemented 
at no costs. Again, the probability of detection is such that this will result 
in some underdeterrence. For small offenses, below a given treshold, no 
enforcement is effi cient. If the harm increases, some positive enforcement 
becomes benefi cial and the sanction should equal wealth. It is not always 
necessary to increase deterrence with imprisonment. More generally, it is 
not optimal to impose the maximal non-monetary sanction. If an impris-
onment sanction is supplemented with a fi ne, this reduces the possibility 
to trade-off the probability of detection and the imprisonment time. Sup-
pose that the imprisonment time is doubled and the probability of detec-
tion is reduced. This also reduces the expected fi ne. Halving the probabil-
ity of detection would leave the expected imprisonment time constant, but 
reduce the expected fi ne, hence reduce deterrence. Put differently, in order 
to maintain the same level of deterrence the probability of detection should 
be less than halved. This will, however, increase the expected man-years 
in prison and hence increase the costs of imposing imprisonment (unless 
the marginal social costs decrease suffi ciently). The costs of detection are 
reduced, but the costs of imposing sanctions increase, so that the enforce-
ment costs may rise. The trade-off between the probability of detection 
and the non-monetary sanction is not necessarily effi cient. Moreover, it 
may be optimal not to supplement the maximal fi ne with imprisonment. 
This depends on the severity of underdeterrence.
Some remarks on investigation
Several remarks can be added to the results obtained:
1. If the costs of compliance are known before detection, the costs of detection 
will only have to be made where violation is ineffi cient. Firms for whom 
non-compliance is effi cient will not be sanctioned, so detection is not re-
quired. Similarly, if the costs of compliance are not known before detection, 
but only afterwards, the costs of prosecution and punishment can be saved 
by not prosecuting fi rms for whom non-compliance is effi cient. As under 
monitoring, this implies that a sanction that implements pS ≥ c for ineffi -
cient offenses suffi ces. Since for ineffi cient offenses h ≥ c , this means that a 
lower level of pS suffi ces for deterrence, hence the trade-off between p and 
S can be further utilized.
2. If the maximum available fi ne (or imprisonment time) is not known at 
the time that the probability of detection is determined (which generally 
seems to be the case), and if it is binding, the authorities should base the 
probability on the expected maximum fi ne. In choosing the optimal prob-
ability of detection, a balance must be made between deterrence of fi rms 
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with small maximal sanctions and the costs of detection. This depends on 
the distribution of f max. 
3.2.4 Joint use of monitoring and investigation
In the analyses above, the information about the harm done before detection 
was either perfect (hence investigation is efficient) or zero (hence only moni-
toring is available). Generally, information about harm done is imperfect and 
may vary with the severity of the offense. For example, the reporting degree of 
offenses by victims is imperfect but increases with the severity of the offense. 
When the reporting degree is sufficiently high for all levels of harm and the 
costs of investigation are sufficiently low (relative to those of monitoring), it is 
always optimal to only enforce through investigation (Mookherjee and Png, 
1992). If, however, these conditions are not satisfied, some levels of harm will 
be insufficiently deterred by investigation. If reporting is positive (although 
insufficient), so that some information about the harm done is available, it is 
optimal to combine investigation and monitoring. Given that some positive 
monitoring is desirable, efficient enforcement is as follows (Mookherjee and 
Png, 1992; Shavell, 1991, for the case of multiple firms):
1. Under monetary sanctions, there is no specific enforcement for firms 
causing relatively little harm (below h/p ≤ f max). Only general enforce-
ment is used and the fi ne is chosen so that the expected sanction equals 
the harm (f = h/p). It is possible to optimally deter these fi rms. If the sanc-
tion becomes larger than the wealth (h/p > f max), the fi rm cannot pay the 
fi ne and there is underdeterrence. When this underdeterrence becomes 
severe enough, it becomes optimal to supplement the measures with 
specifi c enforcement. The specifi c probability of detection rises with the 
harm done.
2. Under non-monetary sanctions, similar results apply. For low levels of 
harm, only general enforcement is used and the results of section 3.2.2 
concerning the optimal magnitude of the sanction (which may be zero if 
the costs of imposing sanctions are large) apply. For higher levels of harm, 
this results in underdeterrence and it might be benefi cial to supplement 
the  measures with specifi c enforcement. Whether it is optimal to employ 
maximal imprisonment depends on the costs function of imprisonment 
as discussed in section 3.2.3.
3. If both monetary and non-monetary sanctions are used, monetary sanctions 
should be used fi rst. This means that for low levels of harm (h/p ≤ f max), 
there is only general enforcement. The expected sanction equals the ex-
pected harm (f = h/p). This implies that above the treshold h = pf max , the 
fi rm will not be able to pay the fi ne and it will be underdeterred. Hence, be-
yond this treshold, the monetary sanction is maximal and optimal impris-
onment and optimal specifi c enforcement eventually become positive if 
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under deterrence becomes severe enough. Which of these measures is used, 
fi rst or jointly, depends on the specifi c (social) cost functions. 
3.3 Interactions between the crime rate and enforcement
In the above subsections, I discuss the influence of enforcement on the crime 
rate. However, there might also be significant influences of the crime rate 
on (the effectiveness of) enforcement. It is therefore important to study the 
interaction between the compliance rate and enforcement and the existence 
of (multiple) equilibriums of compliance rates and enforcement policies. 
The offense rate might influence both the probability of detection and the 
magnitude of the sanction. The literature – see Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) as 
well as Glaeser et al. (1996), Persson and Siven (2006) and Conley and Wang 
(2006) – studies the relationship between the crime rate, in particular theft, 
and enforcement. Let me describe the most important interactions that can be 
translated to safety regulation:
– The probability of detection might depend on the number of offenses. 
If the number of inspectors or police officers is given (in the short run), 
and the number of offenses exceeds their possible work load, the prob-
ability of detection decreases as the number of offenses increases, making 
non-compliance more attractive. Any firm’s individual decision to offend 
lowers the probability that any other firm’s offense will be detected. 
– The presence of offenders can influence others to become offenders as 
well (peer-effects). Alternatively, a lower compliance rate might decrease 
the stigma imposed on offenders, making non-compliance less costly. 
More generally, extralegal sanctions such as reputational effects might 
depend on the imposition of legal sanctions and the compliance rate.
– If the offense rate increases, both non-compliant firms as well as enforce-
ment authorities might realize positive returns to scale. Firms might learn 
from each other or be better able to obtain the equipment required for 
violation. Enforcement authorities might be more capable of exploiting 
information.
In chapter 7, I discuss the influence of informal (extra-legal) sanctions and 
will demonstrate how their influence depends on the compliance rate. With 
respect to the effects of the interactions discussed here and the existence of 
multiple equilibriums, similar conclusions apply as those derived in chap-
ter 7 about informal sanctions. The existence of multiple equilibriums might 
explain why compliance rates vary over time and place, even if social and 
economic conditions are comparable.
With respect to the optimal level of enforcement resources, Bar-Gill and 
Harel (2001) conclude that if a decrease in the offense rate raises [lowers] the 
probability of detection as well as the magnitude of the sanction, the deterrent 
effect of enforcement is stronger [weaker] than in the above analysis, hence 
the optimal level of enforcement resources will be higher [smaller]. If a lower 
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offense rate has opposing effects on the probability of detection and the mag-
nitude of the sanction, conclusions about the deterrent effects of enforcement 
depend on the magnitude of the interactions. Because of these interactions, 
it is possible that an increase in enforcement deters violation, but at the same 
time this decrease in the offense rate makes violation more attractive. This 
again provides an explanation for less than maximal sanctions.
3.4 The value of self-reporting
 Law enforcement often uses what is called self-reporting, i.e. the report-
ing by firms or individuals of their own compliance status to the enforce-
ment authority. For instance, an individual may confess a murder or firms 
may report an excess of environmental emissions. Sometimes self-reporting 
is even required. Let me summarize the general benefits of self-reporting 
(Malik, 1993; Kaplow and Shavell, 1994a; Innes, 1999b).
1. Self-reporting allows enforcement authorities to save on detection costs. 
A fi rm can be induced to self-report a violation when the penalty for a 
self-reported violation is equal to or slightly less than the expected pen-
alty for a violation that is detected by the authority itself. This will not af-
fect deterrence, but will allow the enforcement authorities to save on the 
costs of inspecting these fi rms.
 The extent to which costs are saved depends on the nature of detecting 
violators. If detection is carried out by means of investigation, many re-
sources can be saved. The problem is how to find the perpetrator of a 
single known violation (with known harm) such as an environmental 
spill. If the injurer self-reports, the whole detection problem is solved. 
On the other hand, under a pure monitoring system, for example when 
police officers patrol on streets or on highways, there will probably be no 
reduction in monitoring costs if offenders self-report. If monitoring is car-
ried out by means of inspection of firms, without knowledge concerning 
their potential violations, monitoring costs can be saved because a firm 
that self-reports does not have to be inspected. However, firms that do 
not self-report still have to be inspected.
2. In general, the optimal penalty for a self-reported violation is smaller than 
the optimal penalty for dishonest reports. This is the case in the real world 
where dishonest reports are usually considered to be a criminal offense 
for which individual employees can be prosecuted. The logic behind this 
echoes that of Becker (1968). Enforcement costs for dishonest reports can 
be minimized by making the fi ne for dishonest reports as high as pos-
sible and reducing the probability of inspection (= detecting the truth of 
reports). However, this implies that the penalty for truthfully reporting a 
violation should be smaller than maximal in order to induce self-report-
ing.
 If the decision to commit an offense is a binary decision, the authority 
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will only inspect those firms that report compliance, because a firm will 
have no incentive to wrongfully report a violation. If reporting is per-
fectly truthful, this implies that monitoring does not detect violations 
and is therefore seemingly ineffective. Inspections are required in order 
to induce truthful self-reporting. Inspections are not aimed at detecting 
violations of safety standards, but at detecting dishonest reporting and it 
therefore focuses on firms that report good behavior.
3. Not only monitoring costs, but also the costs of prosecuting and convicting 
a violation might decrease. If a fi rm confesses to a violation, enforcers will 
possibly have to spend less effort on trying to fi nd evidence and less time in 
costly court proceedings that would guarantee suffi cient accuracy. If a fi rm 
self-reports a violation, a sanction can be imposed immediately.
4. The costs of imposing sanctions can increase as well as decrease. If impos-
ing sanctions is costless, self-reporting is always benefi cial because it re-
duces monitoring costs. If there are fi xed (administrative) costs involved 
in imposing a sanction, the costs of imposing sanctions will increase be-
cause every fi rm that reports a violation will have to be punished. There-
fore, self-reporting is only benefi cial if the reduction in monitoring costs 
outweighs the increase in costs for imposing sanctions.
 If the costs of imposing sanctions increase over the level of sanctions (like 
imprisonment), we have a different result. Because a lower sanction is re-
quired under self-reporting, the costs of imposing an imprisonment sanc-
tion decrease. On the other hand, the frequency with which imprison-
ment is imposed increases. If the marginal social costs of  imprisonment 
are increasing, self-reporting decreases the expected costs of imprison-
ment and self-reporting is certainly socially beneficial.
5. Self-reporting indirectly reduces enforcement costs by reducing the reli-
ance on imperfect monitoring technologies. If the actions of the enforce-
ment authority do not detect all violations and/or the authority some-
times penalizes compliant fi rms, deterrence is weakened (section 6.1) and 
more resources are required to achieve the same compliance rate. Hence, 
the potential benefi ts of self-reporting are higher. Put differently, self-re-
porting is more likely to be desirable if the public enforcement authori-
ties commit more errors. The more violations are self-reported, the fewer 
mistakes are made by public enforcement authorities.
6. Similarly, self-reporting is more likely to be effi cient if the inspection costs 
are high, the maximum feasible sanction is low or the standard is high. All 
these factors increase the costs of public inspections, and therefore imply 
higher potential savings by self-reporting.
7. Self-reporting depends on the ability of individual fi rms to observe their 
level of compliance. This might require costly self-audits by fi rms. Fri-
esen (2006) discusses that a fi rm will only self-audit if the costs of audits 
are suffi ciently low relative to the gains of self-reporting in the form of 
a lower expected sanction. The higher the costs of audits, the lower the 
fi ne for reported violations must be. More importantly, if audit costs are 
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relatively large, it is possible for the enforcement authority to induce self-
reporting, but the overall costs might be lower if the enforcement author-
ity carries out the inspection itself. This is what happens if the benefi ts 
of self-reporting in the form of direct and indirect saving of enforcement 
costs are insuffi cient to outweigh the costs of auditing itself. Audits (by 
fi rms) and inspections (by enforcement agencies) are a kind of substitute. 
Therefore, before recommending self-reporting, it is important to inves-
tigate which party best observes violations relative to the costs: fi rms or 
public agencies. 
 A more complicated analysis is required if (non)compliance is continuous 
(Friesen, 2006). In that case, auditing does not only reveal whether or not a 
violation occurs, but also the level of violation and hence the level of pen-
alty than can be escaped. This makes the benefits of auditing uncertain. 
A possible equilibrium might be achieved if firms were to audit, but only 
report small violations, while large violations would not be reported. In 
addition, firms may be reluctant to conduct audits because the violations 
the firm is aware of might be punished more severely.80
8. Friesen (2006) also discusses the problem of credibility (more extensively 
discussed in chapter 9). The problem with self-reporting is that if fi rms 
truthfully report their compliance status, the authority has no incentive 
to inspect fi rms. However, if the authority does not inspect, fi rms have 
no incentive to report violations truthfully. It is optimal for the enforce-
ment authority to update its belief about the probability of a violation if 
it receives no report or a report that claims compliance. The enforcement 
authority decides on its inspection strategy after the fi rm submits a report. 
Generally, this implies that the authority inspects with a smaller prob-
ability than above because it believes that compliance-reporting fi rms are 
more likely to be compliant, but with a probability larger than zero, be-
cause otherwise fi rms would have no incentive to report.
9. Self-reporting is also benefi cial when potential offenders are risk-averse . 
If they self-report, they face a certain sanction instead of an uncertain one. 
The risk-bearing of sanctions is eliminated by self-reporting.
3.5 Conclusion: Extreme sanctions?
This chapter starts with the logic of implementing the highest possible sanc-
tions, as put forward by Becker (1968) and subsequent scholars. By lowering 
the probability of detection and increasing the sanction, enforcement costs 
80 Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) discuss a situation in which self-audits by a firm increase the 
probability of detection. If enforcement agencies cannot observe self-audits, this implies 
that the firm will not have a socially optimal incentive to self-audit and take precautions 
and/or remedy. Possibly, the authority can make fines dependent on observable char-
acteristics that are positively related to self-audits, such as the mode of detection, self-
reporting, or observed corrective actions after self-audits.
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can be saved and deterrence remains constant. Within the restraints of the 
available maximum sanctions this inevitably reduces social costs and is there-
fore socially desirable. Moreover, increasing the sanction and/or increasing 
the probability of conviction should increase compliance.
Let me now summarize the arguments concerning the extent to which these 
conclusions are correct.
1. When prosecution and punishment are costless, this conclusion holds. It 
is optimal to impose the maximal sanction and the minimal probability of 
detection that is necessary to implement the desired level of deterrence.
2. When prosecution and punishment are costly, this conclusion depends 
on the more precise nature of the costs. If the marginal social costs of pros-
ecution and punishment do not increase and the marginal private costs 
do not decrease, the conclusion still holds. Increasing the sanction to the 
maximum and decreasing the probability of detection keeps deterrence at 
least equal, it does not lead to an increase in costs of prosecution and pun-
ishment, but decreases the costs of detection, hence it is socially desirable. 
If the marginal social costs of prosecution and punishment increase or the 
marginal private costs decrease, implementing the maximal sanction is 
not necessarily optimal. 
3. With respect to the probability of detection: because of the costs of detec-
tion some underdeterrence is desirable. It is not benefi cial to eliminate all 
offenses. This implies for example that for low levels of harm, optimal en-
forcement is zero if detection can be made dependent on the harm done. 
However, under costly non-monetary sanctions, it may be optimal, in line 
with the previous point, to have overdeterrence. 
4. If enforcement authorities have perfect information about harm and com-
pliance costs, it is not necessary to carry out punishment if non-compli-
ance is effi cient.
5. Under monitoring (including certain enforcement), and if only harm is 
known, it is not optimal to impose maximum sanctions because the ex-
pected sanctions should rise with the harm (marginal deterrence). Hence, 
the magnitude of the sanction should rise, implying that for lower lev-
els of harm, maximum sanctions cannot be implemented. The maximum 
sanction should be saved for the more harmful offenses. However, this 
implies that under monitoring, the more harmful offenses are underde-
terred when multiple fi rms decide on a single offense. However, if fi rms 
decide on a level of offenses or precautions, all levels of harm are under-
deterred, unless non-monetary sanctions are so costly that it is optimal to 
overdeter the most serious offenses. This induces fi rms to choose for less 
harmful offenses.
6. If the maximum (monetary) sanction is not known to enforcement au-
thorities (before detection) the probability of detection should be large 
enough to deter fi rms with low wealth. Therefore, the sanction on fi rms 
with higher wealth should not be maximal.
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However, there are also other factors which are relevant for the optimal en-
forcement policy and which have consequences for the trade-off between the 
probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanction. These include (1) 
time, (2) limited enforcement budgets, (3) counter-enforcement actions by 
firms and (4) informal sanctions. These are discussed in the following chap-
ters.

4 Continuing compliance and enduring 
enforcement – time constraints
The analysis in the previous chapter assumes that an offense is committed 
only once and that the harm caused by an offense is immediately realized. 
This chapter discusses the time problems arising when offenses can be re-
peated (section 4.1) or when offenses or the resulting harm can last several 
periods (section 4.2).
4.1 Dealing with repeat offenses – increasing sanctions? 
 Firms can again commit the same, or at least a similar, offense in subsequent 
time periods. The optimal enforcement policy with respect to this problem is 
discussed in this section. It is common practice in most enforcement policies 
to punish repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. This sec-
tion discusses whether or not it is optimal to increase the penalty for repeat 
offenses (given a constant level of detection). Attention is also given to the 
issue of incapacitation.
4.1.1 The optimality of non-increasing penalties
If the penalty is optimal for the first offense, there is no reason to increase the 
sanction for a second (identical) offense.
This is most rigorously argued for in Emons (2003).81 He shows that if 
all offenses are undesirable – hence complete deterrence is desirable – and 
if wealth is large enough to deter the first offense, it is always optimal to set 
the monetary sanction for the first offense at the extreme, i.e. wealth. Because 
wealth is completely seized by punishment of the first offense, the sanction 
for the second offense is necessarily zero. However, because the expected 
sanction suffices to deter the first offense, there are no second or third offenses 
committed.
Generally, not all offenses are undesirable and due to the enforcement 
costs some underdeterrence is optimal. However, Emons (2003) argues that if 
the benefits and costs of potential offenses are identically distributed in time 
over the potential offenders, the same result holds. Firms that can commit 
offenses that society wants to deter, i.e. firms with relatively small costs of 
compliance and high levels of harm, are deterred from committing offenses 
81 See also Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) and Shavell (2004).
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by a maximal fine according to the same logic as above. Firms that can commit 
desirable offenses or some not very undesirable acts, i.e. offenses with high 
costs of compliance and low levels of harm, are offenses which society does 
not want to deter (given the costs of detection). These are committed and, if 
detected, sanctioned maximally in the first period82 and still committed and 
not sanctioned (because of the absence of any wealth) in the next periods.
This argument is extended by Polinsky and Shavell (1998). Emons (2003) 
presupposes that wealth is a given maximum for all periods (e.g. a building 
or a car). Polinsky and Shavell (1998) presuppose that wealth is a maximum 
per period (e.g. income) . In that case, the sanction for the first offense in the 
first period should be maximal, and can and should also be maximal for a 
repeat offense. They show, however, that it may be optimal to lower the sanc-
tion for first offenses in the second period. Such a lowering of the sanction has 
two effects. First, it reduces deterrence in the second period for firms which 
complied in the first period. Secondly, it strengthens deterrence for firms in 
the first period, because compliance in the first period implies a smaller fine 
and hence potential benefits of violation in the second period. Whether or not 
lowering the fine in this manner is beneficial depends on the magnitude of 
these two effects. Note that it can only be beneficial if deterrence is not first-
best, i.e. there should be some underdeterrence. Otherwise there would be no 
benefits of increased deterrence in the first period.
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) provide the following interpretation of their 
results: it is optimal to sanction young (‘first-period-of-life’) offenders and 
old (‘second-period-of-life’) repeat offenders with the maximal sanction. Old 
first offenders are punished leniently. Similarly it can be argued that it is an 
efficient strategy to be tough on young companies that have just recently been 
established, as well as firms that have often shown to be in violation, while 
existing companies that have good compliance records should be punished 
only moderately.
4.1.2 Increasing sanctions: offense as signal
The reasons for increased penalties should be based on the fact that offenses 
reveal valuable information to the enforcement authorities.
Note first that in the above discussion, there is no reason for specific or: 
individual deterrence. Specific deterrence refers to the objective of punish-
ing offenders in order to stop them from committing further offenses in the 
future. Specific deterrence implies that people who are sanctioned are more 
deterred than those who have not been sanctioned, or more deterred than 
they were before being sanctioned. On the other hand, general deterrence is 
82 Of course, as explained in section 3.2, if the enforcement authority is informed about 
individual compliance costs and expected harm, it can decide not to sanction this type of 
offense.
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the deterrence, through threat of penalties, of firms who have not (yet) been 
sanctioned, as in section 3.2. If rational and well-informed firms decided to 
commit a crime, there would be no reason for them to increase their belief in 
the expected sanction and to be deterred in the future. As long as the expected 
sanction is the same before and after apprehension, they will make the same 
decision about compliance (Shavell, 2004). Only in case of uncertainty about 
the probability of detection or the magnitude of the sanction will the firm 
rationally increase its belief in the expected sanction after punishment, lead-
ing to specific deterrence.83
Similarly if enforcement authorities were perfectly informed and deter-
mined the enforcement policy optimally, there would be no reason to increase 
their belief in the fact that a firm is dangerous and therefore to change the 
enforcement policy. The optimal policy would remain the same. An increased 
sanction would only create overdeterrence. It may be optimal to increase pun-
ishment, but only if enforcement authorities are imperfectly informed and 
committing offenses signals valuable information about the dangerousness 
of the offender. There should be some ‘learning’ by enforcement authorities. 
Let me give some examples.
In Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), committing an offense reveals infor-
mation about the private benefits of crime. Some of these private benefits 
are assumed to be ‘illicit’, i.e. they are deemed to be socially worthless, and 
therefore are not counted in social welfare. But the higher the illicit benefits, 
the more likely the firm will be to commit the offense. First-best deterrence 
implies that offenses with low acceptable gains (which are inefficient) are 
deterred (in all periods), while offenses with high acceptable gains (which are 
efficient) are undeterred (in all periods). Suppose, however, that the benefits 
of an offense are unobservable for the enforcement authority. A uniform fine 
creates either under- or overdeterrence. If the fine is low, there is underdeter-
rence of firms with low acceptable gains but high illicit benefits. If the fine is 
high, all firms with low acceptable gains are deterred, but there may also be 
overdeterrence of firms with high acceptable gains and low illicit benefits. An 
increasing fine for repeat offenders might lower both the under- and overde-
terrence. The overdeterrence is weakened because the fine in the first period 
is lower. Firms with low illicit benefits will commit the offense in the first peri-
od if the acceptable gains are high. The underdeterrence is reduced because 
the fine is higher in the second period. Firms with high illicit benefits and a 
detected first offense will comply in the next period if the acceptable gains are 
low. Since committing an offense shows that the illicit benefits are relatively 
high, it may be optimal to increase the fine in order to increase deterrence.
Two crucial assumptions are made in order to arrive at this result. First, 
some of the private benefits or costs are illicit, i.e. not counted in social wel-
fare. Otherwise, a sanction equal to the harm done would induce the firm 
83 A more precise and detailed discussion of specific deterrence can be found in Shavell 
(2004, pp. 515-518).
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to perfectly balance the costs of compliance and the expected harm.84 How-
ever, the construction of illicit benefits is a doubtful idea. It is an admission of 
weakness to a priori place some benefits or costs outside social welfare when 
explaining the undesirability of offenses is an important aspect of the enforce-
ment theory. Functional economic explanatory theories are mixed with moral 
theories. Moreover, it is hard to think of good examples, especially in regula-
tory crime by firms. With respect to crimes by individuals, we might think of 
the pleasure of killing or raping a victim. An example for firms might be the 
higher turnover a horeca proprietor obtains by admitting more customers 
than allowed. But I do not understand why the festive joy of customers mea-
sured by this turnover should not count.
The second crucial assumption is that firms can have different acceptable 
gains over time (i.e. gains are stochastic), while the illicit gains are fixed for 
each firm. If both gains are stochastic, second-time offenders do not system-
atically differ from first offenders, so there is no rationale for a different pun-
ishment. The first offense does not predict high illicit benefits for the second 
offense. If both are fixed there is also no reason for changes in punishment. 
The (marginal) costs and benefits of punishment are equal in all periods. 
There is some unique optimal level of (under- or over-)deterrence for all peri-
ods. If the acceptable gains are fixed and the illicit gains stochastic, decreasing 
fines may be optimal. Committing an offense reveals that the acceptable gains 
of the firm are high, implying that the offense is less likely to be inefficient, 
allowing lower fines to decrease possible overdeterrence.
Rubinstein (1979) shows that it may be optimal to increase sanctions if it 
is uncertain whether or not an offense is committed deliberately or acciden-
tally. Accidental offenses cannot be prevented and hence deterrence of these 
offenses has no social objective. If the enforcement authorities cannot observe 
the willfulness of an offense, they cannot make punishment dependent on 
this willfulness. Rubinstein (1979) shows that if the offense can be committed 
an infinite number of times, an equilibrium is created in which the enforce-
ment authority does not punish offenders who have a “reasonable” offense 
record and in which the potential offenders refrain from committing deliber-
ate offenses. Hence, there is some form of increased punishment for repeat 
offenders. 
The distinction between accidental and deliberate offenses is related to 
the issue of erroneously sanctioning compliant firms. Chu et al. (2000) work 
out the argument that was already informally sketched by Stigler (1970, pp. 
528-529) and others: punishing repeat offenders more severely is justified 
because the probability that an innocent firm is punished twice is relatively 
84 If the firm also has some private illicit gains, it will compare its private illicit gains and 
compliance costs with the expected sanction equal to the expected harm, leading to a less 
than optimal outcome because more, or more severe, offenses than optimal are committed. 
The expected sanction should be higher than the harm but it is unclear exactly how much 
higher because the illicit gains are unknown.
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low. Increased punishment therefore reduces the social costs of convicting 
innocent firms (type II errors).85 Under any uniform sanctioning scheme, wel-
fare can be improved by a slight reduction in the first penalty and an increase 
in the second penalty such that overall deterrence is held constant, but the 
social costs of convicting innocent firms are reduced. Note that – as discussed 
in section 6.1 – if the probability of erroneously convicting firms is positive, it 
may be inefficient to impose the maximal penalty (on first offenders). Only in 
cases where the sanction for first offenses is not maximal is there scope for an 
increase in the sanction in the next period(s), if enforcement authorities have 
more certainty concerning the firm’s guilt.
4.1.3 Non-monetary sanctions and the benefits of incapacitation
 All of the above references discuss the use of costless monetary sanctions. 
The question is whether imposing costly non-monetary sanctions would 
affect the results. If imposing imprisonment leads to underdeterrence (see 
section 3.2 for details), it can be optimal to increase deterrence in the first 
period by reducing imprisonment in the second period for first-time offend-
ers (Polinsky and Shavell, 1998, p.314-15). In addition, the results derived in 
4.1.2 hold analogously. However, in all analyses, we have to take into account 
the increase in the costs of imprisonment when the time that has to be served 
increases. These costs have to be balanced with the potential benefits of 
increased deterrence.
The analysis in section 3.2 assumes that the benefits of imprisonment only 
consist of the deterrent effect on potential offenders. However, once we consider 
possible repeat offenses we must acknowledge an additional benefit of impris-
onment: the fact that imprisoned individuals are unable to commit offenses, the 
so-called incapacitation effect. As a result, even if someone cannot be deterred, 
imprisoning him will reduce offenses, because he will be unable to practice 
fraud, spill toxic substances or cause too many fire accidents, etc. If these offenses 
are inefficient, this is potentially socially beneficial. The higher are the number of 
offenses someone might commit, the higher the benefits of incapacitation.86
Suppose that someone cannot be deterred, and that the only function of 
imprisonment is incapacitation. In this case, the person in question should be 
imprisoned as long as the net harm he can inflict in a period exceeds the costs 
of incapacitating him that period. This implies that if the number of potential 
offenses is constant, a person should either be imprisoned for ever (because 
the harm from his potential offenses is higher than the costs of imprisonment) 
or not at all (because of the reverse situation). However, if the number of 
offenses decreases over time (as is the case for individuals who become older) 
a finite imprisonment time might be beneficial.
85 The costs of convicting innocent firms are discussed in section 6.1.
86 See for example Shavell (2004, pp. 531-535).
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If imprisonment also has deterrent effects, we must recognize, in addi-
tion to the results derived in section 3.2, that the benefits of imprisonment are 
higher due to the benefits of incapacitation. This implies that it might be effi-
cient to impose more or longer imprisonment sanctions. Incapacitation also 
influences the optimal probability of apprehension. To acquire a desirable 
level of incapacitation, the probability of detection should be high enough 
and generally be higher than a minimal probability (say 1%). However, given 
this probability of detection, the sanction for deterrence should be lower than 
the maximal imprisonment term, in order to prevent overdeterrence. Becker 
(1968)’s idea that sanctions should be maximal and probabilities of detection 
as low as possible no longer necessarily applies.
Incapacitation is not limited to imprisonment. Undesirable acts can also 
be banned by otherwise preventing an individual or firm from engaging in 
a particular activity, for instance the withdrawal of a license and/or forced 
closing of a firm (Shavell, 2004, p.531). A truck driver can be prevented from 
causing traffic accidents by taking away his driver’s license. A restaurant can 
be prevented from violating fire safety prescriptions by threatening it with 
closure for a finite or infinite period of time. Of course, such measures are 
only successful if engaging in the activity without the necessary license is 
sufficiently enforced. The most extreme incapacitation sanction is the death 
penalty, which forever stops all offenses.
4.1.4 Increasing apprehension
So far I have discussed whether it is efficient to punish repeat offenders more 
severely. It was assumed that the probability of detection is constant. The 
fact that a firm or individual has been prosecuted before might influence 
by itself the future probability of detection, both positively and negatively 
(Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1991). The probability of detection can decrease 
because repeat offenders are more experienced, and therefore less likely to be 
detected. Therefore, for deterrence to remain unchanged, the sanction should 
rise with the number of offenses. On the other hand, enforcement authorities 
might have learned about relevant characteristics or acquired information 
about the repeat offender, leading to a higher probability of detection and 
implying lower sanctions.
A different question is whether it is efficient to allocate more resources to 
detect repeat offenders than first offenders, assuming that the effectiveness of 
detection is equal. Is it efficient to increase deterrence by increasing the prob-
ability of detection? As discussed above, if there is no new information about the 
offense that might be valuable in deterring future offenses, there is also no reason 
to increase the expected sanction. However, if there is serious underdeterrence 
and perfect deterrence is not feasible, increasing the expected sanction as part of 
the so-called state-dependent enforcement policies (Harrington, 1988) might be 
valuable. This is discussed elsewhere, in a separate section (section 5.3).
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4.2 Repair sanctions and the time spent in violation
The analysis so far assumes that the interest of the enforcement authority lies 
in reducing the extent of violations, i.e. the extent to which precautions fall 
short of the standard. Until now, these violations might have been commit-
ted over several periods of time, but every offense occurs at a single given 
moment. An offense is a discrete event. This applies to most crimes by indi-
viduals, such as murder and theft. For offenses of firms, examples of this type 
of offense are fraud, illegal trading or illegal transport of dangerous substanc-
es. However, in many situations, especially with respect to offenses by firms, 
(non)compliance is not a discrete event, but rather a continuing state of affairs 
(Veljanovski, 1984) which can last for a lengthy period of time, until it ends 
deliberately or naturally. Such an offense is spread over multiple periods. An 
enforcement authority cannot only reduce the harm from violation by reduc-
ing the extent of the violation, but also by reducing the time spent in violation 
(Nadeau, 1997). If the enforcement authority detects a violation, it can take 
action to induce compliance as quickly as possible.
The duration of a violation is examined in this section. First, I discuss the 
importance of the duration of an offense and the enforcement actions that can 
be taken to induce compliance. The second subsection discusses the impor-
tance of self-reporting in limiting the duration of violations.
4.2.1 Duration of violation and ‘repair sanctions’
Nadeau (1997) provides two major reasons why enforcement agencies might 
wish to ensure shorter periods of non-compliance. First of all, longer periods 
of non-compliance are associated with higher levels of (expected) harm. Espe-
cially if the harm is cumulative over time, enforcement authorities should be 
concerned with reducing the time of non-compliance. Secondly, the existence 
of persistent violators is harmful for the enforcement authority’s reputation 
and signals that its actions are ineffective. This can reduce the incentive to 
comply for other firms, especially if they believe that the enforcement author-
ity will not have enough time and resources at its disposal to deal with viola-
tions of standards that the authority cares less about. Moreover, it might reduce 
political support and therefore the funding of the authority’s program.
Remediation
Enforcement authorities might be interested in decreasing the period of non-
compliance and take actions to return the violator to compliance. This return 
to compliance, labeled remediation, can happen in two different ways.
First of all, some offenses lead to damage that can (partially) be undone, 
such as (illegal) discharges of environmentally hazardous substances, illegal 
dumping of waste, etc. The enforcement authority can force the firm to clean 
the area and return to the state of compliance. Time is an important factor 
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in this case because if an offense has been committed, it might be socially 
beneficial to have the damage repaired before it is too late. Possibly, the costs 
of clean-up or the harm done will increase if the offense persists for a longer 
time. Hence, the socially optimal moment of clean-up is probably immedi-
ately following the offense. I will call this type of remediation clean-up.
Secondly, some offenses lead to a continuing state of violation until some-
thing is done to stop the violation, for instance the breakdown of an abatement 
technology such as escape-route marks or emission filters, violating building 
prescriptions or using unsafe working equipment. The issue here is not repair-
ing the damage, but ‘repairing’ the precautions that were taken and – willingly 
or unwillingly – have fallen below standard. If the enforcement authority finds 
out about such a violation, it might be socially beneficial to stop the offense 
from lasting any longer and the authority can force the firm, under threat of 
penalties, to return to compliance. I will call this type of remediation repair.
In both clean-up and repair cases, harm might result ‘accidentally’, 
beyond the control of the firm, and the offense is not so much that dam-
age occurs, but that a firm exerts insufficient effort to limit this damage. An 
offense might not be referred to as efficient or inefficient, but there might be 
an efficient period of violation (possibly zero) .
Repair sanctions and administrative law enforcement
The actions that an enforcement authority can take to force the firm to return to 
compliance are especially related to the administrative law enforcement pro-
cess. By means of warnings, (legal) letters, re-inspections etc. the authority can 
induce the firm to comply. The sanctions that it can use to force compliance 
(at least as a threat) are called repair sanctions (contrary to punitive sanctions). 
The two most important sanctions are the duty by penal sum and the duty by 
administrative coercion. A duty by penal sum states that a specific firm must for 
example remove the waste it has dumped or stop dumping its waste before a 
certain given date, otherwise the firm will have to pay a penal sum (a fine) of, 
for instance, €500 a day. A duty by administrative coercion requires that the firm 
should carry out similar actions, but threatens that the enforcement authority 
will otherwise itself restore compliance and recoup the costs on the violating 
firm. Administrative coercion also includes the possibility to close the firm.
A penal sum has the benefit of delegating the decision to the firm. It leaves 
room for the firm to evaluate the best way to end the violation. If this is car-
ried out by the enforcement authority, it will probably be more costly for two 
reasons. First of all, the firm is more likely to be experienced. Since these sanc-
tions are usually incidental, the authority may not realize economies of scale. 
Secondly, the authority must satisfy further requirements, such as those of 
entering private property, opening closed gates etc. which leads to higher 
(administrative) costs. On the other hand, under administrative coercion, the 
enforcement authority is certain that the violation will end. This may be ben-
eficial if there is, for example, a judgment proof problem with a penal sum. 
Even if the authority can not recoup the costs, administrative coercion can be 
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efficient, because recoup is only a transfer of wealth. It is important which type 
of sanctions lead to the lowest costs of violation and ending the violation.
Remediation and enforcement
The presence of remediation benefits does influence the optimal enforce-
ment policy (Innes, 1999b). Suppose that the enforcement authority can use 
repair sanctions to enforce a return to compliance while also using fines for 
deterrence. The optimal enforcement policy balances the (marginal) gain in 
deterrence, the increase in enforcement costs and the benefits of remediation. 
Trading off the probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanction (as 
proposed by Becker, 1968) is no longer always beneficial. A trade-off of the 
fine and detection which would keep deterrence equal decreases the frequen-
cy of socially beneficial remediation (because the probability of detection is 
decreased) and is therefore costly. If the probability of detection is larger than 
the minimal probability, following Becker’s logic, the magnitude of the sanc-
tion for deterrence should be adjusted in order to prevent overdeterrence.
However, this analysis only holds if the enforcement authority cannot con-
dition sanctions on clean-up or repair, because enforcement takes place before 
any possible clean-up or repair could be carried out or because the authority 
is unable to observe the timing of clean-up and repair (Innes, 1999b). If – as 
generally seems to be the case – enforcement can be made dependent on the 
level of remediation, the problem is reduced to one of marginal deterrence as 
discussed in section 3.2.2. The problem is to let the firm choose a level of com-
pliance – consisting of both ex-ante precautions and ex-post remediation – in 
order to minimize the costs of compliance and the expected harm. The optimal 
enforcement policy would prompt firms to engage in pre-inspection clean-up 
or repair by offering a lower sanction if clean-up or repair is undertaken.
If the only objective of enforcement is remediation – for example because 
offenses are accidental – the optimal sanction is such that it will implement the 
efficient level and moment of remediation. If the sanctions are such that reme-
diation only takes place if an offense is detected (as under the repair sanctions 
above, which begin with a warning), the probability of inspection should be 
high enough. However, a better solution would be to impose sufficiently high 
punitive sanctions on firms that fail to remedy. This is particularly relevant if 
the socially optimal moment of remediation immediately follows the offense.
4.2.2 Remediation and self-reporting
 Section 3.4 summarized the general benefits of self-reporting. Self-reporting 
may be particularly beneficial in cases where offenses are accidental and/or 
there are benefits associated with remediation. Self-reporting allows the ben-
efits of remediation to be realized with probability one, whereas non-report-
ers only clean up or repair if they are caught.
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Self-reporting and accidental offenses
 Let us first assume that the only benefits of enforcement are remediation, as in 
Livernois and McKenna (1999).87 This is what happens if a firm has no control 
over its violations because these result from an accidental equipment failure, 
variations in input quality or process upsets. If there is a technical failure in an 
abatement device, which results in non-compliance, repairing the failure will 
restore compliance. If the enforcement authority finds out about a violation, 
it will impose a fine and order the firm to repair the device and return to com-
pliance in the next period. It is assumed that the authority can do the latter 
by means of warnings and legally enforceable administrative orders as dis-
cussed above, but that returning to compliance takes some time and allows 
the firm to save on the costs of compliance for one period. If the abatement 
device fails, the firm has three options, where the optimal strategy depends 
on their costs of compliance (per period)88: (1) Repairing the device imme-
diately and fully comply (optimal if the costs of compliance are small). (2) 
Reporting the violation to the enforcement authority, which will then impose 
a fine and order a return to compliance (optimal if the compliance costs are 
intermediate) (3) Remaining silent and await inspection, and only repair the 
device if the authority detects the violation, in which case a fine will have to 
be paid and compliance will have to be restored (optimal if compliance costs 
are large). Of course the optimal choice also depends on the fine structure. 
The influence of a fine on reporting firms (type 2) is ambiguous. Increasing 
this fine induces some firms to repair a failure immediately (type 1), instead 
of reporting and slow repairing (type 2). However, it also induces firms to 
no longer report, but to await inspection (type 3 instead of type 2). Depend-
ing on the distribution of compliance costs, which determines which effect 
dominates, decreasing the fine may be beneficial. In this case, the optimal 
policy for reported violations is a zero fine and only requiring a return to 
compliance, as this will maximize the incentive to report. No one will repair a 
failure immediately, but the number of firms that will report and then return 
to compliance is maximized.89
However, this is only true if the target compliance rate is sufficiently low 
(see section 5.1). The maximum feasible compliance rate under this strategy is 
the probability that the device does not fail. Firms that report truthfully com-
ply only in the next period. The expected compliance rate if all firms report 
truthfully therefore equals the probability that there is no failure. If the target 
compliance rate is higher, it might be optimal to have some firms that repair 
immediately. In order to induce immediate repair, the fine for reported viola-
87 See also Malik (1993) and Friesen (2006).
88  Similar to Harrington (1988) and Raymond (1999), section 5.3.
89 Livernois and McKenna (1999) show that under a uniform distribution function this policy 
is efficient. Friesen (2006) assumes that the costs of remediation are lower for firms if they 
voluntarily repair or clean up than if they are forced to repair or clean up by the enforce-
ment authority. Therefore, immediate repair will be beneficial for some firms, even if the 
fine for reported non-compliance is zero.
85Continuing compliance and enduring enforcement – time constraints
tions should be higher than zero. Since this will make reporting less attrac-
tive, the probability of inspection must be increased in order to deter non-
reporting firms (type 3).
Accidental and deliberate offenses
If violations are not completely beyond the control of the firm but also depend 
on for instance the level and frequency of servicing, the enforcement policy 
should not only aim at remediation, but also at deterrence of technical fail-
ures. This might be problematic because deterrence and remediation are 
sometimes in conflict. The benefits of repair by self-reporting are only real-
ized if the penalty for non-compliance is low enough (possibly zero) to induce 
self-reporting. However, a low penalty does not deter the firm and prevent 
technical failures. Livernois and McKenna (1999) show that if a firm can also 
deliberately disable the abatement device, the efficient policy depends on the 
self-reporting of deliberate offenses. If deliberate offenses are not reported 
(type 3), the optimal policy is the same as described above. The only differ-
ence is that some type 3 firms will now deliberately disable the device and 
only comply if inspected. If, however, truthful reporting of deliberate offenses 
dominates, the fine for reported offenses should be high enough to deter from 
deliberately disabling the device. If the fine for self-reported offenses is zero, 
every firm will disable the device and truthfully report they did so, hence the 
compliance rate will be zero.
The possible conflict between deterrence and remediation in self-report-
ing is best illustrated by looking at the consequences of self-reporting for 
large damages (Friesen, 2006). For large damages, the social benefits of reme-
diation are relatively high, making self-reporting socially desirable. Howev-
er, because self-reporting requires costly remediation by firms, the sanction 
should be lower for self-reported violations. This implies that self-reporting 
harms deterrence, which is worst for severe offenses with high damage. So 
the social benefits of self-reporting (remediation) as well as the social costs of 
self-reporting (reduce deterrence) are relatively high for large damages.
Innes (1999b) shows that self-reporting brings an additional benefit. When 
benefits of remediation are present, self-reporting allows for a lower prob-
ability of detection for deterrence. Recall from earlier in this section that if the 
sanction cannot be conditioned on the level of remediation, the optimal sanc-
tion (without self-reporting) may be less than maximal. Self-reporting undoes 
this effect. When self-reporting is introduced, it will be possible to increase the 
sanction for dishonest reporting to the maximum, following Becker’s logic. If 
the fine is lower than the maximum, the same level of deterrence of dishonest 
reporting can be achieved by increasing the fine to the maximum and accord-
ingly lowering the probability of detection. This does not affect the benefits of 
remediation, since these are obtained by inducing self-reporting. This implies 
that a given level of deterrence can be achieved against lower enforcement 
costs than without self-reporting. So, not only allows self-reporting to inspect 
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only non-reporting firms, but also if there are remediation benefits to inspect 
non-reporting firms less intensively.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter draws attention to the problem of time in enforcement policies. If 
there is sufficiently large underdeterrence, it may be optimal to punish repeat 
offenders more severely than first-time offenders. This limits the possibilities 
to trade-off the probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanction. 
Moreover, this trade-off is constrained by the fact that enforcement might not 
only be aimed at deterrence, but also at remediation. 
It was assumed that the probability of detection remains constant over 
time. An alternative approach would be to increase deterrence for repeat 
offenders relative to first offenders by increasing the probability of detection 
and conviction. The next chapter investigates this approach.
5 Partial compliance and targeting 
enforcement – resource constraints
It might be efficient to base enforcement on past performance if there is suffi-
ciently large underdeterrence. In section 5.1 I explain what might create such 
underdeterrence. Then I discuss the enforcement problem, in particular the 
probability of detection, in cases of underdeterrence. In section 5.2, enforcement 
concerns only one period. In section 5.3, I extend the analysis to multiple periods, 
allowing for so called state-dependent enforcement policies and warnings.
5.1 Partial compliance
 The firm complies with a standard if the costs of compliance are lower than the 
expected sanction. Therefore the enforcement authority must have a certain lev-
el of resources in order to enforce compliance. The efficient level of resources 
balances the expected harm, the costs of compliance and the costs of enforce-
ment. There are two reasons why full compliance should not be the enforcement 
authority’s objective.
First of all, non-compliance can be efficient when the marginal costs of com-
pliance exceed the marginal expected harm for some level of non-compliance. 
If this occurs – even in the absence of any enforcement costs – partial compli-
ance is desirable. Full compliance is not the aim of the enforcement authority. 
This includes the point made in section 3.2 about partial compliance within the 
population when there are multiple firms with different costs of compliance. 
For example, for some cafés, compliance with the prescribed closing times is 
efficient (those located in residential areas), while for others compliance is pos-
sibly inefficient (those located outside the city). However, partial compliance 
can also apply to a single firm if their costs of compliance or the expected harm 
vary over time. For example, compliance with closing times is efficient during 
week days (when café attendance late at night is limited and people’s night rest 
is important) but not during weekends (when many people want to go out and 
noise is less damaging). If this is the case, the optimal allocation of resources is 
such that it leads to partial compliance, and enforcement should target ineffi-
cient offenses. Offenses with limited harm might go unpunished.
A second reason why full compliance might not be an enforcement 
authority’s objective follows from the fact that enforcement is costly. Even if 
all offenses are inefficient, full compliance might require more enforcement 
resources than is efficient, i.e. the marginal decline in expected harm does not 
outweigh the marginal increase in the costs of compliance and enforcement. 
I already argued in section 3.2 that this is a reason for underdeterrence. If the 
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maximum (monetary) penalty is infinitely large, this problem will never occur. 
The enforcement costs can be minimized by maximizing the sanction and 
minimizing the probability of detection and therefore the enforcement costs. 
However, if the maximum penalty is binding, and especially if it is relatively 
low, full compliance will require significant resources since the probability of 
detection should be sufficiently large. Therefore, even if all offenses are inef-
ficient, it might not be efficient to allocate sufficient resources to induce full 
compliance (Lando and Shavell, 2004). If the marginal costs of enforcement 
are constant or decreasing, it is always efficient to impose either full compli-
ance or zero compliance. If offenses are identical and inefficient and if the 
marginal costs of enforcement are constant, an enforcement policy that is effi-
cient for one group of firms or for one period of time must also be optimal for 
the other group or period. Hence, enforcement costs are either low enough to 
enforce full compliance, or too high to take action against any offense. How-
ever, if the marginal enforcement costs are increasing, the results might be dif-
ferent. If marginal enforcement costs are increasing, enforcing a higher level 
of compliance becomes increasingly costly, so that it is less costly to increase 
the level of compliance from 10% to 20%, than from 90% to 100%. It is effi-
cient to increase enforcement as long as the marginal costs of enforcement are 
lower than the marginal benefits of the decline in expected harm minus the 
compliance costs. When the marginal costs of enforcement increase, a point 
might be reached where this condition is no longer satisfied, implying that it 
is efficient to allocate a level of resources that will induce partial compliance 
(both in time and over the population). Increasing marginal costs are common 
because of capacity constraints. For example, in the short run, the amount of 
technical equipment and the number of enforcement agents is given. Increas-
ing the capacity would require a larger budget or the training of agents, both 
of which take significant time (Stigler, 1970). Suppose that some circumstanc-
es change, affecting the expected harm, the compliance costs or the enforce-
ment costs. For example, an (unexpected) increase in the number of cafés 
will imply that more cafés have to be inspected on closing times, leading to a 
decrease in the expected probability of inspection per café if the resources are 
not adjusted. Alternatively, enforcement agents might become ill, requiring 
replacement. Changing circumstances such as these might possibly require 
an increase in enforcement resources. However, this might prove to be impos-
sible in the short run because of capacity constraints, implying that full com-
pliance can no longer be achieved. As a result, because marginal enforcement 
costs are increasing (at least in the short run), the enforcement authority will 
frequently find itself constrained in its resources with respect to the enforce-
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ment problem, which in turn will prevent it from enforcing full compliance.90 
Therefore, the second reason for partial compliance as an objective is that full 
compliance is unachievable  due to limited enforcement resources and given 
the maximum penalty. This is significantly different from the first reason for 
partial compliance: if a higher level of deterrence could be obtained at no cost 
(against the same level of enforcement costs), it would be socially beneficial.
In the remainder of this section, I focus on situations in which full com-
pliance is unachievable, ignoring the first reason for partial compliance (to 
which I return in section 6.1). In the remainder of this section, I assume that 
all offenses are identical and inefficient, and I examine how the highest level 
of compliance can be obtained given the level of resources and the maximum 
sanction, first when an offense is committed only once, secondly when an 
offense can be committed several times.
5.2 Targeting enforcement
 Suppose that all potential offenses are identical and inefficient, and that 
constraints on resources and penalties are such that not all offenses can be 
deterred. In that case, the best thing the authority can do is to try and achieve 
the highest possible level of compliance. If the authority adopts a uniform 
enforcement policy in which it approaches all offenses in the same way, the 
consequence of incomplete deterrence will be that no one will ever comply.
Consider the example of enforcing closing times in cafés. Suppose that 
a café should comply with the rule concerning closing at 1:00 AM in order 
to keep the night’s rest in the neighborhood. Every Saturday, each café must 
decide about compliance. If a given café complies, it foregoes a benefit of €200 
of being opened until 2:00 AM. The maximum feasible fine equals €1000. If 
the municipality is able or willing to carry out a random inspection rate of 
only 10%, a café will violate (assuming risk neutrality) and remain open until 
2:00 AM, since  10% * € 1000 = 100 <  € 200. Hence the compliance rate will be 
zero.
In this case, it would be helpful if all available resources were allocated 
to some subgroup of the population (Lando and Shavell, 2004). This would 
induce this particular population group to comply, achieving some level of par-
tial compliance . Of course, deterrence is lost for the part of the population that 
is not inspected, but this part would also violate under the uniform policy.
Consider again the example of enforcing closing times at cafés. If the avail-
able resources allow an average inspection rate of 10% and the maximum fine 
90 A related reason for partial compliance as an objective is that the political process does not 
allocate efficient enforcement budgets, constraining the authority’s objective to a maxi-
mizing of compliance given the available resources. Note also that although on paper, the 
objective of enforcement agents is often to achieve full compliance, in practice this means 
that they try to maximize compliance with a limited enforcement budget.
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is €1000, the best policy would be to only inspect the cafés that are located in 
one half of the city (region A), and not inspecting all the other cafés (region B). 
This would allow the inspection rate in region A to be 20%, sufficient for deter-
rence, while the inspection rate in region B would be 0%. Hence, half the popu-
lation will comply, leading to a compliance rate of 50%, which is an improve-
ment on the 0% compliance rate of the uniform inspection rate of 10%.
Other examples, given by Lando and Shavell (2004), are tax audits which 
focus only on citizens in some regions of the country or citizens have names 
starting with A-M, or highway patrols for speeding that discriminate between 
highways.
Harrington (1988) provides a similar solution for enforcement in dealing 
with one firm during multiple periods. In this case, enforcement can target 
on certain periods. For example, cafés could be inspected during one half of 
the year (from July – December), and be left without control for the rest of 
the year (January – June). This would result in cafés complying half the time, 
leading to a compliance rate of 50% with an average inspection rate of 10%.
Another variant is offered in Heyes and Rickman (1999). They consider a 
situation in which an enforcement authority has to enforce regulations on sev-
eral domains of a firm, for example several locations or several types of regu-
lation. If the authority has insufficient resources and penalties, a firm might 
possibly incur violations in all domains. It can then be efficient to tolerate non-
compliance in one domain in order to enforce compliance in the other.
For example, if a proprietor has two cafés (A and B) in which he can violate 
closing times as in the example above, he will, under a uniform policy, incur 
violations in both. If however, the enforcement authority follows a policy of 
not enforcing at location A, but enforcing at location B with probability 20%, 
the proprietor will at least comply at location B. In which case, the compliance 
rate will again be 50%, with an average inspection rate of 10%.
The recommended policy of targeting is only efficient under certain con-
ditions (Lando and Shavell, 2004). First of all, the population must be aware 
of the targeting otherwise they will not correctly estimate the probability of 
inspection. Knowledge of the average inspection rate is insufficient. A pro-
prietor should know whether or not his specific region will be inspected. 
An automobilist should know whether or not the highway he takes will be 
inspected. Otherwise, the compliance rate remains zero. Secondly, movement 
from one group to the other should not be possible for potential offenders, 
or it should at least be sufficiently costly. Otherwise, the potential offenders 
can still escape enforcement. Individuals cannot easily change their name to 
avoid enforcement when targeting is based on the first letter of a name (A-M), 
and in the example of inspecting closing times, cafés do not easily move to 
region B. Evasion can be discouraged by varying the inspected group in time. 
However, if a particular highway is targeted, some truck drivers might pos-
sibly take an alternative route, while in case of environmental offenses with 
high compliance costs there might be an incentive to locate the industry in a 
region with relaxed enforcement regimes.
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5.3 State-dependent enforcement
 In case of serious underdeterrence, due to full compliance being unachiev-
able, it is possible to increase detection for repeat offenders. If the overall level 
of resources is given, deterrence is enhanced by differentiating inspection. 
This problem is dealt with in the literature studying the use of so-called state-
dependent enforcement policies. These policies were first studied mathemati-
cally by Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) in a model of income tax evasion. 
Harrington (1988) applied the analysis to the enforcement of pollution stan-
dards and provided a more general framework.
5.3.1 The benefits of a state-dependent enforcement policy
Harrington (1988) shows that an enforcement regime in which the probabil-
ity of inspection depends on the outcome of the most recent inspection is 
more cost-effective than a system in which the inspection rate is independent 
of past performance. An enforcement authority can enhance deterrence by 
dividing regulated firms into two groups according to their past compliance 
record. If a firm is in the first group and it is caught violating, the firm will 
be transferred to the second group. In this second group – also called target 
group – inspection is more frequent and the penalties are higher. If the firm in 
question again violates while in the second group, it will remain in this sec-
ond group. If the firm is found to be in compliance, there is a probability that 
it is sent back to the first group.
Such an enforcement policy can only be beneficial in case the maximum 
feasible level of compliance is partial . If the resources for enforcement are 
insufficient – given the maximum sanction – for full compliance, a firm 
with costs of compliance that are too high will not comply under a uniform 
enforcement policy, i.e. a firm will fail to comply if c > pf max. This does not 
necessarily imply that it is better to save costs and allocate no resources at all. 
I already demonstrated above that a targeting policy might result in partial 
compliance for these firms. Harrington (1988) shows that a state-dependent 
policy can obtain even higher levels of partial compliance.91 Using a given 
level of resources, the enforcement authority can choose to impose a differ-
ent probability of inspection for group 1 than for group 2. If the probability of 
inspection in group 2 becomes large enough, the firm will comply if it is in the 
second group. The probability of inspection in group 1 necessarily decreases, 
but no deterrence is lost because compliance in group 1 was already zero. 
Hence, partial compliance is gained, namely the time the firm spends in the 
91 More specifically, Harrington (1988) shows that a given compliance objective can be 
obtained with a lower level of resources, which is in essence the same reasoning. I discuss 
the objective of maximizing compliance given a constrained level of resources.
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second group. A state-dependent enforcement policy has two major benefits 
over the uniform targeting policy.
1. Under a state-dependent enforcement policy, a fi rm may be induced to 
comply in group 2 even if the compliance costs exceed the expected pen-
alty. The reason is that there are some additional benefi ts from compliance 
in group 2. If the fi rm complies in group 2, it will possibly be returned to 
group 1 where it will receive the benefi ts from violation (avoiding com-
pliance costs). Because of this incentive – called leverage – the expected 
formal sanction can be lower than the costs of compliance (c > p*2  f2) al-
lowing for a savings in resources which can in turn be used to increase 
the number of fi rms in the target group or the time the fi rm spends in the 
target group.
2.  A state-dependent enforcement policy can result in at least a certain level 
of compliance even if the costs of compliance exceed the maximum fea-
sible penalty (c > f max) because of the same leverage effect. The maximum 
level of compliance that can be obtained is the ratio between the costs of 
compliance and the maximal penalty. To obtain this maximum level, all 
fi rms in group 2 must be inspected.92
In order to make the incentive to comply in the second group (the leverage) 
as high as possible, the difference in expected punishment between the two 
groups should be made as large as possible. This implies that the penalty in 
the second group should be maximal, while being zero in the first group. This 
maximizes compliance in the second group and has no effect on compliance 
in the first group, as these firms violate anyway. The optimal probability of 
inspection is also higher in the second than in the first group. The probability 
of inspection determines the time spent in a group. For example, the prob-
ability of inspection in the first group should be high enough to ensure that 
enough firms transit to the second group where they are forced to comply, and 
it should be small enough to let the firms in the first group benefit from viola-
tion, so that the incentive to comply in the second group is high enough.
Note that in this state-dependent enforcement policy, no penalties are 
ever collected, the expected sanctions are low (or at least lower than compli-
ance costs), while the compliance rate is positive and can be quite high. As 
Harrington (1988) notes, this might provide an explanation for the enforce-
ment policies which are actually observed, later called the ‘Harrington Para-
dox ’ (for example Heyes, 2000; Harrington and Heyes, 2001). This paradox is 
the combination of the following observations. In environmental regulation 
(1) the frequency of inspection is low, (2) (even if a violation is detected) pen-
alties are hardly ever imposed and are rather low, (3) yet the level of compli-
ance seems to be pretty high.
Harrington (1988) also shows that by adding to this model a third group, in 
92 I.e., if c > f max, the maximum feasible compliance rate Z equals f max / c.  
 To achieve Z = f max / c requires p2 = 1.
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which all firms are inspected and no escape is possible, even more can be 
saved in enforcement costs. The main reason is that adding such a group in-
creases the costs of violation in group 2, hence allowing the inspection fre-
quency in group 2 to decline. We might also think of the threat of closing firms 
which violate in group 3. The problem with such a third group is that when 
enforcement agencies make mistakes, all firms end up in the third group.
5.3.2 An example of state-dependent enforcement
An example might be useful at this point. Consider again the café that should 
comply with the closing at 1:00 AM rule in order to keep night’s rest in the 
neighborhood. Every Saturday the café must decide about compliance. If it 
complies, it foregoes a benefit of €200. The maximum feasible fine equals 
€1000. The municipality is willing or able to carry out inspections at an 
 average rate of only 10%. As discussed above, under (random) uniform 
inspections, the café will violate and remain open until 2:00 AM (because
10% * € 1000 < 200). Hence, the compliance rate will be zero. Under a targeting 
scheme of enforcement during half of the periods, a compliance rate of 50% 
can be obtained. 
A state-dependent enforcement policy can increase the compliance rate 
even further. Suppose that cafés are classified into two groups. First of all, 
observe the policy in which the municipality inspects cafés with a standard 
probability of 5% (group 1), which means that cafés will fail to comply. How-
ever, if a café is caught, it will be transferred to group 2 where it is inspected 
with a probability of 20% and, if found in violation, sanctioned with a fine of 
€1000. Once caught, the café will comply (because 20% * € 1000 = € 200). If, 
after a certain period of compliance, the firm is returned to the 5%-category, it 
will return to non-compliance, until it is caught again, etc. Now note that this 
possible return to group 1, where the café non-complies, presents some future 
benefits. If the café is returned to the first group, it will violate and receive 
benefits of €200. Because of these benefits, compliance in the second group 
remains attractive if the expected formal sanction is somewhat decreased. 
Suppose the probability of inspection in group 2 is reduced to 15%. If the 
café violates in group 2, it will have to pay a fine of €1000 with a probability 
of 15%, so the expected costs will be €150. If the café complies, it will forego a 
benefit of €200. Thus, non-compliance in group 2 saves €50. However, if the 
café violates, it will remain in the second group, yielding expected costs of 
€150 every week. If the café complies, it might also remain in group 2 (yield-
ing opportunity costs of €200 per week), but there is also a chance that the 
café will be returned to group 1 where it benefits from violation by €200. If the 
expected future benefits of a possible return to group 1 are valued higher than 
€50, the café will still comply in the second group, even under an inspection 
rate of 15%.
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Table 5.1 An example of optimal enforcement policies of closing timesa
Uniform State-dependent
Random Target Basic
Variant 1
(r = 0,05)
Variant 2
(Fmax = 500)e
Variant 3
(Fmax = 100)
Inputs:
C 200 200 200 200 200 200
Fmax 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 100
βb 0.9982 0.9982 0.9982 0.9991 0.9982 0.9982
Iavc 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Results:
Z 0 0.50 0.6784 0.6867 0.4663 0.2010
p1 0.10 0.10d 0.0118 0.0088 0.0118 0.0118
p2 - - 0.1418 0.1416 0.2010 0.4505
u - - 0.0393 0.0282 0.0671 0.1042
f1 1000 1000 0 0 0 0
f2 - - 1000 1000 500 100
a. Solutions are calculated with help of Excell 2000.
The example concerns a café that every Saturday can decide whether or not it com-
plies as explained in the main text. Variables are defi ned as follows:
C =  costs of compliance
Fmax = maximum feasible fi ne
β = discount rate per week = 1/((1+r)^(1/52))
Iav = average inspection rate = P(G1)*p1 + P(G2)*p2
Z = compliance rate = P(G2)
p1, p2 = probability of inspection in respectively group 1 and group 2
u = probability of transition from group 2 to group 1 if found to be in compliance
f1, f2 = fi nes in respectively group 1 and group 2
P(G2) = probability of being in group 2 = p1/(p1+p2u) = 1 – P(G1) = 1 – p2u/(p1+p2u)
The problem is to maximize Z given the following constraints: (a) Iav = 10%; (b) the 
fi rm complies in the second group, implying that the costs of compliance should be 
smaller than the expected sanction and the benefi ts of leverage:
c  ≤ p2 f2+ L = p2 f2 +  
p2 bu (p2 f2 − p1 f1)
 
                                   
1 −(1 − p1) b
  
(and the fi rm violates in the fi rst group implying c ≥  p1 f1 ); (c) variables are feasible so 
probabilities should be between 0 and 1 and penalties between 0 and Fmax .
b. An interest rate r of 10% per year corresponds to a discount factor β of  0.9982 per 
week. An interest rate of 5% per year corresponds to a β of 0.9991 per week.
c. It is assumed that the enforcement resources can and should result in an average 
inspection rate of 10%. Hence, Iav is held constant for all variants. Examination shows 
that under Iav of 5%, the uniform policy becomes of course increasingly impossible. 
Also, the possibilities to target compliance in the uniform policy become smaller and 
hence the state dependent policy becomes more favorable. Although of course the fea-
sible Z becomes smaller under a state dependent policy too. Reverse results hold for 
an Iav of 18%.
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d. This means the agency inspects the fi rm half of the periods (for example from July 
– December) with probability 20%. Hence average inspection probability is 0,5*0% + 
0,5*20% = 10% and average compliance rate is 0,5*0 + 0,5*1 = 0,5.
e. The variant of a decrease of fmax from 1000 to 500 yields exactly the same results as 
an increase in c from 200 to 400. The effects of decreases in fmax are similar to those of 
increasing c.
A café will comply in group 2 if its costs of compliance are lower than the 
expected sanction plus leverage benefits (formally c  ≤ p2F2+ L, where L 
denotes the leverage93). This implies that the probability of inspection in 
the second group can be reduced to below 20%. Moreover, if this probability 
decreases, the firm can be kept in group 2 longer while keeping the aver-
age inspection rate at 10%. And if the firm spends more time in group 2, the 
compliance rate will increase. Calculation reveals that under a discount rate 
of 0.9982 (which corresponds to an interest rate of 10% per year) the optimal 
policy is to inspect firms in the first group with a probability of 1.2% per week, 
in the second group with a probability of 14.2% per week, and to return firms 
in the second group that are found to be in compliance to the first group with 
a probability of 3.9%. This policy will induce an expected sanction in the sec-
ond group of €142 (which is less than €200), but it will achieve a compliance 
level of 68%. See table 5.1. Given the expected sanction of €142, the leverage 
benefits equal €58. These benefits are the additional benefits of compliance 
in group 2. They follow from the expected time the café spends in group 1 
multiplied by the discounted expected penalty the café avoids when in group 
1. The expected time spent in group 1 depends on the probability of being 
inspected in group 2 and returned to group 1 relative to the probability that – 
once the café is returned to group 1 – it will be inspected and transferred back 
to group 2, etc. If the café is in group 1, it will not face the expected penalty of 
€142. These leverage benefits are maximized by the enforcement policy (i.e. 
the fine in group 2 is maximal, the fine in group 1 is zero) so that the café will 
just decide to comply in group 2: €200 ≤ €142 + €58. Thanks to these leverage 
benefits, the compliance rate is 68%, which is higher than the feasible compli-
ance level under the targeting scheme described above (50%, third column).
Table 5.1 also contains some variations which reveal further characteristics 
of the state-dependent enforcement policy. First, if the firm cares more about 
the future (i.e. the discount rate b increases), the probability of inspection in 
group 1 (p1) and the probability of return to compliance (u) can be made arbi-
trarily low. Since this firm cares more about the future, even a low probability 
of return to compliance is promising. As a result, the firm can be induced 
to comply in group 2 through a low probability of return. If few cafés are 
returned to group 1, few cafés need to be targeted from group 1 to group 2, 
93 Harrington (1988) shows that L equals  L=  
p2bu(p2F2 − p1F1)
   (see table 5.1 for an explanation of variables.
     1 −(1 − p1)b
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allowing the probability of inspection in group 1 to also remain low. Secondly, 
if the fine becomes lower, or the costs of compliance go up, the maximum 
feasible level of compliance becomes lower (given resources). However, even 
if the costs of compliance exceed the maximum fine (for example €100), lever-
age effects will occur and the café can be induced to comply partially. If the 
maximum fine becomes lower, the probability of inspection in group 2 should 
be higher in order to ensure compliance. Note that the solutions for the prob-
ability of inspection in group 1 do not depend on the level of the maximum 
fine. This follows from the fact that the fine in the first group is always zero 
and the probability of transition (u) determines the time spent in each group 
in order to meet the inspection rate of 10%. Finally, a different interpretation 
of u would be that the café is not returned to the first group with a probability 
u (after observing compliance in group 2), but instead the firm is returned to 
the first group after some t periods of being found in compliance. This yields 
the same results with t= 1/ u, but is less flexible as these periods must have 
integer values. For example, in the basic variant the café could be returned to 
compliance after 8 inspections in which compliance is observed (1/ 0.1418 = 
7.052 which is rounded upwards to 8).
Furthermore, we can show that the benefits of a state-dependent enforce-
ment policy become smaller as the available resources increase. Greater resourc-
es allow for higher compliance levels. In order to have a higher level of com-
pliance under a state-dependent enforcement policy, the expected time in the 
second group must be higher, implying that the possible savings in resources 
will be lower. On the other hand, if the available resources increase, the achiev-
able level of compliance under a uniform targeting policy comes increasingly 
close to unity. If the available resources allow for an average inspection rate of 
20%, the optimal policy reduces to a uniform policy with a fine of €1000 and an 
inspection rate of 20%. If a uniform enforcement policy already obtains a high 
level of compliance, the possible benefits of a state-dependent policy are lower.94
5.3.3 Improvement and discussion of the state-dependent enforcement policy
In later contributions, the results of Harrington (1988) have been extended and 
criticized. The most important criticism is directed at the specific objective func-
tion of the enforcement authority. In Harrington’s model the objective of the 
enforcement authority is to maximize compliance given the available resources 
and the maximum feasible penalty, and assuming that the authority knows the 
firm’s compliance costs. Given this structure of the model, Harrington shows 
that a state-dependent enforcement policy (1) can achieve the same compliance 
level at lower enforcement costs, (2) can achieve at least some compliance even 
94 Formally, Harrington (1988) demonstrates that if the compliance rate under a uniform tar-
geting policy is a, the maximum state-dependent compliance rate Z will have the property 
Z ≥  a  ≥  Z2/(1 + u).
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if the costs of compliance exceed the maximal available penalty. Later contri-
butions show that these results crucially depend on the structure of the model.
1. Harford and Harrington (1991) criticize the fact that the standard in 
Harrington’s model is fi xed (which is probably correct for tax evasion 
models), while in environmental and safety regulation, the standard 
can often vary. The higher the standard imposed, the higher the costs of 
compliance, hence the lower the social welfare. From a social point of 
view, it is not only important to minimize enforcement costs given the 
level of compliance, but also to minimize the costs of compliance with 
the standard, given the level of compliance. This is obtained when all 
fi rms realize the same marginal costs of compliance for all periods.
 In Harrington (1988)’s model, firms with identical cost functions pollute 
at different levels, implying that this condition is not satisfied. If – as is 
usually the case – it becomes increasingly costly to satisfy a higher stan-
dard, the costs of compliance increase more than proportionately with 
the level of compliance (i.e. the marginal costs are rising). If these costs 
rise sufficiently95 and if a uniform enforcement policy cannot enforce the 
(legal) standard at the optimal level, the best response is not to impose 
a state-dependent enforcement policy, but to lower the standard some-
what and to uniformly enforce this lowered standard. Because this low-
ering of the standard implies that compliance costs will decrease, the ex-
pected sanction for non-compliance can be smaller, so that enforcement 
resources can be saved or can be used to enforce a relatively higher level 
of compliance.
 Consider the example discussed above. Suppose that customers leave 
at different times and cafés become increasingly empty, so that reducing 
closing time from 2:00 AM to 1:40 AM costs €30 and reducing from 1:40 
AM to 1:20 AM costs €60, while the costs of reducing the closing time 
from 1:20 AM to 1:00 AM costs €110 (total costs €200). In this case, a café 
can be forced to comply under a uniform policy if it is inspected only after 
1:20 AM (10% * € 1000 = € 100 > 60 + 30 = € 90). It will then comply for forty 
of the sixty minutes, in other words at 67%. It is better to always close 
a café at 1:20 AM (costs €90) than to close it at 1:00 AM 67% of the time 
and at 2:00 AM 33% of the time (expected costs €134 as in the example 
above under a state-dependent enforcement policy96). For the same level 
of compliance and hence of expected noise (“67%”) and for the same av-
erage inspection rate (10%), the costs of compliance are lower under the 
95 Or, analogously, if the marginal harm decreases sufficiently in the level of compliance.
96 For the sake of simplicity, I am rounding off the compliance rate of 0.6784 (table 5.1) to 0.67 
or 2/3.
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uniform policy of inspecting only after 1:20 AM (€90) than under the for-
mer state-dependent policy (€134).97
 Of course, the numbers in the example are such that after 1:20 AM, full 
compliance can be achieved and compliance after 1:20 AM will in strict 
terms be more beneficial. However, the general point is that the decline 
in compliance costs under a uniform policy and lowering of the standard 
can be higher than the decline in monitoring costs under a state-depen-
dent policy. Therefore, uniform inspections and certain compliance after, 
for example, 1:30 AM (a compliance rate of 50%) might be socially more 
desirable than a state-dependent enforcement policy in which the café 
complies at 1:00 AM with a probability of 67% and fails to comply at all 
with a probability of 33% (a compliance rate of 67%).
 Thus Harford and Harrington (1991) show that the uniform enforcement 
policy is superior if the enforcement authority sets both the standard and 
the monitoring strategy simultaneously. However, if setting the standard 
is a separate decision, then Harrington’s (1988) results apply. Once a stan-
dard has been selected, a state-dependent enforcement strategy is the 
most cost-effective way to achieve a given level of compliance with that 
standard. This shows that there might be efficiency gains from simultane-
ous decisions.98
2. Harford (1991) discusses a model in which the levels of compliance are 
measured with some random error and in which the enforcement author-
ity can differentiate standards, fi nes and inspection rates. If these errors 
are large enough, it will be benefi cial for fi rms to choose a level of compli-
ance that is different from the standard, but higher than zero.99 Harford 
(1991) shows that in such cases it is optimal to have a lower standard 
and a lower inspection rate in the fi rst group. This makes compliance in 
group 2 more attractive, allowing savings of monitoring costs. However, 
under reasonable conditions, it is optimal to have maximum fi nes in both 
groups. At the very least, the fi ne for group 1 should be larger than zero in 
order to offer suffi cient incentive for some fi rms to choose a positive level 
of precautions.
3. Raymond (1999) analyzes the situation when enforcement authorities fail 
to observe the costs of compliance. As Harrington (1988) shows, fi rms 
can be categorized by their level of compliance costs. If the costs of com-
pliance are low, a fi rm will comply under a uniform enforcement policy
97 Following note 95, it could also be beneficial to lower the standard if the marginal compli-
ance costs are constant, but the marginal harm is increasing. If noise from cafés increases 
sufficiently, society will be better off always having the café closed at 1:30 AM (achievable 
under uniform enforcing at this time) than sometimes (probability of 67%) at 1:00 AM and 
sometimes at 2:00 AM (probability 33%) (under a state-dependent enforcement policy).
98 This is examined further in section 9.3.1 where I discuss the optimal discretion and organi-
zation of enforcement authorities.
99 If there are no errors, it will be optimal, as in Harrington (1988), to choose for either zero 
compliance or the standard.
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(c ≤ pf with f ≤ f max). If the costs of compliance are higher, a fi rm will vio-
late under a uniform policy. For very high compliance costs, a fi rm will 
always violate under a state-dependent policy too. However, for inter-
mediate values of compliance costs, the fi rm can be induced to partially 
comply under a state-dependent policy. Harrington (1988) assumes that 
the enforcement authority knows the level of compliance costs and he 
then only discusses fi rms with such intermediate compliance costs, since 
the other two cases are not interesting. If the enforcement authority can-
not distinguish between fi rms, it will have to apply the same enforcement 
strategy to all fi rms, regardless of their compliance costs. If the enforce-
ment authority switches from a uniform policy to a state-dependent en-
forcement policy with zero fi nes for the fi rst group, this will have two op-
posing effects: (1) It will be benefi cial because compliance will be gained 
for fi rms with intermediate compliance costs which would violate under 
the uniform policy and at least partially comply under the state-depen-
dent policy; (2) It will be costly because compliance is lost for fi rms with 
low compliance costs which would always comply under the uniform 
policy and now only partially comply because the fi ne in the fi rst group 
has been reduced. Whether or not the benefi ts are higher than the costs 
depends on the distribution of compliance costs over fi rms. If the propor-
tion of fi rms with low compliance costs is high, setting the fi ne for the fi rst 
group at zero is not a good idea. Depending on the distribution, it might 
be optimal to impose a maximal fi ne for the fi rst group and choose for a 
uniform enforcement policy.
 In the example of cafés, cafés with compliance costs below €100 will com-
ply under a uniform enforcement policy. If the enforcement authority 
switches to a state-dependent enforcement policy, these cafés will only 
partially comply. Therefore, the enforcement authority will have to bal-
ance the decrease in compliance (from 100% to some partial compliance 
rate) for cafés with costs below €100 with the increase in compliance (from 
0% to some partial compliance rate) for cafés with compliance costs above 
€100.
4. Friesen (2003) shows that in the state-dependent enforcement policy, fur-
ther savings in monitoring costs can be realised. Since firms incur vio-
lations in the first group and only comply in the second, inspection in 
the first group will not serve deterrence but is only required to select the 
firms that will be moved to the second group. By randomizing the move-
ment of firms from group 1 to group 2, the enforcement authority can 
avoid the costs of inspection in group 1 without affecting the firm’s incen-
tive to comply. Therefore the optimal choice will be to set the inspection 
rate in group 1 at zero and randomly select the firms that will be moved 
to group 2. These results follow from the fact that Friesen (2003) extends 
Harrington’s model by making all possible transitions between the two 
groups endogenous. In Harrington’s model, only the transition prob-
ability of moving from group 2 to group 1 when in compliance is endo-
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geneous. Besides the savings in inspection costs in group 1, other costs are 
also saved. The incentive to comply in group 2 is maximized by setting 
u= 1 (the firm will always be transferred to group 1 if found in compli-
ance in group 2). Because the leverage benefits are higher, the expected 
formal sanction can be lower. Therefore u= 1  will allow the probability of 
inspection in group 2 to be smaller, leading to lower enforcement costs, 
which can be used to increase compliance. The random transition from 
group 1 to group 2 is adjusted to meet the constraints on the inspection 
rate and/or compliance level. In contrast, in Harrington (1988), the tran-
sition from group 1 to group 2 is given (and equal to one if a firm is in-
spected and found in violation), so u has to be adjusted in order to meet 
the constraints. Hence, the optimal u is generally smaller than 1, implying 
that leverage is not maximized.100
 In the example used above, the same compliance level of 0.6784 can be ob-
tained by setting p1= 0, u= 1, p2= 0.1360 and randomly moving cafés from 
group 1 to group 2 with a probability of 0.7132 (table 5.2). In that case, the 
average inspection rate will only be 0.0922, as compared to 0.1000 in the ex-
ample above. This might seem a small difference but it implies a decrease 
in the inspection rate (and hence enforcement costs) of nearly 8%.
 Therefore, in Harrington (1988), in a “past compliance targeting” scheme, 
transition from group 1 to group 2 as well as from group 2 to group 1 is 
based on past performance. In contrast, Friesen’s (2003) “optimal target-
ing” scheme uses past compliance records only to enable a transfer from 
group 2 to group 1. As such, it has a similar drawback to the one involved 
in the case of repeat offenders. It is not optimal to base enforcement on 
past violation records and to increase enforcement on offenders. How-
ever, it is optimal to reward compliant behavior by relaxing enforcement, 
which in this case means no inspections at all.101
100 From this, Friesen (2003) concludes that the past performance policy of Harrington (1988) 
is feasible for higher levels of target compliance rate and/or higher levels of compliance 
costs. The random optimal targeting policy is not feasible if the probability of inspection in 
group 2 exceeds 1 or if the probability of transition from group 1 to group 2 is smaller than 
zero. However, she seems to continue to assume that u= 1. If she allows u< 1, the random 
targeting policy remains feasible. The general point of saving inspection costs in group 
1 seems to always apply. It is always possible to randomize the inspection probability of 
Harrington (1988) since this probability has no other function than to determine the tran-
sition to group 2.
101 The differences in the targeting schemes are further discussed and evaluated in experi-
ments in Clark et al. (2004). Cason and Gangadharan (2006) also provide experimental 
evidence. Empirical research based on field data is given in Helland (1998) and Eckert 
(2004). Both provide support for Harrington’s policies, but also present counter-effects. 
Helland (1998) finds that firms in the pulp and paper industry which violate environ-
mental regulations experience a one- or two-quarter period of more frequent inspections. 
However, he also finds that the return to a weak enforcement regime is especially based on 
self-reported violations rather than demonstrated compliance. Empirical research is ham-
pered by the absence of (reliable) data on individual reporting behavior and uninspected 
firms.
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Table 5.2  State-dependent enforcement policy of closing times improved by 
Friesen (2003)a
    Uniform              State-dependent
Random Target Basic Target (Friesen)
Inputs:
C 200 200 200 200
ƒ max 1000 1000 1000 1000
β 0.9982 0.9982 0.9982 0.9982
Iav 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.0922
Results:
Z 0 0.50 0.6784 0.6784
p1 0.10 0.10 0.0118 0
p2 - - 0.1418 0.1360
u - - 0.0393 1.00
a - - - 0.7132
f1 1000 1000 0 0
f2 - - 1000 1000
a. See the notes to table 5.1. In addition:
a = probability of transition from group 1 to group 2.
5.3.4 Warnings
 In the state-dependent enforcement policy, a firm caught incurring a violation 
in group 1 will not be penalized, but transferred to a target group in which 
a stricter enforcement policy applies. Only if it again incurs a violation will 
it be punished. This is similar to the use of warnings, a system in which the 
enforcement authority detects a violation, issues a warning and only pun-
ishes the firm if the violation is repeated or continues.
The use of warnings is very common. Most repair sanctions discussed in 
section 4.2 are in effect warnings. If a firm is found to be in violation, a warn-
ing is issued that it will be penalized if it does not return to compliance and/
or repair the damage caused. At first sight, warnings seem to be inefficient 
(Nyborg and Telle, 2004). If potential violators know that they will be given a 
second chance, will they ever comply before receiving a warning? And why 
should regulators not sanction violators immediately, thereby providing 
stronger incentives to comply (recall the discussion about repeat offenders 
in section 4.1)?
There are several answers to these questions. First of all, warnings are a 
form of state-dependent enforcement with the state depending on whether a 
warning has been issued. As explained above, if full compliance is unachiev-
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able, overall compliance may be higher if the enforcement authority uses a 
state-dependent enforcement policy, in which the penalty in the non-target 
group is zero.102 The problem is that the regulator faces a limited budget and 
monitoring is costly. Hence, targeting inspections may be more beneficial than 
random inspections.
A different (although related) answer is that warnings can be beneficial 
if the enforcement authority faces a limited budget and prosecution is costly 
(Nyborg and Telle, 2004). This implies that the authority can prosecute only a 
limited number of violators. Therefore, the ability to impose sanctions on an 
individual violator is decreasing with an increasing number of violators.103 
When the number of violators exceeds a critical threshold, the expected sanc-
tion becomes insufficient to deter violation. The outcome therefore depends 
on a firm’s expectation about (non)compliance by other firms. Firms might 
possibly form their expectation on past compliance rates. Nyborg and Telle 
(2004) show that if violation can be both accidental and deliberate, the enforce-
ment authority is likely to lose control at some point. This is what happens if, 
due to accidental violations, the compliance rate exceeds the threshold in one 
period, following which every firm will begin to violate deliberately, leading 
to an equilibrium in which the enforcement authority spends all its resources 
on enforcement, yet most firms violate. Nyborg and Telle (2004) also show 
that warnings may substantially improve the effectiveness of enforcement. 
Since warnings are less costly for the regulator to impose, they offer more pos-
sibilities for stopping the breakdown of compliance. For firms, delayed com-
pliance is more costly than immediate compliance (due to the costs of extra 
inspections for example). This explains why firms might comply under warn-
ings and not always adopt a “wait-and-see approach”. However, it often pays 
to delay compliance (due to discounting effects or because monitoring and 
detection are uncertain), in which case warnings do not necessarily help the 
regulator to retain control, since many firms will start delaying compliance. 
Still, I suggest that even if firms delay compliance in reaction to warnings, 
warnings can nevertheless be beneficial. Since warnings are cheaper than for-
mal sanctions, the enforcement authority will have more resources available 
to monitor firms under warnings. If the enforcement authority’s budget com-
petes for both monitoring and prosecution, using warnings might save pros-
102 Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) for example argue that if the limits on the enforcement author-
ity’s budget and penalties are such that firms will fail to comply (p*Smax< c), it might be 
more effective, after an inspection, to offer the offenders the option to comply and avoid 
prosecution, where the fine will be certain if non-compliance is chosen for. This might 
induce some firms to comply after inspection (Smax ≥ c). Therefore, as in the state-depen-
dent enforcement policy, the outcome will depend on the distribution of compliance costs. 
If this distribution is such that many firms will choose to delay compliance (“wait-and-
see”) instead of complying immediately, warnings would clearly harm social welfare. If 
this distribution is such that many firms will choose to at least comply after inspection, 
instead of not complying at all, it might improve social welfare.
103 This is an example of the interactions discussed in section 3.3.
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ecution costs and hence the monitoring rate (before and after a warning) can 
be higher, which will increase the compliance rate. Warnings are beneficial if 
the limits on the authority’s budget and sanctions are such that immediate 
punishment will enforce a lower compliance rate than the situation in which 
firms only comply after inspection (“wait-and-see”).
Two final points can be made concerning the desirability of warnings, 
both of them relating to the fact that warnings may well be a necessary ele-
ment in an effective enforcement process. This is the case, for instance, when 
inspections are used to cheaply inform the regulated firms about the rules, 
following which, a procedure of enforcement and prosecution is started. Or, 
alternatively, warnings might be needed to sustain the firm’s internal motiva-
tions to comply. These issues are discussed in the following two chapters.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter explains that immediate and equal punishment of all (identical) 
offenses – as is the case in Becker’s model – is not a good idea in cases where 
the level of resources and the penalty are sufficiently restricted. The threat is 
that the enforcement authority will spend many resources without effectively 
enforcing compliance because the expected sanction is too small. It would 
then be optimal to target enforcement resources. The optimal targeting strat-
egy is one in which enforcement depends on past compliance, for instance 
by issuing warnings . By tolerating a given level of non-compliance, or by 
sometimes tolerating non-compliance, the enforcement authority can ‘buy’ 
or ‘negotiate’ partial compliance . It can also reward compliance in the target 
group by transition to a non-target group. The prospect of the possibility of 
violating and thereby avoiding the costs of compliance will offer the firm a 
higher incentive to comply.

6 Flexible compliance and cooperative 
enforcement – information constraints
Until now it was assumed that firms are perfectly informed concerning their 
own compliance costs as well as the standard. It was assumed that the legal 
standards are known to all parties and that a firm is fully aware of the enforce-
ment authority’s request as well as the consequences of non-compliance. This 
may, however, not necessarily be the case. I now discuss the consequences of 
uncertainty over the legal standards. There are two issues to be discussed: 
firms might claim ignorance of the relevant standards or the way to comply 
with them (section 6.1) and firms might be able to exploit the uncertainty con-
cerning the standards by arguing that they are innocent (section 6.2).
6.1 Uncertainty about standards – flexible compliance
 Especially for technically complicated regulations, firms might not be costless-
ly and perfectly informed about the standards they should obey or about their 
actual level of compliance. Moreover, they might be unaware of the costs of 
all alternatives. According to Veljanovski (1984), there are two kinds of uncer-
tainty for firms:
1. Uncertainty concerning the law: Given the number of (detailed) stan-
dards, fi rms will often have an incomplete perception of the law, their 
obligations and the possible sanctions.
2. Uncertainty concerning the least-cost method of compliance: Firms do 
not always have perfect information on the best compliance techniques, 
particularly not small fi rms that do not possess the necessary expertise.
Shavell (2004, pp. 562 – 564) discusses two related problems. First, a firm may 
claim that it was unaware of acting unlawfully (ignorance). Secondly, a firm 
may choose a level of precautions that it believes to be sufficient although it 
actually violates the standard (mistake).
In this section, I discuss the problems of ignorance and mistake and the 
optimal reaction to claims of this type. I then investigate in further detail 
the sources of these types of uncertainty. This will lead to a discussion of the 
advantages of cooperative enforcement strategies.
6.1.1 Ignorance and mistake, and an information exchanging enforcement policy
Firms may claim that they are ignorant of the relevant regulations. Gener-
ally, such claims should be ignored in order to provide firms with an incen-
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tive to learn about the law and adhere to it. If, however, a reasonable effort 
is insufficient to learn about a legal rule, it is best to permit firms to escape 
(costly) penalties, since a firm can be deterred by possible sanctions only if it 
knows which levels of precaution lead to the imposition of sanctions (Shavell, 
2004).
Following Friesen (2006, see section 3.4 about self-reporting), it can be 
argued that firms only have an incentive to obtain information if the costs 
of finding information are not too high in relation to the benefits. These ben-
efits are that if a firm is informed and finds out that it is in violation, it can 
take appropriate action to escape penalties for non-compliance. Therefore, 
more stringent enforcement creates a higher incentive to obtain information. 
Generally, imposing sanctions equal to harm done gives firms the optimal 
incentive to invest in self-audits in order to investigate (non-)compliance.104 
Therefore, ignorance should not be considered a valid excuse for sanctions. 
However, (still following Friesen, 2006) if auditing costs are high relative to 
public inspection costs, it would be socially beneficial for firms not to self-
audit but instead for public enforcement agencies to inspect the firms’ com-
pliance level. A firm’s incentive to obtain information might be inadequate. 
This may occur if standards are highly technical and change rapidly, or if there 
are many standards and they possibly run together. In these cases, informa-
tion requires effort or the development of special expertise (rather than this 
expertise being a natural by-product of operating business) and/or the ben-
efits of information development are non-exclusive. If this is the case, firms 
– especially small firms – might be ignorant, even under reasonable costs, of 
the standards that apply to them and/or of the way to comply with the stan-
dard.105 Under such circumstances, public agencies might produce and share 
the relevant information at less cost than the firms themselves. For example, 
the fire brigade might be better informed about taking precautions to prevent 
fires in cafés than the proprietors.
A different problem is that a firm may choose a level of precautions that it 
believes to be sufficient although this actually violates the standard (mistake). 
Generally, there should be no sanctions in such instances, (Shavell, 2004) espe-
cially if imposing sanctions is costly, because someone cannot be deterred 
from non-compliance that he is unaware of. For example, a café proprietor 
who incorrectly believes that he bought the right inflammable decorations 
cannot be deterred by sanctions. At the same time, claiming unawareness of 
104 Recall the discussion in section 2.3.5 concerning the incentive to obtain information under 
liability. Shavell (1992a) and Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000) demonstrate that if sanctions 
equal harm and if self-audits do not influence the probability of apprehension, firms will 
have the socially optimal incentive to self-audit, take precautions and remedy.
105 Brehm and Hamilton (1996) do find evidence for the existence of ignorance. They argue 
that non-compliance may be due to ignorance rather than evasion. They provide empiri-
cal evidence that violation is better understood by those variables associated with the 
likelihood that a firm is ignorant of reporting requirements, than by those associated with 
evasion.
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the requirement to hang only inflammable decorations – the problem of igno-
rance – is insufficient to escape sanctions. A related problem is that a firm may 
knowingly be non-compliant, but believe this to be either more or less harm-
ful than it actually is. The conclusions concerning whether sanctions should 
be based on actual or on perceived harm are not uniform (Shavell, 2004). On 
the one hand, to which extent a firm can be deterred depends on what the 
firm thinks it is doing, not on what it is in fact doing. On the other hand, sanc-
tions can be imposed both on actual harm and on average (expected) harm. 
The latter may be most closely related to ex-ante expected harm. However, 
if firms are able to falsely convince courts that they thought they were doing 
little harm, sanctions will be too low and deterrence will be weakened.
If problems of ignorance or mistake persist and/or if information about 
the law and its applications is better produced by public agencies, a strict 
enforcement approach might be inappropriate. Veljanovski (1984) argues that 
enforcement activities may be used by the inspector to freely provide infor-
mation to the firm and buy greater compliance. If firms are ignorant of the 
law, the inspector’s visit can be used to provide the firm with information on 
its legal obligations, possibly at zero cost. Instead of the firm incurring the 
costs of fully acquainting itself with the law, the inspector will provide the 
firm with information as part of his routine activities. If firms are unaware 
of the least-cost method of compliance, while the inspector possesses the 
necessary expertise, a similar information transfer may take place. It may be 
welfare-improving for the inspector to adopt the role of advisor rather than 
policeman.106 
Of course, this implies that the probability of detection must be sufficient-
ly large in order to realize the benefits of advice. Penalties can be decreased 
accordingly, if they are necessary for deterrence at all. Enforcement then con-
sists of two stages. First of all, with sufficiently high probabilities of detec-
tion, the firm is informed about the relevant regulation. After that, an enforce-
ment policy as proposed by Becker (1968) can be used. Note that such a policy 
can only be efficient if either the firm fails to remember the information or 
if the information quickly becomes outdated. If, following an inspection, a 
firm knows for quite some time what they have to do, the optimal enforce-
ment policy would be to inform it only once and after that to enforce severely 
according to the guidelines discussed in chapter 3.
The discussion here pertains to the case in which firms do not know what 
the standards are and/or how they can comply with it. This uncertainty can 
be solved by somehow supplying this information, possibly through inspec-
tions. A somewhat different problem occurs when firms know what the stan-
dards are, but are uncertain of how these standards apply to them in a par-
ticular situation, because the law does not precisely describe what should 
happen in all possible situations. Such uncertainty might be more persistent. 
This is discussed next.
106 See also Law (2006). 
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6.1.2 Incomplete law, sources of uncertainty and cooperative enforcement
The literature so far assumes that law is complete, i.e. that all potentially 
harmful actions are unambiguously stipulated by law. Generally, however, 
law is incomplete for two major reasons (Xu and Pistor, 2002)107 . First, law uses 
ambiguous open-ended norms, implying that the boundaries of the law are 
not clearly circumscribed (this is called type I incompleteness). As a conse-
quence, it is not unambiguously clear which actions will actually be punished, 
leading to uncertainty in choosing precautions. Secondly, the law can try to 
be highly specific, but because the law-maker will never be able to capture 
all actions that may result in harm, some relevant applications will be miss-
ing (this is called type II incompleteness), especially in cases of a high rate of 
technological change, socioeconomic development or institutional transfor-
mation. Gaps will always remain and there will always be actions which the 
law fails to address, and which prove, in hindsight, to be equally harmful to 
the ones stipulated in the law.108
As a consequence of these two types of uncertainty, the law is both under- 
and overinclusive (Veljanovski, 1984). The law is written for all firms and for 
all possible situations. It therefore may fail to adequately address a particular 
situation in a particular firm. The law is overinclusive because it forbids activ-
ities that are efficient or prescribes levels of precaution that are inefficiently 
high. The law is underinclusive because it fails to forbid activities that are 
inefficient or prescribes levels of precaution that are too low.
If the law were complete, a deterrent approach as proposed by Becker 
(1968) would efficient. Both firms and the enforcement authority would 
agree on a single interpretation of the law. In such a world, the law could 
be enforced to the letter provided evidence was established. Hence, full 
deterrence could be implemented if the expected penalty was large enough. 
Provided that rules are efficient, achieving compliance would be desirable 
and punishing all detected offenses would be efficient (refrained from the 
influence of enforcement costs). However, if the law is incomplete, punish-
ing every violation is not efficient because of overinclusion. Moreover, due 
to underinclusion, society will sometimes require more compliance than 
the minimal level of compliance that satisfies the standard. The problem is 
therefore how to implement socially optimal levels of precaution, provided 
that the law is incomplete. If the law is incomplete, the rules do not necessar-
ily prescribe efficient solutions for all particular situations and a suboptimal 
outcome may result if the enforcement authority punishes all detected viola-
107 See also Pistor and Xu (2003).
108 An implication of this distinction is that if the law attempts to be specific, it becomes very 
detailed and numerous and firms may claim that they are ignorant of the law. If the law 
contains open-ended norms, firms may claim that they thought they were in compliance 
and satisfied the standards. Therefore, the incompleteness of the law may be a source of 
ignorance and/or mistake.
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tions on the basis of observed harm. Even if ex-post enforcement, for instance 
by courts, can determine perfectly whether or not an offense is efficient, the 
problem remains that firms are uncertain ex-ante about the evaluation of their 
behavior. Therefore, the law may both under- and overdeter (Xu and Pistor, 
2002). It overdeters [underdeters] if firms expect the enforcement of the law 
to punish more [fewer] actions than is actually intended by the law and/or 
if they choose high levels of precautions in order to be certain of complying 
with the law.
Xu and Pistor (2002) argue that there are two possible solutions. In one 
solution, the law would remain incomplete and courts would restrain the 
level of punishment in order to prevent excessive punishment of relatively 
harmless actions. By implication, punishment would become insufficient to 
deter non-compliance. A different solution would be to delegate law-making 
powers to the enforcement authority (a regulator), who is then able to specify 
the law for individual firms and particular situations ex-ante. This may be 
done for example by means of licenses. Alternatively, especially if the rate of 
technological and institutional change is high, a different possibility would 
be to carry out a regular inspection in which the firm is told which specif-
ic precautions it must take. Subsequent inspections would then be held to 
investigate whether the firm complies with these specifications. This is an 
advantage of enforcement by regulators instead of courts.109 However, this 
solution depends on an enforcement authority that has sufficient information 
about the relevant costs and benefits to implement socially optimal levels of 
precaution.
But suppose the enforcement authority is not informed about the compli-
ance cost function of the firm. In general, there is two-sided uncertainty (Rick-
etts and Peacock, 1996) . Due to the incompleteness of the law, regulators have 
better knowledge of the applicable standards than firms. However, firms have 
better knowledge of their production process, which governs the detailed 
application of regulations and which determines the costs and possibilities of 
achieving compliance. In such a situation, firms and the authority are able to 
overcome problems of over- and/or underinclusion if they exchange private 
information. This requires the kind of cooperative enforcement strategy that 
is proposed by Scholz (1991) and Ricketts and Peacock (1996).
In essence their reasoning is as follows: since the enforcement author-
ity has no specific information, it can choose for a strict enforcement policy, 
punishing every violation based on the observed harm. The authority will 
then impose penalties on all detected violations and require all violations to 
109 This argument is further explored in section 9.3.2. Arguedas and Hamoudi (2004) discuss 
the importance of the timing of decisions. Will the firm decide on investment in compli-
ance before or after the enforcement policy (consisting of standards and inspections) is 
announced? If the policy is announced afterwards, the firm has an incentive to over-invest 
in compliance technologies. Over-investment is a good signal for the enforcement author-
ity, which might in turn decide not to inspect the firm at all.
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be abated regardless of cost or the firm’s particular safety problems. Since 
all firms face the same probability of being caught and punished in every 
period, the firm will choose minimal compliance, i.e. it will choose a level 
of compliance that minimizes the firm’s expected costs of compliance and 
penalties. Both the enforcement authority and the firm benefit if they behave 
more cooperatively. Ricketts and Peacock (1996) argue that both benefit 
if they reveal their private information. If firms reveal their information, it 
will allow the enforcement authority to enforce the socially optimal level of 
precautions. The firm will benefit if it implements the required precautions, 
because compliance with this (adjusted) standard will relieve it from penal-
ties. This will allow the enforcement authority to bargain for higher precau-
tions, which is beneficial if the law is underinclusive. In essence, this type of 
information-sharing allows the enforcement authority to switch from strict 
liability to a negligence approach that favors both the firm and the enforce-
ment authority.
Scholz (1991)110 argues that rather than having firms and authorities reveal 
their information, firms and authorities could be induced to forego a strict, 
inflexible approach if they interact with each other repeatedly. A voluntary 
compliance equilibrium is preferred by both the firm and the authority. In this 
equilibrium, the authority can reduce its monitoring and prosecution costs 
with flexible enforcement, overlooking minor technical violations (due to 
overinclusion) in recognition of the firm’s extralegal safety efforts to reduce 
greater hazards not directly addressed in the regulations (due to underinclu-
sion). If, in response, the firm chooses flexible compliance, this will allow it 
to tackle its worst health and safety hazards with the most efficient methods 
available rather than spending money on complying with safety standards 
that are less important and efficient in the firm’s particular situation. Hence, 
flexible compliance produces greater safety at lower costs.
Therefore, in both Ricketts and Peacock (1996) and Scholz (1991) the 
enforcement authority is able to handle the over- and underinclusion prob-
lem by being more flexible. The enforcement authority foregoes a legalistic, 
to-the-letter enforcement of regulations that are inappropriate for a particular 
firm in return for extralegal efforts by that firm to work towards the poli-
cy objective of damage prevention. By tolerating offenses of overinclusive 
regulations, the authority can induce the firm to comply with standards not 
included. While both the firm and the enforcement authority eventually ben-
efit in such a system, the problem is that in the short run both have an incen-
tive to deviate (Scholz, 1991). If the authority chooses flexible compliance, 
the firm will be better off choosing minimal compliance instead of flexible 
compliance. Since enforcement is weak, it might in this way avoid most or 
all compliance costs by choosing very low levels of precaution and ignor-
110 A more extensive formal treatment is given in Scholz (1984). See also Fenn and Veljanovski 
(1988) and Arguedas (2005). Informally Scholz’s (1991) argument is also presented by Vel-
janovski (1984).
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ing even severe safety problems. If the firm chooses flexible compliance, the 
authority will benefits from choosing more stringent enforcement, because 
this will achieve even greater safety gains. Therefore both have an incentive 
to ‘cheat’ on the voluntary compliance equilibrium. This is an example of the 
Prisoner’s dilemma. Scholz (1991) shows that a voluntary compliance equi-
librium may result if both parties are sufficiently concerned about the future 
to resist the short-term incentive to obtain higher gains. The best strategy for 
the enforcement authority might possibly be to choose a tit-for-tat strategy 
as proposed by Axelrod (1984), where the authority chooses for maximal 
enforcement against firms that have established a record of minimal compli-
ance in the past, and flexible enforcement if the firm has a record of flexible 
compliance. Observe that this cooperative strategy is similar to other strate-
gies already discussed. It is also based on past behavior, it is related to the 
discussion about reasonable compliance records and it is only possible if the 
authority and the firm interact with each other repeatedly. Under this coop-
erative strategy, enforcement is characterized by negotiation s (Veljanovski, 
1984). The enforcement authority will attempt to persuade the firm that com-
pliance, sometimes extralegal compliance, is the cheapest way to achieve the 
highest safety gains. The firm will try to persuade the authority that compli-
ance is infeasible or extremely costly in order to minimize compliance costs.
Since the law is incomplete, there is uncertainty concerning the appli-
cation of the law to individual cases. Hence, the incompleteness of the law 
opens the possibility for a discussion concerning enforcement actions, and 
firms might try to contest an enforcement authority’s decisions. This is the 
subject of the following section. 
6.2 Accuracy of enforcement technologies
In section 3.2, it was assumed that enforcement authorities detect violations 
perfectly and that the enforcement authorities are perfectly able to convict 
only firms that really violated the standards. The problem of the conviction of 
innocent firms has already received some attention. It is further investigated 
in this section. First of all, the general problem of the accuracy of enforcement 
is discussed. I then examine the firms’ incentives to invest in, respectively, 
adjudication to escape penalties (non-conviction), and hiding violations from 
detection (non-detection). Finally, I discuss the optimal response to the prob-
lems of non-conviction and non-detection.
6.2.1 Court’s mistakes and the problem of the conviction of innocent firms
Detection, prosecution or conviction of offenders is generally not perfect. The 
resources that are required to obtain perfection are not worth the benefits. 
However, this implies that sometimes, innocent firms will be convicted (type 
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II errors) or that guilty firms will escape sanctions even when inspected (type 
I errors). The conviction of innocent people leads to personal and social costs. 
Both personal and social resources are wasted in prosecution and execution 
of punishment, and the result is a feeling of injustice and distrust in the legal 
system. Moreover, both types of error harm the deterrent effect of enforce-
ment because they reduce the difference between the costs of compliance and 
the costs of the expected sanction.111 Errors of type I reduce deterrence because 
they lower the expected fine for violation. Errors of type II reduce deterrence 
because they lower the benefits of compliance.112 Note that mistakes can also 
lead to a certain degree of overdeterrence. Since compliant firms that just 
comply with the standard may be judged to be in non-compliance, firms may 
have an incentive to take excessive precautions in order to prevent errone-
ously being found in non-compliance.
Most likely, the costs of convicting innocent people will increase with the 
magnitude of the sanction. If they increase more than proportionately with 
the sanction, it might not necessarily be desirable to increase the sanction to 
its maximum and to trade-off the probability of detection and the sanction as 
far as possible. For example, in many European, countries capital punishment 
was abolished, (partly) because of the impossibility to restore mistakes that 
are made. The probability of detection can be both larger and smaller than in 
the absence of mistakes. Since deterrence is weakened, a higher probability of 
inspection is required to achieve a given level of deterrence. On the other hand, 
inspection is more costly because mistakes make inspection less effective.
The presence of mistakes also explains why the standard of proof is 
smaller for lower or less severe penalties. Imprisonment is a severe sanction 
because it removes personal freedoms and imposes large costs (including 
stigma) on the convicted individuals. Therefore, also from a social welfare 
point of view, the benefits of preventing the conviction of innocent people 
are large and the standard of proof in criminal law is high. On the other hand, 
imposing small administrative penalties does not lead to many other costs 
than the costs of the fine and some feelings of injustice if there are mistakes. 
Therefore the standard of proof is much smaller and the level of inspection 
and prosecution needed for conviction can be lower both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. If a higher or more severe sanction is imposed, this will increase 
the standard of proof and hence increase the costs of imposing sanctions. A 
regulatory system with a low burden of proof (hence a high probability of 
conviction) and low penalties might be more efficient than a system with a 
111 See for example Polinsky and Shavell (2000a, section 8). The precise consequences of 
errors, especially wrongful conviction, for deterrence are analyzed in more detail in Lando 
(2006).
112 To see why this is the case, suppose that (following inspection) the probability that a com-
pliant firm is convicted equals a, and the probability that a non-compliant firm escapes 
conviction is b. Then compliance leads to costs c + pa f (suppose: fines) and non-compli-
ance p(1 −b) f. Hence, the firm will comply if c ≤  p( 1 − a − b) f. As a result, the higher a or b, 
the smaller the deterrent effect of enforcement.
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high burden of proof (hence low probability of conviction) and high penalties 
(Garoupa, 2004).
Of course, the probability that mistakes are made (by inspectors, public 
prosecutors or courts) is not given, but depends on the resources (in time or 
money) spent on a case (see Kaplow and Shavell, 1994b). I will not discuss the 
full implications of such models. Generally speaking, it is optimal to spend 
resources in such a way that the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits, 
which implies a probability of mistake that is larger than zero, but decreas-
es with the magnitude of the sanction. I now focus on the fact that the level 
of errors not only depends on public resources, but also on a firm’s private 
resources for adjudication. 
6.2.2 Firms’ investment in escaping penalties
 
The fact that enforcement authorities make errors in enforcement cre-
ates a possibility for discussing the decisions they make. Firms can object 
to and appeal against the decision to impose a penalty. The discussion can 
deal with the question of whether and if so to which extent the firm violates 
a standard, which standard actually applies and which sanction or which 
magnitude of the sanction is appropriate. If the violator contests a decision 
successfully, the contemplated sanction will not be imposed. Therefore, the 
higher the sanction, the more resources the firm will use to try and escape 
sanctions. Khambu (1989) demonstrates that since enforcement is contest-
able, an increase in the expected sanction or an increase in the standard can 
have an adverse effect on the level of compliance if, as a result, firms make 
more use of procedures of objection and appeal. This effect is even stronger 
when such procedures are costly for enforcement authorities, because of the 
time spent on collecting evidence, concluding objections, conducting pros-
ecution, etc. On balance, raising the regulatory standard and/or raising the 
sanction can decrease the realized expected sanction and can cause the level 
of compliance to decline. In cases of full compliance, a firms’ level of precau-
tions almost always increases when the standard is raised. However, in cases 
of non-compliance, raising penalties or standards will sometimes cause com-
pliance to drop because non-compliant firms will have a stronger incentive 
to contest regulatory outcomes.113 Khambu (1989) therefore argues that con-
testable enforcement explains why enforcement agencies often use informal, 
lowered standards.114 Non-compliance with the statutory standard that is not 
penalized does not necessarily imply that the enforcement authority is lax 
113 A similar point is made in Nowell and Shogren (1994) and Raymond (2004).
114 A related argument was used in section 5.3 about relaxing the standard (Harford and Har-
rington, 1991). In both papers, in cases of non-compliance, relaxing the regulatory stand-
ard will always lead to a higher level of compliance.
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or captured. On the contrary, by enforcing only up to the lowered informal 
standard, the regulator is able to obtain a higher level of compliance than 
under ‘strict’ enforcement. In many cases, a firm will have two possibilities 
for reducing sanctions: (a) by taking more precautions, or (b) by spending 
money on ‘good’ lawyers to ‘talk down’ the offense in court, thereby reducing 
the magnitude of the ultimate sanction.115 Increasing the expected sanction or 
the standard will increase both incentives. It cannot be argued that (a) will 
always dominate (b).
In a subsequent paper, Khambu (1990) distinguishes between contesting 
the fine imposed and the regulatory standard against which compliance is 
measured. This distinction refers to two different regulatory systems. When 
enforcement takes place through direct controls of the regulator by means 
of directives and commands, the firm may challenge the standard applied. 
When enforcement is incentive-based, for example through fines, the firm 
can challenge the magnitude of the sanction imposed. Khambu (1990) shows 
that enforcement by direct controls is superior if the enforcement powers of 
the authority are weak, i.e. if the probability of successful contest by firms is 
high. Enforcement through direct controls has the benefit that, if the enforce-
ment power becomes weak, the enforcement authority can mitigate the 
standard, which will lower the incentive to contest and result in at least a 
‘reasonable’ level of compliance. Under an incentive-based regime, the stan-
dard is immutable and weak enforcement powers therefore cause enforce-
ment to be increasingly less effective in achieving compliance with the stan-
dard. A decrease in enforcement power has stronger negative effects under 
enforcement through direct controls than through fines. However, Nowell 
and Shogren (1994) show that an incentive-based regime is still favorable if 
the government subsidizes compliance. For a situation involving dumping 
of waste, they show that a decrease in the legal costs of waste disposal unam-
biguously reduces illegal dumping because it does not affect a firm’s incen-
tive to evade enforcement. Although it might increase total waste, a greater 
percentage of the waste will be disposed of in a legal manner.
The presence of possible contest actions explains why enforcement policies 
with severe sanctions are, as predicted by Becker (1968), ineffective. They are 
subverted ex-post (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). The market structure is relevant 
here (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Nowell and Shogren, 1994): if a firm’s assets 
become larger, the incentive to avoid paying damages increases.116 In a perfect-
ly competitive market, a firm operating at the margin will often not have suffi-
cient assets to rigorously contest enforcement. On the other hand, monopolists 
115 One paragraph in Khambu (1989) is labeled “Raise your standards and you’ll hear from 
my lawyer”. See also Heyes (2000, section 3.1).
116 Note that reducing the wealth constraint may have two consequences. As discussed 
above, this may imply an increase in precautions. However, it may also imply an increase 
in enforcement procedures.
115Flexible compliance and cooperative enforcement – information constraints
or oligopolists generally have numerous assets at their disposal, and therefore 
the possibility to use them to reduce the effectiveness of penalties.
6.2.3 Firms’ investment in non-detection
I argued above that the effective penalty is an endogenous variable depending 
on a firm’s incentive to invest in ways to escape penalties. These investments 
can be made after inspection during the adjudication process (investment 
in non-conviction), but firms can also invest ex-ante in hiding an offense in 
order to reduce the probability that a violation is detected during inspection, 
which Heyes (1994) calls an investment in “uninspectability” (see also Malik, 
1990). For example, illegal dumping of waste can be performed at night or at 
an inconspicuous place; automobilists can install radar detectors; café propri-
etors can try to quickly remove beer crates from the emergency exits; or firms 
can simply increase the number of objects or the area that has to be inspected. 
Similarly to the results above, a stricter enforcement or regulation might on 
balance decrease the level of compliance, because it becomes more attractive 
to invest in hiding violations, and it is no longer necessarily optimal to set the 
fine at its maximum.
6.2.4 Public investment in detection
Heyes (1994) demonstrates that if regulatory outcomes are contestable (ex-
post or ex-ante) it becomes relatively more beneficially to invest in the thor-
oughness, rather than the number of inspections. Investing in the thorough-
ness of an inspection increases the likelihood that a detected violation will 
also be convicted and punished (such as collecting more samples or using 
more sophisticated monitoring equipment), and thereby makes investments 
in appeal procedures by firms less profitable. Alternatively, investments in 
thoroughness might/will increase the probability of detection itself (by for 
instance increasing the time spent on inspection), thereby making investments 
in hiding violations less attractive. Increasing the thoroughness of inspections 
unambiguously raises the level of compliance, because it increases the prob-
ability of conviction and reduces the marginal productivity of investments 
in uninspectability. When the frequency of inspections or the level of fines 
is increased, it becomes more valuable for firms to invest in uninspectability 
to avoid sanctions. A decrease in compliance may result if the direct positive 
effect on compliance from a higher expected sanction is smaller than the indi-
rect negative effect on compliance through reduced inspectability. Khambu 
(1989) made a similar point when he argued that investments in monitoring 
are effective if they not only raise the expected penalty (which will increase the 
evasion effort), but also reduce the marginal productivity of a firm’s evasion 
effort.
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If firms can evade enforcement, it is optimal to invest in the thoroughness of 
inspections. A two-stage inspection can then be beneficial because in such a 
procedure, not every firm has to be inspected thoroughly. Hence, on aver-
age, inspection costs can decrease. For example, Heyes (2002) discusses an 
inspection process that consists of two stages. First a firm is inspected. If the 
observed precautions of a firm fall short of a certain “trigger” the firm is audit-
ed, which implies a more thorough inspection of the firm. If the audit reveals 
that the firm is in violation, it will be penalized. Jost (1997a) discusses a simi-
lar model, where investigations are executed when a firm lodges an appeal 
against the imposition of a fine. Note that this type of two-stage enforcement 
process is a sequential combination of monitoring (general enforcement) and 
investigation (specific enforcement) as a variant on the joint simultaneous use 
discussed in section 3.2.4.
6.3 Conclusion
If the law were complete and perfectly predictable, a strict enforcement policy 
as proposed by Becker (1968) would be efficient – provided that the expected 
sanction is large enough. If, however, the standards are uncertain, a more 
flexible form of enforcement might be needed. Public inspections might be 
required to inform firms about the standards and the compliance techniques, 
so that enforcement is aimed at advice, in addition to or instead of deterrence. 
Cooperation might be required to buy or negotiate precautions not included 
in the regulation in exchange for tolerating violations of other standards. 
Moreover, the trade-off between the probability of detection and the mag-
nitude of the sanction is hampered by the incentive of firms to try to escape 
sanctions. Informal enforcement might on balance achieve higher levels of 
compliance than strict punishment of every offense. 
7 Voluntary compliance and persuading 
enforcement – informal constraints
Until now I have considered the compliance decision to be one in which 
the firm balances its costs of compliance with the expected formal sanction. 
However, compliance does not only depend on the formal sanction that is 
imposed by the enforcement authorities. Apprehension, prosecution and/or 
conviction may have other consequences for the individual or firm, which 
are identified in this section. Special attention is given to the interaction with 
public enforcement.
7.1 Informal sanctions: social and moral control
 A sanction does not only include the formal sanction imposed by the enforce-
ment authorities, but also the informal sanctions imposed by private institu-
tions. Apprehension, prosecution and/or conviction may harm an individ-
ual’s or firm’s reputation in their social network. For example, crime may 
lead to disapproval by family members, friends or neighbors or to a decrease 
in future career possibilities. If a firm incurs a violation, consumers might 
decide to turn to another producer, or governmental agencies or sector orga-
nizations may change their attitude towards the firm.117 Besides, violation 
may be accompanied by feelings of regret, guilt, remorse, moral dilemma, 
etc. Therefore, these informal sanctions will increase the personal, moral or 
social costs of non-compliance (section 2.1.1).
The informal sanctions can be of two types: in economics, a distinction is 
made between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Extrinsic motivations refer 
117 For example, regulators are in a position to make use of a firm’s compliance history when 
determining whether a permit should be granted. Decker (2003) shows that firms with a 
bad reputation with governments have to wait longer for the necessary permits. He inves-
tigates how long it takes for environmental agencies to process and issue new source con-
struction permits pursuant to the Clean Air Act regulations and new industrial discharge 
permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act regulations. He finds that plants (or firms) with 
fewer instances of non-compliance receive permits for major projects more quickly. For 
New Source Review (NSR) permits, according to one model specification, “one additional 
violation increases the time it takes to receive a permit by roughly 23 percent. For the aver-
age (median) major NSR permit, this translates into an increase of about 52 days” (p.120). 
For Industrial Discharge Permits (IDP), similarly, “one additional violation at any one of 
the firm’s plants will increase subsequent permitting times by 15 percent. For the average 
(median) major IDP, this translates into an increase of about 81 days” (p. 124).
 See also Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff et al. (2005) who demonstrate that reputa-
tional penalties are important for criminal fraud but not for environmental offenses.
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to incentives from outside the individual and are imposed on him by others. 
These include the informal sanctions , imposed by relatives, consumers, neigh-
bors, employers or employees, etc. which lead to loss of (future) earning capac-
ity and other financial costs or shame, stigma and other psychological costs. 
These types of informal sanctions might be labeled social control. They follow 
from the fact that others find out about a violation. Intrinsic motivation s refer 
to incentives inside the individual that do not depend on rewards or penalties 
by others. These costs (or benefits) are realized irrespective of whether others 
are informed about the offense. These include informal sanctions such as guilt 
and regret. These types of sanctions might be labeled moral control.118 119
Informal sanctions, just as formal ones, are seen as costs for (potential) 
offenders and are taken into account when comparing the expected costs and 
benefits of (non-)compliance. The costs (or benefits) of informal sanctions 
should be counted from the moment that they are realized, which might vary 
from the moment of violation to the time of conviction or execution.
There are three important points to be made regarding the interaction 
of informal sanctions with public enforcement. First of all, public detection 
might enable private informal sanctions to be carried out. Secondly, formal 
and informal sanctions might reinforce each other. This happens when infor-
mal sanctions depend on the level of compliance by others, hence on public 
enforcement. Thirdly, formal sanctions might crowd out the intrinsic motiva-
tion to comply, leading to a conflict between formal and informal sanctions. 
Let me discuss these three points in more detail. The first interaction pre-
sumes that the presence of informal sanctions has no effect on the effective-
ness of formal sanctions and public enforcement, while the other two forms 
of interaction refer to cases where informal sanctions increase, respectively 
decrease, the effectiveness of public enforcement.
7.2 The deterrent effect of informal sanctions
First of all, the costs of informal sanctions increase the sanctioning risk and/or 
make compliance more attractive. This makes it easier to induce compliance. 
Even if the costs of compliance are higher than the expected formal sanction, the 
118 A review of norms and possible sanctions can be found in Posner and Rasmusen (1999). 
Elffers (2005*) discusses the importance of social and moral control from a rational choice 
perspective.
119 Sugden (1989) explains how a system of norms and values can evolve and, once sufficient-
ly supported in the population, can reproduce itself. Certain conventions arise because 
people need to coordinate their potentially conflicting behavior. When a sufficiently large 
number of people obey the convention, these conventions can become norms – written 
(law) or unwritten – because people expect and demand that other people should obey 
them too. Violation of the norms will lead to disapproval and possible sanctions by other 
people, not only by those who are directly harmed by the violation. See also Ellickson 
(1991).
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firm might comply because of the social or moral costs. Acceptation of norms 
does not imply that the rules are always obeyed. However, violation of the rules 
might produce guilt, regret or a loss in reputation, all of which make violation less 
attractive. A firm will comply if the compliance costs are lower than the expected 
formal sanction and the disutility that results from social and moral control.120 
Since informal sanction s make violation less attractive, a lower expected formal 
sanction suffices to enforce compliance. It is possible to strengthen the effect of 
informal sanctions – especially the extrinsic social control that depends on others 
finding out about the violation – through, for instance, publicity, public criminal 
records, etc.121 However, the presence of informal sanctions also implies that it 
is less attractive to trade-off the probability of detection and the magnitude of 
the formal sanction, in line with Becker (1968). A lower probability of detection 
decreases the effectiveness of the informal sanctions, at least the extrinsic infor-
mal sanctions which are only imposed if violation is detected.
7.3 Formal and informal sanctions as reinforcing instruments
A second important point concerning the interaction of formal and informal 
sanctions is that the level of informal sanctions might depend on the level 
of compliance by other firms. A report of the WRR (2003*) provides a clear 
analysis of the implication of this dependency for enforcement policies, based 
on the work of Akerlof (1980).122
Both moral and social control lead to psychological costs which depend 
on the proportion of individuals complying. Individuals may agree on the 
rules but to a different degree. Some individuals may not accept the rules at 
all. If the rules are accepted, violation of the rules may produce regret, guilt 
and other moral costs. If fewer individuals comply, the acceptation of the 
rules might decrease. Especially those who regret violation least might lose 
their belief in the rules. Hence, a decrease in compliance leads to a decrease in 
the costs of regret for at least a proportion of the individuals. The same thing 
happens with informal sanctions such as social control. Individuals who do 
not accept the rules and/or fail to comply are unlikely to address others on 
their non-compliant behavior or switch their business to a more compliant 
firm. This implies that the level of costs in loss of reputation depends on the 
proportion of firms who comply.123
120 Put differently, a social or moral norm (acceptation of the rules) is treated as a preference. 
Individuals try to maximize utility, which implies that they have to balance several prefer-
ences given the limited resources available. See WRR (2003*, chapter 4 and its appendix).
121 See further Posner and Rasmussen (1999).
122 See also Lai et al. (2003) for a more specific application to firms. See also Conley and Wang 
(2006). In a different context a similar point is developed by Wittberg (2006).
123 See note 119 for an explanation of how such informal sanctions can arise and at a given 
moment in time can be at an equilibrium in which they reproduce themselves at a certain 
level of public and private enforcement.
120 Chapter 7
If informal sanctions depend on the proportion of individuals who comply, 
there is an important implication for public enforcement. If the enforcement 
policy is weakened, this not only directly decreases the level of compliance, 
but it also breaks down the acceptation of the norm and the social control 
of the norm, which further reduces compliance. A “snowballing” effect is 
engendered so that more and more individuals are induced to violate. This 
process only ends if the internalization of the rules in part of the population is 
so strong that it can stop the decline of the acceptation. Therefore, weakening 
public enforcement also weakens the effect of informal sanctions.
Another implication is that deterioration and recovery of compliant 
behavior may be asymmetric processes.124 A weakening of enforcement will 
reduce compliance. Returning to the old enforcement policy will not suffice to 
restore the old compliance level. The decrease in compliance will have led to 
a decay of moral standards and social control that can only be made undone 
through an increase in the sanctions which more than off-sets the weakening 
of the policy. This is the only way to induce compliance by those individu-
als who no longer accept the rules. If this procedure is successful, so that the 
proportion of individuals who comply increases, the belief in the rules may 
possibly be restored. This will, in the long run, increase social control and the 
costs of regret. However, the restoration of norms may possibly take a much 
longer time than the decline, especially if it has to be restored by means of 
formal control. Therefore, a small decrease in public control – for example the 
removal of supervisors in public transport, the change to self-service in shops 
– can lead in the long run to a large reduction in compliance. Another infer-
ence is that informal and formal control are not only possible substitutes for 
each other, but also have complicated interactions. As long as rules are widely 
accepted and violation brings large losses in reputation, a low level of public 
enforcement may have a large impact on (non-)compliance. If, however, the 
belief in rules and informal control breaks down, enforcement may have a 
much smaller impact on (non-)compliance.
7.4 Crowding out of intrinsic motivation
In the economic literature, it is well-known that extrinsic rewards might 
crowd out intrinsic rewards. For instance, voluntary blood donation decreas-
es both in quantity and quality if a monetary reward is given to those who 
donate, because this might decrease or crowd out the altruistic motives for 
blood donation.125 Some authors have applied a similar analysis to penalties. 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) analyze the introduction of a fine on late-
coming parents in a day-care centre. They found that after the introduction 
of a monetary fine the number of late-coming parents increased significantly. 
124 See Mulder et al. (2005) for a similar point.
125 The classic reference is Titmuss (1970). See Frey (1997) for an overview.
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However, once the fine was removed, no reduction in late-coming occurred. 
Lin and Yang (2006) explain these findings on the basis of the social norm 
that individuals should be on time and not late. Violation of this norm leads 
to a psychological cost resulting from guilt (intrinsic) and shame (extrinsic). 
The introduction of a fine for late-coming parents is assumed to reduce this 
psychological cost directly (again following Akerlof 1980 and psychological 
theories such as “equity theory”). This erodes the effectiveness of the social 
norm in preventing late-coming. An increase in the fine has a deterrent effect, 
because it imposes a financial cost on violation, and a norm-psychological 
effect, because it reduces the costs of guilt and shame. If the fine is below 
a certain threshold an increase in the fine will increase late-coming because 
the norm-psychological cost dominates the deterrent effect from the fine. 
Suppose there is no fine. Then two equilibriums are possible: one with few 
parents coming late, because of the high psychological cost, and one with 
many parents coming late, because of low psychological costs (“everyone 
else is doing it”). In the low late-coming equilibrium, the introduction of a 
small fine can start a “snowballing” effect. The fine reduces the psychological 
costs, which (if the fine is below the threshold) will induce parents to come 
late. This will increase the proportion of parents coming late, further reduc-
ing the psychological costs, increasing late-coming, increasing the proportion 
late-coming parents, etc. In the end, a new equilibrium will be established 
in which many parents come late.126 Once the small fine is removed, it will 
increase late-coming somewhat because of the deterrent effect. Since in the 
meantime, late-coming has become widespread, the social norm will be too 
weak to generate substantial psychological costs on late-coming parents and 
the new equilibrium will still be one with many late-coming parents. Note 
that there is once again an asymmetry, but a somewhat different one from the 
one above. Here, an increase in enforcement is not comparable to revoking this 
increase, because in the meantime this increase has reduced norm support. 
Above, a decrease in enforcement is not comparable to revoking this decrease, 
because in the meantime this decrease has reduced norm support.  
The important lesson is that imposing formal sanctions can reduce or 
even remove the effectiveness of informal sanctions. Once formal sanctions 
crowd out the intrinsic motivation to comply, public and private enforcement 
will have opposite effects. Put differently, the effectiveness of public enforce-
ment might be reduced because of the presence of informal sanctions.
126 Note that the main difference between Lin and Yang (2006) and WRR (2003*) is that WRR 
(2003*) examines what happens when for some reason there is a weakening of enforcement. 
This weakening leads to a reinforced (downward) snowballing effect because compliance 
depends on the proportion of individuals complying. In Lin and Yang (2006) a downward 
snowballing effect results from the strengthening of enforcement due to a direct effect of the 
fine on informal sanctions, and is further increased by the dependency of informal sanc-
tions on the proportion of individuals complying. Here the snowballing effect is counter-
productive.
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7.5 Conclusions on informal sanctions
Taking informal sanctions into account allows us to acknowledge that firms 
do not make decisions in isolation, playing against nature or the authori-
ties, but in a social context, playing against their neighbors, customers, etc. 
(Lin and Yang, 2006). Informal sanctions make compliance more attractive. 
However, informal control and intrinsic motivation to comply might not only 
increase the deterrent effect of (formal) enforcement, but also impose limits 
on it. First of all, informal control may only work when there is some public 
enforcement, limiting the possibilities of reducing detection. Secondly, infor-
mal sanctions may depend on the proportion of individuals or firms comply-
ing, hence strengthening the effectiveness of public enforcement. This may be 
problematic if enforcement is weakened. Thirdly, formal control can diminish 
the intrinsic motivation to comply, which may be so strong that an increase in 
formal control leads to a decrease in compliant behavior.
If the crowding out of intrinsic motivation is very severe, imposing even a 
small sanction breaks down the moral or social intention to comply. A policy 
in which the authority refrains from formal sanctions and only tries to stim-
ulate the intrinsic motivation (through relaxed inspections, informing etc.) 
may possibly result in a higher level of compliance than a policy in which a 
violation is immediately sanctioned with a (limited) formal sanction. At least, 
the efficient enforcement policy should recognize the impact on intrinsic 
incentives. A related issue is that in the presence of important extrinsic infor-
mal sanctions, sufficient to achieve compliance but depending on detection, 
public enforcement can be limited to inspection and detection and can pos-
sibly avoid almost all (costly) formal sanctions.
This may give rise to enforcement strategies that are not based on penal-
izing offenders, but on strengthening the informal control and intrinsic moti-
vation. However, Lin and Yang (2006) show that enforcement based on deter-
rence has not lost its power. The optimal policy is to “fine enough or don’t 
fine at all”. If enforcement is severe enough, it is always possible to enforce 
the desired level of compliance. The optimal response in case of the day-care 
centers is not to remove the fine, but to increase it. This already appeared in 
the model of WRR (2003*), where compliance could be enforced by means 
of a sufficiently low (i.e. negative) extrinsic reward, and this is recognized in 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) when discussing the use of fines in day-care 
centers in the United States. As long as the formal sanction can be made large 
enough, it is efficient to induce compliance by means of sufficiently high sanc-
tions irrespective of the effects of informal sanctions. 
8 Economic explanations of compliance 
strategies
The previous chapters dealt with the economic analysis of optimal public en-
forcement policies. I discussed the possibility to save resources by  trading 
off the probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanction, and inves-
tigated the conditions for and limits of this trade-off. This chapter attempts 
to summarize the analysis and to bring together the various conclusions. I 
do this by starting from a somewhat different perspective than before. In 
practice, enforcement authorities, especially those concerned with enforcing 
safety standards in firms, often do not use strict enforcement policies of im-
mediately punishing violations with sanctions, and even less often do they 
apply extreme sanctions. Instead, they often use a more relaxed approach by 
bargaining with the firm, issuing warnings and only penalizing following a 
very long enforcement process. This approach is sometimes referred to as a 
compliance strategy. This chapter discusses, making use of the insights from 
the previous chapters, how these policies can be interpreted from an econom-
ic point of view and why they might be efficient.127
First, I discuss in further detail the issues concerning deterrence and 
compliance strategies. I then provide the economic rationale for compliance 
strategies and examine in further detail how compliance strategies might be 
designed from an economic point of view. I also attempt to explain why these 
strategies might be particularly helpful in cases involving regulatory crime 
by firms. Finally, I relate the economic analysis to the approach used in other 
social sciences.
8.1 Compliance strategies: what is it all about?
 It has been observed that in practice, many enforcement authorities, espe-
cially when dealing with regulatory crime by firms, do not adopt a policy 
involving severe penalties. Becker’s (1968) recommendation of maximizing 
the sanction in order to minimize the probability of detection is not often fol-
lowed. Most of the time enforcement authorities issue firms found in violation 
with a warning. With the first discovery, this is often not a legal warning (such 
as the repair sanctions discussed before), but only an informal warning that 
an enforcement process will be started if the firm does not return to compli-
127 In Suurmond (2007), I analyze the discussion on compliance and deterrence strategies 
both theoretically and empirically (strategies of enforcing fire safety regulation in horeca 
establishments, chapter 13).
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ance. In addition, there is room for a bargaining process between the firm and 
the enforcement authority. The parties negotiate about the time the firm may 
spend in violation, the standard the firm has to obey and/or the solutions to 
ensure that the firm will comply with the standard. Firms are not sanctioned, 
but informed about the danger of non-compliance. Such enforcement actions 
seem to harm the deterrent effect of enforcement. Firms can use the space that 
is given to (partially) fail to comply or at least to delay compliance.
Yet, firms are thought to be in compliance most of the time. This is referred 
to (for instance in Heyes and Rickman, 1999) as the Harrington paradox. This is 
a label for the following combination of facts, observed by Harrington (1988) 
with respect to the enforcement of safety standards at firms:
Fact 1: The frequency of surveillance is usually low.
Fact 2: Fines or penalties are hardly imposed, even if a violation is detected.
Fact 3: Yet, compliance with the standards seems to be pretty high.
Similar observations have inspired scholars, particularly non-econo-
mists, to distinguish two different enforcement styles, a deterrence or penalty 
strategy and a (negotiated) compliance strategy (table 8.1).128 The central idea of 
a deterrence strategy is that tracing offenders and punishing their violations 
with a punitive sanction deters them from committing a violation. A deter-
rence strategy assumes that the potential offender makes a conscious deci-
sion by comparing the costs and benefits of (non-)compliance. Compliance 
is obtained by instilling a fear of the consequences of violation: a penalty. It is 
a punitive, repressive method that is aimed at achieving general deterrence 
or prevention. The government bears the main responsibility for compliance. 
The deterrence strategy strengthens the extrinsic incentives to comply with 
the rules. Becker (1968) and more generally the economic models and theories 
are considered to be the main defenders of this approach.
This strategy is often criticized in literature, beginning with Bardach and 
Kagan (1982) and Hawkins and Thomas (1984). According to these authors, 
enforcement should not be based on the assumption that potential criminals 
make conscious comparisons of costs and benefits, but on the moral and 
social value they attach to compliance. Individuals or firms do not comply 
because of the costs associated with non-compliance, but because of a moral 
intention to do so. People morally adhere to rules, and violations are consid-
ered immoral. Compliance is mainly spontaneous and enforcement should 
consist of moral persuasion to comply. Non-compliance is either the result of 
a mistake or misinformation, or of a lack of norms and values. A deterrence 
strategy has some important disadvantages. It stimulates people to think in 
128 See for example Hawkins and Thomas (1984), especially the chapter by Kagan and Scholz 
(1984), Hawkins (1983 and 1984), Huisman (2001*), Van Stokkum (2004*), Ponsaers and 
Hoogenboom (2004*) and Van Rooij (2006). This literature and debate is inspired by a 
number of volumes by Bardach and Kagan (1982), Braithwaite (1985), Tyler (1990), Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992), Hutter (1997) and many others. A few economists who partici-
pated in this debate are Veljanovski (1984), Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) and Garvie and 
Keeler (1994). See also Ogus and Abbot (2002).
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terms of costs and benefits, reducing moral intentions and hence compliance. 
A deterrence strategy is also reactive, hence coming into action too late, when 
the harm has already occurred. A pro-active approach would be more ben-
eficial. If people are confronted with non-compliance at an earlier stage, the 
enforcement authority can inform them about the fact that they are in non-
compliance, as well as about the dangers of non-compliance and about the 
available methods for restoring compliance. Therefore enforcement primarily 
takes the form of negotiation, convincing and advice rather than sanctioning. 
Imposing penalties is only seen as a final possibility for restoring compliance 
if negotiations break down. It has also been argued that in our modern soci-
ety, rules are not only dictated by the government (‘command-and-control’), 
but that many forms of alternative regulation hold with joint responsibility 
for the government, firms, interest groups, etc. A deterrence strategy is char-
acterized as ‘going by the book’, a detached approach in which every detect-
ed violation is sanctioned, without any reference to circumstances or motives 
for non-compliance and/or the objective of the rules. However, enforcement 
should strengthen the intrinsic incentive to comply by moral persuasion.
It should be stressed that these strategies are stereotypes and that no 
scholar argues that a single one of them can be the sole means of solving the 
enforcement problem. For instance, in a compliance strategy imposing a 
sanction is necessary if all other means of enforcement have failed. However, 
there is a clear distinction between the two different strategies and between 
those who favor them.
Table 8.1 Deterrence versus compliance strategies
Deterrence: Compliance:
Fear of consequences non-compliance Moral approval and rejection
Cost-benefi ts, rational Spontaneous compliance
Command-and-control Alternative regulation
Punitive, sanctioning Bargaining, persuading, advising, informing
Repressive, reactive Pro-active
Criminal law, government action Confi dentiality, social cooperation
Generic prevention (deterrence) Fight causes (repair)
Going by the book (to the letter of law, 
bureaucratic)
Motives and circumstances
Police-offi cer Advisor, relief worker
Extrinsic incentives Intrinsic incentives
Economists, Becker Hawkins and Thomas, Braithwaite, Scholz, etc.
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8.2 Compliance strategies from an economic perspective
In this section I show that economists do not necessarily favor deterrence 
strategies. I also explain why a deterrence strategy may fail and why a com-
pliance strategy might be desirable. 
8.2.1 Why and when deterrence may fail
 The deterrence strategy described above is based on the assumption that 
enforcement is aimed at deterring rational firms from choosing for non-com-
pliance. Following Becker (1968), extreme sanctions can lead to enforcement 
of compliance and minimization of enforcement costs. One of the implications 
of Becker’s (1968) approach is that, given the sanction and budget constraint, 
an enforcement authority should devote its resources to detecting and sub-
sequently prosecuting as many breaches of the law as possible, weighted by 
some measure of the severity of the offense (Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988). The 
deterrent effect of enforcement relies critically on the expectation by poten-
tial offenders that a detected offense will be prosecuted, i.e. on the author-
ity’s reputation for consistently prosecuting wrongdoers. The enforcement 
authority must punish every violation, immediately. In the previous chap-
ters, I discuss two major categories of reasons that might make such a strategy 
inefficient. First of all, a failure of deterrence results from the fact that the rules 
are incomplete and/or inappropriate. Secondly, there are important limits on 
the possibility of trading off the probability of detection and the magnitude 
of the sanction, because in many cases increasing the sanction is not costless. 
These reasons are especially relevant if the maximum achievable compliance 
rate is partial (section 5.1) and/or if there is serious underdeterrence.
Incomplete regulations
The first type of failure of a deterrence strategy is related to problems with 
the prescribed standards. Regulation is generally insufficiently appropriate 
to deal with a particular problem. As explained in section 6.1.2, the law is 
inherently incomplete. This has a number of consequences :
1. If fi rms are ignorant about the law or compliance status and methods , 
strict enforcement will not lead to compliance (section 6.1.1). If public au-
thorities have a natural informational advantage (especially in the case of 
technically complex regulations), it might be favorable for them to visit 
fi rms in order to offer advice . Enforcement offi cials then behave as con-
sultants or advisors rather than as policemen. However, I would like to 
repeat that generally speaking, fi rms themselves should acquire infor-
mation about the relevant law. Ignorance can also be the result of weak 
enforcement. 
2. More importantly, since the law is incomplete, regulations are both 
under- and overinclusive. Therefore, the enforcement authority should 
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forego a legalistic enforcement policy to the letter of the law (“going by 
the book”) but instead consciously determine whether or not an offense 
is effi cient (section 6.1). Furthermore, in order to reduce underinclusion, 
the enforcement authority should be granted law-making powers so that 
it can impose the most effi cient standard on a particular fi rm and enforce 
it properly.
 If it is impossible for the enforcement authority to determine the efficien-
cy of an offense, the authority should bargain with the firm in order to 
improve the application of the law for a particular firm, in a particular 
situation. Both parties might benefit from such a cooperative approach in 
which they adopt a flexible attitude towards the standards .
3. Since rules do not fully address every particular situation, they are po-
tentially confl icting or contradictory. In such cases, fi rms are unable to 
comply, hence high sanctions will not be effective. Firms will not comply 
under a strict enforcement policy, especially if they are uncertain about 
how the enforcement authority will deal with this confl ict (with respect to 
its law-making powers). In such cases, the fi rm might possibly wait until 
it receives an offi cial statement from the enforcement authority which 
states which standards must be satisfi ed. A similar point can be made 
when standards are handled inconsistently in time, for example if inspec-
tors vary from year to year.
4. More generally, if the rules are wrong, i.e. if they prescribe ineffi cient lev-
els of precaution, imposing high sanctions, thus forcing compliance, is 
ineffi cient. Moreover, the effi cient level of precautions takes the enforce-
ment costs into account. Since enforcement is costly, the enforcement 
authority should also forego minor ineffi cient violations not worth en-
forcing. As became apparent throughout the analysis, a certain degree of 
underdeterrence is favorable because of the costs of inspection.
5. In some cases, rules are not aimed at deterrence, but at remediation . If 
offenses are beyond the control of the fi rm (due to technical failures), the 
major task of the enforcement authority is not deterrence but remedia-
tion. For remediation, extreme sanctions might be ineffi cient if enforce-
ment cannot be conditioned on the level of remediation performed (sec-
tion 4.2).
Imposing sanctions is costly
 Even without the problems resulting from incomplete or inappropriate law, 
i.e. even where an offense is most certainly inefficient, a deterrence strategy 
may be in- or counter-effective because increasing the sanction is costly. If 
imposing a sanction is sufficiently costly, extreme sanctions are inefficient. 
Moreover, if sanctioning leads to very high costs, refraining from sanctions 
and choosing for different enforcement actions can be beneficial. This situ-
ation was already described in the case of the direct costs of sanctions, as 
under imprisonment. However, I have also identified many other reasons 
why increasing a sanction is not without costs. Increasing the sanction is 
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costly if it somehow reduces overall deterrence. The enforcement authority 
then has to balance the effects of a penalty on direct deterrence of the offense 
at hand with the importance of overall deterrence. This might explain why 
the enforcement authority should not choose a deterrence strategy in which 
every violation is punished.
1. Increasing the sanction for minor offenses is costly if it reduces deterrence 
for serious offenses (the problem of marginal deterrence , section 3.2.2). 
If the harm from serious offenses is suffi ciently high, it will be effi cient 
to tolerate small offenses in order to deter the more serious ones. The en-
forcement authority should then be lenient towards minor violations.
2. Increasing the sanction is costly if it makes compliance in another period 
less attractive. If there is serious underdeterrence, the optimal penalty 
scheme depends on past compliance records. First, as explained in sec-
tion 4.1, the optimal sanction for fi rst-time offenders should be lower in 
the second than in the fi rst period. Increasing the sanction in the second 
period decreases deterrence in the fi rst period . For example, the authority 
should treat existing fi rms with good compliance records more leniently 
than young companies or persistent violators. Secondly, as explained in 
section 5.3, if the target compliance rate is partial , the effi cient enforce-
ment policy is based on past compliance, implying that enforcement is lax 
for one group and severe for the other. Tougher measures might reduce 
overall deterrence . In order to make the incentive to comply in the target 
group as large as possible, fi rms in the non-target group should not be pe-
nalized. Increasing the sanction in the non-target group will reduce deter-
rence in the target group. In essence, a warning functions as a transition to 
the target group.
3. When self-reporting exists, increasing the sanction is costly because a 
higher sanction for self-reported violations will reduce self-reporting 
and thereby increase monitoring costs (as well as reduce the other ad-
vantages of self-reporting, see section 3.4). Self-reporting as such may 
resemble cooperative enforcement. If self-reporting concerns technical 
failures beyond the control of the fi rm, a zero punishment policy may be 
effi cient, even if the fi rm does not immediately return to compliance (sec-
tion 4.2.2).
4. Increasing the sanction is costly if the enforcement process also convicts 
some innocent fi rms (section 6.2) . This might be especially important in 
the case of high and severe sanctions. Moreover, higher sanctions require 
a higher standard of proof, which will increase prosecution costs.
5. Increasing the sanction is costly if fi rms are able to contest the enforce-
ment authority’s decision and/or to invest in the non-detection of offens-
es (section 6.2) . This problem might be so severe that decreasing the sanc-
tion will increase compliance. Therefore a zero sanction can be optimal, 
especially if investments in the thoroughness of inspections are costly.
6. Increasing the sanction is costly if it crowds out the effectiveness of infor-
mal sanctions, especially the intrinsic moral intention to comply (section 
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7.4) . If this crowding out is very severe, imposing even a small sanction 
will break down the moral or social intention to comply. No sanction 
might then possibly be the most effi cient policy. A related point is that, 
due to the presence of extrinsic informal sanctions, public enforcement 
might possibly limit itself to detecting violations and refraining from 
(costly) formal sanctions.
7. Similarly, increasing the sanction may be costly due to some negative re-
lationship between the decision to comply and the compliance rate, lead-
ing to a negative interaction between public enforcement and the compli-
ance rate, as described in section 3.3. Therefore, increasing the sanction 
may have a negative counter-effect on deterrence. One example of such 
an interaction is that the enforcement authority faces a limited budget. If 
prosecution is costly, this implies that it can only prosecute a limited num-
ber of violators (section 5.3.4). Therefore warnings , which are cheaper to 
impose, might be a better enforcement technology, especially if delayed 
compliance is more costly for fi rms than immediate compliance (due to 
the costs of extra inspections, for example).
8.2.2 The design of compliance strategies
 I identified above a number of reasons why a deterrence strategy may be inef-
fective or inefficient and why the enforcement authority should adopt a com-
pliance strategy. If increasing the sanction is sufficiently costly, a non-extreme 
sanction is optimal. Even a zero sanction can be efficient. In cases of incom-
plete or inadequate rules, a legalistic deterrence approach is also inefficient.
There are a number of possible reactions to the failures of a deterrence 
strategy. Instead of immediately sanctioning a violation of the standard, the 
authority might choose to apply one of several forms of compliance strat-
egy. These have already been discussed in the previous chapters; they are not 
mutually exclusive, and can be used simultaneously.
1. Adjusting standards (tolerance). 129 If the legal (statutory) standard cannot be 
enforced, it is generally optimal for enforcement authorities to adjust the 
standard downwards and to enforce some informal standard. This im-
plies a combined use of a deterrence and compliance strategy. It qualifi es 
as compliance because the enforcement authority does not legalistically 
enforce every violation of the standard but instead foregoes minor viola-
tions. It is a deterrent, however, because the authority can follow Becker 
(1968) in enforcing the adjusted standard.
 If the standard cannot be adjusted, it may be optimal to target compliance 
129 See, for example, Khambu (1989), Harford and Harrington (1991), Heyes and Rickman 
(1999) and Lando and Shavell (2004), as well as sections 6.2 and 5.2. See also section 3.2 in 
which I discuss the fact that if the enforcement authority is perfectly informed, inefficient 
offenses should not be punished.
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for some subgroup of potential offenders, and forego violations of the 
remainder of the population or rules . This garantuees compliance by at 
least some part of the population or of at least some part of the rules. This 
system however more strongly resembles the deterrent approach, except 
that it does not lead to any enforcement in the non-target group at all, 
neither by compliance nor by deterrence.
2. Warnings and enforcement on past compliance.130 If there is some underde-
terrence, it is often favorable to apply enforcement based on past com-
pliance. The most explicit case involves a state-dependent enforcement 
policy in which a fi rm caught in violation is not penalized but transferred 
to a target group in which a more strict enforcement policy applies, i.e. if a 
fi rst violation is detected the fi rm receives a warning. If offenses can also 
occur accidentally, it will be effi cient to make punishment dependent on 
the compliance record. If this record is reasonable, the enforcement au-
thority should forego punishment. This is closely related to well-known 
enforcement pyramids implying that the most severe enforcement ac-
tions should be kept for persistent non-compliers.
3 Self-reporting. Self-reporting might play an important role in a cooperative 
enforcement strategy (section 4.2.2) in which the fi rm reveals its offenses 
to the enforcement authority in exchange for a more fl exible enforcement 
policy. Furthermore, self-reporting is particularly effective if offenses 
occur accidentally, beyond the control of the fi rm, and/or if remediation 
is also an objective of enforcement. Note, however, that self-reporting is 
not only benefi cial if there are deterrence failures, but can also enhance 
deterrence as such because it allows savings in monitoring costs (section 
3.4). Therefore, self-reporting can be an element of both compliance and 
deterrence strategies.
4. Advice. If fi rms cannot reasonably obtain information about the relevant 
standards or if obtaining and sharing information about compliance is 
cheaper through public agencies, inspectors should behave as consul-
tants rather than policemen, at least in the fi rst instance (section 6.1.1).
5. Negotiation. If the enforcement authority has insufficient information 
about the socially optimal level of precautions, it might be optimal to 
choose for a cooperative, bargaining strategy in which information is ex-
changed between the authority and the fi rm. Both may benefi t from a 
fl exible, cooperative approach (6.1.2). The fi rm will try to persuade the 
enforcement authority that compliance is too costly. The enforcement 
authority will try to convince the fi rm that non-compliance will be very 
costly.
130 See for example Harrington (1988), Rubinstein (1979), Livernois and McKenna (1999) and 
Nyborg and Telle (2004), as well as sections 5.3 and 5.3.4, 4.1 and 4.2.
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8.2.3 An important remark on the desirability of compliance strategies
I discussed several reasons why a deterrence strategy might be ineffective or 
inefficient and why the enforcement authority should adopt a compliance 
strategy. However, it should be stressed that these reasons only hold if full 
compliance is not the aim of enforcement or is unachievable (section 5.1).
Full compliance is not the aim of enforcement if not all offenses are inef-
ficient. If the law is incomplete, this implies that some offenses will be effi-
cient, or that the precautions satisfying the standard may still be insufficient. 
Therefore, the enforcement authority should consider whether an offense is 
efficient and only prosecute if it is not. Non-compliance is efficient if the mar-
ginal costs of compliance exceed the marginal expected harm for some level 
of non-compliance. In the absence of other failures and costs, the enforcement 
authority can use a deterrence strategy against inefficient offenses. However, 
if it lacks the information required to determine the costs and benefits, the 
authority might try to cooperate with the firm . A compliance strategy can 
only be beneficial if full compliance is not the aim of enforcement (section 5.1) 
and if the authority does not have sufficient information or sufficient law-
making powers to enforce socially optimal levels of precaution. If the law is 
complete and/or offenses are always inefficient, it is efficient to try to deter as 
many offenses as possible. 
More importantly, full compliance can be unachievable due to the enforce-
ment costs and the limits on the level of sanction . A compliance strategy is 
only favorable if the enforcement authority’s budget is limited. If there are no 
limits on the level of sanction or on the enforcement resources, the expected 
sanction can be made large enough to enforce full compliance. A deterrence 
strategy in which every detected inefficient violation is punished, is efficient 
(see for example Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988). If everyone complies, there are 
no costs of imposing sanctions, including no adverse effects on deterrence . 
Most of the reasons discussed above for assuming that increasing the sanc-
tion is costly only hold given a limited budget and limited sanctions. If these 
are sufficiently limited, underdeterrence, possibly severe underdeterrence, 
will result, which can be reduced by choosing a different enforcement strat-
egy. However, the optimal response is generally to increase the budget or (if 
possible) to try and increase the maximum sanction. This point has by now 
repeatedly been made. As discussed in section 7.5 (Lin and Yang, 2006), if 
the sanction is extremely high, the deterrent effect always dominates over 
a possible negative effect associated with informal sanctions. Similarly, a 
state-dependent policy (section 5.3, Harrington, 1988) is only favorable if par-
tial compliance is the target and the budget is limited. Moreover, punishing 
repeat offenders more severely is only efficient if first-time offenders cannot 
be perfectly deterred (section 4.1). Warnings are only a beneficial response to 
costly prosecution if the enforcement authority’s budget is not increased (sec-
tion 5.3.4, Nyborg and Telle, 2004).
There are two important reasons for assuming that the budget is not 
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increased (section 5.1). First of all, increasing the budget may take a long time. 
Therefore, in the short run, the enforcement authority’s budget is given and 
a compliance strategy can be favorable. Secondly, increasing the budget may 
be inefficient because enforcement becomes increasingly costly. In that case, 
a partial compliance rate is the maximum feasible compliance rate and com-
pliance strategies might be more effective in enforcing this level than a deter-
rence strategy. If a certain level of underdeterrence is desirable, a compliance 
strategy might be a better response than a deterrence strategy, due to the rea-
sons discussed above. In cases involving a given level of non-compliance or 
underdeterrence, we can distinguish two types of firms: compliant firms and 
violating firms. The enforcement authority can try to exploit this fact by using 
compliance strategies. The enforcement authority and the firm can – implic-
itly or explicitly – bargain for a compliance strategy. The enforcement author-
ity might profit if the rules are better, even though not perfectly, adhered to. 
Firms might benefit if they face smaller expected sanctions or are allowed 
an occasional violation. If there is full compliance, such a trade-off is impos-
sible.
The focus in much literature lies on the effectiveness of enforcement: 
which policy will achieve the highest level of compliance, given the enforce-
ment authority’s budget? However, the efficiency question is still relevant. We 
must keep asking whether, if a higher compliance rate is desirable, it might 
not be more efficient, instead of adopting a compliance strategy, to somewhat 
increase the budget (or, if possible, the sanctions) and pursue a deterrence 
strategy.
The results of Garvie and Keeler (1994) most clearly summarize when and 
why a compliance strategy is favorable.131 They show that compliance strate-
gies are related to weak enforcement (or regulatory) powers and relatively 
inexpensive monitoring. Deterrence regimes are consistent with expensive 
monitoring and the existence of strong societal sanctions for violations. If 
monitoring costs are higher, this makes a trade-off in the way proposed by 
Becker (1968) more favorable. High monitoring costs require that the prob-
ability of detection should be kept low, making aggressive sanctioning neces-
sary. On the other hand, if monitoring is relatively inexpensive, a high prob-
ability of detection can be realized if accompanied by moderate sanctions. 
The enforcement authority’s powers depend on the political, legal and social 
attitudes towards the regulation being enforced. Severe offenses are largely 
objected to and can be enforced by low detection rates and vigorous enforce-
ment. Offenses regarded more ambiguously by society will probably not be 
punished harshly and will therefore be characterized by frequent contact 
with regulators and relatively mild sanctioning. 
131 See further Law (2006).
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8.3 Explaining the scope for compliance strategies
 As a result, compliance strategies might be desirable if an enforcement 
authority’s powers are relatively weak. This may explain for which offens-
es and in which field compliance strategies are best applicable. Garvie and 
Keeler (1994) argue that a deterrence strategy is more likely to be efficient if 
the consensus about the desirability of higher compliance is broader and non-
compliance is regarded more as a criminal act. Where such a consensus fails 
to hold, because there is broad disagreement about the desirability of regula-
tion or the definition of compliance, compliance strategies are more efficient.
It is claimed that these conditions are satisfied in the case of regulatory 
offenses by firms. Several authors have identified important characteristics 
of regulatory offenses as opposed to criminal offenses (see for example Vel-
janovski, 1984, or Kagan, 1984). However, most of these studies do not dis-
cuss why these characteristics should make the use of compliance strategies 
more effective (as opposed to a deterrence strategy). Any explanation of this 
kind should link these characteristics to weak enforcement powers and the 
broadness of societal disapproval for the offenses in question. I will attempt 
to provide such an explanation with respect to the characteristics of regula-
tory offenses identified by Veljanovski (1984).
1. “Regulatory offenses do not involve a positive act, but rather a failure 
to act.” It might be that failures to act are more diffi cult to observe and 
prove, and are less often reported by civilians or victims. Hence, enforce-
ment is more costly and the boundaries on the enforcement authority be-
come more pronounced. In addition, positive acts may be deemed mor-
ally more unacceptable. Moreover, ignorance and incomplete law is more 
problematic in cases of failures to act.
2. “A regulatory offense is not a discrete event, but a continuing state of af-
fairs.” Therefore, remediation is important, and the offense is something 
that can still be bargained about. It also implies that enforcement is a con-
tinuing problem, implying that constraints on the enforcement authority 
may become more problematic.
3. “Regulatory offenses normally occur within an organization where the 
responsibilities for compliance are often diffused, and non-compliance is 
the result of either ignorance or a conscious profi t-maximizing decision.” 
As discussed, if potential offenders are ignorant of the law, a coopera-
tive enforcement strategy is possibly more effective. In addition, if no one 
feels responsible for achieving compliance, warnings or bargaining might 
help. If there is no clearly responsible offender, society might disapprove 
of severe sanctions because such measures would be considered ‘unfair’ 
or because there is a high probability of convicting innocent persons. 
Moreover, if no one is clearly responsible, informal sanctions such as re-
gret and shame might be less effective, requiring higher formal sanctions. 
That an offense results from profi t maximization does not seem to have 
any particular relationship with a deterrence or compliance strategy. 
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4. “Common crimes destroy or redistribute wealth, but regulatory offenses 
are frequently the by-product of some otherwise socially benefi cial ac-
tivity” (mala in se versus mala prohibita). This implies that in the case of 
regulatory offenses, the danger and social costs of over-compliance and 
overdeterrence are higher. In common crime, the effi cient activity level 
is (almost) zero, while the problem in regulatory crime is not to deter ef-
fi cient activities but to enforce effi cient precautions. If these precautions 
are taken, every activity is effi cient. Therefore, for common crime, full 
compliance is often the aim (although possibly unachievable). Moreover, 
this distinction implies different moral attitudes towards an offense, both 
by the offender and by society.
5. “In regulatory enforcement personality and offense-specifi c factors are 
(more) important in the enforcement process and the decision to pros-
ecute. Detection is automatically linked to the identity of the offender 
and creates immediately a bilateral relationship between the authority 
and the offender, with the possibilities of bargaining.” The availability 
of more specifi c information allows the authority to determine whether 
prosecution is desirable and to forego punishment. Possibly, too, if fur-
ther circumstances are known, society might better ‘understand’ the of-
fense and oppose severe punishment.
I add to these factors three of my own:
6. Since fi rms as such cannot be imprisoned but only fi ned, the maximum 
sanction is more likely to be binding. Of course, responsible managers or 
other employees can be imprisoned, but this might lead to different prob-
lems, as discussed in section 2.3.6.
7. Regulators and fi rms interact with each other repeatedly. While common 
crimes may be committed more than once, they usually do not imply fre-
quent interaction with the same inspector or other enforcement offi cials. Re-
peated interaction makes compliance strategies possible and/or more favor-
able.
8. Since fi rms, especially the larger ones, are wealthier than individuals they 
are better able to contest enforcement actions (section 6.2). More gener-
ally, Garoupa (2004) argues that corporations can more easily ‘corrupt’ 
enforcers, regulators and judges, as well as politicians and the media. 
Corruption harms deterrence and might infl uence societal attitudes to-
wards the offense and the standard.
8.4 Concluding public law enforcement: Economics and other 
social sciences
This section began with a description of the debate surrounding deterrence and 
compliance strategies. Non-economists have criticized the deterrent approach 
of economics. As a final reflection, I wish to make a number of comments 
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on this debate. These comments summarize some important lessons to be 
learned from the chapters on public law enforcement.
8.4.1 Some comments on the debate concerning enforcement strategies
Economics and compliance
First of all, one-sidedly linking economics to deterrence strategies is inappro-
priate. As should be clear from the above analysis, economists do not neces-
sarily favor a strategy in which every violation is punished. The (modern) 
economic analysis of public enforcement began with Becker (1968), who rec-
ommended maximal sanctions. However, the literature has moved far beyond 
this analysis. It has identified important limits to the trade-off between the 
probability of detection and the magnitude of the sanctions. Moreover, there 
are many reasons why enforcement should make use of informal standards, 
warnings, compliance records, negotiations and/or advice. Therefore, econo-
mists cannot be reduced solely to defenders of deterrence strategies.
As Becker (1968) notes, from an economic perspective the social objective 
of law enforcement is not deterrence, but minimizing the social costs of crime 
and enforcement (i.e.: maximizing social welfare). These include the costs to 
(potential) victims (the harm done and the costs of enforcement) and the costs 
to potential offenders (the costs of compliance). In choosing enforcement, we 
should balance the benefits of deterrence (less harm but higher costs of com-
pliance) against the costs of enforcement. It should be stressed that (maximal) 
deterrence is not the objective of optimal economic policy.
Rationality and morality
 Secondly, many compliance theorists assume that if a firm behaves rationally, 
a deterrence strategy is favorable, while if a firm is irrational, a compliance 
strategy is most effective. In addition, a direct relationship is made between 
rationality and morality. Rational firms are assumed to be amoral. For exam-
ple, Kagan and Scholz (1984) and, following them, Huisman (2001*) make a 
distinction between three different types of firms and argue that for each type 
of firm a different enforcement strategy is effective. First of all, firms can be 
amoral calculators who are motivated only by profit-seeking. For such firms, 
a deterrent, aggressive approach is favorable and the regulator should behave 
as a policeman. Secondly, firms might behave like a civilian who is inclined to 
obey the law as long as it is reasonable. Law-breaking follows from disagree-
ment with the regulations. In these cases, the regulator should behave as a 
politician, bargaining with and persuading the firm about the relevant and 
optimal law. Finally, the firm may be inclined to obey the law but is organi-
zationally incompetent to do so. Law-breaking in such cases follows from 
organizational failure. The regulator should serve as a consultant, educating 
the firm about compliance.
From an economic perspective, this scheme does not make sense. It is use-
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ful as far as it provides a number of reasons for and forms of the compliance 
strategies discussed above. However, rationality does not exclude morality 
and is certainly not restricted to profit-maximization. As explained above, 
even for rational, profit-seeking firms, compliance strategies can be favor-
able, while moral inclination to obey the law is insufficient reason for failure 
of deterrence. Economics does not require any assumptions concerning the 
morality of firms, but explains the desirability of compliance strategies as the 
result of the relevant costs and benefits, i.e. the costs functions of expected 
harm, costs of compliance and costs of enforcement. These costs as well as 
their interaction (the effectiveness of enforcement in reducing offenses) deter-
mine which level of compliance is desirable and feasible and whether this 
level can be obtained by means of a deterrence strategy, consistently assum-
ing that firms or individuals behave in a rational manner. The costs functions 
include the possible crowding out of moral motivations and the incentive 
to learn the relevant law and its application. The desirability of compliance 
strategies follows from a difference between deterrence and compliance strat-
egies in social costs and benefits and in the incentives resulting from these 
strategies. For example, whether enforcement should include advice to the 
firms about compliance depends on whether the firm itself or a public agency 
is better at acquiring information about compliance.
The importance of marginal analysis
Thirdly, there are sometimes differences in interests between the different 
fields. While non-economists tend to largely explore the motivations to com-
ply among the whole population, economists are more interested in a mar-
ginal analysis. The main interest of most economic literature is not with iden-
tifying the average or aggregate motives to comply and enforcing average 
compliance. The main interest is in how the marginal individual or firm can be 
induced to comply. In addition, (increased) enforcement by public authorities 
is often precisely the extra incentive required to induce the marginal individ-
ual to comply. This might explain why economists focus more on incentives 
from enforcement than on social or moral intentions. Precisely the lack of such 
intentions in the marginal individual explains why such individuals fail to 
comply. As discussed in section 2.2, the social and moral concerns are usually 
insufficient to maintain compliance. If this were not the case, the enforcement 
problem would be absent because the efficient outcome would already be 
implemented. Moreover, the fact that most firms do comply because of their 
moral intentions to do so is not sufficient to justify a compliance strategy. A 
deterrence strategy might be required to impose extrinsic penalties on mar-
ginal offenders.
A lack of knowledge and experience
Generally speaking, it is impossible to make resolute statements on the desir-
ability of both a compliance and deterrence strategy because of the limited 
empirical evidence concerning the explanation of regulatory behavior and 
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concerning the effects of enforcement strategies.132  Empirical research is ham-
pered by the lack of data, especially on non-reported violations. Moreover, 
it is inappropriate to make firm statements if one of the strategies has never 
been tried. For example, Van Stokkum (2004*) quotes others on the fact that 
in the Netherlands, a truly punitive enforcement has never been seriously 
tried.
Enforcement failures
So far it was assumed that the enforcement authority tries to deal with the 
enforcement problem as well as possible, i.e. to maximize social welfare. How-
ever, the enforcement authority may also fail in achieving deterrence. This is 
more extensively discussed in chapter 9. The observation that the law is not 
vigorously enforced does not necessarily show the ineffectiveness of deter-
rence strategies, it might also indicate government insincerity and capture, 
if not corruption. Alternatively, deterrence strategies may fail to be imple-
mented because bureaucrats are mostly interested in budgets and employ-
ment, while deterrence strategies as described by Becker (1968) require few 
resources.
8.4.2 The appropriate distinction between compliance and deterrence strategies
 As can be seen from the discussion in section 8.1, the debate about compliance 
and deterrence involves many factors, such as morality and rationality, the 
timing of enforcement (ex-post or ex-ante; re-active or pro-active), informa-
tion problems, alternative regulation etc. Therefore the debate about deter-
rence and compliance strategies is often confusing and does not adequately 
describe the difference.
The labels of a deterrence and a compliance strategy are confusing because 
they do not adequately address the difference. Both enforcement strategies 
are aimed at improving compliance (and deterring violations), or even bet-
ter at the goal behind compliance, namely maximizing social welfare. What 
differs is the way in which they attempt to obtain this. In a deterrence strat-
egy, this is carried out by means of directly punishing violations. In a compli-
ance strategy, it is carried out by means of negotiations. When a violation is 
detected, no sanction is imposed, but instead some kind of warning is issued. 
Persuasion is by information rather than through sanctions.
The distinction between compliance and deterrence strategies is often 
analyzed confusing because it compares several factors simultaneously. For 
example, ex-post criminal law enforcement is compared with an ex-ante com-
132 See for example Huisman and Beukelman (2007*) and Ponsaers and Hoogenboom (2004*). 
The latter state (p.179) that, due to a lack of empirical knowledge, “the discussion breaks 
down in an ideological war of positions rather than an empirical founded, rational argu-
mentation”.
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pliance strategy (Ponsaers en Hoogenboom, 2004*), and/or ex-post enforce-
ment is assumed to be repressive. However, ex-post is nothing more than 
enforcement after some damage has actually occurred (harm-based) while 
ex-ante enforcement is enforcement of standards that attempt to prevent 
damage (act-based). There is no direct relationship between the distinctions 
ex-post/ex-ante and compliance/deterrence. For instance, remedying dam-
age with a compliance strategy is ex-post, while strictly enforcing automobil-
ist speeding is ex-ante. The distinction ex-post/ex-ante might explain some of 
the characteristics that are usually assigned to a compliance strategy but may 
as well be applied to a deterrence strategy and vice versa. When enforcement 
takes place ex-ante, there are no clearly identifiable victims since no dam-
age has occurred. Ex-post enforcement is re-active (which is not the same as 
repressive) while ex-ante enforcement is pro-active.
It is important to limit the distinction between deterrence and compliance 
strategies to a distinction between the enforcement styles. The style describes 
what an enforcement authority will do once it detects a violation. A deter-
rence style is a style in which every violation is immediately punished and 
the enforcement authority bases its decisions solely on the information it 
has obtained itself. A compliance style is a style in which the enforcement 
authority might forego some violations (for some time) if this induces the 
firm to reveal important information necessary for enforcement. In addition 
to the enforcement style, the enforcement authority must also decide how 
the inspection process will take place (monitoring versus investigation) and 
whether it will be harm-based or act-based (ex-post or ex-ante). These three 
factors together determine the enforcement policy and they should not be 
confused or connected.133
8.4.3 Conclusion: Integrating different views
Note finally that economic and non-economic views on enforcement may not 
diverge as much as they seem to at first sight. What should be clear from this 
chapter is that economics has moved far beyond Becker (1968). Economists do 
not necessarily favor harsh, deterrent, legalistic enforcement, but have broad-
ly investigated the conditions that determine the optimal policy, i.e. the most 
welfare-enhancing policy. Their conclusions concerning optimal enforcement 
policies do not always deviate from those of other disciplines. The econom-
ic description and explanation of deterrence and compliance strategies fits 
fairly well in the discussion at the beginning of this section. Both economists 
and non-economists generally favor a pyramid of enforcement in which the 
most severe enforcement action is saved for the most severe violations and 
most persistent violators. Moreover, the three important determinants of an 
enforcement policy as identified in Kagan and Scholz (1984) and Huisman 
133 Chapter 10 further investigates the optimal structure of enforcement.
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(2001*) can be interpreted economically. First of all, enforcement should be 
reasonable, which in economic terms implies that it should balance the social 
costs and benefits. Secondly, it should take into account whether the firm is 
willing to comply, which in economic terms refers to the costs and benefits of 
internal motivations and external incentives from the environment. Thirdly, 
it should take into consideration whether the firm is able to comply, which in 
economic terms refers to the formulation of standards and technological bar-
riers. An important contribution that economists can make to this discussion 
is their investigation of the interaction of these factors with and the depen-
dency of these factors on enforcement itself.

9 Discretion, credibility and objectives of the 
enforcement authority
The previous chapters describe the socially optimal enforcement policy which 
enforcement authorities should adopt in order to obtain socially optimal lev-
els of precaution. Two important assumptions were made that have not, so 
far, been discussed. First of all, it was assumed that the enforcement authority 
can commit itself to the enforcement policy that it has announced. Secondly, 
it was assumed that the enforcement authority will seek to maximize social 
welfare. Both assumptions may be problematic and are therefore examined 
in this chapter. Essential to this analysis is the recognition that the decision 
to prosecute a violation is not fixed, exogenous, but depends on the firm’s 
decision to comply (Tsebelis, 1989). The enforcement authority is a strategic 
player with its own objectives and incentives. Therefore, the firm’s decision 
to comply is the result of a strategic interaction between the firm and the en-
forcement authority.
Section 9.1 investigates the credibility problem. Section 9.2 investigates 
the objectives of law enforcers. Section 9.3 discusses the role of courts in con-
trolling enforcement authorities.134
9.1 Credibility and commitment
 It cannot be taken for granted that the enforcement authority will be able to 
commit itself to the efficient enforcement policy. First, commitment is difficult 
if circumstances have changed so that expected harm and compliance costs 
have changed and so that punishing or remedying non-compliance is no lon-
ger efficient (section 9.1.1). Secondly, such commitment may be impossible 
because enforcement is costly (section 9.1.2).
9.1.1 The problem of commitment when the costs and benefits of non-
compliance change
Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that it is sometimes better not to allow pol-
icy makers discretion to act in accordance with what is in society’s best inter-
est, but to provide them with long-term rules which are difficult to change. 
134 The analysis in this chapter is presented in Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2006*) while 
discussing the desirability of a duty to enforce for municipalities [beginselplicht tot handhav-
ing].
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Otherwise, a time-inconsistency, or credibility problem may arise. A credibil-
ity problem arises when citizens realize that the government may, in future, 
use its discretion to make a new policy decision which differs (for good rea-
sons) from the one in place when the policy is announced. This problem is 
well-known in macroeconomics. Kydland and Prescott  (1977) argue that the 
best outcome can be achieved if policy makers are not given discretionary 
powers to determine the best policy for every period, but (fixed) rules, as for 
instance is the case with an independent central bank which is solely con-
cerned with fighting inflation.
Credibility problems also occur in the case of enforcement policies. Con-
sider the following example: suppose municipal by-laws prescribe that build-
ings must be built in a fire-proof manner which requires that an emergency 
exit can be reached within 50 meters. It will probably be efficient for café 
proprietors to comply with this rule when they decide to build or rebuild 
an establishment, because the extra costs of compliance are small relative to 
the reduction in expected harm. Violation would lead to a loss in welfare. 
However, once the café is built in such a way that an exit can only be reached 
within, say, 60 meters; a different balance of costs and benefits is achieved. 
In order for the proprietor to comply, he will first have to break down the 
existing walls and exits, and then to rebuild the café in such a way that it satis-
fies the requirements for emergency exits. In the meantime, the café will be 
closed, while the expected harm is only reduced by “10 meters”. It may well 
be that these costs of compliance are higher than the benefits, so that requir-
ing compliance would in this case not be efficient. As a result of this balance of 
social costs and benefits, the municipality may refrain from enforcement.
However wise it may be to refrain from enforcement ex-post, the deterrent 
effect of enforcement is seriously weakened. If proprietors know and expect 
that the municipality will not enforce the rule of exits within 50 meters, they 
will probably not comply with this rule. If citizens expect that the enforcement 
authority will, in the end, not enforce the rules, they will take this freedom to 
act against the rules. This is socially undesirable if the offenses in question are 
ex-ante inefficient and the administration ex-ante wants to enforce the rules, 
but cannot commit itself to the promised policy. It may be difficult for enforce-
ment authorities such as municipalities to carry out enforcement based on 
ex-ante costs and benefits because citizens are interested in current, ex-post, 
results. The tendency to refrain from enforcement will be higher when the 
ex-post costs of compliance are high, the competition for the limited enforce-
ment budget is larger and offenses occur infrequently. Then social pressure 
against enforcement ex-post will be large, due to for instance the fear of loss of 
employment or loss of consumption of pleasant activities, and/or due to the 
underestimation by citizens of the expected harm that is inflicted.
Situations in which such credibility problems occur are very common in 
environmental law, especially building law, where remediation is a relevant 
policy objective. With remediation, the costs of compliance are higher after an 
offense than before.
143Discretion, credibility and objectives of the enforcement authority
9.1.2 Commitment when enforcement is costly
A credibility problem is present when the decision to tolerate a violation is 
different ex-post and ex-ante because there has been a change in expected 
harm and/or compliance costs once an offense has been committed. Howev-
er, the credibility problem is much broader and, in principle, concerns every 
offense. Once an offense has been committed, the enforcement authority will 
not want to realize costs of enforcement because the welfare loss of the offense 
can not be made undone (Boadway et al., 1995; Baker and Miceli, 2005). Once 
a criminal has decided whether to commit a crime, given the government’s 
announced punishment plan, the social benefits from the enforcement policy 
will have been completely realized with respect to that individual or firm. The 
reason for realizing enforcement costs is that enforcement creates deterrence 
of potential offenses that might be committed in the future. Therefore, the 
announcement of enforcement is only credible if society and the enforcement 
authority are sufficiently interested in the future. Boadway et al. (1995) dem-
onstrate that if the future is sufficiently important, the enforcement author-
ity will have an incentive to build a reputation of strict enforcement. If the 
enforcement authority is not sufficiently interested in deterring future crime, 
it may refrain from enforcement activities ex-post.
Baker and Miceli (2005) show that credibility is especially problematic 
if detection and imposing sanctions are costly . Consider a static policy (i.e. 
without credibility problems) of some optimal probability of detection. This 
policy will result in enforcement costs in realizing this probability. When 
sanctioning happens by means of fines, the optimal dynamic policy (which 
takes into account the problem of credibility) causes the optimal probability 
of detection to fall; hence crime rates will rise, reflecting the greater weight 
society attaches to minimizing current enforcement costs compared to deter-
ring future crimes.135 If, however, jail is included as a possible punishment, 
credibility can result in either more or less aggressive detection and punish-
ment policies, as compared to the optimal static policy. The optimal strategy 
depends on which policy is more likely to lower the expected enforcement 
costs.136
Tsebelis (1989) obtains similar results.137 However, he does not consider 
135 Similar results were derived in section 3.4 concerning self-reporting. Malik (1990, p. 243) 
recognizes the assumption that the enforcement authority is committed to its announced 
policy even though it realizes that the firm must have made an honest report. Friesen 
(2006) discusses the optimal enforcement policy when the enforcement authority updates 
its belief about the probability of a violation on the basis of the reports it receives. This 
leads, as in Baker and Miceli (2005), to a smaller probability of inspection because the 
enforcement authority believes that compliance-reporting firms are more likely to be com-
pliant. See also Franckx (2002).
136 Along the lines discussed in section 3.2 that under imprisonment both under- and overde-
terrence may occur.
137 See also Bianco, Ordershook and Tsebelis (1990) and Chang et al. (1998).
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the situation in which the enforcement authority and the firm act sequen-
tially (because detection takes place through inspection), but simultaneously 
(detection by monitoring ). The enforcement authority and the firm have to 
simultaneously decide whether to inspect the firm respectively whether to 
comply with the law. The enforcement authority may prefer to enforce the 
law if it is violated, but due to the enforcement costs the enforcement author-
ity will prefer not to enforce the law if not violated. Under these circum-
stances, the optimal strategies of the enforcement authority and the firm are 
interdependent. If the authority enforces the law, the firms will stop violating 
assuming that the expected sanction is high enough; if firms stop violating 
the law, the authority will stop enforcing it; if the authority stops enforcing 
the law, the firms will violate it; if the firms violate the law, the authority will 
enforce it; if the authority enforces the law, then the firms will stop violating 
it, and so on. Tsebelis (1989) shows that under these circumstances an equilib-
rium can only be found in mixed strategies, i.e. if the enforcement authority 
carries out inspections with some probability, and if the firm violates with 
some probability.
The results of Tsebelis force us to recognize that the probability with which 
an enforcement authority takes action is the result of a rational calculation, 
and not an exogenously given probability. Therefore, the decision of firms to 
comply given the probability that they will be inspected is not a simple deci-
sion under uncertainty. The probability that the firm will be inspected is not an 
exogenous value, which can be determined by the government at the desired 
level, but it results from the interaction between the firm and the enforcement 
authority. Moreover, as Tsebelis (1989) discusses, an increase in the sanctions 
on non-compliance might – in equilibrium – not lead to an increase in the 
compliance rate, but to a decrease in the probability of inspection. In the short 
run, higher sanctions may lead to some deterrence, resulting in a higher com-
pliance rate. However, once the enforcement authority observes that the law 
is better adhered to, it will decrease its enforcement actions, so that deterrence 
is weakened and the initial compliance rate is restored. If society wants to 
obtain a higher compliance rate, the pay-offs to be modified are not those of 
firms (through sanctions), but those of enforcement authorities. It is therefore 
important to discuss the incentives and objectives of enforcement authorities, 
as well as the discretion given to these authorities.
9.2 Enforcement authorities’ objectives
 Up till now, it has been assumed that law enforcers try to maximize social 
welfare given the rules, the allocated budget and the available sanctions. 
In addition, the assumption was that budgets are allocated with the goal 
of maximizing social welfare. However, decisions concerning enforcement 
policies and actions are not made by “society”, but by bureaucrats and poli-
ticians. Politicians allocate a budget, control the detection and prosecution 
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policy, and – in their role of law-makers – determine both the rules and the 
maximum level and design of sanctions. Given the budget and the rules, a 
law-enforcement authority stipulates a detailed enforcement plan, including 
priorities and a production level, and carries responsibility for executing the 
enforcement policy. 
As law enforcers also happen to be human beings, they are not necessar-
ily seeking efficient enforcement, but may have different, even counterpro-
ductive, objectives. “A law is enforced, not by “society”, but by an agency 
instructed with that task. That agency must be given more than a mandate 
(…) to enforce the statute with vigor and wisdom. It must have incentives 
to enforce the law efficiently” (Stigler, 1970, p.531). Therefore, this section 
discusses the objectives of law enforcers as well as the financing issues they 
face.
9.2.1 The objectives of law enforcers
Cohen (1999) and Firestone (2002) have identified six different theories con-
cerning the behavior of law-enforcement officials:
1. Social welfare maximization. As assumed up till know, this objective implies 
that the enforcement authority compares the social costs and benefi ts of 
compliance and enforcement.
2. Violation minimization. Under this objective, the enforcement authority 
tries to reduce the number of offenses (or maximize the compliance rate), 
without reference to the costs and benefi ts of compliance. The enforce-
ment authority is interested in achieving (general) deterrence. This ob-
jective corresponds to an authority with a limited enforcement budget 
which must compete with other functions of the authority in question. 
Given the budget, the authority tries to maximize compliance. The en-
forcement style best fi tted to this objective is a deterrence strategy.
3. Harm minimization. The enforcement authority tries to maximize the ben-
efi ts of compliance without reference to the compliance costs. It allocates 
its limited budget to action taken against offenses which cause relatively 
high degrees of harm. In contrast to the goal of violation minimization, 
which involves focusing on ‘easy’ enforcement targets even if these yield 
relatively little harm, an enforcement authority whose goal is harm mini-
mization focuses on fi rms with the highest harm reduction per euro en-
forcement effort. However, this  type of authority tends to ignore the costs 
of compliance.
4. Case maximization. The enforcement offi cials behave like (self-interested) 
bureaucrats who try to maximize budgets (following theories of bureau-
cratic behavior inspired by Niskanen). This implies excessive inspections 
instead of the minimizing of inspections proposed by Becker (1968), al-
though larger budgets may also be used to create ‘paperwork’ instead of 
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carrying out actual enforcement actions. Such authorities will probably 
follow a compliance, rather than a deterrence strategy. 
5. Political support maximization. The enforcement authority tries to maxi-
mize the difference between the number of supporters and the number 
of detractors of its enforcement policy (following for example Pelzman). 
For example, the authority puts the least regulatory burden on well-orga-
nized, concentrated parties. The possible consequences for employment 
may be an important argument for decisions on enforcement actions. Less 
stringent enforcement is demanded when the compliance costs are high 
and there is a danger of plant closing and loss of employment.
6. Bias. Collective decision-making may be decided by the median voter. 
Therefore, enforcement policies are designed so that they most closely 
match the needs of the median voter. For instance, the representative 
voter is not informed about enforcement effort and compliance costs and 
will therefore choose relatively stringent regulation and enforcement. On 
the other hand, voters are also less able to observe the extent to which the 
government is enforcing its standards. We might therefore expect more 
stringent regulations than are socially optimal, and less than stringent 
enforcement to compensate.
9.2.2 The financing of enforcement authorities
The goal of enforcement officials is also determined by the financing and 
evaluation of the enforcement authority. If the “success” of the enforcement 
authority is measured by the number of cases commenced, the authority is 
more likely to maximize the number of cases. Similarly, if the budget of the 
authority is based on the budget or costs of the previous year(s), the authority 
may have an incentive to increase the number of cases, hence increasing its 
budget. In addition, the extent to which enforcement is “politicized” depends 
on the institutional environment. Generally, public prosecutors and courts 
are quite independent. Regulatory agencies may also behave as independent 
bodies. On the other hand, administrative enforcement by the board of mayor 
and aldermen might be highly influenced by citizens’ opinions.
Marette and Crespi (2005) discuss three different financing systems of 
enforcement authorities. First of all, the authority may be financed by gen-
eral taxes. Secondly, the enforcement authority may be financed by user (or: 
monitoring) fees, paid by all potential violators. All regulated firms pay a fee 
regardless of their actions. Thirdly, an enforcement authority may be financed 
by the benefits of the fines paid by violating firms. Only firms that violate the 
rules pay. Marette and Crespi (2005) show that if it is expected that there will 
be some non-compliance, it is optimal to cover the authority’s enforcement 
actions by penalties such as fines. This provides an optimal incentive to com-
ply because non-complying firms also pay for the enforcement costs. As the 
monitoring costs increase and a higher budget is required, the financing has 
147Discretion, credibility and objectives of the enforcement authority
to be augmented with a lump-sum tax, rather than a fee. A fee would result in 
a negative incentive for complying firms. If, however, all firms are expected 
to comply with the standards, clearly no money can be collected through a 
penalty. In this case, a per-firm fee would be the optimal method of regula-
tory financing. As the monitoring costs increase, the financing has to be aug-
mented with a lump-sum tax.
These results may also help to understand the kind of enforcement 
authority which may emerge. Suppose that a public authority cannot receive 
penalties and a private self-regulatory body cannot receive public taxes. It 
then follows that if only fees are required to finance the authority, there will 
be no difference between a private and a public organization. Both will be 
able to collect the necessary budget. It may be efficient to rely on private self-
regulation if the per-firm monitoring cost is relatively low. However, if no 
penalties are raised, and hence no money can be collected in this way, a pub-
lic agency would be better because its financing can be supplemented with 
taxes. Marette and Crespi (2005) also discuss the fact that the way a given 
authority is financed may help explain which enforcement style they choose. 
It may make perfect sense for an enforcement authority to allow some firms 
to remain in violation if the revenue generated from these firms in the form 
of fines can be used to finance inspections for the rest of the industry in a 
way that encourages more efficient firms to mitigate their pollution. In other 
words, a pure command-and-control scheme (deterrence strategy) in which 
all firms must comply with the same standards may be suboptimal as com-
pared to a flexible-financing scheme (compliance strategy) in which a regula-
tor will use the revenue generated through fees and penalties on a subset of 
firms, in order to pay for a program that will raise overall welfare.
An important warning must be made at this point. Marette and Crespi 
(2005) assume that the enforcement authority is acting in the public’s best 
interest, given the budget constraint. However, as discussed above, enforce-
ment authorities do not always maximize social welfare. Moreover, as shown 
in for instance Benson et al. (1995), the financing system may also create 
perverse interests and seduce the authority to seek other goals than social 
welfare. Benson et al. (1995) show that the US police resources allocated to 
drug enforcement haven risen dramatically since 1984, because local police 
bureaus which cooperated with federal drug enforcement authorities have 
a share in the money and/or property confiscated from drug criminals. As a 
result, police attention to other types of crimes, such as property crimes, was 
reduced, leading to an increase in these types of crimes.138
9.3 The role of courts in controlling law enforcers
The previous sections identify two problems with respect to enforcement 
138 See also Benson et al. (1998).
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authorities. First of all, it may in practice be impossible for enforcement 
authorities to commit to the policies they announce. Secondly, enforcement 
authorities and their employees may not be trying to maximize social welfare. 
This section investigates how these problems can be solved. Special attention 
is given to the role of courts in controlling enforcement authorities. 
9.3.1 The optimal level of discretion
 Discretion for enforcement authorities is needed because law is necessarily 
incomplete (section 6.1) and an enforcement authority should balance the 
desirability of its enforcement actions. However, discretion also has its dis-
advantages.
Consider the time inconsistency problem discussed in section 9.1. An 
enforcement authority which adopts an enforcement policy involving strict 
enforcement may be unable to commit to this policy ex-post. This credibil-
ity problem can be mitigated by limiting the discretion of the enforcement 
authority. If the enforcement authority is not granted discretion to act in soci-
ety’s best interest, but is instead given a strict enforcement rule (such as vio-
lation or harm minimization), time-inconsistency may be less of a problem. 
Although such rules are less flexible and force the authority to also take action 
against efficient offenses, overall social welfare may in the end be higher.
Moreover, I argue in chapter 6 that under certain circumstances, the opti-
mal enforcement policy is to target enforcement resources and to try to maxi-
mize compliance (although full compliance will never be achieved). Gener-
ally, however, inefficiencies result if enforcement officials do not maximize 
social welfare. Discretion allows enforcement officials to exercise their pow-
ers in seeking their own objectives. Ignoring the motivation of enforcement 
authorities might lead to the wrong outcome in making normative policy 
descriptions (Cohen, 1999). 
Therefore, the optimal level of discretion will balance the flexibility 
required to evaluate the desirability of enforcement with the problem of time-
inconsistency and the problem of abuse of powers. There are two ways in 
which the discretion of enforcement authorities can be controlled. Ex-ante, 
the actions of the enforcement authority can be constrained by the rules. Ex-
post, the actions can be controlled by courts.139
139 In Suurmond (2006*) I discuss the optimal level of discretion for the Ministry of Justice 
in taking precautions against fire damage in prisons. This issue came to the fore after a 
fire in a detention centre at Schiphol airport killed 11 people. In the article in question, I 
also present another solution for controlling the discretion of politicians and bureaucrats: 
independent investigation boards which examine accidents and investigate whether rules 
and procedures are obeyed.
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Ex-ante discretion by rules 
First of all, the level of discretion of enforcement authorities is determined by 
law. If the law were complete, no credibility problems would arise because 
the law would prescribe exactly which offenses are inefficient and would 
force the authority to take action against all offenses. An enforcement author-
ity which, given a sufficiently high budget, will try to minimize violations or 
expected harm, would be efficient.
However, the law is generally incomplete , and it therefore leaves room 
for interpretation of rules, facts and circumstances. It is important to take 
into account the costs and benefits of compliance and enforcement. This 
requires discretion for enforcement authorities. Discretionary powers allow 
the enforcement authority to consider whether an offense is efficient. More-
over, in cases of underdeterrence, welfare may be improved if the enforce-
ment authority uses informal standards and warnings (section 8.2). On the 
other hand, incomplete rules may create credibility problems. A rule stating 
that a proprietor should use his establishment in a fire-proof way may be 
subjected to more time-inconsistency problems than a rule stating that the 
proprietor is not allowed to hang any decorations, although the latter is less 
flexible and applies to all firms in the same way (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 
1979). Moreover, the more rules are open to interpretation, the more enforce-
ment authorities are able to use this room to seek their own objectives. There 
is therefore a trade-off between the informational advantages of discretion 
– that law enforcers can act on information not included in the rules – and 
the disadvantage of discretion – that law enforcers use this discretion to seek 
objectives that are different from society’s (Shavell, 2005).
Discretion can also be controlled by, for instance, minimum (and maxi-
mum) penalties prescribed by law.
Ex-post control of discretion by courts
Given the level of discretion sustained by the rules, a second control of discre-
tionary powers takes place through the courts. Credibility problems can be 
reduced by victims and courts. If a crime leads to serious social concern and 
disapproval, the social pressure to prosecute an offense will be large and the 
enforcement authorities will be forced by this pressure to take action. There-
fore, credibility problems are more serious in (act-based) administrative law 
enforcement than in (harm-based) criminal law enforcement.
More importantly, the credibility problem can be reduced if an indepen-
dent court uses a duty to enforce (following a request of the victims). For 
example, in the Netherlands, in cases of environmental law, if a municipality 
decides not to take action against a violation, (potential) victims can ask the 
court to convict the enforcement authority and force it to take action. Such a 
duty to enforce the law in fact reduces the discretion that enforcement agen-
cies have in deciding whether or not to enforce. As a consequence, potential 
violators know that they cannot get away with violations of the rules, but 
that the enforcement authority will be forced to take action against violations 
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(even if it does not want to do so), and potential violators will therefore com-
ply with the law. A duty to enforce may thus be beneficial when the enforce-
ment authority would use her discretion to be lax on violations as a conse-
quence of the credibility problem. Again, such a duty to enforce also has an 
important disadvantage. Since the law is necessarily incomplete and not all 
violations are inefficient, a duty to enforce all offenses will also imply that 
inefficient compliance is enforced. A rigorous duty to enforce will force the 
enforcement authority to take action regardless of the social costs and ben-
efits of enforcement.
Therefore, the optimal level of the court’s (marginal or full) evaluation 
of the decisions of enforcement authorities and hence the optimal level of 
discretion granted to the enforcement authority balances the problem of 
time-inconsistency with the flexibility required to evaluate the desirabil-
ity of enforcement. Note that it is important in this case for the court to be 
independent from politics (as in the case of the central bank in Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977), so that it is not subjected to the same credibility problem as the 
enforcement authority.140 Bishop (1990) explains that this type of independen-
cy can arise because the judiciary faces different incentives than enforcement 
authorities. “The constraints that hedge a judge tend, by accident or design, 
to the same end: confining anyone appointed to the bench to one, and only 
one, role – to life as a judge. (…) to remove the possibility of using the office 
for any purpose other than acquiring judicial fame – that is, the approbation 
of judges and others whose esteem is valued” (p. 492).
Courts may also be helpful in controlling enforcement authorities’ deci-
sions because enforcement authorities abuse their discretion to seek their 
own objectives. If enforcement officials are reluctant to enforce, a duty to 
enforce the rules may improve social welfare. Moreover, this may improve 
rule-making since society is confronted with the obligation to really enforce 
the rules it imposes. If, however, enforcement officials are too much inclined 
to enforce the rules, a duty to enforce will be ineffective in controlling enforce-
ment officials.
The next subsection elaborates further on the relationship between courts 
and regulators. First, the arguments of this subsection are further analyzed by 
considering whether social welfare is always best served by an independent 
enforcement authority or whether it might be optimal to have non-welfare-
maximizing enforcement officials, even if their discretion is not controlled for. 
Secondly, what, if any, is the optimal level of control of law enforcers’ actions 
by courts?141
140 Feld and Voigt (2003) have shown that the arguments of Kydland and Prescott (1977) can 
analogously be applied to the enforcement of private property rights. Ex-post, there is a 
danger that the government will expropriate these rights. Only if the citizens have suf-
ficient confidence in an independent court will the promise not to expropriate their prop-
erty rights be credible.
141 Bishop (1990) provides the most extensive theory on the role of courts in regulation.
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9.3.2 The relationship between courts and regulators
In section 9.2, several objectives and incentives of law enforcers have been 
identified. One step further would be to examine which type of enforcement 
authority and which incentives and goals lead to the socially best results. 
Who should enforce a legal rule? In reality, we can observe different types of 
enforcement authorities. For common crime, enforcement is in the hands of 
a general public prosecutor and court who are instructed to balance the costs 
and benefits of taking action. For regulatory crime by firms, there are several 
national specialized agencies which enforce certain kinds of regulation, such 
as competition regulation or environmental regulation. At the local level, 
administrative enforcement is in the hands of administrative bodies such as 
the Board of Mayor and Aldermen.
These different authorities may differ in their objectives. Several argu-
ments have already been offered to justify enforcement authorities having 
aims that diverge from social welfare maximization. If the credibility problem 
is severe, it may be optimal to create an enforcement authority which tries to 
minimize offenses or the harm from offenses. Enforcement can best be del-
egated to a specialized regulatory body with the specific task of detecting, 
prosecuting and convicting offenses, rather than to a general public prosecu-
tor and court who are instructed to balance the costs and benefits of taking 
action. Such an agency can also be efficient when the maximum feasible com-
pliance rate is a partial compliance rate. In such cases, targeting enforcement 
resources and trying to maximize compliance will lead to the best results.
In principle, society would wish to have a social welfare maximizing 
enforcement authority, for example a very professional and motivated judi-
ciary which will have both a sufficient incentive to investigate a case and a 
strong interest in doing justice (Glaeser et al., 2001). However, such a perfect 
welfare maximizing authority may simply not exist. 
Courts versus regulators
It may be impossible to have very professional and motivated law enforcers, 
because law enforcers also have their own objectives. Doing justice is person-
ally expensive because it requires investigation into the facts, circumstances 
and laws of the case. Judges must be able, and more importantly willing, to 
read complicated contracts, to verify the events and clauses and interpret 
broad and ambiguous language. Society only has limited control over the 
incentives of law enforcers (Glaeser et al., 2001; see also Bishop, 1990). “Doing 
justice” is largely unverifiable. Many rewards for carrying out justice are 
intangible (such as self-esteem, or respect from one’s peers). The government 
can only improve this reward in the long run. In reality, in many countries, 
the courts are underfinanced, unmotivated, unsure as to how the law applies, 
unfamiliar with economic or technical issues, or even corrupt. Such courts 
cannot be expected to engage sufficiently in costly verification of the facts 
and the laws. On the other hand, the government has the ability to politicize 
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the enforcement of particular legal rules by rewarding the enforcers for cer-
tain outcomes such as finding violations (through future career concerns or 
budgets).
Generally, the government must choose between two alternatives for 
delegating the enforcement of a rule: judges and regulators (the specialized 
agencies described above). There are two important differences between them 
(Glaeser et al., 2001). First, regulators can be more easily provided with an 
incentive to punish violations of particular statutes. Judges, in contrast, are by 
design more independent and therefore harder to motivate. Regulators may 
be better motivated to invest in understanding the laws and circumstances of 
a case, but are also more likely – if over-motivated – to reach politically desir-
able decisions at the expense of doing justice.142 A second distinction between 
courts and regulators is that regulators may have lower costs of investigation 
because they are more specialized.
Therefore, the best enforcement strategy – particularly when investiga-
tions are personally expensive – may be to have a regulator. Providing the 
regulator with a sufficiently strong incentive to punish violators may induce 
them to search for evidence and convict on the basis of this evidence, while 
courts may decide not to search for evidence and acquit regardless of viola-
tions. However, there is also a danger of abuse of power by regulators. If they 
are over-motivated, they might choose not to search for evidence and to pun-
ish regardless of violations.
Note that these results are consistent with the observed enforcement prac-
tices. Regulatory inspectorates which are responsible for the regulation and 
enforcement of a certain rule are mostly found in administrative law enforce-
ment for firms. This is due to the fact that doing justice is more important in 
criminal law enforcement and therefore requires more independent judges. 
In addition, in regulation of firms, specialization is more important.
Courts and regulators
The analysis in Glaeser et al. (2001) focuses on whether enforcement should be 
in the hands of courts or regulators. Generally, enforcement is shared by regu-
lators and courts together. Even if a regulatory agency is qualified to impose 
penalties, a firm can always appeal against this decision in a court. This is 
important because this control by courts deters enforcement authorities from 
abusing their discretion to seek their own objectives. Moreover, appeal proce-
dures may help to correct enforcement errors as well as credibility problems.
There are three different legal procedures with respect to the relationship 
between regulators and courts (Jost, 1997b) when the regulatory agency is 
in charge of the detection of offenses. (1) Conviction takes place through a 
court trial. The regulatory agency is instructed to detect offenses and, if there 
is sufficient evidence, to prosecute the case in a court trial. (2) The regulatory 
142 Note that regulatory bodies may also be ‘captured’ by the regulated industry so that they 
will not, in contrast to courts, be willing to either enforce or to search for information.
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agency may have the power to penalize a violating firm. A firm which has 
been penalized by the agency has the right to lodge an appeal. The question 
whether the firm complied will be reconsidered. There are two different pro-
cedures at this point. (2a) The case is decided by the court, and the regula-
tory agency is required to provide sufficient evidence for its decision. (2b) 
The agency reconsiders its decision and decides whether to press charges in 
court.
Suppose the regulator can choose between two levels of investigation. 
A full investigation will certainly reveal (non)compliance. Alternatively, the 
regulator can choose a lower-scale type of investigation, called preliminary 
investigation, which will provide insufficient, sufficient or strong evidence 
for an offense. Under system (1), the regulatory agency will choose for a full 
investigation of firms. Otherwise, it will not be able to prosecute the case in a 
court trial. Given a full investigation, the detection of an offense will lead to 
prosecution and conviction. In system (2), the agency can save on enforcement 
costs by choosing only preliminary investigations, because the procedural and 
evidential requirements for penalties are lower for regulators than for courts. 
The regulator can punish a firm if there is sufficient or strong evidence of an 
offense. In (2a), the regulator is required to fully investigate the case if the firm 
appeals against its decision to penalize. A firm will lodge an appeal if it did in 
fact comply with the law, since further investigation will perfectly reveal its 
legal behavior. If the firm was non-compliant, it will not appeal because that 
would prove its offense. Therefore, for guilty firms, the regulator only has to 
carry out the relatively cheap preliminary investigations. On the other hand, 
for innocent firms, the regulator must perform additional investigations and 
prepare a court trial.143 If the costs of additional investigations are low and 
the accuracy of preliminary investigations sufficiently high, the regulatory 
agency will sanction an individual if its preliminary investigations provide 
sufficient or strong evidence of non-compliance. The savings in enforcement 
costs can be used to achieve a higher compliance rate. This may be especially 
helpful if the compliance rate is low due to institutional conditions (such as 
limited budgets or low maximal sanctions), because the number of appeals 
will be lower if the compliance rate is lower.144 In (2b), the situation may be 
somewhat different. If a preliminary investigation provides strong evidence, 
the regulator never drops the case, but carries out a full investigation once a 
firm has lodged an appeal. If a preliminary investigation provides sufficient 
evidence, the regulator will drop the case if the costs of additional investiga-
tion are high and the reliability of the investigation low. The system in (2b) 
saves costs as compared to (2a) and it is therefore always preferred over (2a). 
From an economic point of view, it is preferred that the regulatory agency is 
allowed to make cost considerations during the proceedings.
143 Note that it is assumed that the regulator can commit to its policy.
144 The regulator’s policy under (2a) is more extensively discussed in Jost (1997a). See also 
Reinganum (1988) and related literature.
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Courts plus regulators
The co-existence and relationship of regulators and courts can be character-
ized in two ways (Garoupa, 2004). Firstly, the enforcement of regulators and 
court may be interdependent: firms may want to dispute regulatory outcomes 
and consequently appeal to the courts. This is efficient for two reasons. First, 
it corrects for errors ex-post and a reduction in enforcement errors enhances 
efficiency. Secondly, it can produce an adequate incentive for regulators to 
perform efficiently ex-ante, for instance in order to mitigate credibility prob-
lems or abuses of power.
A second justification, not discussed so far, for the existence of courts in 
addition to regulators is that courts and regulators may exist as independent 
enforcement authorities at the same time. Both have their own procedures 
and may impose penalties. The imposition of a criminal sanction on top of 
a regulatory penalty (and violation of ne bis in idem) may be efficient if (a) a 
regulatory penalty is relatively cheap to impose, and (b) there are high agency 
costs due to delegating law enforcement, many legal errors are made by regu-
lators or there is collusion between the regulator and the regulated industry, 
i.e. if regulatory enforcement is weak but sufficiently cheap to still have both 
courts and regulators (Garoupa and Gomez, 2004).
9.4 Conclusion
The previous chapters discuss several reasons why Becker’s (1968) recom-
mendation to impose maximal sanctions may not be efficient. This chapter 
covers an additional reason, namely that maximal sanctions can lack credibil-
ity because the enforcement authority is unable to commit itself to imposing 
severe sanctions on violations that are regarded as minor offenses. Moreover, 
this chapter offers an explanation for why maximal sanctions, even if they are 
efficient, are not observed in practice: Law enforcers may have no incentive to 
minimize budgets and/or impose maximal sanctions because their objectives 
are better served with other enforcement policies.
Since law enforcers are also human beings, they do not necessarily seek 
efficient enforcement, but may have different, even counterproductive, objec-
tives. This may, of course, harm social welfare. However, this chapter argues 
that one-sided objectives of law enforcers may be beneficial for two reasons. 
First, a social welfare-maximizing law enforcer may be unable to commit 
itself to an efficient enforcement policy, leading to the toleration of ex-ante 
inefficient, but ex-post efficient violations. Therefore, social welfare may be 
improved if law enforcers are instructed to enforce violations regardless of 
individual circumstances. Secondly, social welfare may be better served by a 
biased, political regulator than an independent judge, because the first is more 
inclined to invest in acquiring the necessary information in a given case.
10 The optimal structure of law enforcement
This chapter concludes on the theoretical analysis of the optimal enforcement 
method. The previous chapters analyze whether and how private or public 
law enforcement can induce optimal precautions. This chapter compares the 
alternative enforcement methods of private, criminal and administrative law 
enforcement. Section 10.1 starts with addressing several distinctions that can 
be made between these methods, namely the stage of intervention, the type 
of public law enforcement and the initiating party. In section 10.2 I examine 
the joint, simultaneous, use of private and public law enforcement. When 
and why is this joint use efficient? Should this use then be independent or 
interdependent? In section 10.3 I summarize the arguments for the choice 
between a compliance and a deterrence strategy. Section 10.4 summarizes the 
theoretical part by providing the conditions under which private, criminal 
and administrative law enforcement are effective and efficient in inducing 
precautions. This summary makes clear that for the problem of enforcing fire 
safety in horeca establishments a mix of enforcement methods is likely to be 
efficient. However, how the costs and benefits should be balanced and exactly 
which mix is optimal, requires an empirical analysis.
10.1 Analyzing and comparing enforcement methods
There are three basic ways in which an appropriate sanctioning risk can be 
realized: through private, through criminal, or through administrative law 
enforcement. A comparison of these alternatives implies comparing several 
distinct characteristics. Firstly, they differ in the stage of intervention. Sec-
ondly, there is a difference between the two types of public law enforcement: 
criminal or administrative. Thirdly, there is a difference between private and 
public law enforcement. These are discussed below.
10.1.1 Stage of intervention: prevention, act-based or harm-based sanctions?
 The different stages of enforcement
Shavell (1993) discusses the fact that there are three basic stages of enforcement.
Firstly, intervention may take place before an act is committed by means 
of prevention of the act. This prevention rests on physical force or something 
close to it. A truck with dangerous substances may be prevented from driving 
through a tunnel at the toll-gate. A speed ramp may prevent automobilists 
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from speeding. A fence may prohibit entering a forbidden territory. Denial or 
withdrawal of a license, or imprisonment may prevent firms or individuals 
from undertaking an activity and causing danger.
Enforcement relies on act-based sanctions if it takes place after an act has 
been committed (or refrained from), but before harm results, or independent-
ly of whether it does so. For example, a restaurant that is fined because it fails 
to maintain its emergency lighting and marks in working order (indepen-
dently of whether there is a fire). Or an automobilist who is fined for speeding 
irrespective of whether he causes an accident. Enforcement actions are not 
aimed at preventing the restaurant from operating nor the automobilist from 
driving, but at guaranteeing that precautions are taken to prevent harm.
Enforcement takes place through harm-based sanctions if intervention 
takes place after harm has occurred. Examples are when a victim sues a res-
taurant owner for the damages that result from a fire in his establishment, or 
the automobilist for a car accident. Another example is when public enforce-
ment is started after a murder is reported. Harm-based sanctions may deter 
undesirable behavior but do not prevent it.
Note that private law enforcement using liability rules is harm-based 
enforcement. Administrative law enforcement is often carried out by means 
of act-based enforcement (safety regulation) or prevention (withdrawal of 
license), although harm-based sanctions are also used sometimes (especially 
in environmental law for remediation of harm). Criminal law enforcement is 
used in all three stages, but is applied in the latest stage possible because of 
the severe consequences of criminal conviction.
Factors that determine the optimal stage of intervention145
The optimal stage of enforcement is determined by several factors:
1. Enforcement costs. In general, harm-based enforcement is relatively cheap 
compared to act-based enforcement, because enforcement costs are only 
realized after harm has been done. The costs of prevention vary. If preven-
tion requires a once-only expenditure on a technical solution (such as a 
speed ramp or a fence), it can be relatively cheap. If, however, prevention 
requires the continued attention of enforcement agents (as in watching 
for any establishment without licence or in operating a toll-gate), the costs 
can be quite high. More generally, it can be argued that daily activities, 
ordinary and modifi able behavior can best be enforced in a later stage of 
enforcement, because these do not necessarily result in harm and require 
large enforcement costs. On the other hand, fi xed physical objects such as 
safety devices can be enforced in an earlier stage because their presence 
145 Shavell (1993). See also Shavell (1984a, 1984b).
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or absence can be observed relatively easily and, as a consequence, evi-
dence of violation is easily provided.146
2. The magnitude of the sanctions, in particular the ability to pay monetary sanc-
tions. If the magnitude of the sanctions is too low to deter violators (effi -
ciently) – for example because the level of wealth is limited – prevention 
must be used to control harmful activities. If the available magnitude of the 
sanctions is high, harm-based sanctions can be used. This argument is es-
pecially relevant for accidental harm, where harm-based sanctions are only 
carried out with the probability that an accident occurs, while the costs of 
precaution have to be paid in advance. To compensate for this probabilistic 
sanctioning, the magnitude of the harm-based sanction should be higher 
than in the case of an act-based sanction.
 In previous chapters I argue that, given the maximal magnitude of a pos-
sible sanction, the probability of detection should be raised high enough 
to deter. However, this is costly and it may be more efficient to switch to 
an earlier stage of enforcement to implement the efficient level of pre-
cautions. This is more likely to happen when the probability of detection 
or conviction is inherently small, for example when harm is widely dis-
persed and/or collective in nature, when there is no clear causal relation-
ship between harm and injurer, or when injurers can invest in the non-
detection of the harm.
3. The quantity and quality of the information of the government or courts 
about the costs and benefi ts of acts, in particular their harm, and hence the 
(un)desirability of offenses. The better the information, the better the al-
location of enforcement costs. In general, this information becomes avail-
able (without effort) only after the occurrence of harm, which creates a 
tendency towards a later stage of enforcement. If a government or court is 
able to observe the harm done, there will be a preference for harm-based 
sanctions, because the government or court is able to impose an appropri-
ate sanction likely to deter effi ciently. Since the information about harm 
is limited ex-ante, act-based sanctions, and even more so preventive ones 
are more likely to be infl exible.
146 However, Innes (2004) shows that this argument only applies to situations in which the 
harm from accidents is freely observable, i.e. if no resources are needed for detecting and 
apprehending injurers, but only for prosecuting them (enforcement is characterized more 
by investigation than by monitoring, section 3.2). This might be the case with fire accidents, 
but not for food, drug and product safety nor for some types of environmental damage. In 
these cases, ex-ante regulation provides an inherent cost advantage to ex-post liability. The 
advantage of regulation is that it provides a stronger incentive to take precautions because 
it always sanctions negligent behavior rather than only sanctioning such conduct when an 
accident occurs (provided the same sanction is imposed). As a result, a lower probability 
of monitoring applies and enforcement costs can be reduced. Therefore, an ex-ante policy 
will be superior if the costs of an ex-ante inspection are not much higher than the costs of an 
ex-post inspection, and if the probability of an accident is relatively low.
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4. The quantity and quality of the information of injurers about the acts. If injur-
ers are well-informed about the expected harm and costs of precautions, 
they can be deterred effi ciently through harm-based sanctions. If, how-
ever, injurers do not recognize how much harm they might cause, they 
will not be adequately deterred by harm-based sanctions, but might better 
be deterred by act-based ones. Act-based sanctions might force the injurer 
to take the effi cient level of precautions, provided that two assumptions 
are met. First, the government (or court) must have superior information 
about the acts and be able to determine more effi cient standards than the 
injurers themselves. This is the case, for instance, when information takes 
effort or special expertise to develop and/or the benefi ts of information 
development are non-exclusive. Secondly, the government must be un-
able to provide injurers with this information in any other way. If injurers 
learn of the expected harm (and compliance costs), harm-based sanctions 
can be used. However, people are limited in terms of the amount of time 
and effort they can invest in learning and are sometimes unable to handle 
technical or statistical information. Moreover, the government may have 
diffi culty communicating the information because the (potential) injurers 
are hard to identify or too numerous.
 If injurers do not even recognize that certain levels of precaution will result 
in sanctions (because there is a large, and unavoidable, uncertainty about 
the standard or because they are unable to learn about efficient compliance 
techniques), prevention might be the optimal enforcement method. 
10.1.2 The optimal method of public law enforcement: criminal or administrative
 This subsection analyzes whether public law enforcement should be carried 
out through criminal or administrative law enforcement. This comparison 
is different from the one discussed above because the distinction between 
criminal and administrative enforcement does not depend on the question 
whether enforcement should be harm-based or act-based. It is also not related 
to the question whether detection should take place through monitoring or 
investigation. Moreover, although administrative law enforcement predomi-
nantly makes use of compliance strategies, the enforcement style is not neces-
sarily related to administrative or criminal enforcement.
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Criminal or administrative sanctions?
What factors determine the choice between criminal and administrative sanc-
tions, hence criminal and administrative law enforcement?147 The main char-
acteristic of criminal law enforcement is that it allows imposing imprison-
ment. In addition, criminal sanctions lead to stigma on the individual or firm. 
Therefore, criminal sanctions are considered more severe than administrative 
sanctions. This implies that procedural requirements are higher for criminal 
sanctions.148 Therefore, the explanation of the choice between criminal and 
administrative sanctions, should explain when higher sanctions are needed 
or beneficial, or when lower procedural requirements are needed or benefi-
cial .
1. If imprisonment is required to impose a suffi ciently high sanction, criminal 
law enforcement is required (Shavell, 1993). The need for imprisonment 
is more likely to arise if the level of wealth is relatively low, the costs of 
compliance are relatively high, the probability of sanctions is relatively 
small, the expected harm from an offense is relatively high, or the infor-
mal sanctions are relatively weak.
2. Administrative enforcement includes the possibility of prevention of the 
activity by withdrawing a license or closing a plant. Prevention can be 
benefi cial if the offense cannot be deterred. In addition, administrative 
sanctions are aimed at remediation. Note, however, that where imprison-
ment implies incapacitation, this also produces a preventive effect.
3. The stigma that criminal law enforcement imposes is helpful in creating 
deterrence, especially when an offense is morally undesirable, rather than 
the by-product  of an otherwise benefi cial activity.
4. Administrative law enforcement (often) implies law-making powers for the 
enforcement authority. A criminal sanction can only be imposed if the 
activity is explicitly forbidden by law (principle of legality). In cases where 
considerable discretion is required, especially due to underinclusion, ad-
ministrative law enforcement is more favorable. For undesirable activi-
ties, which are always morally reprehensible, criminal law enforcement 
147 It is striking that there is (as far as I know) no literature on this point, except for Shavell 
(1993). The literature building on Shavell (1993) in essence provides arguments in favor of 
criminal law enforcement (i.e. when is imprisonment needed?) and no positive arguments 
in favor of administrative law enforcement. Moreover, the given explanations often refer 
to the distinction between harm-based and act-based enforcement and/or the enforcement 
style (cooperative versus deterrence). Although this has some intuitive appealing, it is 
incorrect since administrative law enforcement can also be harm-based (as when damages 
have to be remedied), while criminal law enforcement is often act-based (as in the case of a 
prohibition on gun possession).
148 See for example Ogus and Abbot (2002).
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can be used because law enforcers do not have to determine whether an 
offense is (un)desirable.149 Because of the considerable discretion, admin-
istrative law enforcement sanctions are relatively small to limit the poten-
tial abuse of this discretion.
5. Due to the severe sanctions that can be imposed by criminal law enforce-
ment, individuals or fi rms should be able to know which actions will be pun-
ished. Therefore, criminal law enforcement applies to activities of which 
everyone knows or ought to know that they are forbidden. On the other 
hand, administrative law enforcement is most suitable in case of technically 
complex regulations, especially when the law enforcement authority also 
has the task of informing parties about regulation and compliance.
6. Since under administrative enforcement, the infringements on private rights 
are limited and stigma is absent, the authority is allowed to inspect fi rms 
even if there is no presumption of violation. Therefore, administrative 
law enforcement is more likely to be optimal if there is little information 
concerning an offense. Criminal law enforcement is especially suitable 
in cases where an offense, or a potential offense, is known (for example 
because of reports by victims), while the offender is unknown and must 
be traced using public resources. For example, it is known that a murder 
has been committed or that oil has been spilled into a lake. Due to these 
resources for apprehension, it is benefi cial to save enforcement costs by 
imposing severe sanctions and minimizing apprehension. On the other 
hand, administrative law enforcement is especially suitable in cases 
where the potential offenders are known, but it is not known whether an 
offense has been committed. For example, it is known that the restaurants 
in a municipality may create fi re accidents, but not which particular res-
taurants use inappropriate decorations; or it is known which fi rms may 
spill oil but not whether oil has been spilled.
7. For similar reasons, administrative law enforcement is most suitable for 
cases where there is no clearly responsible individual or fi rm. Especially 
with respect to safety regulation, and for larger fi rms, it may be diffi cult 
to identify the role of individual employees, while it may also be impos-
sible to argue that the fi rm as a whole is guilty of violation, especially 
if fi rms cannot easily monitor the behavior of their employees. In such 
cases, administrative law enforcement is most appropriate. In the most 
extreme case, if fi rms cannot monitor their employees’ behavior, the fi nes 
imposed on fi rms will create no deterrent effect, while enforcement costs 
will be made. Social welfare might be improved if (lower) administrative 
sanctions such as warnings are used. Offenses for which individuals can 
be made responsible (such as fraud and similar offenses) are enforced 
criminally.
149 Except for clear cases of self-defense or circumstances beyond one’s control for which the 
burden of proof lies with the injurer.
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10.1.3 Private or public enforcement?
Whether enforcement should be initiated by private parties or public agents 
depends on the method which most efficiently results in identification, appre-
hension and conviction of the injurer.150
If (potential) victims naturally possess information about the identity of 
injurers, it is socially desirable that enforcement be private, because it would 
be a waste of resources if public resources were spent on uncovering offenses. 
On the other hand, if effort must be expended to identify or apprehend injur-
ers, enforcement by public agents may be required. Apprehension requires 
coordination because several individuals (victims) benefit, and, in some 
cases, this requires an investment in information systems. The incentive for 
victims to take action is high if they are provided with a monetary reward 
for taking action, as under liability where they receive compensation for the 
damage suffered. However, if the harm is widely dispersed or even collective 
in nature, if it takes a long time before the harm manifests itself, or if the vic-
tims are unable to prove a causal relationship between harm and injurer, the 
incentive to take action might be insufficient.
Furthermore the choice between private and public enforcement depends 
on the available information. Optimal sanctions generally require the ability 
to observe the expected or actual harm and precautions. There is no general 
argument for deciding whether the efficient level of precautions can be more 
easily determined in private proceedings (by courts) or in public proceed-
ings (inspectors, regulators, administrative bodies, courts). Moreover, pub-
lic enforcement might be required to inform injurers about the relationship 
between taking precautions and the expected harm.
Finally, public criminal law enforcement can be beneficial if a high sanc-
tion is required to create a deterrent effect, because it allows imprisonment. 
This is especially helpful if the wealth of the injurer is limited making him 
unable to pay large damages. Note, however, that criminal sanctions raise the 
burden of proof, so that the probability of conviction is lowered.
Two related questions must be raised at this point:
A. As discussed in section 2.3.2, insurance companies may be required to 
monitor the behavior of injurers to control for moral hazard. If injurers are 
insured, an additional relevant question is whether the injurer’s behavior 
should be monitored and controlled by insurance companies or by gov-
ernment agencies. No general statement can be made on this point. Insur-
ance companies might use the threat of not paying out. Sometimes, they 
might be more experienced due to economies of scale. On the other hand, 
the government can use imprisonment as a threat, as well as the preven-
150 Shavell (1984a; 1984b; 1993; 2004). Some of the arguments are similar for the use of harm-
based and act-based sanctions because private enforcement is by definition harm-based, 
while public enforcement is not. I try to provide arguments that especially draw on the 
distinction private – public (given harm-based or act-based sanctions).
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tion of the activity. It may also have more opportunities to interfere with 
private behavior, although this governmental interference is restricted by 
legal constraints (more than that of private organizations).
B. The analysis above restricts private enforcement to harm-based enforcement 
by liability rules. However, if it is optimal to have some act-based enforce-
ment, such enforcement can also be provided by private parties. The gov-
ernment might impose the obligation to have an horeca establishment or 
an automobile inspected by some certifi ed private company. Alternatively, 
it might at least use certifi cation in granting and inspecting licenses. For 
example, horeca proprietors have to provide private certifi cates about the 
inspection of fi re extinguishers. The relevant question is whether private or-
ganizations can monitor behavior more effi ciently than public institutions. 
Due to competition, private organizations may be cheaper in providing the 
same level of monitoring, while public institutions may suffer from enforce-
ment offi cials who are not maximizing social welfare (section 9.2). Moreover, 
economies of scale might be involved if a private organization can offer to 
immediately repair shortcomings. In addition, since the injurer must pay for 
the services of private organizations, he will be confronted with the full costs 
of his activities.
10.2 Private and public enforcement
None of the enforcement methods always dominates the others in effective-
ness and efficiency. The question is therefore whether different enforcement 
methods can be used together, so that the advantages of each system can be 
combined and their weaknesses compensated.
10.2.1 Criminal law enforcement as a supplement
Criminal law enforcement allows for high sanctions, possibly imprisonment. 
This allows for the incarceration of people who refuse to pay (civil or public) 
monetary sanctions, or who appear to be notorious and incorrigible offend-
ers. Criminal law enforcement can be used as an ultimate sanction (ultimum 
remedium) to enforce private or administrative sanctions. The threat of crim-
inal sanctions is then the big stick which guarantees that compensation or 
fines are really paid.
Private law enforcement and criminal law enforcement can be used 
together in cases involving both monetary and non-monetary loss. Liability 
is used for monetary loss. Imprisonment is used to deter the non-monetary 
part of damages to prevent over-compensation.
A different combination involves regulation and administrative law 
enforcement being used as act-based enforcement against a firm. It is pos-
sible that individual employees might not be sufficiently induced to take the 
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efficient level of precautions, because they do not (fully) take into account the 
sanctions imposed on the firm (section 2.3.6). The threat of personal prosecu-
tion and possibly imprisonment can deter at least the most serious offenses in 
which an individually assignable employee was clearly and/or deliberately 
negligent in complying with the regulations. Similarly, compensation claims 
in private litigation may improve employees’ behavior.
10.2.2 The simultaneous use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability
 The use of regulation as act-based enforcement is widespread. Howev-
er, often, the use of regulation does not imply that there is no harm-based 
enforcement or that victims of accidents are unable to sue the injurer for dam-
ages. The combined use of regulation and (negligence) liability is explored in 
the literature.
The use of liability alone may fail to deter because injurers are judgment-
proof or difficult to identify as the authors of harm (Shavell, 1984b and 2004). 
Regulation might be useful in forcing these injurers to take at least some pre-
cautions that are subjected to regulation. On the other hand, regulation alone 
may be inadequate because the government does not possess the perfect 
information concerning an injurer’s behavior which would allow it to deter-
mine individually efficient standards. The use of liability may induce some of 
the injurers to take more precautions than the regulations prescribe.
There are two relevant points to consider. First, should there be a com-
pliance defense, which states that compliance with the regulatory standard 
relieves the injurer from liability? Secondly, should there be a per se rule, 
which states that non-compliance with the regulatory standard automatically 
results in negligence? In fact, victims can actually become the enforcers of the 
public regulation by claiming damages when the proprietor does not comply 
with the regulation. Under the compliance defense, the regulatory standard 
is at least as high as the court standard. Under the per se rule, the court stan-
dard is higher than the regulatory standard. This leads to four different cases 
to be considered (Rose-Ackerman, 1991; Shavell, 1984a; Burrows, 1999).151
Independent use of liability and regulation: no relationship between standards
First, consider the case in which liability and regulation are used together but 
in an independent way, so that there is no relationship between the regula-
tory and the court standard. This implies, in fact, that neither the compliance 
151 In fact, Rose-Ackerman (1991) distinguishes three different complementarities between 
liability and regulation. Shavell (1984a) only discusses the answers to the two defenses 
independently. Burrows (1991) analyzes whether the standards in liability and regulation 
should be dependent or independent. Taken together, we can identify four cases, which 
correspond to the two questions with two possible answers for each. An overview of the 
discussion can be found in Faure (2007). See also Ogus (2007).
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defense nor the per se rule applies. The injurer can be punished twice, first by 
sanctions from the government and then by paying damages to victims. If the 
standards are adequately enforced, this implies that the injurer will choose 
the tightest standard (Burrows, 1999). If both standards are lower than the 
efficient standard or enforced below the efficient level, then the simultane-
ous use of both will be welfare-improving.152 A compliance defense and/or 
per se rule will not be efficient, but only eliminate this benefit. On the other 
hand, if both standards are higher than the efficient level, the simultaneous 
use of liability and regulation can increase the danger of excessive precau-
tions, because the injurer faces two penalties.
A related issue concerns the joint use of regulation and strict liability.153 If 
the regulatory standard is set at the efficient level, and the damages are set as 
equal to the harm done, regulation and liability need not conflict.154 If the firm 
complies with the regulatory standard, it will not have to pay a fine. The pos-
sibility of a liability payment provides an additional incentive for choosing 
the efficient level of precautions. The benefits of strict liability are that victims 
might be compensated for their damage and that the injurer has an incentive 
to choose efficient activities (if the regulatory standard only applies to taking 
care). Innes (2004) shows that the joint use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post 
strict liability (civil or criminal) can be beneficial if some accidents are freely 
detected and some are not. If the expected liability is sufficiently low (because 
there is a judgment proof problem ) supplemental ex-ante government obser-
vations and the enforcement of precautions can reduce underdeterrence.155
The use of both compliance defense and per se rule: equal regulatory and court standards
Consider the situation in which both the compliance defense and the per se 
rule apply, i.e. compliance with the regulatory standard implies non-negli-
gence and non-compliance with the regulatory standard implies negligence. 
In fact, the court will follow the regulatory standard in determining negli-
gence (Burrows, 1999). Such a joint use of liability and regulation is benefi-
cial if liability functions as a stopgap which applies in the absence of more 
stringent regulation (Rose-Ackerman, 1991). Since legislation is necessarily 
a slow process, regulation will fail to establish a regulatory program in all 
152 In the absence of enforcement costs. In the analysis in this section, I do not discuss the 
impact on enforcement costs. Of course, using more enforcement methods together will 
increase enforcement costs. The right question is whether the increase in enforcement 
efforts from a simultaneous use of enforcement methods balances the increase in deter-
rence that is gained, compared to the use of one method alone. The text only investigates 
whether simultaneous use can increase deterrence, which is also the focus in the literature 
(with Innes, 2004, as a notable exception).
153 Under strict liability, there is no court standard of due care, so that neither a compliance 
defense nor a per se rule apply.
154 Rose-Ackerman (1991).
155 Whether ex-post or ex-ante supplemental government activity is optimal depends on the 
factors identified in Innes (2004) and described in section 10.1.1.
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areas in which regulation is superior. Liability is then required as a stopgap 
for cases for which regulation fails to provide. Courts will take the regulatory 
standard as the level of due care. Liability is only required as a supplement in 
cases where regulation is missing, so that courts have to determine due care 
themselves. Priority is given to the regulatory standard.
Similarly, Shavell (2004) argues that regulation may fail to deter because 
the government is unable to capture in regulations – no matter how detailed 
– actual daily behavior, such as, for instance, keeping beer-crates away from 
emergency exits or limiting the number of people inside a building. Liability 
will be used to enforce precautions that concern modifiable behavior, while 
regulation concerns easily observable safety devices such as sprinkler sys-
tems and fire extinguishers.
Finally, the joint use of regulation and liability can be beneficial if regula-
tion is used as an advisory function through which the injurer is informed 
about the expected harm (and hence sanctions) and/or the least costly meth-
od of compliance. Regulation alone might be unattractive because of the high 
costs of frequent inspections. If a periodic regulation is used to provide the 
injurer with information, it is possible to further rely on liability to induce 
precautions. This might minimize the costs of inspections. In such cases, it 
seems logic that the court follows the regulatory standard.
Interdependent use: the court standard exceeds the regulatory standard
Consider the situation in which the combined use of liability and regulation is 
interdependent because non-compliance with the regulatory standard implies 
negligence (per se rule). Assume, however, that compliance with the regula-
tory standard is not sufficient to escape liability (no compliance defense). In 
fact, regulatory standards are intended as minima that can be supplemented by 
more stringent court standards. There are several arguments against a compli-
ance defense, i.e. reasons why the regulatory standard should be lower than 
the court standard. If the court standard equals efficient precautions, regula-
tion can only be beneficial if some conditions for an effective use of liability are 
not met. If liability is failing, regulation may be beneficial.
1. Liability alone may fail to deter because it is possible for injurers to escape 
litigation (and there are no punitive damages; Schmitz, 2000). Regulatory 
requirements are generally based on imperfect information and do not 
perfectly describe standards for individual fi rms (Shavell, 1984a, 1984b, 
2004).156 The government may be unable to describe all behavior in (de-
tailed) regulations, while courts (ex-post) may be able to evaluate this 
156 Note, however, the remark in Hiriart et al. (2004) that ex-ante transfers may induce firms 
to provide information to the government. The joint use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post 
liability ensures that the firm has an incentive to reveal its information because a firm that 
provides incorrect information runs the risk of being caught ex-post if a lawsuit is started 
and the true harm and compliance costs are revealed.
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behavior.157 Hence, regulation alone may underdeter, and the use of li-
ability may induce some of the injurers to take more precautions than the 
regulations prescribe, which is socially benefi cial. If regulatory standards 
equal the minimal level of precautions that every injurer ought to take, a 
compliance defense will be unfavorable, because (some) injurers ought to 
do more than the regulatory standard. If, however, due to limited infor-
mation, regulation is too excessive, this would provide an argument in 
favor of a compliance defense and against the per se rule.
2. If there is uncertainty about the level of due care that is handled by the 
court, negligence may lead to underdeterrence (section 2.3.5). If this un-
certainty is high, a higher level of precautions results in a slightly reduced 
likelihood of being held liable, thereby paying for the victim’s losses (Kol-
stad et al., 1990). If the marginal costs of precaution around the legal stan-
dard are high, undercompliance will substantially lower the injurer’s costs 
of precautions but only slightly reduce his expected liability costs. Kolstad 
et al. (1990) argue that using regulation (which has no uncertainty) as a 
supplement to liability will limit the problem of underdeterrence. Under 
the per se rule, the regulatory standard will inform the injurer that the 
court standard cannot be lower. Therefore, no injurer will choose a level of 
precautions that is lower than the regulatory standard. As a result, if it is 
effi cient to use regulation as a supplement, the regulatory standard will be 
lower than the regulatory standard used alone, and lower than the effi cient 
precautions level, i.e. the average court standard.
 These conclusions, however, depend crucially on the assumption that 
there is Bayesian up-dating about the legal standard, where only the be-
lief that the court standard falls below the regulatory standard is affected. 
Other assumptions can also be made. For example, the regulatory stan-
dard may affect the belief that the court standard is substantially higher 
than the regulatory standard.158
3. Whether regulation or liability is the optimal enforcement method de-
pends (among other things) on the wealth of the injurer. If wealth is suffi -
ciently large, liability is favorable, if wealth is limited, regulation is. How-
ever, the joint use of liability and regulation can be benefi cial if wealth is 
limited and varies among injurers (Schmitz, 2000). In such a situation, 
regulation might be preferred for low-wealth injurers, while liability 
might be preferred for high-wealth injurers. Joint use of liability and reg-
ulation can increase social welfare by making low-wealth injurers stick to 
the regulatory standard and by inducing high-wealth injurers to take op-
timal, or at least higher, precautions. In that case, the optimal regulatory 
standard is strictly lower than the standard used under regulation alone, 
which is based on effi cient average precautions.
157 Whether courts are indeed better able to estimate the benefits and costs of a firm’s behav-
ior is disputed by for instance Bergkamp (2001).
158 For a more extensive discussion, see Burrows (1999) and Ewerhart and Schmitz (1998).
167The optimal structure of law enforcement
Interdependent use: the regulatory standard exceeds the court standard
There is hardly any literature providing a rationale for situations in which there is 
a compliance defense but no per se rule, so that injurers who fail to comply with 
the regulatory standard are not necessarily negligent. Shavell (1984a) argues that 
a per se rule is not necessarily efficient because it induces some injurers, undesir-
ably, to comply with the regulatory standard when they would not otherwise 
have done so. There will be some injurers (a) who ought not to meet the regula-
tory standard because they face higher than usual costs of precautions or lower 
than normal expected harm, and (b) who will not have been forced to satisfy 
regulatory standards due to flaws in or probabilistic methods of enforcement. By 
allowing these parties to escape liability in view of their circumstances, the pos-
sibility that they would still be led to take wasteful precautions can be avoided. 
However, similar arguments explain why a compliance defense is not favorable, 
so these arguments do not explain why there is a compliance defense but no per 
se rule, just why there should be no per se rule.
An argument for applying a compliance defense without a per se rule 
is that regulation is ‘excessive’ because it is biased to favor high precautions 
due to private interest theories (section 9.2) or one-sided information (see – 
although in a different context – Calcott and Hutton, 2006). However, this 
argument only explains the existence of regulatory standards that exceed the 
court standard, not how this existence can be efficient (as is the case above for 
the reverse). 
Another reason why non-compliance with the rules should not automati-
cally lead to negligence is that negligence should only be allowed if there is a 
causal relationship between non-compliance with the regulatory standard and 
the occurrence of an accident. A related point is that not using the per se rule 
strictly can be efficient in providing victims (in case of bilateral accidents) or 
other injurers (in case of multiple injurers) with sufficient incentives to take pre-
cautions.
10.2.3 Liability and prevention
The former analysis focuses on regulation as enforcing regulatory standards 
for taking precautions through the use of act-based sanctions. However, gov-
ernment regulation can also be carried out by means of prevention, a situa-
tion discussed by Calcott and Hutton (2006). The combination of prevention 
by licenses and liability is frequently observed.
An activity (or product) should be allowed if the benefits of the activity 
are larger than the expected harm and other external costs. In ideal circum-
stances, either regulation or liability will implement efficiency. Liability could 
be set in such a way that firms will incur the full social costs of their activi-
ties and hence will only undertake socially beneficial activities. In addition, a 
regulator might withhold approval from activities whenever the social costs 
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exceed the benefits.159 However, liability may, due to the reasons identified 
before, underdeter. Moreover, Calcott and Hutton (2006) argue that liability 
may overdeter if firms underestimate the social benefits of new activities 
(e.g. consumer surplus, employment). Under strict liability, a firm will bear 
the damages, so the expected net benefit from activities will be lower than 
under negligence-based liability and so will the incentive to propose activi-
ties. However, if firms under-appraise activities, negligence-based liability is 
more favorable to stimulate proposals.
If there is a perfect regulator, regulation alone will also be efficient. In 
general, a regulator will be imperfectly informed and may also be biased. If 
the regulator is not perfectly informed about the private benefits of the activ-
ity to the firm (but he is unbiased), there is a danger of permitting activities 
that are not socially beneficial. In such cases, strict liability will be a more 
effective constraint on proposals than negligence. Harsher regimes are more 
desirable if the expected harm is higher. Therefore, for low harm risks, the 
sole use of negligence is at least as efficient as the alternatives. For intermedi-
ate risks, either supplementing negligence with regulation or the sole use of 
strict liability becomes beneficial. For high risks, the joint use of strict liability 
and regulation is efficient.
There can also be failures in regulatory enforcement because the regula-
tor is biased (Calcott and Hutton, 2006; see also section 9.2). First, regulators 
might be biased against proposed activities because they give more atten-
tion to possible harm than to the benefits of proposed activities, for exam-
ple because criticism is higher for problems with approved activities than 
with foregone activities. Similarly, there may be a regulatory culture which 
emphasizes caution, because it bases its decisions on ‘upper-bounds’ on acci-
dent risk, rather than on best estimates. Alternatively, regulators might be 
biased toward activities because of regulatory capture or an internal conflict 
of interest.
If the regulator is biased against activities, strict liability might be a bet-
ter supplement to regulation than negligence. Under strict liability, the firm 
is more constrained in proposing activities. Since the regulator knows that 
under strict liability, the expected benefits of proposed activities are likely 
to be higher, it will approve more projects. On the other hand, negligence-
based liability encourages a firm to apply more often, but discourages the 
regulator from approving so many proposals. Because none of the regimes 
are unambiguously more restrictive, there is no general reason to prefer strict 
or negligence-based liability when the firm under- or over-appraises. More-
over, because the regulator is biased, it may be more efficient to refrain from 
regulation and only use liability. On the other hand, it is not necessarily opti-
mal to have negligence-based liability in addition to a regulator who is biased 
against activities (“excessive regulation”) because this will not induce the 
159 Note that in the case described, the expected harm from an activity is exogenous and does 
not depend on taking precautions. The only relevant question is whether firms have an 
adequate incentive to undertake only socially beneficial activities.
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regulator to approve more projects. A regulatory bias against proposals does 
not provide an argument in favor of softer liability regimes.
10.3 Deterrence versus compliance strategies
 In public law enforcement, both administrative and criminal law enforce-
ment, the efficient enforcement policy also constitutes the choice for an 
enforcement strategy or style. In chapter 8 I describe the distinction between 
a deterrence and a compliance strategy. I discuss the need for and the benefits 
of a compliance strategy from an economic point of view. This section tries to 
conclude by describing whether and when a deterrence strategy or a compli-
ance strategy should be used.
10.3.1 The appropriate distinction
It is important to limit the distinction between deterrence and compliance 
strategies to a distinction between the enforcement styles. The style describes 
what an enforcement authority will do when it detects a violation. A deter-
rence style is a style in which every violation is immediately punished and 
the enforcement authority bases its decisions solely on its own information. 
A compliance style is a cooperative style in which the enforcement authority 
might forego some violations (for some time) when this induces the firm to 
reveal important information necessary for enforcement.
The enforcement style should not be confused with what might be called 
the objective of enforcement. In regulatory enforcement of firms maximiz-
ing social welfare may include several intermediate (not mutually exclusive) 
enforcement objectives: deterrence, remediation, advice, education, and com-
pletion. It is important to start with identifying the objective of enforcement 
and subsequently examining which enforcement strategy can best achieve 
this objective.
10.3.2 Deterrence
Under deterrence (the focus of most economic literature) the objective is to 
induce compliance by making non-compliance unattractive. The threat of 
sanctions signals that non-compliance does not pay. If the objective is to deter 
offenses, the primary enforcement style is a deterrence strategy in which 
offenses are immediately punished. The deterrent effect of enforcement relies 
critically on the expectation by potential offenders that a detected offense will 
consistently be prosecuted (Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988). Under a compliance 
strategy, the firm is able to delay compliance or to negotiate a lower level of 
compliance.
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Failures of deterrence strategy
 However, a deterrence strategy assumes that enforcement authorities are 
granted sufficient resources to enforce compliance (chapter 5). In practice, 
they are usually not, so that there is serious underdeterrence and the maxi-
mum achievable compliance rate is a partial compliance rate. It might then 
not be optimal to directly impose severe sanctions because such sanctions 
might – on balance – increase underdeterrence. For instance because they lead 
to a waste of resources on imposing sanctions, because they crowd out the 
intrinsic motivation to comply or because such sanctions do not sufficiently 
discriminate between the different harm from offenses. In short, there might 
be problems if imposing sanctions is sufficiently costly (see for a more exten-
sive list chapter 8). These costs become relevant if there is underdeterrence.
Under a deterrence strategy, the enforcement authority strictly enforces 
the legal standard. If law is incomplete , a deterrence strategy that legalisti-
cally enforces the legal standard to the letter will not induce the first-best level 
of precautions (chapter 6). Note, however, that if the enforcement authority 
is perfectly informed and is granted sufficient discretionary powers it is able 
to discriminate between firms and to induce the first-best level of precautions 
by strictly enforcing this level for each firm. Moreover, a strict enforcement of 
the standards forces the lawmaker to avoid unnecessarily incomplete stan-
dards.
A final reason why a deterrence strategy may fail is that enforcement offi-
cials are insufficiently interested in pursuing deterrence and in consistently 
sanctioning every violation . This might be the result of credibility problems 
or may stem from a misalignment between public interests and the private 
interests of enforcement officials (chapter 9). The officials might be more 
interested in their short-term careers than in deterring future offences, or they 
might not want to spend sufficient time on (actual) enforcement.
In sum, a deterrence strategy fails to deter (i) if imposing sanctions is too 
costly, (ii) if regulation is too incomplete, or (iii) if the enforcement authority 
and its officials have insufficient interest in pursuing deterrence.
Alternatives to a deterrence strategy
If a deterrence strategy fails to deter, different other enforcement methods 
might be more efficient. If only a partial compliance level is achievable, it is 
optimal to target enforcement on some subgroup of the population. This will 
induce the target group to fully comply, while there is no sanctioning in the 
non-target group. Hence, the enforcement authority will avoid the costs of 
imposing sanctions. The best targeting scheme is one that depends on past 
compliance, for example by issuing warnings . Yet, the primary enforcement 
style is a deterrence strategy. The only point is that this strategy might forgo a 
part of the population or that the first enforcement action involves moving to 
the target group instead of a direct penalty.
If the legal standard cannot be enforced, it is generally optimal for the 
enforcement authority to adjust the standard downwards and to enforce 
some informal standard . Again, the costs of imposing sanctions are avoid-
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ed. A partial compliance rate is realized by inducing every firm to partially 
comply with the standard. This is not a pure deterrence strategy because the 
enforcement authority should not legalistically enforce every breach of the 
standard but instead forgo minor violations. However, it is still a deterrence 
strategy in enforcing the adjusted standard.
If, due to the incompleteness of the law , there is much two-sided uncer-
tainty about the standards and the compliance methods, a cooperative, flex-
ible enforcement style can be efficient. The enforcement authority can achieve 
higher levels of safety against lower enforcement costs by offering mutual-
ly beneficial deals to the firm. This implies that the firm will be required to 
reduce the most important safety problems in exchange for reduced sanctions 
for minor violations. 
10.3.3 Optimal strategies for other objectives
Remediation
Remediation implies that enforcement is aimed at restoring compliance. For 
example, repairing a technical device that causes non-compliance or clean-
ing-up the environmental harm resulting from some emission (chapter 4).
Only in cases of purely accidental offenses where it is impossible to make 
enforcement dependent on the level of remediation will immediate punish-
ment of violations have no merit, and a strategy of warnings be efficient. If, 
however, it is possible to sanction insufficient remediation, a deterrence strat-
egy that imposes sanctions dependent on the level of remediation is efficient, 
as this is most likely to induce the firm to choose remediation (given the gen-
eral conditions for a deterrence strategy discussed above). Similarly, if offens-
es also occur deliberately, there is no need for lowering deterrence .
Advice
Advice implies that the objective of enforcement is to ensure that the firm is 
sufficiently informed about all the benefits and costs of (non)compliance, the 
standards that apply and the least costly method to create compliance.
If the firm is able to acquire the relevant information at a reasonable 
effort, advice is not needed. Imposing efficient deterrent sanctions provides 
firms with the efficient incentive to inform themselves. If the firm is unable to 
do so (especially under technically complicated regulation), advice might be 
relevant. If all firms lack the same kind of information, general information 
campaigns will be sufficient to inform them. If the law is (very) incomplete, 
so that an individual firm cannot learn from others, it might be efficient for 
public inspection to have advice as its objective. This requires a more compli-
ant strategy, in which inspection is characterized by speech, explanation and 
cooperation.
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Education
 Enforcement may also have as objective the stimulation of norms and val-
ues that enhance compliance. Public inspection may be needed to maintain, 
strengthen or even create norms and to realize the costs and benefits of norms 
(chapter 7).
If the costs of norm-violation are only realized once an offence is detected 
– which is especially true for informal social sanctions – public inspection 
might be necessary to detect offences. The magnitude of sanctions may be 
relatively low, but generally violations must be punished, and immediately 
so.
If the costs of norm-violation depend on the level of compliance in the rel-
evant population, public enforcement through sufficient deterrence is need-
ed to prevent a breakdown in compliance and norm-subscription. If norm 
formation occurs by observing that non-compliance is punished, a more 
deterrent enforcement style is appropriate. If norms are stimulated by being 
inspected if in compliance because this signals that compliance is important 
and valued, a more cooperative style, aimed at compliers, is appropriate.
Another problem is that public enforcement may destroy norms, because 
imposing sanctions crowds out the intrinsic motivation to comply. Then 
deterrence might fail and preventing the breakdown of norms might require 
a compliance strategy.
Completion
 Another objective of public enforcement is to supplement private enforce-
ment. There are several reasons for this complementary function. First, public 
enforcement might be used to provide the firm with the information it needs 
in order to take efficient precautions. Public enforcement is especially needed 
to reduce the uncertainty concerning the levels of due care in private litiga-
tion claims. Moreover, public enforcement is needed when firms and their 
employees are not, or not fully, aware of the existence and consequences of 
private enforcement because they suffer from cognitive limitations . For these 
cases, public enforcement has advice as its objective, as specified above. In 
addition to the arguments above, information about standards might only 
be credible if the public standard is actually enforced. Therefore, in general, 
public enforcement should apply a deterrence strategy.
Finally, public enforcement might be used to create deterrence in cas-
es where private enforcement fails to deter efficiently. Deterrence through 
private enforcement may be hindered by for instance wealth constraints or 
litigation barriers for victims. Here, public enforcement has the objective of 
deterrence. In general, a strict enforcement policy is needed to induce the 
privately underdeterred firms to take precautions.
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10.4 Effective and efficient enforcement
10.4.1 Conditions for the enforcement methods
Part I of this thesis deals with the conditions under which private, criminal 
or administrative law enforcement provide an efficient incentive for firms to 
comply with safety standards. If an appropriate expected sanction is imposed, 
the expected harm that the firm inflicts will be internalized into the decision 
of the firm. Let me summarize the most important conditions identified.160
Private law enforcement
 Characteristic for private enforcement is the fact that enforcement is left to the 
victims. The sanction consists of compensation of the victims for the damage 
they suffered. Therefore, in order to realize an expected sanction that equals 
the expected harm, the probability of sanctions must be 100%. If enforcement 
costs are negligible (for instance because liability fully deters or because a 
settlement is arranged) an efficient outcome results. If, however, the firm can 
sometimes escape liability, the incentive to take precautions will be insuffi-
cient. Therefore, private enforcement is effective under the following condi-
tions:
1. Most of the harm done consists of monetary damages, or, if there are sig-
nifi cant non-monetary damages , courts should be able and willing to 
award adequate compensation for these damages .
2. The fi rm has suffi cient wealth to pay for the damages , or is fully insured 
for liability. If it is insured, insurance companies should be able to easily 
monitor and enforce precautions.
3. Courts and fi rms have suffi cient information about the possible accidents 
so that courts are able to enforce socially optimal levels of precaution and 
fi rms are able to anticipate on courts’ decisions.
4. Victims have suffi cient access to the legal system so that the probability of 
sanctions is suffi ciently high. Therefore victims should be able to identify 
the injurer and should suffer suffi cient harm to fi nd it worthwhile to fi le a 
claim.
Criminal law enforcement
 For those failures to take precautions that fall under criminal law, enforce-
ment takes place through a public prosecutor. Generally, the injurer must be 
traced, so that public resources are required to realize the probability of sanc-
tions. Due to these costs, it is usually not efficient (if possible at all) to realize a 
probability of conviction of 100%. As a consequence, to maintain the expected 
sanction, the magnitude of the sanction should be correspondingly higher. If 
monetary sanctions are insufficient, imprisonment may be used. Due to the 
severe sanctions that may be imposed, and because conviction also raises the 
160 See Shavell (1984a; 1993; and 2004), Ogus (2007) or Faure (2007) for an overview.
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(moral) question of guilt and stigma, the criminal law enforcement process 
must satisfy important requirements of due process. This implies a high bur-
den of proof, especially with respect to the relationship between the behavior 
of the injurer and the harm inflicted. Criminal law enforcement is especially 
suitable to enforce precautions in the following situations:
1. The injurer is unknown and has to be traced using public resources.
2. Imprisonment is required to impose a suffi ciently high sanction.
3. The harm can be related to a specifi c injurer and the magnitude of the 
harm is fairly well known. There is be ‘intent’ and ‘responsibility’ of the 
fi rm.
4. The fi rm has suffi cient knowledge about the possibilities for preventing 
harm, because otherwise there is no ‘guilt’ and even extremely high sanc-
tions will not deter.
5. The regulations refer to norms that are widely held in society, so that it is 
certain that offenses are regarded as immoral and undesirable, and en-
forcement actions are always desirable.
Administrative law enforcement
If public intervention is required, administrative law enforcement may be an 
attractive alternative. This is especially true in cases where it is uncertain who 
is responsible for the harm caused, what the magnitude of the harm is or 
when it comes about. If the expected harm is a by-product of an otherwise 
desirable activity, it may be inefficient to completely ban the activity and the 
question of guilt is less prominent. Since penalties are small, the procedural 
requirements are low and the enforcement authority has much discretion. 
Administrative law enforcement is appropriate in the following situations:
1. Enforcement is aimed at repairing technical devices (remediation) that 
occur accidentally.
2. Offenses are not associated with guilt, for example because an offense is 
not deemed immoral for lack of causality.
3. Compliance requires much technical expertise that is not freely available. 
In such cases, warnings might be helpful especially when intrinsic moti-
vations to comply are relevant.
4. Discretion is required to specify the laws for individual cases and to de-
termine whether and which enforcement action is appropriate.
Joint use of enforcement methods
Observation of enforcement in the real world shows that in many cases all 
three enforcement methods are employed. This may be justified by the fact 
that criminal law enforcement is used as an ultimum remedium to deter severe 
offenses and clear neglect, or to impose public sanctions against an individual 
employee. Private enforcement is used because it is a relatively cheap way 
of providing an incentive to take precautions and offering victims compen-
sation for their monetary loss. Additional act-based enforcement, especially 
by means of administrative enforcement, is required because some firms are 
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wealth-constrained and/or have difficulty in predicting the level of due care 
and/or are unaware of the best compliance techniques. In these cases, it is 
likely that the court standard will exceed the regulatory standard: compliance 
with the regulatory standard will not exclude from liability. Moreover, public 
enforcement is needed as a supplement to private enforcement if damages 
are difficult to determine and if prevention of non-monetary loss by private 
enforcement is insufficient.
Enforcement costs
Besides the factors mentioned, the enforcement costs are relevant for deter-
mining which enforcement method is socially optimal. The theoretical part 
repeatedly argued that the efficient enforcement policy balances the costs of 
enforcement with the benefits of a higher level of compliance (i.e. a lower 
level of expected damage minus the costs of compliance). There is no general 
argument that enforcement costs are lowest for one of the enforcement meth-
ods. A joint use will increase enforcement costs but this might be justified by 
the higher level of deterrence gained. The level of enforcement costs and its 
effects on (non)compliance is, in the end, an empirical issue. The empirical 
part of this thesis attempts to estimate the level of enforcement costs and to 
evaluate whether this level is socially optimal for the field of enforcing fire 
safety regulation in horeca establishments.
10.4.2 The case of fire safety in horeca establishments
For the case of fire safety in horeca establishments chapter 2 argues that it is 
likely that some enforcement activity is needed. The analysis thereafter ana-
lyzes whether in general enforcement by private, administrative or criminal 
law enforcement is effective and efficient in inducing compliance with the 
regulation. It has to be examined whether and to what extent these arguments 
apply to the field of enforcing fire safety in horeca establishments. Such an 
investigation is not possible without filling in the analysis with the available 
data on this field.
The relevance of the conditions identified 
A quick survey of the fire safety case reveals that almost all conditions stated 
above matter for fire safety in horeca establishments. In fire damage, non-
monetary damages are an important part of the harm to victims, but not of 
the compensation award. Many proprietors will be able to pay damages, but 
it is unlikely that all proprietors have sufficient wealth to pay for all the harm 
a disaster like the one in Volendam causes. As argued in chapter 2, insurance 
companies might be able to monitor technical devices, but not daily behavior 
of the proprietor. Whether courts and proprietors have sufficient information 
about the accident problem can not be decided in general. Knowing due care 
in advance might be problematic for proprietors especially when courts devi-
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ate from the regulatory standards in determining negligence. Given the clear 
presence of harm in the fire safety case, access to the legal system seems to 
be sufficiently guaranteed in the Netherlands (as in most Western European 
countries), but proving that the proprietor was negligent may require techni-
cally complex investigations and coordination by the victims. So, in fact, all 
named barriers for private enforcement are present. Still, private enforcement 
might be beneficial because of the relatively low enforcement costs and the 
incentive for victims to pursue a case.
Criminal law enforcement is also not unambiguously effective or ineffec-
tive. In the fire safety case, the injurer is generally known. But public resourc-
es may be helpful in conducting technical investigations into the negligence 
of proprietors and in unraveling enterprise structures. And imprisonment 
might be needed for those proprietors that are unable to pay for a high sanc-
tion. On the other hand, the remaining conditions are not necessarily satisfied. 
If for instance a fire is caused by third parties or is caused by an (unpredict-
able) technical failure the harm can not be related to a specific injurer. If the 
proprietor can not prevent the accident, criminal sanctions are inefficient. In 
such cases there may be no ‘guilt’. As argued in chapter 2, proprietors are not 
well informed about expected harm so that they might not be able to under-
stand which precautions should be taken. While some requirements concern 
acts of which everyone knows or ought to know that they are dangerous (like 
– possibly – a beer crate in front of an exit, far to many visitors inside), other 
requirements might not be viewed as immoral by society (perhaps locking an 
emergency exit because of prevention of burglary or maintaining fire extin-
guishers).
Administrative law enforcement can be an effective method for enforc-
ing fire safety in horeca establishments, especially for requirements concern-
ing technical devices (like for instance repairing broken escape-route signs or 
fire extinguishers). These requirements are primarily aimed at guaranteeing 
that the devices are adequately maintained and repaired. Violations of these 
requirements are primarily viewed as the by-product of an otherwise social-
ly beneficial activity and therefore not regarded as immoral. Compliance 
requires knowledge of technically complicated devices. However, for other 
requirements these conditions do not hold, like for instance blocking emer-
gency exits or allowing too many visitors. And the disadvantage of admin-
istrative enforcement is the lack of an incentive to prevent technical failures. 
In the end, the (expected) harm is the result of the level of precautions of the 
proprietor, including the adequate maintenance of technical devices, and the 
proprietor might thus be viewed as the causer of an accident. Moreover, a 
gross or deliberate level of negligence might be viewed as immoral. An argu-
ment in favor of administrative enforcement is the discretionary powers of 
municipalities. Because exploiting a horeca establishment is a socially desir-
able activity, fire safety regulations should be applied with wisdom. The pri-
mary requirement is that an establishment is fire proof, not that the regula-
tions are complied with to the letter.
177The optimal structure of law enforcement
The need of further information
As should be clear from the description above there is, as yet, no unambigu-
ous conclusion on the optimal enforcement method for enforcing fire safety 
in horeca establishments. None of the enforcement methods is superior to 
the other ones. The optimal enforcement policy is likely to constitute a mix 
of private, criminal and administrative enforcement. The real question is not 
whether a condition is satisfied or not. As described, almost all of the condi-
tions are likely to be of relevance for the case of fire safety in horeca establish-
ments and none of the conditions is perfectly satisfied in this case. The real 
question is the intensity of the problems: is it a real barrier for enforcement? 
This can hardly be decided in general, without filling in the analysis with 
actual data for this specific problem.
Take for instance the condition on an adequate compensation of non-
monetary damages for private enforcement. It is generally known that in the 
Netherlands the compensation for non-monetary damages is small (in light 
of the preventive effect of liability). But the question is to which extent this 
affects the incentive to take precautions given that the proprietor will have 
to compensate an important part of the monetary damages and given that 
under negligence a less-than-full compensation might be sufficient. This can 
only be concluded by filling in the analysis with information on the actual 
compensation the proprietor has to pay and on his costs of precautions. Like-
wise, saying that fire accidents are an undesired by-product of an otherwise 
socially beneficial activity, does not deny that gross and deliberate negligence 
may occur at times and require criminal law enforcement. Or consider the 
fact that many fire safety regulations concern technical devices. Therefore, 
non-compliance may be the result of technical failures instead of the intention 
of the proprietor. But does administrative enforcement provide a sufficient 
incentive to repair and maintain the fire safety devices?
Similar uncertainty remains concerning the discussion on the optimal 
enforcement style. The previous section argues that neither a compliance nor 
a deterrence strategy is always superior to the other. Which enforcement style 
should be applied, depends on the circumstances. On first view, the fire safety 
problem seems to be an outstanding example of the benefits of a compliance 
strategy. Remediation, advice, education and completion can all be relevant 
objectives. Cooperation with proprietors can be expected to increase the will-
ingness to comply more than strict punishment of every violation. At least, 
the actual enforcement policy does not look like the description of Becker ’s 
(1968) trade-off with high sanctions. Moreover, in many cases only adminis-
trative repair sanctions are available. But doubt on a compliance strategy is 
at place. The different goals might also be achieved by a deterrence strategy. 
The lack of deterrence allows the proprietors to postpone compliance. The 
arguments for a compliance strategy might seem plausible arguments, but 
the question is whether they really make a reasonable case for fire safety in 
horeca establishments. Especially, to what extent do they apply to the case of 
fire safety in horeca establishments? In the end, the optimal enforcement pol-
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icy concerns a mix, a balance of deterrence and compliance strategies. Does 
the actual enforcement policy apply the right mix? The arguments in favor 
of a compliance strategy do not necessarily justify the present intensity with 
which a compliance strategy is applied.
As a final example of the need of further information, consider the ques-
tion which stage of enforcement is optimal for fire safety in horeca establish-
ments. The presence of limited wealth and information problems point at act-
based enforcement, but the large enforcement costs that are involved with 
act-based enforcement are a clear disadvantage. So it is important to under-
stand how large these costs are and how severe the information problems 
are.
So, although one might fairly say that enforcing fire safety in horeca estab-
lishments requires a mix of enforcement methods and styles, this is a rather 
empty phrase if this mix is not further specified. Such specification requires 
that the analysis is filled in with data on the relevant cost functions. These 
should decide how intense one enforcement method can be used and to what 
extent it fails to induce precautions. This part explains how, according to the 
economic analysis of law enforcement, the costs and benefits of enforcement 
should be weighed at an abstract, general level. To determine the optimal lev-
el of enforcement for fire safety in horeca establishments, one has to specify 
the benefits and costs in the concrete.
The analysis in part I describes the optimal enforcement policy of safety 
standards for firms in general. A next question is whether actual enforcement 
policies correspond to this recommended policy and follow the arguments 
provided in the literature. Such a judgment can not be made in general but 
only by considering specific enforcement problems. Moreover, such a judg-
ment is only valid when it is based on the available data for this specific prob-
lem. Therefore the next part analyzes whether the actual enforcement policy 
for fire safety in horeca establishment adequately applies the theoretical 
arguments of the literature and is in line with the description of the optimal 
enforcement policy.
Part II 
Empirical analysis
Part I of this thesis provides a theoretical analysis of the conditions 
under which some type of enforcement will be effective and demonstrates 
that the costs and benefits of enforcement must be balanced. Further 
conclusions can only be drawn once the analysis is filled in with specific, 
empirical data. This is done in this part where I attempt to analyze the 
enforcement of fire safety regulation in horeca establishments in the 
Netherlands. This mainly concerns the enforcement policies that are 
adopted following the Volendam disaster, in the period 2001-2007. 
First, in chapter 11, I describe this case and the broader context of 
the Volendam disaster and its consequences. Secondly, in chapter 
12, based on the interviews with enforcement officials, I interpret the 
enforcement policy in light of the economic literature described in part 
I. Is this policy effective? Particular attention is given to the evaluation 
of the use of a compliance strategy. Thirdly, in chapter 13, the question 
is whether the enforcement actions following the Volendam disaster are 
efficient. Do they pass a cost-benefit analysis? A further step in chapter 
14 is to consider whether private actions by victims, such as those of the 
Volendam disaster, may, through filing and settling damage claims be 
expected to be more effective.
In chapter 15, I take a different approach. I consider the case of a 
hypothetical but representative Dutch municipality and examine 
which enforcement policy is most welfare-enhancing, assuming that a 
horeca proprietor acts according to the rational choice framework of the 
economic model. This simulation allows me to examine the effects of 
alternative enforcement policies and to examine whether the conditions 
formulated in part II for private, administrative and criminal law 
enforcement are satisfied.The final chapter (chapter 16) concludes on 
the socially optimal enforcement policy, based on both the theoretical 
and the empirical part of this thesis.

11 Fire safety regulation in horeca 
establishments and policy developments
In this chapter I introduce the problem of enforcing fire safety regulation in 
horeca establishments in the period 2001-2007. This period begins with the 
Volendam disaster and ends with the introduction of the Use Decree and the 
abolishment of use licenses, now planned for mid 2008. First, I give a brief 
description of the horeca sector. Then, I describe the fire safety regulation 
and the importance of and the response to the Volendam disaster. Finally, I 
describe how this response to the Volendam disaster fits to an increasing at-
tention to enforcement problems in general. This builds a bridge to the inves-
tigation in 13 municipalities in the next chapter.
11.1 The horeca sector
 I use the term horeca to indicate a group of businesses, aimed at serving food 
and/or drinks that are consumed at the establishment itself, i.e. restaurants, 
cafés, bars, pubs, discothèques, party centers, etc. 
11.1.1 A general description of horeca establishments
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 provide some summary statistics concerning the horeca 
in the Netherlands in 2003, in order to give a short impression of the char-
acteristics of horeca businesses. There are about 7.4 establishments in the 
drinking sector (cafés/bars, disco, party centre) per 10,000 inhabitants. These 
establishments vary greatly. Some of the neighborhood cafés or brown cafés 
are located within a particular neighborhood, are relatively small and attract 
a rather constant number of regular customers. Instances on which these 
proprietors might allow more people than the maximum prescribed are for 
example soccer matches and similar events.
Other cafés, as well as discothèques, are located more in the centre of 
town and aim at day-trippers, tourists and/or the café-frequenting public in 
the weekends. They may allow more visitors than the maximum prescribed 
almost every weekend. Over-attendance may also occur when the estab-
lishment is hired out (for private parties). Sometimes, these establishments 
request an entrance fee, which makes easily accessible emergency exits prob-
lematic. Drinking is usually quite severe, which makes people more careless 
and difficult to handle.
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Table 11.1 Characteristics of the catering industry in the Netherlandsa
       Number    Sales area (m2)b
Exploita-
tion in  
(years)c
Total
Per 10.000 
inhabit.
Total Average Average
Café, bar: 10.900 6,7 1.174.000 110 5,6
Of which Neighbourh., brown 7.010 4,3
Pub, diner  2.240 1,4
Grand café 260 0,2
Music café 420 0,3
Theme, target group 970 0,6
Disco 380 0,2 144.400 380 10,8
Party centre 880 0,5 768.100 880 11,5
Fastfoodrestaurant 310 0,2 58.200 190 6,0
Restaurant sector: 10.220 6,3 1.563.800 150
Of which Bistro 1.420 0,9 115.300 80 8,7
Restaurant 5.910 3,6 800.500 140 8,2
Café-restaurant 2.790 1,7 616.500 220 11,9
Road-house 110 0,1 31.400 300 13,9
Of whichd Dutch / French 5.850 3,6
Mediterranean 1.890 1,2
Chinese, Indian 2.210 1,4
Other Asean 360 0,2
Other Foreign 1.490 0,9
Total 22.690 14,0
a. Source: Horeca in Figures 2003. Set day: July 1, 2003
b. Sales area: the number m2 that is fi tted up as consumption on the spot, excluding the 
area for the kitchen, bar etc.
c. Duration of exploitation: the average number of years that a fi rm is registered on 
name of one proprietor. The fi gures in the table are for existing fi rms, not for those 
who stopped business.
d. Figures for classifi cation into kitchen includes hotel-restaurants and hotel-restaurant-
cafés, therefore the sum does not fi t the total of the restaurant sector.
Party centers are relatively large, because they usually have several rooms. 
They earn their living from letting rooms for private parties. This implies 
that there are a frequent and rather unpredictable number of instances on 
which the maximum number of visitors may be violated. When the number 
of guests at a party is uncertain in advance (e.g. a wedding party), it may be 
difficult for the proprietor to enforce the number of people inside.
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Table 11.2 Employees and turnover in the catering industry in the Netherlandsa
% of fi rms 
with 
employees on 
the pay-roll
Average number 
of employees per 
company (with 
employees)
Average turnover 
(excl. VAT)
Drinking sector 69 8,0 € 155.000
Restaurant sector 90  10,5 € 390.000
a. Source: Horeca in Figures 2003. Set day for number of employees: September 30, 2002. 
See Suurmond (2004, appendix 2).
There is a group of establishments, such as pubs/diners, grand cafés and café-
restaurants, which serves food as well as drinks. Extra fire danger is present 
because of the existence of a kitchen. Since people want to have some space 
at their table, the maximum number of visitors is not easily violated. What 
may happen is that in order to create more tables, some of them are placed in 
front of emergency exits or on an escape-route. In addition, since there is an 
apparent peak in the stir (eating times), the danger of neglect of fire safety by 
the personnel at such times is high. The same holds for regular restaurants. 
Differences in fire damage do not seem to be related to the type of kitchen, 
but more to the target group. The more luxurious, special restaurants will not 
have problems with the maximum number of visitors.
In 2000, 92% of the Dutch people between the ages of 12 and 74 years 
(about 12.7 million people) had a drink at an horeca establishment. They did 
so on average 36 times, amounting to more than 400 million visits. In 2002, 
average consumption varied from €10 (in cafés) to €20 (in discothèques). Sim-
ilarly, 88% attended a horeca establishment to eat something, on average 21 
times, which makes almost 230 million visits. Average consumption varied 
from €6 in fast-food restaurants to €14 in Chinese/Indian restaurants and €28 
in Dutch/French restaurants.161
11.1.2 Competition and ownership
The horeca sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. Within a 
neighborhood, there are usually various horeca establishments or similar alter-
natives for eating and drinking, so that price elasticity is quite high. However, 
not every horeca establishment is the same. There is heterogeneity in the atmo-
sphere, quality and target group. Note also that the horeca sector is aimed at the 
local market. Individuals do not tend to drive to another city in order to visit a 
café or restaurant (with the exception of weekend nights by youngsters).
That the market is quite competitive is reflected in the relatively high 
number of new firms. In 2002, for example, 3.300 of the 37.100 firms in the 
161 For more details, see Suurmond (2004*) in which I combine data from various sources.
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whole recreation and horeca sector were closed and 1.200 new firms were 
established.162 In this sector, bankruptcy and change of ownership is a com-
mon phenomenon. Frequently, a new horeca firm is set up in an existing hore-
ca establishment. Sometimes, only the owner of an establishment changes, 
keeping the same names and brands. In these cases, the new horeca firm also 
takes over the structural engineering state of the establishment, leading to the 
same level of fire safety and the same fire safety prescriptions.
In many cases, a horeca firm will consist of (only) one establishment with 
a single proprietor who is both the owner and the manager of the firm, and 
who is able to monitor the behavior of his (limited number of) personnel. 
Often, the horeca entrepreneur will rent the establishment from a brewery, 
investment holding or otherwise, or he will own the establishment himself. 
Sometimes, one horeca entrepreneur owns several establishments in one or 
more cities. In such cases, every establishment is quite independent and will 
have its own target group. In any case, the decisions about compliance with 
fire safety regulations are taken at establishment level since fire safety pre-
scriptions are relevant at that level (and not at firm level). All these horeca 
firms are characterized by a rather simple organization with few hierarchy 
levels. The manager is usually the person who receives the profits of exploit-
ing the horeca establishment. There are a few larger chains, notably in fast-
food restaurants, hotel-restaurants and roadhouses (e.g. McDonald’s), which 
are characterized by a professional organization with possibly special depart-
ments for purchase, promotion and dealing with legal-administrative issues.
11.1.3 Regulation
The horeca sector belongs to one of the most highly regulated sectors. Sixteen 
national laws and regulations have been identified (usually each with their 
own Inspectorate), in addition to several local bylaws, covenants for copy-
right and the like.163 To name the most important ones: the Drink and Horeca 
Act (for serving alcohol), the Environmental Protection Act, the Act of Area 
Planning, the Housing Act, the Food and Drugs Act, the Act on Working Con-
ditions and the Building Bylaw. In addition, the Act of Monuments and Tax 
Laws are also (sometimes) relevant.
Given the large number of regulations and Inspectorates, the importance 
of fire safety can clash with other safety interests. Horeca proprietors often 
complain about contradictory requirements. Upon further examination, how-
ever (see section 11.3.1), the number of real contradictions appears to be very 
small. The main problems are either the diverse interpretations and inconsis-
tency of the Inspectorates, or the high costs that may be at stake in applying a 
162 Source: CBS, Statline. The year 2002 is the most recent year for which definitive data are 
available.
163 See Bekkers et.al. (2003*).
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satisfying solution. In any case, for horeca proprietors, the fire prescriptions 
are just one type of prescription out of many.
11.2 Fire safety regulation
I analyze the enforcement of the requirements that concern a fire-proof use of 
an establishment. Let me describe these requirements and the enforcement of 
these requirements in the past.
11.2.1 Fire safety prescriptions
The care for fire prevention is delegated to municipalities in the Fire Services 
Act 1985.164 A brief summary of the historical development of fire safety regu-
lation is given in the report of the Committee of Inquiry Café Fire New Year’s 
Eve 2001.165
General history of regulation
The Fire Services Act of 1952 reflected the tendency for decentralization fol-
lowing World War II. Municipalities were made responsible for fire safety 
and therefore adopted municipal bylaws which regulated fire safety. In the 
seventies, fire safety was professionalized. In particular, there was an increase 
in the knowledge and quality of technical aspects of fire safety. The Asso-
ciation of Dutch Municipalities developed a model fire protection bylaw in 
order to structure the many municipal bylaws. In this model bylaw, a use 
license system was introduced.
A further stimulus to fire safety was provided in the eighties. In 1985, a 
new Fire Services Act appeared. A real revolution in fire safety regulations 
came in 1992, when a major revision of the Housing Act took place. In this 
revision, the Building Decree was introduced, in which all technical fire 
safety requirements were harmonized into one national Building Decree, 
which is updated on regular basis. The Housing Act also stipulates that every 
municipality must lay down a Building Bylaw which must contain (among 
other things) prescriptions with respect to fire safety. Although these Build-
ing Bylaws may in principle differ among municipalities, all municipalities 
tend to a large extent to follow the model Building Bylaw of the Association of 
164 A more extensive description of fire safety regulation can be found in Zoomers (2001*). 
See also Weerkamp (2004*). Helsloot et al. (2007*) is a general handbook on fire safety and 
fire safety organization in the Netherlands. Helsoot (2006*) is a short introduction into the 
enforcement of fire safety regulation.
165 Also known as the Alders Committee (2001*). The historical description is found in Part A, 
p.60-63 of which I give a summary here.
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Dutch Municipalities.166 As far as I know, all municipalities have adopted the 
use license system from the model Building Bylaw. According to this system, 
the fire safety prescriptions can be divided into three parts: (1) construction, 
(2) installations, and (3) use.
Construction requirements
In order to prevent fires and to limit their spreading, certain structural require-
ments are laid down in the (national) Building Decree 2003. These techni-
cal prescriptions concern for instance the creation of fire and smoking com-
partments, the use of inflammable materials and the presence of emergency 
exits and escape-routes. A building license is required in order to supervise 
whether a building satisfies these prescriptions. The owner must apply for 
this building license at the municipality, which is charged with the inspection 
and enforcement of the Building Decree regulations.
Installation requirements
In order to detect and fight fires, buildings must be supplied with certain 
equipment, such as sprinklers, a fire alarm system, an evacuation alarm sys-
tem, escape-route marks and emergency lighting. Especially the latter two 
are relevant for horeca establishments. These prescriptions are laid down in 
the municipal Building Bylaw. Together with the construction requirements, 
the installation requirements are specified in the necessary building license 
and enforced by the municipality. The Act of Occupational Health and the 
Environmental Protection Act contain regulations with respect to fire extin-
guishers, evacuation plans and instructions, as well as safety measures with 
respect to dangerous substances.
Use requirements
 The regulations for the fire-safe use of a building are also included in the 
municipal Building Bylaw. Hence, it is the municipality which is charged with 
the enforcement of these regulations. Appendix three and four of the model 
Building Bylaw contain the regulations a user must satisfy. These regulations 
have a general effect on all the exploiters of a building. In addition to these, 
Article 6.1.1 (1) of the model Building Bylaw stipulates that structures that 
satisfy one of the following characteristics must possess a use license :
– fifty or more people can be present at once;
– there is storage of fire dangerous substances;
– night residence is given to more than ten people, commercial or related to 
care;
– day residence is given to more than ten children or disabled persons.167
166 In Dutch: Vereniging van Nederlandse gemeenten (VNG). For the model Building Bylaw, 
see VNG (2002*).
167 Municipalities differ on the numbers in these requirements (e.g. twenty-five instead of 
fifty people present) but all municipalities have chosen for a system of use licenses.
187Fire safety regulation in horeca establishments and policy developments
The granting of a license (with an unlimited period of validity) guaran-
tees that the municipality investigates whether the structure satisfies the gen-
eral requirements of appendices three and four. Beside these, the use license 
may also stipulate the maximum number of people allowed in (a part of) the 
building. In addition, other building-specific regulations may be included. 
However, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen is not allowed to stipulate fur-
ther regulations on the construction or the installations, such as prescribing 
an extra escape-route. The structural state of the building determines how 
many people can safely use it. The use requirements stipulate that this num-
ber of people may not be exceeded and that the structural state of the build-
ing must be well maintained. If a building does not possess a use license, the 
maximum number of people allowed is in principle restricted to fifty since 
operating with more people present without a use license is illegal.
I analyze the enforcement of the use requirements, whether or not laid 
down in a license, given the structural state of the building and the present 
installations. The most important use requirements (for horeca establish-
ments) can be summarized in the following seven points:
1. The (emergency) exits and escape-routes should be kept free. This means 
for example that emergency exits can be opened immediately if necessary, 
and that escape-routes may not be blocked by trash-bins, (beer) crates, 
etc.
2. Furnishings (such as curtains and drapes) and decorations should be cor-
rectly hung and impregnated.
3. Escape-route signs (called transparencies) should be clearly visible and 
burn when people are present, also in case of voltage or current failures. 
The emergency lighting (if required) must light up in case of voltage or 
current failure within 15 seconds and keep on burning for at least 60 min-
utes. Periodical inspections, and if necessary servicing, are required to 
check whether these installations satisfy the requirements.
4. Fire extinguishers must be indicated clearly (with the correct pictures) 
and must be inspected annually (and if necessary serviced or replaced) 
by a professional company.
5. Candle lights, trash, ash-trays etc. must be used safely.
6. The maximum number of persons allowed in (a part of) the building may 
not be exceeded.
7. Remaining use requirements must be obeyed, such as those in the domain 
of evacuation plans and personnel instructions, the periodical inspection 
and service of required fi re alarm or evacuation alarm systems, etc.
 Note that parts of these regulations require periodical attention, while 
other require continued attention by the user (during use). The former 
type implies that if the user regularly (say yearly) inspects whether he 
complies with these regulations, he will do so for some period (say a 
year). Fire safety is then stable in that period. The latter type implies that 
complying with these requirements is a daily (or even hourly) decision 
and hence expected fire damage differs from day to day.
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The enforcement set-up
Municipalities control compliance with the use requirements. Four types of 
inspections can be distinguished:
A. On application for/granting of a licence.
B. Periodical inspection.
C. During ‘events’ (Christmas, Carnival or local events), also called actions.
D. Repressive (after a complaint or report, or after a false fi re alarm).
For violations detected during inspections of type A, possible sanctions 
include not granting a license. For violations detected during other types of 
inspection, as well as for operating without a license, several administrative 
sanctions can be imposed:
– (duty under) penal sum;
– administrative coercion (execution by the municipality on the firm’s 
costs);
– (partial or temporary) closing, which is the (ultimate) consequence of the 
withdrawal of a licence.
Besides these, relevant enforcement tools are: toleration or legalization of 
violations, warnings, re-inspections, deliberation, etc. The municipality can 
also use sanctions such as naming-and-shaming, less willingness to cooper-
ate in other respects (e.g. renovation) or, for example, no more municipal par-
ties or receptions allowed in the building.
Offenses can also be enforced through criminal law by the Public Pros-
ecutor, especially when the offenses create clear and immediate danger.168 The 
maximum sanction is a fine of €4500 or four months of imprisonment.
11.2.2 Short history of enforcement and the Volendam disaster
The granting, inspection and enforcement of building licenses is usually 
assigned to a department of the municipality which is charged with building 
and housing supervision. The fire brigade gives advice on the granting of 
these licenses. In the nineties, (municipal) building supervision became more 
professional, also due to the pressure from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment. New buildings are almost always provided 
with the necessary building license. Enforcement problems are usually caused 
by relatively small-scale renovations for which no permission is asked, so 
that current situations do not necessarily reflect the original building license. 
As regards the problem of fire safety, these renovations might imply that the 
maximum number of people that is allowed is smaller than the number stipu-
lated in the original license.
With respect to the use license, most municipalities did not grant, inspect 
168 According to article 12.1 of the model Building Bylaw (VNG, 2002*) violation of the use 
requirements is a criminal act and is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
four months or by a fine of the third category.
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and enforce these licenses during a substantial period. Since 1992, the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, the Association of Dutch Municipalities and national, 
regional and local Fire Brigades have often pointed to the importance of a 
municipal fire safety policy. Only as late as the late nineties did several munici-
palities start programs for granting use licenses. Priority was given to sleeping 
and care institutions. What happened in many municipalities was that from 
time to time, inspections were carried out, especially in horeca establishments 
in periods preceding Christmas or Carnival. Enforcement in cases of violation 
hardly ever occurred. Administrative attention for fire safety was low.
The Volendam disaster and its consequences
 These problems came to the fore after the Café Fire in Volendam at New 
Year’s Eve 2001. What happened that night in café “’t Hemeltje” in Volendam 
has been described in the report of the investigating committee:
Like any year, groups of youngsters celebrated New Year on the dyke. ’t Hemeltje 
was still in the Christmas mode.(…) Shortly after midnight, ’t Hemeltje was com-
pletely packed…[A]round midnight, the proprietor had opened the doors to some 
three hundred people in total who were only able to shuffle around. (…)
Half past one. A boy took a packet of sparklers and lit the packaging with a burst of 
flame as the result. He got a fright and held the packet upwards consequently set-
ting fire to the Christmas decorations. Panic set in. The fire spread through the dry 
branches  in no time and burning branches dropped onto the floor which people try-
ing to stamp out. Clothing was set alight.
The temparature in ’t Hemeltje quickly rose to some 500 degrees…In less than three 
minutes the fire had smothered itself.
Everyone was trying to get away. But where to? People…got stuck in the crowd on 
the stairs and in the bar itself. There was panic there also. The …exit has inwards-
opening doors….’t Hemeltje had an emergency exit with an emergency lock. The 
lock, however, was fitted upside down and covered by a beam. Therefore it took 
quite some time before anyone was able to open it and people could escape using the 
concrete outside stairs. Meanwhile, people were trying to break the windows on the 
front of ’t Hemeltje. The windows, however, are bolted and have bars in front of them. 
People were pressed against them. (…)
But [on the flat roof at the back] there were no stairs leading down off the flat roof. 
People jumped down. In the mean time, people were fainting because of the lack of 
oxygen and lay – sometimes in piles of four or five – on the floor on top of each oth-
er….The youngsters who were in the toilets…vainly attempted to break the windows 
of the door on the small hallway.
(Committee of Inquiry Café Fire New Year’s Eve 2001 (or: Alders Committee), Eng-
lish Summary, p.4-6)
In the end, fourteen youngsters died in the fire and approximately 300 people 
were wounded. It appeared that fire safety in the café was far below standard. 
The building was not in accordance with the building license that had been 
granted. The owner had consciously created a situation with inadequate (dif-
ficult to use) emergency exits. He had hung fire-dangerous decorations, and 
he was allowing entry to too many visitors. The owner did not possess the 
prescribed use license.
However, the municipality of Edam-Volendam was also to blame, 
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because they were consciously not granting the use licenses. Only at the end 
of 1999 did they employ someone to be responsible for fire prevention. Their 
only feat of arms was a letter to horeca entrepreneurs on November 30, 2000 
to warn against flammable Christmas decorations. The owner of ’t Hemeltje 
did nothing about it, and neither did the municipality.
Enforcement practice
It appeared that such practices, although somewhat extreme, were not excep-
tional, but representative for many more municipalities. A quick scan by 
order of the investigating committee showed that:
– Seventy percent of the municipalities did not have an active use licence 
policy;
– Eighty percent of the municipalities had great backlogs in granting use 
licences, especially for existing buildings. On 1 January 2002, the Pub-
lic Order and Safety Inspectorate (IOOV,  2002*) ascertained that in the 
meantime, almost every municipality had adopted a policy of granting 
use licences, but that only 29% of the buildings under obligation in fact 
possessed a use licence, and hence 71% did not. Without further action, 
this backlog will only be caught up on after 13 years.
– This backlog was accompanied by a personnel shortage, both for grant-
ing and inspecting of licences. AEF (2002*) estimated this shortage for the 
fire safety policy in case of application of the so called prevap-norms169 at 
465 fte. More generally (and importantly), the investigations ascertained 
a clear lack of qualified personnel.
– In almost no municipality was there a systematic and adequate inspec-
tion of the licences. If there were inspections, they usually did not take 
place at a time the building was thoroughly used. As an indication: hore-
ca proprietors mentioned that in the five-years period of 1996-2001, 20% 
of them were never inspected, and 75% only once. This period includes 
the first months after the Volendam disaster, when many municipalities 
carried out inspections in horeca establishments. Eighty percent of the 
municipalities did not pay attention to the number of visitors during in-
spections.
– In most municipalities, a good foundation for the enforcement policy 
was lacking. Generally, norms and guidelines were lacking on the basis 
of which licences might be granted and enforcement executed. The IOOV 
(2002*) gave only 65% of the municipalities a pass for the structural policy 
with regard to the granting of licences; for enforcement, this was not more 
169 The Prevention Action Plan, published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1997*), gives 
detailed guidelines for the inspection of fire safety in buildings. These guidelines give each 
type of building a priority. Depending on the priority provided in the guidelines an indica-
tion is given of the number of hours required for the granting and inspection of a license, 
as well as an inspection frequency.
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than 37%.170 The Fire Brigade, to which the task of fire safety was usually 
mandated, had little legal knowledge and was not backed by the legal 
departments of the municipality. Real enforcement was therefore excep-
tional.
These observations caused a major increase in municipal effort in fire safety 
enforcement, especially relating to horeca establishments. Municipalities 
began to eliminate the backlogs in use licenses and to regularly inspect the 
licensed buildings. Due to the Volendam disaster, horeca establishments were 
labeled as having the highest priority.
11.3 The enforcement problems and actions of recent years
The Alders Committee (2001*), which investigated the Volendam disaster, 
concluded that the enforcement of the use requirements was far below stan-
dard. Many municipalities launched new programs to grant licenses and 
enforce fire safety regulations. These conclusions and actions do not stand 
alone. They fit into a more general description of the state of administrative 
enforcement around 2000.
11.3.1 The ‘enforcement deficit’
In 1998, the Michiels Committee concluded that the government was seri-
ously lacking in the enforcement of its adopted rules.171 This “enforcement 
deficit ” appeared to exist in many fields, from environmental to fire safety, 
from European subsidies to school inspections. For fire safety, the committee 
concluded that there was a serious backlog in granting (use) licenses and that 
the inspection of compliance with the rules was not as required. The work 
of the Michiels Committee led in 2000 to the Project ‘High Quality Enforce-
ment ’, aimed at supporting lower governments in their enforcement efforts 
and eliminating the enforcement deficits that had been detected. 
Several disasters alerted the general public to these problems. The two 
most important ones are the fire in café “’t Hemeltje” in Volendam on 1 Janu-
ary 2001, and the fireworks disaster in Enschede. On 13 May 2000, a fireworks 
trade company exploded in the middle of a residential area in the municipal-
ity of Enschede, leading to 22 dead, approximately 950 wounded, and much 
material damage. In both cases, the primary responsibility rested with the 
170 See also the references in note 174.
171 Michiels Committee (1998*), officially the Committee Administrative and Private Law 
Enforcement. This committee followed on the work of several prior committees. Van 
de Peppel (2006*) provides a retrospective on the Michiels Committee and the notion of 
enforcement deficits.
192 Chapter 11
entrepreneur, but the government was also to blame for failing to grant and/
or inspect the necessary licenses. Since several governmental agencies had 
failed to supervise the licenses, the entrepreneurs did not feel the responsi-
bility to take the regulations seriously and accidents could therefore end in 
disasters.
The reports by the Oosting (Enschede) and Alders (Volendam) inves-
tigating committees initiated much attention for the problems regarding 
both regulation and enforcement, and especially for fire safety. DHV (2002*) 
reported that regulation is complex, in content as well as form, and is experi-
enced as inaccessible by the business community as well as the executing and 
enforcing institutions. In addition, the coordination between the departments 
involved is insufficient. There are no real contradictions in the system or the 
text of the regulations: the large number of complaints about the conflicts 
of requirements usually concern conflicts in interests (for instance a horeca 
establishment in a monumental building).172
Moreover, studies by the Ministry of Justice have shown that the number 
of regulations is rather high,173 forcing the authorities to set priorities. Howev-
er, reports also revealed that in most municipalities, a good foundation for the 
policy is lacking. Norms and guidelines are usually lacking concerning which 
licenses are granted and when enforcement is executed.174 These problems are 
accompanied by a quantitative and qualitative personnel shortage.
11.3.2 The response
As a consequence, the attention for administrative enforcement has strongly 
increased. In response to the Oosting and Alders Committees, large-scale 
action programs have been adopted to reform both regulation and enforce-
ment. The level of resources for enforcement has increased, at least in relation 
to other budget alternatives. The detection of enforcement problems has led 
to different kinds of policy initiatives. At the national level, the work of the 
Michiels Committee led to the project ‘High Quality Enforcement ’, followed 
by ‘Rich in Enforcement’ and ‘Enforcement with Effect’. There is an ‘Expert 
Centre Law Enforcement’, a ‘Service Centre Enforcement’, a ‘Taskforce Suc-
ceeding in Safety’, and a ‘Complaints Office Conflicting Rules’, usually 
supported by their own websites. The idea of ‘programmed’ and ‘integral’ 
enforcement is stimulated .175 Instruments such as the ‘Table-of-eleven ’ and 
172 See also reports by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Contradictory Regulations in Practice, 
in ‘s Hertogenbosch, Maastricht en Arnhem.
173 De Jong and Herweijer (2004*) conclude that the number of valid laws has increased since 
1980 from 1100 to 1800. Other regulations have also strongly increased. ‘High Quality 
Enforcement ’ argues, in accordance with the report of AEF (2005*) that a municipality has 
approximately 500 enforcement tasks.
174 Netherlands Court of Audit (1996*, 2002*, 2005*), IOOV (2002*) and AEF (2002*).
175 See Expert Centre Law Enforcement (2006*).
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the ‘Risk Matrix ’ (Ministry of Justice, 2004 and 2002*) have been developed to 
support municipalities in setting priorities.
These actions have had effect. In many municipalities, plans have been or 
are being developed to intensify and reorganize enforcement. By now, almost 
all municipalities use ‘programmed and integral enforcement’.176 Programmed 
enforcement implies that enforcement proceeds according to plan and not to 
incidents. The enforcement program includes the following parts: (i) the formu-
lation of a view on enforcement, (ii) an inventory of the size of the enforcement 
tasks, (iii) a risk analysis (using the Risk Matrix ), (iv) the establishment of priori-
ties, and (v) an implementation plan for targets, methods and costs. This must 
guarantee that the enforcement process becomes cyclical (including a regular 
evaluation), democratic (the plan must be approved by the council), integral and 
cooperative (it concerns all enforcement tasks, and internal and external officials 
are expected to work together), and transparent (priorities become visible).
11.3.3 Evaluation of these policies
Unfortunately, all these investigations, plans and instruments provide little 
information about the costs, and even less about the benefits of the additional 
enforcement efforts. The Netherlands Court of Audit (2005*) concludes that 
enforcement has indeed become more professional over the past years, but 
that this professionalization has not as yet had much result.177 In three of seven 
fields, the court still detected important enforcement deficit s due to failures 
both in regulation and in enforcement (capacity). Choices and priorities often 
remain implicit. Enforcement officials usually do not know to which extent 
their enforcement efforts contribute to compliance with the regulations and 
to solutions for underlying problems. The risks to which citizens are exposed 
at the chosen level of enforcement remain unknown, and it is unclear how 
and at what price risks can and should be reduced.
In the academic field, several studies have also investigated enforcement 
policies, but they merely describe these policies and/or evaluate them in 
terms of their judicial merits. Sometimes, the level of compliance is discussed 
and the effects of the policy are described, but the effectiveness or efficiency 
of the policy are hardly ever examined or discussed.178 The same is true of 
176 See Expert Centre Law Enforcement (2006*). The Service Centre Law Enforcement esti-
mates that in early 2007, 85% of the municipalities had an enforcement program. See also 
Boek and Michiels (2006*) and Boek (2006*) for a description of ‘High Quality Enforce-
ment’ and programmed enforcement.
177 See also Leeuw and Willemsen (2006*). See, furthermore, the Michiels Committee (1998*) 
and the Netherlands Court of Audit (1996*, 2002*, 2005*). Similarly, Voermans (2007*) 
questions the effectivenessis of the project ‘High Quality Enforcement’.
178 See for example Huisman (2001*), Hoitink and Michiels (1993*), Blomberg and Michiels 
(1997*), Van der Tak (1988*), Wiering (1999*). See Huisman and Beukelman (2007*) for an 
extensive overview of national and international literature.
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the enforcement style (compliance or deterrence strategies). Both the nation-
al and international literature examine whether these strategies are used.179 
However, whether they are effective, or which is most effective, and under 
which circumstances, is hardly ever tested.
Recently, Leeuw and Willemsen (2006*) have collected evidence on 
enforcement at the national level. They show that national enforcement agen-
cies hardly provide any information about the (social) consequences of their 
actions. Since it is very fashionable to be transparent and informative, many 
of these agencies do provide information about their performances: how 
many schools have been visited, how many sanctions have been imposed, 
how many licenses have been withdrawn, etc. They also investigate customer 
satisfaction and quality management. However, none of these measures guar-
antees that inspection and enforcement is effective, let alone efficient. Their 
conclusions match those of the Netherlands Court of Audit (2005*). Many 
enforcement agencies have professionalized their organization, but whether 
this has yielded effects for compliance is unknown. Enforcement agencies do 
provide more or less information on their output. However, what we want 
to know is how this output affects the level of compliance, and even more, 
how compliance affects the expected damage and compliance costs (outcome). 
There are, as yet, no data on this relationship.
These conclusions are not typical for the Netherlands. For instance, in the 
UK, a program on Better Regulation has been launched over the past years. 
Reviews by Macrory (2006a, 2006b) conclude that enforcement authorities 
publish on their output, but not on the effectiveness of their enforcement 
policy. “Tangible data is absent in this area” (Macrory, 2006b, p. 24). He rec-
ommends that “regulators and government departments should make every 
effort to identify and measure regulatory outcomes” (p. 32). 
11.3.4 The analysis in the next chapters
In general, there is no knowledge whatsoever about the effectiveness, let 
alone the efficiency of the increased enforcement efforts. I therefore focus on a 
specific problem in the hope that this knowledge may be available at a lower 
level. I investigate the enforcement policies of the use requirements for fire 
safety in horeca establishments which are enforced at the local level.
The next chapters all deal with a part of the main question: what is an 
effective and efficient enforcement policy for enforcing fire safety in horeca 
establishments? Given the lack of direct available data on enforcement, com-
pliance and expected damage, several alternative methods are employed to 
collect and analyze the enforcement policy. Chapter 12 analyzes the current 
administrative enforcement policy. I describe how I obtained information 
about the enforcement policy of municipalities by interviewing enforcement 
179 See the references in note 128.
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officials and collecting the available policy documents. I investigate to what 
extent this policy is in line with the description in part I of an optimal enforce-
ment policy. In chapter 13 I use the data available in national reports and 
supplemented by experts to examine whether the policy of municipalities 
following the Volendam disaster passes a cost-benefit-analysis. In chapter 14 
I search parliamentary documents, newspapers and information of relevant 
organizations to collect data on the settlement of the damage claims of the 
victims of the Volendam disaster. I analyze this settlement process to learn 
whether private enforcement by victims is effective in inducing proprietors 
to take precautions against fire damage. Finally, in chapter 15 I integrate all 
the available information that I can find to simulate enforcement policies for a 
representative municipality. This simulation investigates which enforcement 
policy is efficient.

12 Analyzing current municipal enforcement 
policies: Which strategy is effective?
In this and the next chapter I analyze the municipal enforcement policies as 
they were implemented in response to the Volendam disaster. This chapter 
evaluates the enforcement policies in 13 municipalities in light of the econom-
ic literature discussed in part I. In section 12.1 I first describe how I obtained 
information on these municipalities. In section 12.2 I give a general descrip-
tion of the enforcement policy in these municipalities. In the following sec-
tions I analyze this policy, from the perspective of the issues covered in part 
I of this thesis. Section 12.3 discusses whether the observed policy confirms 
the Harrington Paradox. Section 12.4 analyzes whether the observed use of 
a compliance strategy is justified. Section 12.5 discusses the legal constraints 
applying to the fire safety enforcement officials. Section 12.6 returns to the 
general policy developments described in the previous chapter: to what ex-
tent have these led to an improvement in enforcement actions for fire safety 
regulation in horeca establishments? Section 12.7 concludes.180 The next chap-
ter considers the benefits and costs of these policies.
12.1 Data collection for municipalities’ enforcement policies
The analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the enforcement policies 
requires information on these policies. Several national reports exist that will 
be used in chapter 13 in a nationwide cost-benefit analysis (e.g. IOOV, 2002*, 
AEF, 2002*, and AVD, 2004*) as well as on websites reported in section 11.3.2. 
However, these suffer from the same problem as most enforcement informa-
tion: these sources mostly provide information concerning output, and hard-
ly any information concerning outcome.
In order to obtain more information on enforcement policies, I try to 
obtain information at the local level, from municipalities. In 13 municipali-
ties I investigate current enforcement policies and interviewed local officials.181 
This investigation serves two goals. First, together with the national reports, 
it should provide a description of the actual enforcement actions of munici-
palities. Secondly, information and expertise at the local level should yield 
insight into the effectiveness of these enforcement actions. By analyzing the 
180 The analysis in this chapter, especially sections 12.1 to 12.4, is also presented (in a shorter 
version) in Suurmond (2007).
181 Appendix 1 provides a list of persons interviewed, the municipalities they belong to and 
some more background on these interviews. 
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enforcement policies of different municipalities and/or in different years, a 
judgment about the most effective and efficient policy should be possible.
This research focuses on the current administrative enforcement policy 
following the Volendam disaster.
12.1.1 The relevant factors and the required information
What are the relevant enforcement factors? How is compliance by horeca pro-
prietors explained?
First, we need information on the quantity and level of enforcement actions 
as well as the number of violations. How do horeca proprietors pass through the 
enforcement chain? How many inspections are performed? How many viola-
tions are found? Which actions are undertaken against these violations?
In the second place, we must focus on the characteristics of the Fire Depart-
ment, as well as the other relevant departments and their officials. Part I of this 
thesis reveals that the level of compliance does not only depend on the expected 
level of the sanctioning risk and the quantity of the enforcement actions, but 
also on the manner in which they are executed, in other words, ‘the quality’. The 
most important factors are the enforcement style applied by the enforcement 
officials (a compliance or deterrence strategy) and how they use their discretion 
or what they want to achieve by their enforcement efforts (the objective). It is 
also important to know to which extent the enforcement officials are informed 
about the costs of compliance and the expected damage.
Finally, we want to know whether the effect of enforcement depends on 
the characteristics of horeca proprietors. First of all, the level of compliance 
can be explained by the level of the costs of compliance. Which factors explain 
differences in compliance costs? And what are the other relevant constraints 
on compliance and/or characteristics which explain differences in the level of 
compliance? How relevant are other compliance motives, such as concerns for 
one’s reputation or (intrinsic) concern for customers? And to what extent are the 
proprietors informed about fire safety rules and the enforcement policy?
12.1.2 Sources of information
I investigate three possible sources of information. First, I study the written 
material including policy documents and plans, (annual or quarterly) reports 
concerning fire safety, information brochures, websites, etc. I could find this 
information on the municipality’s website myself, or asked the municipality to 
send me the documents. Secondly, I investigate whether the municipality and 
Fire Brigade possessed useful databases of enforcement actions, compliance 
levels etc. Finally, I conduct interviews with enforcement officials and propri-
etors to obtain relevant information that is not available in a written source.
Sixteen municipalities were selected beforehand, from four Fire Depart-
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ment Regions, in order to create a representative selection of all Dutch munic-
ipalities with more than 15,000 and less than 250,000 inhabitants and at least 
20 horeca establishments. Regions were selected in such a way that the geo-
graphical spread included rural, urban and touristy municipalities, as well as 
those celebrating Carnival.
12.1.3 Response and available information
Thirteen municipalities were willing to cooperate. In these municipalities, I 
studied the available policy documents and interviewed one or more offi-
cials. No databases were available which contained detailed information on 
all enforcement steps. Some municipalities do have (computer) databases, 
but these only store information concerning the granting of licenses, and 
occasionally on when (official) inspections are held and whether formal sanc-
tions are imposed. The (more important) process around each inspection and 
the findings of these inspections are not systematically collected.
Therefore the major information has to come from interviews with local 
officials. In each municipality I interviewed officials with three types of func-
tions (which are sometimes represented by one and the same person, so that less 
than three interviews were conducted): (i) executive officials, managers, who 
are responsible for policy plans, priorities, finance etc.; (ii) inspectors, usually 
from the Fire Brigade, responsible for the actual inspection of horeca establish-
ments; (iii) officials concerned with legal actions (including sanctions).182 The 
interviews were conducted with a basically unstructured list of questions.
The interviews with horeca proprietors were not successful and/or failed 
to provide relevant information. Their self-reports concerning compliance and 
enforcement actions were too general, unreliable or even invalid. In a first try-
out, I had the impression that the proprietors were giving ‘desirable’ answers 
(despite my assurance that I was not in any way connected to the municipal-
ity), especially concerning their compliance behavior. They all assured me 
that they fully complied (“of course”, “never something wrong”). They only 
provided very general answers about the costs of compliance (“takes much 
time”, “fire safety is exaggerated”). If asked about the costs of compliance, 
they most often referred to the costs they made in the course of obtaining a 
use license. Finally, they were unable to provide more precise information 
about the inspections (frequency, duration etc.) of the fire safety department. I 
have therefore not invested further in collecting information from horeca pro-
182 Sometimes the officials are employed at different departments, like the Fire Department 
(inspection) and the Building Inspection (licenses). In addition, back-up is often provided 
by the Legal Department or the Department of General Affairs. I use the term fire safety 
department to mean the department or departments that are charged of granting and 
inspecting use licenses and imposing sanctions.
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prietors. They did not provide information about the relationship between 
enforcement activities and their own behavior, or about the costs and benefits 
of compliance. It was my estimation that the most reliable information about 
enforcement actions came from the municipalities themselves.
12.1.4 Interviews and interpretation of the results
Given the lack of detailed, written, objective information on compliance lev-
els, the main sources of information are interviews with the enforcement offi-
cials. This implies that an evidence-based conclusion about the effectiveness 
or efficiency of enforcing fire safety is not possible on the basis of these data.183 
Besides the information available in the written material, the data consist of 
answers, impressions and opinions of the enforcement officials.
That does not imply that these data are useless. On the contrary. Given 
the lack of quantitative data, interviews are an important tool to obtain more 
detailed (qualitative) information about enforcement actions, compliance 
and the interaction between enforcement officials and proprietors. Based on 
the interviews, the additional written material and the national reports, it is 
possible to offer a picture of the enforcement policies and actions of fire safe-
ty departments. That has merit on its own, because we need to know more 
about actual enforcement policies. Moreover, the interviews and the policy 
documents enable a critical evaluation of this policy in the light of the litera-
ture discussed in part I. I try to explain the observed policy, its effects, and the 
observed level of compliance. At first sight, the observed enforcement policy 
confirms the Harrington Paradox : despite the low expected sanctions, the 
level of compliance seems to be pretty high. Moreover, the observed enforce-
ment policy fits the description of a compliance strategy. The following sec-
tions analyze these two observations after describing the policy itself.
12.2 Description of current municipal enforcement policies
Let me try to summarize the most important observations concerning the 
common enforcement policy and actions in the 13 municipalities. What 
this research brought to light confirms the information from other sources 
describing the national and local approach to fire safety.184 It appears that the 
enforcement actions of municipalities do not seem to differ greatly, at least 
183 A related problem is that there is too little variance (in time, between municipalities) to be 
able to compare different strategies. There is no ‘control group’. All municipalities began 
intensifying enforcement following ‘Volendam’ and the accompanying investigating 
report and action program. There is no research for the period prior to Volendam.
184 See for instance AEF (2002*) and AVD (2004*), newspaper articles and municipal policy 
documents. See also the more general enforcement studies and websites discussed in sec-
tion 11.3.
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not when it comes to actual actions and impressions of compliance by propri-
etors. If relevant I describe the differences. Otherwise I speak of the municipal 
enforcement policy that might be considered as the general policy that all 
municipalities apply.
Granting use licenses and history prior to Volendam
Prior to the years 2000/2001 (the Volendam disaster ), most municipalities 
did not have a structured supervision of fire safety in horeca establishments, 
although a number of municipalities had launched some kind of use license -
policy. They carried out only repressive inspections, and did so scarcely, as 
well as an occasional action during Carnival.
– Two municipalities did, in 2004, not as yet have a policy, although they 
were aware that they should start one, and their supervision of the use of 
buildings was uncoordinated.
– One municipality did not grant licences, but inspected cafés every year at 
Carnival.
– Four municipalities had (recently) adopted a policy plan, that sometimes 
had also been launched but was far from completed. These plans focused 
especially on granting licences (rather than on inspection).
– Two municipalities began granting licences a longer time ago but had 
not as yet finished and did not always have a full inspection and sanction 
policy.
– Four municipalities had mostly licensed horeca establishments, although 
the licences were in some cases outdated. Only one municipality had a 
policy of periodical inspections, once per two years. Two others carried 
out inspections every year at Carnival.
The municipalities differ in their opinion concerning the disaster in Volen-
dam and the catching-up required. Some argue that ‘Volendam’ might have 
happened anywhere while others argue that what happened there was excep-
tional and should in principle not be possible in their municipality. There is, 
however, no relationship between these comments and the extent to which the 
municipalities in question have or had an active enforcement policy. Almost 
every municipality indicates that, over the past years, the willingness and 
cooperation of horeca proprietors has increased, that horeca proprietors are 
better informed about the rules, and that fire safety has therefore improved. 
On the other hand, five municipalities warn against an ‘exaggerated’ reaction 
(“witch hunt”) following the Volendam disaster and two others warn that 
actions should not lead to ‘paper safety’. 
Aims of fire safety department, political involvement and organization
The aim of most fire safety departments is either seeking maximal or suffi-
cient fire safety, or achieving the legal standards (as a minimum safety level 
or just because it is legally required). Most officials argue that they do take the 
costs and ‘reasonability’ into account, but do not accept deviations from the 
legal obligations. The flexibility lies in the time that is allowed for taking the 
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necessary precautions. There is also some flexibility in applying equivalent 
solutions, but this only applies to granting licenses and construction or instal-
lation requirements.
The fire safety department functions quite independently. Although the 
political attention for fire safety is (much) stronger than before, the politi-
cal involvement with fire safety policy is low. Since Volendam (2001), almost 
every municipality has some policy, but the political administration mere-
ly approves the plans made by the fire safety department. The only active 
involvement consists of requiring that such plans are made and of setting 
priorities for granting licenses. The daily activities are not strictly monitored 
by political powers. The financing of fire safety departments with respect 
to enforcement consists of a lump sum. The granting of licenses is financed 
through legal fees.
Objective and method of inspections
All municipalities stress the importance of informing the horeca proprietors 
about the regulation and about compliance. They argue that information and 
explanation (1) create an understanding of the rules and of the importance of 
complying with the rules, and (2) alerts horeca proprietors to their own respon-
sibility, and thus leads to cooperation and eventually compliance. Fire safety is 
something all proprietors have to be reminded of now and then. In addition, 
there are always some troublemakers who must be kept on a tight leash.
Therefore, most municipalities say they begin with a cooperat ive atti-
tude, aimed at informing, advising and persuading the proprietor to comply. 
Inspection is only a random indication, in which the personal responsibility 
of the proprietor is emphasized (personal responsibility is mentioned by all 
officials, directly in 8 municipalities, indirectly in the others). However, if the 
proprietor is not going to comply, a more stringent policy is adopted which 
may eventually lead to sanctions (more ‘police-like enforcement’). External, 
private consultancy firms are judged to be more ‘police-like’. Moreover sev-
eral officials stress that they do try to be kind and cooperative, but simultane-
ously try to keep distance in order to show that enforcement is taken seriously. 
This allows them to easily switch to a more formal approach if necessary. For 
example, some argue that they do not always accept coffee or other drinks, so 
that they do not owe the proprietor anything.
View on horeca proprietors
Most municipalities are quite satisfied with the cooperation of horeca propri-
etors, although there is always a group of unwilling proprietors. Most munic-
ipalities indicate that this group is maximally 20%. As mentioned above, all 
municipalities argue that the willingness and cooperation of horeca propri-
etors has improved over the last years, because they are better informed and 
more willing to comply, because they are more conscious of the importance 
of compliance, and/or because they fear their own liability in case of a fire. 
Three municipalities complain (more extensively) about cooperation. They 
argue that horeca proprietors are only willing to comply as long as it is not too 
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expensive. This is particularly problematic in cases involving ‘contradictory 
requirements’ (requiring expensive solutions) or fear of bankruptcy (so that 
proprietors do not want to spend money on fire safety).
Two municipalities indicate that the relationship between the fire safety 
department and the horeca proprietors is reminiscent of an ‘old-boys-net-
work’. Most of the other municipalities say that they are familiar with the 
proprietors they are dealing with at a general level.
The extent to which proprietors are informed about the rules seems to dif-
fer. Two municipalities argue that proprietors are very well informed about 
the rules. Most others argue that they are generally informed about the rules, 
while one states that they are only moderately informed. Most argue that the 
horeca proprietors themselves do not realize the risk of fire safety but only do 
so because of the actions of the fire safety department.
Concerning other characteristics, the reports do not include many systemat-
ic and consistent differences between different types of horeca establishments. 
The only important thing mentioned by several officials is that (small) bars or 
restaurants that have recently been established and/or are struggling to sur-
vive, are less willing to comply, and that the larger establishments are more 
accustomed to regulation and enforcement. Other points are reported by one or 
only a few officials, such as the fact that non-Dutch proprietors cause somewhat 
more trouble because communication is difficult. However, it is also argued that 
this only makes a difference during the period of re-inspections. The “Mediter-
ranean” (Greek, Turkish, Moroccan, etc.) and the “Asian” proprietors do try to 
negotiate more on the necessary improvements (“this way good too?”). On the 
other hand, a uniform has more authority for these proprietors. The Mediterra-
nean proprietors are often not members of the sector organization Royal Horeca 
Netherlands (RHN) plays a double role. On the one hand, it is an important dis-
cussion partner which can be helpful in passing on information, contacting the 
target group, and increasing cooperation. On the other hand, RHN also requests 
‘sweeping actions’ and a more stringent approach, because this will harm the 
establishments not connected to the organization. The smaller bars in the neigh-
borhood do seem to be less aware or frightened from the possibility of a fire 
(“nothing will happen here”). The often older proprietors were not raised with 
fire safety regulations and often either are or play at being ignorant. Anyhow, 
for characteristics like these the interviewees do mention differences between 
proprietors or between establishments, but it remains unknown how these dif-
ferences affect compliance behavior. 
Inspections
a. Periodical. In fact, all municipalities inspect, or try to inspect horeca es-
tablishments periodically once a year. All municipalities but one usually 
carry out their inspections during the day, most often either announced 
or by appointment. However, not all municipalities are yet ready to begin 
a structured inspection of licenced horeca establishments.
 Most periodical inspections are performed by one inspector. The time 
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per inspection varies from 20-30 minutes to 45-60 minutes. This excludes 
travel time and administration.
b. Action. Most municipalities carry out some kind of action around either 
Christmas or Carnival. In the last years, the horeca sector was often a pri-
ority. However, some municipalities indicate that there will in future not 
always be a horeca action, but that other themes may be chosen (e.g. care 
institutes, churches). These inspections usually consist of a quick sight 
spot that lasts about 10-20 minutes and is done by 1 or 2 inspectors, de-
pendending among other things on whether it is a joint (integral) action 
with other governmental agencies. Such actions focus on the establish-
ments located in the centre or other important areas in which many estab-
lishments are grouped together.
 In addition to these actions, municipalities also carry out inspections dur-
ing special events or feasts. Especially the smaller villages have 1 or 2 
local events per year. Preceding or during these events, the fire safety de-
partment inspects the fire safety. This is especially important when spe-
cial tents are put up.
c. Repressive. Every municipality takes reports seriously, but they are not 
judged to be important. No municipality has experience with reports 
leading to sanctions. The violations found during repressive inspections 
are not deviant from those encountered during regular inspections.
Violations
Almost every municipality indicates that they are able to detect at least one 
violation in almost every establishment (more than 90%). What’s more, even 
if the inspectors are not over-zealous, most establishments must improve 
compliance on some points. The number of troublemakers who are not will-
ing to cooperate and/or inclined to comply, is estimated at about 10-20%.
With respect to the actions, hardly any violations were found that are spe-
cifically related to Christmas or Carnival (such as decorations). With respect 
to the specific violations the following can be observed:
– Failures in escape-route signs are most common. This violation is men-
tioned as the most frequent violation. However, municipalities differ in 
the evaluation of the seriousness of this violation and in the way they 
respond to it.
– Blocking the emergency exits is seen as one of the most serious viola-
tions. However, since most inspections take place during the day and an-
nounced, it is not known how this rule is complied to during full use. This 
also holds for the maximum number of visitors allowed.
– Emergency exits are regularly observed to be locked. Discotheques wish 
in this way to prevent youngsters from entering without payment. Other 
establishments wish to be sufficiently burglar-proof. In some cases, a pro-
prietor may have no time or inclination to unlock the exits every time 
someone is present.
– Decorations have improved over the past years. In reaction to the Volen-
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dam disaster, the inspection of decorations has increased. New decora-
tions is almost always impregnated according to the norms. The prob-
lems arise with old decorations. Some municipalities say that due to the 
trouble of strict inspections, proprietors have decided to reduce the (tem-
porary) decorations in their establishment (only one municipality states 
that decorations are still a recurring problem).
– Since fire extinguishers are certified by private companies and most es-
tablishments now conclude service-included contracts with these compa-
nies (sometimes following the advice or pressure from the fire safety de-
partment), compliance has improved and is no longer a major problem. 
However, some report that problems arise because the private companies 
fail to fullfil their obligations.
Re-inspections and sanctions
The cooperative proprietors in particular tend to restore compliance follow-
ing an inspection. The troublemakers often try to stretch the process. Some 
municipalities choose to always (or almost always) re-inspect. Others choose 
to re-inspect only in cases of more serious violations and/or if proprietors are 
judged to be uncooperative. In these cases too, re-inspection occurs in more 
than 50% of the cases.
Hardly any formal sanctions are imposed, except at the stage of granting 
use licenses. If municipalities were to impose such sanctions, they would use 
penal sums and the temporary closing of the establishment (until the necessary 
improvements had been carried out). Several municipalities complain about 
the ineffectiveness of administrative sanctions and procedure. Horeca propri-
etors are able to stretch the process. Troublemakers are often smaller establish-
ments that have recently been founded and/or are likely to go bankrupt soon. 
Many Fire Departments are afraid of the legal requirements they must fulfill 
in order to impose (administrative) sanctions. Furthermore, these departments 
report (especially in cases involving licenses) that they often are uncertain as to 
who the sanction should apply to: the owner or the tenant. Moreover, once they 
are finally ready to execute a sanction, the ownership-structure is sometimes 
changed so that they have to start the whole enforcement process anew.
Some municipalities indicate that they have difficulty enforcing the num-
ber of visitors. First, it is difficult to determine the number of people inside. 
Unless the fire safety department uses costly tools, it can only give a general 
estimation of the number of people present and the proprietor can contest 
this estimation. Secondly, sanctioning is difficult because of the fear of viola-
tion of public order. If an establishment is suddenly closed, it creates a lot of 
trouble due to the sudden large number of people on the street. The Mayor 
is often not inclined to carry out such closings, nor is the police (if they are 
present at all). Therefore, the general solution is to ensure that no one may 
any longer enter the establishment, only exit (flowing off). Note however that 
many municipalities do not inspect the number of visitors at all, so that these 
discussions are partially theoretical. Moreover, several municipalities report 
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that the number of visitors is not easily violated. There is usually enough 
opportunity to fill up the horeca establishment. Horeca proprietors are glad 
if the establishment is completely filled, but their own maximum is often also 
the maximum number that is stipulated in the use license.
Criminal law enforcement is possible but does not occur (except for one 
Christmas action). Public Prosecutors and Police do not have (or make) time 
for it.
Many problems arise when several municipal departments are forced to 
cooperate, for example because the department granting licenses (e.g. Build-
ing Inspection), the one responsible for inspections (e.g. Fire Department) and 
the one that imposes sanctions (e.g. Legal Department) or registers the collec-
tion of sanctions (e.g. Finance), all use different computer systems. Moreover, 
the other departments (may) give fire safety less priority than the Fire Depart-
ment, so that files remain open.
Miscellaneous
The following interesting points also arose:
– Municipalities themselves are often very slow in installing fire safety de-
vices in their own buildings (and/or in applying for use licences).
– The image of external, private firms which help to grant licenses, and in 
the future possibly also to inspect them is mixed. On the one hand, some 
argue that these firms are objective and obey procedures, while the fire 
safety department is not evaluated by anyone and may have a double hat. 
On the other hand, it is argued that external, private firms are too strict 
in applying rules and are unable to provide made-to-measure solutions. 
Moreover, the quality of their work is poorer because they are often only 
jugded on the number of licenses that is granted and because of a person-
nel shortage. Due to the increase in enforcement following Volendam, 
“masses of people have taken a course”, so that the quality of inspectors 
diminishes and experienced personnel is scarce.
– Almost no municipalities advocate a system in which establishments re-
ceive an identifying mark that expresses the safety of their building. An 
inspection only provides a random indication and should therefore not 
be followed by a mark with long-term validity.
– One of the interviewees mentioned that “there are thousands of rules that 
you should enforce. Rotterdam once began counting, but stopped at 4000. 
I have heard the number 7000 mentioned. All things with which a munici-
pality is concerned and that you might potentially enforce. But should 
you? A research bureau by order of Justice comes to 300-400 enforcement 
tasks that you can reasonably pick up. For a relatively small organisation 
that is still quite substantial.” And another one: “For an information af-
ternoon for the horeca I counted how many governmental organizations 
a horeca company is involved with. I came up with 26 departments (of 
which fire safety is one).” Yet another: “16 departments are concerned 
with the enforcement consultation”.
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12.3 A Harrington Paradox?
Several studies have identified a Harrington Paradox (section 8.1), which 
implies that there is a puzzling paradox between the level of compliance and 
the expected sanction. At least the first two observations of Harrington (1988) 
are confirmed here. The frequency of inspection is low and predictable, and 
sanctions are small, almost absent. The level of compliance is more compli-
cated. Enforcement officials indicate that they do find many violations during 
inspections, yet they argue that the level of fire safety is in general sufficient-
ly high. In this section, I investigate whether we can indeed observe a Har-
rington Paradox. I argue that the observed enforcement policy fits well with 
the general rational choice explanation. The level of compliance corresponds 
to the level of the expected sanction.
12.3.1 Low inspection rates?
Most bars and restaurants are inspected once a year (besides re-inspections). 
Bars and sometimes restaurants in the centre of the city often face an addi-
tional inspection during events or feast periods. Given the low penalties, 
this might seem to provide insufficient incentive to comply. However, a dis-
tinction should be made between two types of requirements. Some require-
ments concern continued daily attention on the part of the proprietor, such 
as keeping escape-routes free, carefully handling candle lights and limiting 
the number of visitors. For these types of requirements, an annual inspection 
is insufficient; even weekly inspections might be ineffective. Other require-
ments, however, concern the maintenance of technical devices requiring an 
annual check up, such as the escape-route signs, the fire extinguishers and the 
decorations. If the municipality carries out one inspection a year, it can induce 
the proprietor to carry out this type of check-up and guarantee that he is in 
compliance for the rest of the year.
Moreover, there are several reasons why a low inspection rate does not 
necessarily imply that serious non-compliance remains undetected. If the 
proprietor severely violates the rules, this fact is likely to be observed and 
reported to the fire safety department: visitors, who are not generally afraid 
of insufficient precautions, will be concerned about serious threats to life and 
body, or at least one of them will. In addition, other municipal departments 
are very likely to take notice and inform the fire safety department. For exam-
ple, a bar or restaurant is also inspected for hygiene, serving liquor, public 
order, etc. These inspectors might not notice minor violations, but will most 
certainly report severe violations or a broad non-compliance record concern-
ing all regulations. Finally, a bar or restaurant that has been shown to commit 
serious violations will sometimes be inspected more often and at least more 
thoroughly and more strictly.
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12.3.2 The threat of sanctions
Formal sanctions, and particularly criminal sanctions, are hardly ever carried 
out. However, this does not imply that there is no threat of sanctions. Again, 
we have to distinguish between the serious violations and the minor ones.
For serious violations, the threat of sanctions suffices to induce propri-
etors to comply. For these violations, criminal prosecution is a real possibility. 
Moreover, if a proprietor commits such a serious violation, the municipality 
can close the establishment until the violation has ended. The use of these 
sanctions is credible. If the fire safety department can show that there is real 
danger, the municipality will not want to risk ignoring its responsibility and 
being blamed for inertia if something happens. The threat of these sanctions 
seems to be sufficiently high in relation to the costs of compliance, so that 
almost all proprietors comply. As a consequence, the real imposition of these 
sanctions is hardly ever observed.
Minor violations are a different story. They do not involve the threat of crim-
inal prosecution or immediate closure. On the contrary, should the inspectors 
detect non-compliance the proprietor will receive a (written) notification that he 
must restore compliance. The fire safety department will almost always carry 
out a re-inspection. If the proprietor has adequately responded to this warn-
ing, no further action is undertaken. If the proprietor ignores the warning, the 
threat of sanctions becomes increasingly more severe. Usually, after 2 or 3 re-
inspections, the municipality will issue a formal warning that the proprietor 
must restore compliance failing which he will have to forfeit a penal sum or his 
establishment will be closed. These formal sanctions do not have to be imposed 
very often, and the actual operation of the threat is never used. The threat of 
a legal procedure and of formal repair sanctions is sufficient to enforce com-
pliance, even for uncooperative proprietors. The administrative sanctions are 
expensive for proprietors. If they are actually imposed, the financial costs can be 
quite high. Moreover, just the time and procedure involved in (re-)inspections is 
expensive for proprietors, especially if the proprietor knows that in the end he 
will only be able to pacify the fire safety department by complying.
In fact, the policy in cases of minor violations is a variant of the state-
dependent, targeting enforcement policy proposed by Harrington (1988) and 
others.185 Harrington (1988) demonstrates that it might be effective to use a 
system of warnings in which firms are in first instance not sanctioned but 
moved to a target group. If the firm repeats its violation in this target group, 
it is sanctioned. This is what happens when following a first inspection the 
proprietor is given a warning. It appears that this almost always suffices to 
induce compliance in the target group. As a consequence, sanctioning in the 
non-target group is absent and observed compliance is high. Proprietors have 
no incentive to choose compliance from the beginning but can await inspec-
tion and see whether they are moved to the target group.
185 See section 5.3.
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There is one important problem reported by several municipalities. Propri-
etors who do not do well and fear bankruptcy, seem not to care much about 
the (financial) consequences of sanctions. They already assume that they will 
go bankrupt and do not care whether this happens as a result of administra-
tive sanctions or for other reasons. These proprietors take every opportunity 
to postpone or even escape current expenses on fire safety. They are therefore 
the ones who cause most problems and for whom the fire safety department 
is most strict and inflexible.
12.3.3 The level of compliance
Although there are no hard data concerning the level of compliance, there 
is at least an impression from the enforcement officials and some evidence 
concerning the actions they undertake. They do not detect many situations 
in which the technical state of the establishment requires immediate action. 
Only one of the thirteen municipalities reported such a situation over the past 
years. Given the expected threat of sanctions, this is in accordance with the 
general economic model. The enforcement officials also failed to find serious 
violations of the regulations that require continued attention of the propri-
etor. However, given that they generally carry out announced inspections in 
the daytime, it is not unexpected that they should fail to detect many of these 
violations. Moreover, if they do observe for instance that an escape-route is 
blocked, this might be, and often is immediately corrected, so that no further 
action is taken.
Minor violations are very often detected. Enforcement officials report that 
there is always something wrong. In less than 10% of inspections does the 
report state that there were no failures at all. In more than 50% of the cases, the 
enforcement officials announce a re-inspection. Apparently, in these cases, 
there were enough violations to warrant a re-inspection.
With respect to the different type of requirements, the following observa-
tions can be made:
– The maximum number of visitors is problematic for only some of the 
establishments. Some proprietors do not want to exceed the maximum 
themselves because they want to have sufficient space for their visitors. 
Other establishments do not tend to attract such numbers of visitors that 
the maximum number would be violated.
– Easily accessible emergency exits are especially problematic for disco-
theques, because these establishments want to prevent youngsters from 
entering without payment. For other establishments, the problem is 
sometimes caused by the fact that emergency exits are not sufficiently 
burglar-proof. Alternatively, in some cases the proprietor has to unlock 
the exits every time someone is present (for which he may have no time or 
inclination).
– Temporarily blocked emergency exits (because of a table or beer crate) 
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can hardly be prevented through administrative repair sanctions. Such 
violations would never lead to an official sanction. If an inspector detects 
the violation, the proprietor can easily remove the object blocking the exit. 
Since he is then in compliance, no sanction can be imposed. Therefore, es-
pecially for this type of violation, fire safety departments plead in favor of 
an administrative fine for repeated violators.
– Since it is quite easy to repair a failing escape-route sign, the proprietor usu-
ally responds to the instruction to repair this type of failure. However, pro-
prietors usually wait with repairing until after they have been inspected. 
Therefore, these violations are very often observed on a first inspection.
– Repairing fire extinguishers is more difficult because this must be done 
by a professional company. Due to the periodical inspections of the fire 
safety department, the proprietor knows that sooner or later he will have 
to certify the fire extinguishers. Therefore, many proprietors have con-
cluded contracts with these certifying companies. This is probably cheap-
er than irregular certification.
– Violations of the decorations are not often detected. Since this was a major 
problem in the Volendam disaster, fire safety departments have been very 
tough with respect to this issue. In response, certification has improved 
and most proprietors only buy certified decorations or simply choose 
not to decorate anymore. However, most fire safety departments inspect 
the decorations especially during Christmas or Carnival. It is unknown 
whether the decorations during soccer matches or other events through-
out the year also satisfy the requirements.
12.3.4 A Harrington Paradox?
The level of compliance is not unexpectedly high relative to the expected sanc-
tion. Enforcement officials do find many minor violations (during a first inspec-
tion) because proprietors are not punished, but only warned that sanctions 
might follow in future. This enforcement policy is as described by Harrington 
(1988). In the first instance, violators are not punished but moved to a target 
group in which they are more closely monitored by means of re-inspections 
until they comply. In response, proprietors choose to delay compliance until 
they are inspected. The only important point is that they should not willingly 
and deliberately create a fire-hazard situation. There is a credible threat of suffi-
ciently high sanctions that proprietors are deterred from these major violations. 
As a consequence, actual imposition of sanctions is hardly ever observed.
Recently, a similar point has been made by Nyborg and Telle (2006). They 
conclude that there is no Harrington Paradox in the compliance with environ-
mental regulation in Norway. For major violations, the threat of punishment 
suffices to induce compliance. For minor violations, enforcement is weak, but 
these violations flourish. Based on the evidence available in the literature, 
they conclude (p. 14): “Thus, until additional empirical evidence is available 
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– for Norway or for other countries – the claims that firms comply with envi-
ronmental regulations to a surprisingly high degree must be regarded as a 
yet unconfirmed myth, rather than as an established fact.” With the addi-
tional evidence presented here for fire safety regulation in the Netherlands 
the claim remains a myth. 
12.4 Is a compliance strategy effective? The defenses analyzed
 The main puzzle to the economic model is not that the level of compliance does 
not correspond to the expected sanction, but why enforcement officials choose a 
cooperative enforcement policy (a compliance strategy) that is different from the 
standard economic model of strict enforcement of offenses (a deterrence strat-
egy). Enforcement officials defend their policy by arguing that advice, persua-
sion and warnings are more effective than direct punishment. They start with 
a cooperative attitude with no intention to immediately prosecute an offense. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with analyzing the use of a compli-
ance strategy. This is an important element of the question which policy is effec-
tive and efficient for enforcing fire safety regulation. In section 12.7 I conclude 
by describing the case of enforcing fire safety regulation in light of the general 
description of section 10.3. Several steps will lead to this conclusion. First, in this 
section, I analyze six general claims of the enforcement officials with respect to 
the desirability of advice, persuasion and warnings. Secondly, in section 12.5, I 
analyze whether the conditions for a failure of a deterrence strategy are satis-
fied. Finally, in section 12.6, I argue that a major problem is the fact that both a 
compliance and a deterrence strategy fail if paperwork and policy development 
dominate actual enforcement actions.
This section analyzes the arguments of the enforcement officials that were 
interviewed in favor of a compliance strategy. These arguments correspond 
to the academic arguments (see chapter 8). In the interviews of the enforce-
ment officials six general claims can be detected that defend a compliance 
strategy. These are analyzed below.
1. Most proprietors are insuffi ciently aware of the regulations, of compli-
ance methods and of (the importance of) fi re safety. Inspection is required 
to explain to the proprietor his failures and the danger of non-compliance. 
Enforcement is characterized by advice.
2. Proprietors can not always help being in non-compliance. Inspection is 
aimed at restoring compliance and thereby fi re safety.
3. Most proprietors are willing to comply. There should therefore be no 
witch-hunt on non-compliance. Inspection is needed to persuade the pro-
prietor that compliance is socially and morally desirable.
4. The problem with imposing sanctions is that many strict legal require-
ments have to be satisfi ed, which costs much time and effort. Inspectors 
achieve more compliance, and they achieve it sooner, through explana-
tion and cooperation.
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5. As long as the proprietor appears to be cooperative, the enforcement offi -
cials are cooperative too. However, should the proprietor turn out to have 
no intention of complying, the offi cials begin a strict, deterrent enforce-
ment strategy. Some say that they do not prosecute every offense. Their 
primary question is: is this establishment fi re-proof? Others disagree and 
regard the legal requirements as a minimum that must be satisfi ed. One 
should not compromise on this issue.
6. Fire safety is the personal responsibility of the proprietor. Inspection is 
only a random indication to stimulate proprietors to take this responsibil-
ity. 
12.4.1 Information and advice – non-compliance by ignorance
 The enforcement officials argue that inspection is needed in order to explain 
to the proprietor the requirements and the importance of fire safety, and to 
show him which shortcomings they observe and how he can deal with these 
shortcomings in the future. Most proprietors are insufficiently aware of the 
regulations. A relaxed, cooperative enforcement style, in which officials 
take time to explain relevant matters to the proprietor, is more effective than 
immediately punishing violations. Therefore, inspectors make appointments 
for inspections and take plenty of time for their inspections.
The theoretical defense
If a proprietor is insufficiently informed about the relevant costs and ben-
efits, he is unable to adequately choose a level of compliance (section 6.1). It 
is likely that proprietors do not naturally possess information about expected 
fire damage as this is relatively expert, technically complicated information . 
How fires occur and spread, how to prevent harm to persons present, etc. is 
not common knowledge. It is not a natural by-product of exploiting a bar or 
restaurant. If the proprietor underestimates the probability of a fire, he will 
fail to sufficiently comply if he is sanctioned for the occurrence of a fire. If 
the proprietor does not know which standards apply, because they are too 
numerous or too vaguely formulated, he may choose either excessive or too 
limited precautions. For example, the fire safety regulations contain require-
ments about the maximum number of seconds before emergency lighting 
should burn in case of a power failure, or the minimum number of minutes 
that escape-route signs have to burn. Proprietors cannot be expected to know 
the regulations in such detail.
Moreover, it may be inefficient for every proprietor to incur the costs of 
fully acquainting himself with the law and the least costly method of compli-
ance. If the costs of public inspections are small relative to those of self-audits 
by firms, the social costs will be lower when local firemen, who naturally pos-
sess this information as part of their job, visit bars and restaurants and share 
this information with the proprietors (section 6.1).
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Evaluating the argument
However, none of this provides a sufficient argument in favor of advice and a 
compliance strategy. The problem of insufficient information about expected 
fire damage might be solved by enforcing in an ‘earlier’ stage (Shavell, 1993; 
section 10.1.1). If proprietors are unable to predict the expected damage (and 
therefore the sanctions), the solution might be to choose for act-based enforce-
ment , in which the proprietors are inspected and sanctioned irrespective of 
the resulting damage. This is precisely what has been observed in the field of 
fire safety in bars and restaurants. Act-based enforcement only requires the 
proprietor to be aware of the act-based standards and of the sanctions that 
might follow.
It is argued that proprietors cannot be expected to know the act-based 
regulations in detail. Actually, the rules are not that difficult. The detailed 
rules about seconds and minutes are captured in other rules that are quite 
easy to remember. For example, replacing the lamps in the escape-route signs 
yearly, checking the emergency lighting on a yearly basis and yearly taking 
care of re-certification of the fire extinguishers, all these guarantee that the 
proprietor will satisfy the detailed requirements on minutes and seconds. The 
rules summarized in section 11.2.1 are not difficult to remember and it is clear 
how proprietors can comply with them. In fact, most fire departments have 
a brochure that quite simply summarizes the fire safety rules. There is no 
reason why public inspection is required in addition to this type of general 
information campaigns.
Moreover, it is not clear why advice should be a continued objective of 
inspections. If a proprietor is informed about the law and compliance meth-
ods, it is expected that he will have this information for quite some time, up 
to several years. There is no fast technological or institutional change making 
information outdated within a year. Enforcement might consist of two stages. 
In the first stage, for example during the granting of the fire safety license, the 
proprietor is informed about the relevant regulations. After that, a deterrence 
strategy can be used in which offenses are adequately sanctioned. 
The argument in favor of advice is usually sustained by referring to the 
fact that inspectors do find many violations during inspections. Many inspec-
tors have the impression that the proprietors do not know or simply are not 
aware of their violations, as in the case of placing a table in front of an emer-
gency exit. However, I believe that this type of behavior is primarily the result 
of a relaxed enforcement strategy. Since violations are not sanctioned (at 
least not immediately), proprietors have no incentive to acquire information 
about their compliance status. If a strict punishment policy were adopted, the 
blocking of emergency exits would soon be over. Proprietors would certainly 
be aware of it.
In summary, fire safety is a technically complex issue. It certainly requires 
professional, expensive information by fire experts. However, I would argue 
that a proprietor does not have to be an expert in order to comply. Appar-
ently, the complicated technical requirements (especially concerning techni-
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cal devices) are and can be translated into a number of easy requirements for 
proprietors’ behavior. The proprietor would not have to be an expert him-
self. He can comply by periodically hiring an expert to inspect the technical 
devices. There is indeed a need to inform proprietors about the importance of 
fire safety, the relevant regulation and compliance. However, this is primarily 
achieved through general information campaigns and a deterrence strategy, 
not a compliance strategy.
12.4.2 Remediation – non-compliance by accident
 Another claim is that proprietors cannot always help their failing to comply. 
Failure to  comply is not always the fault of the proprietor. Non-compliance 
can often be the result of defects in technical devices, such as the sudden 
break-down of a lamp in the escape-route sign. Moreover, for many technical 
devices, the proprietor is dependent on supplying companies. It is argued 
to be ineffective and unfair or disproportionate to immediately punish such 
violations. A deterrence strategy would lead to an exaggerated ‘witch hunt’ 
which would not lead to more compliance. Inspections are aimed at restoring 
compliance and thereby fire safety (not deterrence).
The theoretical defense
As argued in section 4.2, if the enforcement authority detects a violation, it 
can and must take action to induce compliance as quickly as possible. In the 
field of fire safety, remediation especially implies repairing broken techni-
cal devices. As explained in Livernois and McKenna (1999), if offenses occur 
accidentally , the optimal enforcement policy might be to issue a warning to 
the proprietor. First, he is given the opportunity to restore compliance. Only 
if he fails to comply before some specified future date is he sanctioned. This 
is what happens when an inspector who detects a violation issues the pro-
prietor with a warning to repair the installation and be in compliance within 
a period of – say – 6 to 8 weeks. The only difference is that Livernois and 
McKenna assume that firms self-report their violations, while in our case the 
warning is only given if the inspector detects a violation.186
Evaluating the argument
However, upon further examination, it turns out that offenses are not ‘acci-
dental’. The probability of technical failures is to a large extent under the 
control of the proprietor. The standards are precisely aimed at inducing the 
proprietor to take sufficient care so that technical failures in the equipment 
186 There are no benefits of self-reporting for proprietors. If they self-report non-compliance, 
the fire safety department will say that the proprietor must correct the failures. This is 
also what happens when the establishment is inspected by the fire safety department. It is 
therefore better for the proprietor to await inspection instead of self-reporting violations.
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are reduced to a minimum. For example, replacing the lamps in the escape-
route signs on a yearly basis should prevent them from suddenly breaking 
down (only in exceptional cases they do burn for less than a year). Moreover, 
the enforcement officials can sanction the fact that proprietors fail to immedi-
ately replace failing escape-route signs (Innes, 1999b; section 4.2). The level of 
repair is quite easily observable for the fire safety departments, even more so 
since proprietors have had to register the repairing they carried out on their 
installations. In such circumstances, the policy of Livernois and McKenna 
(1999) is only efficient if less than full compliance is desired. This is not the 
case, since there is no reason for delaying the replacement of failing lamps. 
The current policy allows the proprietors to delay compliance. A deterrence 
strategy that imposes sanctions dependent on the level of remediation would 
deter the underinvestment in preventing technical failures.
12.4.3 Persuasion – voluntary compliance
 The enforcement officials argue that most proprietors are willing to comply 
and/or to restore compliance. Persuading the proprietors to comply is more 
effective than punishing every violation. The latter will break down their 
cooperation. Enforcement is much easier if it builds on this willingness to 
comply. Therefore enforcement is not aimed at punishing non-compliance, 
but at stimulating voluntary compliance. Inspection involves a moral appeal 
on the proprietor. Enforcement officials try to persuade the proprietor that 
compliance is socially and morally desirable. Proprietors must be taught how 
to behave as good and responsible citizens. Once again, this requires enforce-
ment officials to take much time for inspection and to make an appointment.
The theoretical defense
As discussed in chapter 7, proprietors not only consider the direct costs of 
compliance (in terms of time, effort and money) and the expected formal 
sanction by the government, but also the costs of informal sanctions and the 
benefits and costs of the intrinsic motivation to comply.
The existence of intrinsic motivation to comply justifies both a more deter-
rent and a more compliant enforcement strategy. If enforcement is or becomes 
weak, proprietors might lose their belief in the norm and no longer subscribe 
to it, especially if they observe that others can violate the norm unhindered. 
Enforcement must be strict enough so that proprietors keep on believing that 
the norm is actually important and should not be violated.
On the other hand, strict enforcement can also be counterproductive. 
Immediate punishment of every violation, even if minor, might induce pro-
prietors to believe that the only reason for complying is the sanction that is 
the consequence of violation. Sanctions might crowd out the intrinsic motiva-
tion to comply and/or the sanction may be regarded as a price the proprietor 
can pay to buy non-compliance. Therefore, it might be better to forgo a strict 
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enforcement policy of immediate punishment and choose instead a policy of 
warnings, negotiation and cooperation, in which it is assumed that compli-
ance is voluntary, based on the intention to comply. 
Evaluating the argument
The influence on proprietors of informal sanctions is very limited in the case 
of fire safety. Disapproval of the proprietors’ behavior by customers, neigh-
bors or colleagues is practically absent, unless it actually results in a disaster. 
None of the interviewees mention that visitors acquire information about an 
establishment and/or report non-compliance. Customers lack the informa-
tion to make their consumption dependent on the level of compliance. There 
is also no culture in the horeca sector such that proprietors would stimulate 
each other to comply. Only the reputation with the municipality is somewhat 
important since the municipality would be less ready to help a non-compli-
ant proprietor if he needs a license (fire-related or otherwise) or some other 
favor.
It is likely that the intrinsic motivation to comply is more relevant, 
although this is more a claim made by enforcement officials and a question 
of general common sense than an evidence-based fact. Whether and to which 
extent these motivations are really relevant is unknown. In any case, this moti-
vation does not provide enough indication of what the enforcement policy 
should look like. As discussed above, intrinsic motivation to comply requires 
a balance of compliance and deterrence strategies. It seems that in the current 
situation, in which violations are treated relatively mildly, the enforcement 
policy signals that violation does relatively little harm. This stimulates a cul-
ture in which non-compliance is not regarded as a problem. The lack of large 
norm subscription and accompanying feelings of guilt and regret raises the 
question whether proprietors really have an intrinsic motivation to comply. 
In order to induce compliance earlier, the balance should be shifted towards 
a more deterrent strategy. This will teach the proprietors that regulations and 
compliance with the regulations is something that must really be taken seri-
ously. Of course, the enforcement policy should take into consideration the 
possible  crowding out of motivation. This might be solved by first issuing a 
warning to the proprietor, and then by strictly enforcing the regulations after 
this warning instead of issuing several more warnings and undertaking re-
inspections. Moreover, if sanctions can be made high enough, the problem of 
the crowding out of intrinsic motivation is of no interest (Lin and Yang, 2006). 
If the expected formal sanction exceeds the direct costs of compliance, the 
proprietor will always comply, irrespective of his moral concerns. 
Irrespective of the precise enforcement style, this case study does not 
improve our understanding of how norms are created and shaped by public 
enforcement. Does inspection directly create norms or does it create norms by 
increasing the proportion of complying proprietors? Are inspections needed 
for complying firms, since they will be confirmed in their belief in the norms 
through observing the punishment of non-complying firms? Or are inspec-
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tions needed for non-complying firms, because punishment of the violation of 
norms leads to norm formation through guilt and regret and possibly shame? 
And what is the optimal number of inspections for norm formation? Why 
do moral intentions to comply not survive if public inspections are reduced? 
The knowledge about the working of norms in the case of fire safety in horeca 
establishments is too limited to answer these questions and draw any unam-
biguous conclusion.
In short, enforcement as morally educating the proprietor may be rele-
vant. However, it is as yet unknown which enforcement policy serves this 
goal best. Education as an objective is not a sufficient argument for a compli-
ance strategy. As with raising children, punishment is an essential tool too.
12.4.4 Informal enforcement – tolerated non-compliance
 A claim that can be heard from almost all enforcement officials is that impos-
ing sanctions is complicated. It costs a lot of time, effort and money. The legal 
requirements that have to be fulfilled are strict and high. The interviewees 
are afraid that their decision will not withstand the court’s review because 
of these requirements, more than they are afraid that the judge will reverse 
their decision concerning content. More can be achieved, and achieved earlier 
by cooperation. “You don’t impose a sanction if a single escape-route sign is 
not burning”. A deterrence strategy is ineffective because it carries the threat 
that the whole budget will be spent on expensive legal procedures without 
improving fire safety. Therefore, the enforcement officials do not immediately 
impose formal warnings, but begin with informal notifications. The munici-
pality will only begin an official enforcement procedure if it is really neces-
sary, for instance because the proprietor does not respond to repeated infor-
mal warnings. 
The theoretical defense
Sanctions are imposed by the municipality (the College of Mayor and Alder-
man). If a proprietor disagrees, he can file an objection to this decision. If this 
objection is not accepted, he can appeal the municipality’s decision in an admin-
istrative court. Therefore, in the end, it is the judge who decides who is sanc-
tioned. The municipal enforcement policy must conform to the court’s ruling.
The proprietor might question the facts, the standard and/or the appro-
priateness of the sanction (section 6.2). An increase in the expected sanction 
may have an adverse effect on the level of compliance because it induces pro-
prietors to use objection and appeal procedures more frequently. This effect is 
even stronger when such procedures are costly for the fire safety department, 
because the time spent on procedures cannot be spent detecting violations. In 
response, the enforcement authority might be better off enforcing lowered, 
informal standards (Khambu, 1989) and/or issuing a warning first (Nyborg 
and Telle, 2004; Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988).
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Another problem is that since sanctioning is costly, the threat of sanctions is 
incredible (section 9.1). Therefore, at the supreme moment, the municipality 
(the College of Mayor and Alderman) might be more interested in minimizing 
current enforcement costs than in deterring future non-compliance. Of course, 
unwillingness to sanction might also result from a discrepancy between public 
interests and the private interests of enforcement officials (section 9.2) .
Evaluating the argument
In general, fear for the court’s review seems to be a problem of perception. 
Several studies have shown that there is no reason for municipalities to be 
afraid that judges reverse their decisions because of formal, procedural 
errors. A research by order of the Alders Committee into the judicial review of 
30 fire safety decisions for public buildings showed that municipal decisions 
are not frequently corrected by courts. Moreover, in some cases, the court 
even sustained the decision despite formal failures by the municipality.187 
Similarly, Gundelach and Michiels (2003*) demonstrated for 430 decisions in 
environmental law, spatial planning and horeca law, that governments (usu-
ally municipalities) have no reason to fear judicial review as long as they ‘sim-
ply’ do their job (the title of their book is ‘unfounded fear’). In only 10% of 
the cases in which a sanction was imposed was that decision not maintained 
by the court. The fear of legal procedures seems to stem from a lack of judi-
cial expertise in fire safety departments. This is supported by the fact that 
several officials indicate that they would appreciate a better back-up from 
legal departments or even employing their own lawyer. In addition, the only 
department that does in fact employ a lawyer does not share this fear.
Moreover, it is hard to think of what might be contested by the propri-
etors. In general, the standards are quite clear (section 12.4.1 above and 12.4.5 
next). If municipalities have granted proprietors time to restore compliance, 
they are entitled to impose sanctions. The facts also generally remain largely 
undisputed. The only violation that is difficult to establish is the number of 
visitors, since it is difficult to count the number of people present in a crowd-
ed bar. Generally, however, challenging the imposed sanction is of little use.
These conclusions do not deny that imposing sanctions requires time 
and effort and that the threat of a sanction might therefore be incredible . For 
example, enforcing the number of visitors is problematic because it can lead to 
problems of public order if people are sent out of a bar onto the street. Munici-
palities are unwilling to impose sanctions if the costs are not in proportion 
to the offense. There is no firm line for enforcing every single violation, for 
example when a single escape-route sign fails to light up. The College of May-
or and Alderman will often give priority to other, more severe, cases, such as 
187 Alders Committee (2001; part ‘Rechterlijke toetsing van brandveiligheidsbesluiten’, pp. 
265-288). See also Michiels Committee (1998*). Another relevant reference is Lomwel and 
Nelissen (2005*) which examines how enforcement actions are influenced by (the fear for 
a reaction from) citizens who decreasingly accept risks.
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an environmental or building offense. The imposition of a sanction is often 
carried out by a different department (often a Legal Department or the Build-
ing Department). If the fire safety department eventually wishes to impose 
a sanction, the file begins at the bottom of the stack of the other department 
and possibly never reaches the top. Moreover, there are some indications that 
sanctioning is not always in the private interest of the enforcement officials, 
such as the sometimes poor cooperation between different municipal depart-
ments, and the fact that many inspectors prefer to spend time on advice rather 
than on sending letters. In particular, most fire safety departments have been 
shown to have more interest in granting licenses (for which fees are collected) 
than in enforcing these licenses.
If proprietors know that the enforcement officials may for some reason 
postpone or even refrain from the use of sanctions, they might choose to con-
tinue to non-comply, a fact which has been widely observed. Yet this does not 
mean that a compliance strategy is desirable. On the contrary, social welfare 
will be improved if the enforcement officials are forced to pursue a deterrence 
strategy of strictly imposing sanctions on every violation. The only real prob-
lem is caused by the requirement concerning the number of visitors. How-
ever, in the current situation, this requirement is also not really enforced since 
inspections are hardly ever unexpectedly carried out late at night.
12.4.5 Cooperative enforcement – flexible compliance
 Enforcement officials are of the opinion that enforcement must be somewhat 
flexible, although there are different opinions on the form this flexibility 
should take. Some argue that the primary objective is not compliance, but fire 
safety. They do not investigate whether every single requirement is precise-
ly obeyed, but ask (themselves and the proprietor): is this bar or restaurant 
fireproof? They negotiate about the precautions necessary to restore compli-
ance provided that fire safety is guaranteed. Others argue that there should 
be no compromise on compliance with the regulations, as they describe a 
minimum. There is, however, flexibility concerning the possibilities to restore 
compliance. These officials do negotiate with the proprietor about the time 
allowed for restoring compliance, and whether the proprietor will benefit 
from precautions beyond compliance.
The theoretical defense
Generally, the law is incomplete (section 6.1.2), making it both under- and 
overinclusive.188 This problem might be overcome by granting the enforce-
188 This is different from the uncertainty described in section 12.4.1 that proprietors might be 
ignorant about the law or make a mistake in choosing precautions. The problem here is 
that proprietors know, or ought to know, the standards, but that these standards are only 
partially applicable to their situation.
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ment officials sufficient discretion to specify the law for individual firms and 
particular situations, in licenses and/or during inspections. Once specified, a 
deterrence strategy can induce the first-best level of precautions.
However, in general, a two-sided uncertainty arises. Enforcement offi-
cials have better knowledge of the applicable standards and expected damage 
than firms. Firms, on the other hand, have better knowledge about their pro-
duction process and costs of compliance. In such a situation, both the enforce-
ment authority and the firm may benefit from behaving more cooperatively 
(section 6.1.2). The authority will choose maximal enforcement if a firm has 
established a record of minimal compliance, and flexible enforcement if the 
firm has a record of flexible compliance.
Evaluating the argument
That fire safety regulations are incomplete is self-evident. There are very 
different types of establishments, from very specially situated restaurants 
and establishments in monumental property to regular neighborhood bars. 
The regulations themselves vary from very detailed requirements (such as 
the number of seconds before the emergency lighting should switch on) to 
very open-ended norms (such as being careful with candle lights). Part of 
this problem is solved by the obligation of carrying a license in which special 
requirements can be included.
It is more difficult to determine whether – in general – the regulations 
tend to be under- or overinclusive. As mentioned, there are two attitudes 
common among enforcement officials. Some say that the regulations rep-
resent a minimum to which everyone has to comply. For some proprietors, 
it is necessary to impose even stricter rules. This fits the description of the 
enforcement policy of Ricketts and Peacock (1996; section 6.1.2) in which the 
municipality tries to achieve as high as possible a level of precaution. Both 
the proprietor and the enforcement officials benefit from being cooperative 
and exchanging information. The proprietor benefits if he implements the 
required precautions, because compliance with this (adjusted) standard will 
relieve him from sanctions. If the enforcement officials learn more about the 
costs of the proprietor and his ‘production process’, they are able to bargain 
for higher precautions, which is beneficial if the law is underinclusive.
Other enforcement officials prefer to speak of a required level of fire safe-
ty. They argue that the basic question is whether a bar or restaurant is fire-
proof. This fits the description of Scholz (1991), where the municipality tries 
to achieve the highest safety gains. Both the proprietor and the enforcement 
officials benefit from being flexible. The enforcement officials overlook minor 
technical violations (resulting from overinclusion) in recognition of the firm’s 
extra-legal safety efforts to reduce greater hazards not directly addressed in 
the regulations (resulting from underinclusion). The firm that chooses flex-
ible compliance can tackle its worst health and safety hazards with the most 
efficient methods available rather than spending money on precisely comply-
221Analyzing current municipal enforcement policies: which strategy is effective?
ing with every standard. Hence, flexible compliance produces greater safety 
at lower costs.
In both cases, the enforcement officials benefit from cooperation because 
it allows them to achieve higher levels of safety. They have sufficient discre-
tion to determine the precautions proprietors must take. However, coop-
eration is necessary because the enforcement officials lack the information 
required to determine and enforce first-best levels of precautions. Inspectors 
say that they are only moderately informed about the costs of compliance, but 
they do have an informational advantage concerning the expected damage 
and the regulations.
Another question is what makes the proprietor willing to cooperate. For 
the proprietor, there are three benefits from being cooperative and choosing 
compliance before the enforcement officials launch official procedures: (1) 
Re-inspections require time and effort and being cooperative implies fewer 
re-inspections; (2) Being uncooperative and being re-inspected implies that 
the fire safety department will choose strict terms for compliance, while the 
fire safety department may allow the flexible proprietor to choose compli-
ance at a time that suits him better (for example with respect to supplying 
companies); (3) Being uncooperative may imply that the municipality will 
not be prepared to help the proprietor when needed (governmental reputa-
tion). However, it is unclear when proprietors choose a cooperative approach. 
Are they only behaving cooperatively after inspection or also in the absence 
of an inspection (throughout the year)? I suspect the former, because there are 
many violations found during first inspections, because proprietors are only 
generally informed about fire safety and must be informed over and over 
again, and because (as follows from the above discussion) being cooperative 
(uncooperative) is only rewarded (punished) following inspection.
There are sufficient arguments for stating that enforcement benefits from 
flexibility and cooperation. However, this does not imply that the current 
level of flexibility is optimal. There are several problems. First, cooperative 
enforcement implies that the inspectors are flexible for cooperative propri-
etors, but choose strict enforcement with uncooperative proprietors (“tit-for-
tat”). The latter seems to be insufficient. Under the observed policy, uncoop-
erative proprietors are able to a large extent to delay compliance, because it 
takes much time for official procedures to be started. The inspectors should 
immediately adopt a strict enforcement policy, as soon as they detect that 
a proprietor is unwilling to cooperate. Secondly, a cooperative enforcement 
strategy also includes the threat that enforcement officials might abuse their 
discretionary powers to maximize their own interests and apply unjustified 
discrimination between proprietors. The obligation to strictly enforce viola-
tions might lead to a better, although not first-best, result . It is not obvious 
that the regulations are so incomplete that strict enforcement will produce 
undesirable results. It may be that strictly enforcing a second-best standard 
for every proprietor would lead to a higher level of social welfare.
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12.4.6 Supplementary enforcement – compliance as personal responsibility
 A final comment often made by enforcement officials is that compliance is in 
the first place the responsibility of the proprietor himself. Inspection is only 
a random indication. Therefore, officials argue that they cannot be expected 
to enforce continued compliance at all times by arbitrarily punishing every 
violation. It is better to use inspection to persuade the proprietor that he has 
to guarantee compliance throughout the year.
The theoretical defense
In itself, an appeal on the personal responsibility of the proprietor seems to 
be a weak argument. Such an appeal can be made by every enforcement offi-
cial, for every kind of regulation. However, in a somewhat different context, 
there might be reasons for stimulating the feeling of personal responsibility 
of the proprietor. In many situations, the importance of public enforcement 
lies not in inducing compliance on its own, but in supplementing private 
enforcement. Private enforcement may fail if the proprietor is ignorant of the 
(ex-ante) precautions he can take to prevent damages (ex-post). As discussed 
in section 12.4.1, public enforcement might be needed to provide the propri-
etor with the relevant information. There are three other relevant weaknesses 
of private enforcement.
First, public enforcement is needed to reduce uncertainty about the levels 
of due care in private litigation claims (section 10.2.2). Under such uncertain-
ty, public regulatory standards imposed ex-ante might be helpful, at least if 
courts follow the regulatory standard in a predictable way. Proprietors learn 
how to escape liability. 
A second – related – justification in favor of public enforcement as a sup-
plement is that proprietors are short-sighted and do not think of the long-term 
consequences due to the severe competition or bounded rational perceptions 
(sections 1.4.2 and 3.1.4). In such cases, a proprietor might underestimate 
the low probability of a fire and remain unaware of the full consequences 
of liability. Inspection might alert these proprietors to the issue of potential 
liability damages and therefore prevent underdeterrence (or overdeterrence 
if they are too afraid of liability).
Finally, deterrence by private enforcement may be hindered by for 
instance wealth constraints or litigation barriers for victims. Public enforce-
ment might be required in order to deter non-compliance by wealth-con-
strained firms, so that these firms take at least some precautions. Additional 
private enforcement induces those proprietors who have sufficient assets to 
take higher precautions.
As a result, there might be several reasons for having public enforcement 
in addition to private enforcement. Public enforcement attempts to persuade 
the proprietor that he is responsible for guaranteeing compliance through-
out the year and that he bears the consequences of non-compliance.
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Evaluating the argument
Despite stressing the personal responsibility of proprietors, none of the 
enforcement officials mentioned the supplemental function of public enforce-
ment. Yet this function might be relevant. Let us examine the three arguments 
discussed.
It is quite possible that proprietors are uncertain about the evaluation 
of their behavior by courts, and that they are unable to obtain information 
about this evaluation at a reasonable cost. The probability of a fire is small. 
The probability that it leads to casualties is also small. And if there are victims 
who claim damages, most of these claims will be settled in relatively non-
transparent ways. Therefore, it might be helpful to impose ex-ante regulatory 
standards that will determine negligence .
However, it is not immediately clear which enforcement style is most 
appropriate for these standards. Enforcing the regulatory standard might be 
characterized more by advice than by punishment, but as in section 12.4.1, 
we expect that public standards can better be communicated through gen-
eral information campaigns than by means of inspections (and: how many 
inspections are required?). Moreover, communication about standards might 
possibly only be credible if the municipality really and effectively enforces 
the standards (by means of a deterrence strategy). Otherwise, the proprietor 
can argue in court that he believed that compliance with the requirements 
was not that important because the municipality was unwilling to allocate 
sufficient resources to it and really take action against violations.
The second problem discussed is that proprietors might be cognitively 
constrained so that they are unable to take optimal decisions. The interviews 
or other data do not investigate the rationality of proprietors and the informa-
tion available to them. There is probably not much difference between pro-
prietors and other human beings. Several interviewees observed that in the 
period following the Volendam disaster, proprietors were generally aware 
of potential liability claims. Once this memory vanishes, the awareness will 
disappear too. However, the period after the Volendam disaster is precisely 
the period in which public inspection was most frequent. This pattern does 
not fit in with the argument that public enforcement is needed at times when 
proprietors are insufficiently aware of fire safety. Apparently, public enforce-
ment suffers from the same cognitive constraints. Moreover, the question is 
again how information can best be provided.
The third reason for public enforcement as a supplement does seem rel-
evant. Although claiming damages is not an important problem (see chap-
ter 15 next), there are wealth constraints, especially when several people are 
harmed at the same time. Moreover, the level of assets varies widely among 
proprietors. Some own several bars and restaurants and even other property, 
while others only rent the establishment from a brewery or investment hold-
ing. However, this is more an argument in favor of a deterrence strategy rath-
er than a compliance strategy. In order to induce those firms with insufficient 
assets to choose at least some level of compliance, enforcement must be strict, 
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not relaxed. Since public enforcement is already guaranteeing a minimal level 
of compliance, there is no space for negotiation.
12.4.7 Conclusion
This section analyzed different claims with respect to the optimal enforcement 
strategy in the field of fire safety regulation for bars and restaurants. These 
claims often imply that a deterrence strategy is ineffective. They largely corre-
spond to the claims made by academic scholars concerning the effectiveness 
of a compliance strategy over a deterrence strategy (section 8.1). However, in 
the example of enforcing fire safety in bars and restaurants, we can conclude 
that the arguments in favor of a compliance strategy are usually invalid. On 
the contrary, most arguments imply that in the current situation, the balance 
must be shifted towards a more deterrent strategy. The arguments given fail 
for the same reason as the arguments in the academic literature fail: they do 
not distinguish between the ‘objective’ of enforcement and the ‘enforcement 
style’. For instance, the fact that proprietors are willing to comply, or that they 
fail to comply due to mistakes or misinformation does not in itself provide an 
argument in favor of a compliance strategy.
12.5 The legal environment – why does deterrence fail?
 Section 12.3 argued that in the case of minor violations, the expected sanction 
is initially small so that proprietors choose to delay compliance. In section 
12.4, I examined the claims for the defense of this enforcement policy and 
concluded that a deterrence strategy of strictly enforcing offenses is likely to 
improve compliance. The question then is why the use of a compliance strat-
egy is so widespread. Moreover, a deterrence strategy is limited by the legal 
framework in which the fire safety department operates. Currently, the fire 
safety department is not allowed to impose fines or other immediate sanc-
tions, but only repair sanctions. If it is argued that the fire safety department 
should adopt a stricter, more penalizing, enforcement policy, this means that 
it should impose sanctions quicker than in the current situation, within the 
legal framework. Or that the legal options themselves should be expanded. 
This section analyzes why a deterrence strategy may fail and discusses the 
benefits of the observed compliance strategy.
12.5.1 Legal constraints on the fire safety department
Chapter 8 discusses that a compliance strategy is only favorable if there are 
severe enough limits on the sanctions and the enforcement budget so that 
deterrence fails. In the case of enforcement of fire safety in horeca establish-
ments, these constraints are clearly visible.
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The enforcement constraints
The municipality is not allowed to immediately impose sanctions. Only if 
there is serious and immediate danger the municipality can directly close 
an establishment. Enforcement policies rest mostly on administrative repair 
sanctions. Public Prosecutors give no priority to fire safety regulations.
Given these limited sanctioning opportunities, compliance can only be 
enforced by a high frequency of inspection and by quickly responding to offenses 
by immediately imposing these repair sanctions . This requires sufficient resourc-
es. However, the current budgets assume that the enforcement officials inspect an 
establishment once or twice a year and that some proportion of re-inspection is 
necessary. All other activities, including sanctioning, have to compete with other 
planned targets. Especially when the imposition of sanctions is carried out by 
the Legal Department, there is no direct budget for fire safety files and the Legal 
Department is not inclined to deal with a substantial number of fire safety files.
These limited powers explain that a deterrence strategy will possibly not 
be strict enough to really deter proprietors. As a consequence, proprietors 
will not be induced to take efficient precautions or to immediately restore 
compliance.
Alternative methods for strengthening deterrence
If a strict punishment of all offenses fails to induce full compliance, different 
enforcement methods may induce higher levels of compliance. A higher level 
of compliance can be achieved by (i) targeting enforcement or (ii) adjusting 
standards.189 This would allow the enforcement officials to achieve the highest 
possible level of compliance.
Targeting enforcement is only effective if enforcement is sufficiently pre-
dictable. The enforcement officials use several forms of targeting enforcement 
resources. First of all, they target resources on different establishments. They 
inspect more in the centre town (the going out area), especially during actions 
at Christmas or Carnival. There is no reason why expected fire damage would 
vary per location, but the municipality can realize economies of scale by focus-
ing on the centre. Since in the centre of the city establishments are situated closer 
together, many establishments can be inspected in one evening. Municipalities 
also save resources by rarely inspecting the smaller establishments that do not 
possess a use license (except during the actions just described).
Enforcement officials also target resources in time. Random inspection 
might be inappropriate to induce compliance but if the officials announce an 
inspection the proprietor will comply at least around the time of the inspec-
tion. Moreover, officials target resources on the persistent non-compliers by 
issuing warnings. This corresponds to the idea that the optimal targeting 
scheme depends on past compliance.
Enforcement officials also save resources by not enforcing all requirements 
189 Moreover, I identified self-reporting, advice and cooperation/negotiation. These were 
already discussed in section 12.4.
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(adjusting standards). Although they argue that there should be no compro-
mise concerning legal requirements, they actually fail to enforce every stan-
dard to the same extent. Their focus lies mostly on technical devices. They 
rarely inspect the number of visitors, at least not on a Saturday late at night, 
when these violations are most likely. Enforcement officials, especially in the 
smaller municipalities, do not want to work at these times. Given the limited 
sanctions and inspections, enforcement officials can only induce compliance 
with the technical devices that need a regular (usually annual) check-up. The 
importance of the regulations that require continued attention of the propri-
etor is only explained during inspection but not actually enforced.
Why these constraints?
The legal opportunities of the fire safety department are limited. They try to 
maximize compliance and/or fire safety given these limits. But why are the 
legal opportunities limited? Why is there no higher budget? Why are severe 
fines not permitted? There may be several answers to these questions.
1. Full compliance may be ineffi cient. For high(er) levels of compliance, the 
costs of compliance and enforcement may exceed the benefi ts of a reduction 
in expected damage. Therefore, a limited budget is granted that forces the 
fi re safety department to focus on the most severe problems of non-compli-
ance.
 In the extreme case, compliance may be not desirable at all. The fire safety 
regulations and/or the enforcement of these regulations are a form of 
window-dressing. In order to satisfy the citizens and increase the feel-
ings of safety, regulations are imposed and a small budget is allocated. 
However, it is not intended that proprietors really should comply. As in 
section 9.2.1 (point 6), we might expect stringent regulation and weak 
enforcement. More on this issue in section 13.4.
2. It may be important to have suffi cient marginal deterrence . If other regu-
lations such as those concerning the environment, occupational health, 
closing times, etc. are valued higher, there might be no opportunity for se-
vere punishment of fi re safety regulation violations. Since criminal fi nes 
must be reserved for clear and immediate danger, (small) violations of the 
use requirements might only be punished mildly.
 A problem of this argument is that it shifts the problem up to explaining why 
sanctions are limited for these other regulations. There seems to be room for 
an overall increase in the magnitude of sanctions. In any case, wealth prob-
lems are not great enough to explain the limitations of available sanctions.
3. Due to capacity constraints, the (marginal) costs of increasing enforce-
ment efforts may be high. The increase in enforcement efforts following 
the Volendam disaster resulting in the current policy was accompanied 
by much training of personnel and/or the hiring of private companies. 
Questions about the quality of personnel, especially of these private com-
panies, have already been raised. Higher budgets might possibly fail to 
lead to more inspectors as this personnel is simply not available.
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Increasing powers
 Given the limited powers, a deterrence strategy of prosecuting every viola-
tion is not likely to induce full compliance. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that a deterrence strategy would not work. There are two reasons for 
this. First, every optimal enforcement policy is a mix of a deterrence strategy 
and a compliance strategy. In the current situation, the share of deterrence 
is very small. The main claim of section 12.4 is that within the legal powers 
welfare would be improved by being stricter. Even if municipalities cannot 
impose fines or imprisonment, they can shorten the enforcement proceedings 
by imposing a penal sum or a closure of the establishment sooner, granting 
less re-inspections and spending less time on explanation and advice. This 
requires an improvement of the internal organization (especially the coopera-
tion with the Legal Department) and reducing the fear of court procedures. 
Efficiency gains can be realized by a smarter allocation of personnel, espe-
cially in the evenings (for instance using firefighters’ ‘waiting time’).
A second way to improve enforcement would be changing the legal envi-
ronment as such, for example, by allowing officials to impose fines. However, 
a warning should be made here. Fines should only be introduced if this is 
done right. Given the current budget for inspections, a fine of €50 will prob-
ably not have much effect. Besides, such a policy should be clearly communi-
cated. Otherwise, proprietors will have false expectations of the enforcement 
policy and continue to incur violations, which will require many resources 
for imposing these administrative fines.
Conclusion
The question is why the use of a compliance strategy is so widespread. One 
reason why a deterrence strategy fails is that the budget and legal sanctions 
are too small to induce (full) compliance. Therefore sanctioning might become 
a very costly process. A compliance strategy might be more effective and effi-
cient in inducing compliance with the regulation. Nevertheless, if fire safety 
departments will become more strict when they find violations, this is likely 
to improve compliance. Moreover, allowing administrative fines might be 
considered.
There are two other potential failures of a deterrence strategy: incomplete 
law and private interests of enforcement officials. These are discussed next 
and provide another explanation for the widespread use of a compliance 
strategy.
12.5.2 Explaining the level of discretion and private interests
 A different, competing, explanation for the observed policy is that there is a 
misalignment between the private interests of the enforcement officials and 
public interests (chapter 9). Enforcing fire safety in the way described is not in 
the interest of social welfare, but only in the interest of the fire safety depart-
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ment and its officials. For example, advice might be better for the officials’ 
self-esteem than sanctioning. They want to show their competence. It is also 
possible that they do not like the personal effort required for sanctioning, but 
prefer the easy way of advice and cooperation. Alternatively, it may be in the 
interest of the fire safety department to have a large (but not too large) num-
ber of horeca proprietors incurring violations so that they can demonstrate 
the relevance of their work. Since enforcement officials are specialized, they 
develop their own expectations. They tend to see their own employment as 
relatively important. They perceive fire safety and compliance with fire safety 
regulations and thereby their own employment as being of vital importance 
(Lipsky, 1980). Higher budgets and more status might be important, perhaps 
more so than, or in addition to, maximizing social welfare. 
Such inefficient behavior is only possible if enforcement officials have 
sufficient discretion to apply the policy they want.
The level of discretion
In fact, the fire safety departments do have much discretion. They are not 
under close scrutiny from the College of Mayor and Aldermen or the gen-
eral municipal organization. They function quite independently, choosing 
their own methods. They can determine which establishments and buildings 
require more attention and when action should be undertaken. Following the 
Volendam disaster, discretion was reduced in the sense that the municipal-
ity required that licenses be granted and inspections carried out. However, 
these mostly concerned quantitative requirements. Under which conditions 
a license is granted or what is done following an inspection is primarily up 
to the judgment of the inspectors. There are no instructions from above con-
cerning enforcement. Moreover, the resources granted for the required policy 
largely depends on information from the fire safety department and consist 
of a lump sum. 
The benefits of discretion
The enforcement of fire safety regulations necessarily requires much discre-
tion. The enforcement officials are experts who determine which actions will 
be taken. Relative autonomy from the College of Mayor and Aldermen and 
the municipal organization is generally required because only the inspec-
tors themselves can determine which establishments are dangerous and how 
resources should be allocated. The College of Mayor and Aldermen or the 
municipal organization in general is not really able to evaluate the benefits of 
fire safety. The frequency of fires and casualties is too low to learn the impor-
tance of fire safety.
Even if there are uniform inspection lists and/or an obligation to strictly 
enforce the regulations, the decision on site (whether or not to take action 
against an offense) is difficult to control. It is difficult to write a manual that 
precisely describes which action should be performed in each possible situ-
ation. Moreover, even if this was possible, the costs of monitoring inspectors 
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would be high.190 Moreover, it is difficult to summarize the optimal enforce-
ment policy in simple rules. Maximizing social welfare is not easily captured 
in a single rule. Public targets are necessarily ambiguous. What is sure is that 
the number of inspections cannot be the primary goal. Nor does the observa-
tion that inspectors prosecute in 50% of the cases say anything. It is therefore 
difficult to determine which parameters should be used to evaluate enforce-
ment officials.
This is a different way of arguing that fire safety regulation is incomplete 
and that enforcement officials have to decide how it applies in specific cir-
cumstances. Enforcement should preferably respond to specific situations. 
A cooperative compliance strategy is desired. Such an enforcement strategy 
requires sufficient discretion on the part of enforcement officials. Moreover, 
since the budget and sanctions are limited, enforcement officials must set pri-
orities.
The problem of discretion
It might be hard to reduce discretion because the fire safety department 
and its officials may not want to. They enjoy the power discretion provides 
them, so they try to demonstrate that work pressure is high. Discretion can be 
problematic if enforcement officials use their discretionary powers for pur-
poses other than maximizing social welfare. The observation that fire safety 
departments use a compliance strategy can also be explained by arguing that 
enforcement officials themselves benefit more from a compliance strategy 
than a deterrence strategy. 
That enforcement officials do have their own interests is unavoidable 
and is not necessarily a problem. If the enforcement officials are only gener-
ally informed about the costs of compliance, and hence unable to determine 
whether offenses are efficient, they should simply try to maximize compli-
ance, given the budget that society wishes to spend on enforcement. If the 
efficient level of compliance and enforcement is unachievable, resulting in 
serious underdeterrence, the objective of the enforcement officials should be 
to obtain as much compliance as possible.
However, the private interests of enforcement officials are a problem 
if these interests cannot be brought in line with maximizing social welfare. 
There are generally two ways to deal with this problem. The first is to limit 
the discretion of enforcement officials. As discussed, this is difficult to realize 
in the case of fire safety enforcement officials. The only other way to protect 
public interests is then to limit the available budget and not allow officials 
to impose severe sanctions such as fines. If the enforcement officials ineffi-
ciently aim at maximizing compliance or case loads, society can be protected 
by granting them limited powers. However, this does not save society from 
190 A related point is that discretion might be needed to provide the enforcement officials with 
sufficient enthusiasm for their work. They may derive pleasure from decision-making 
which would disappear if they were strictly following rules and being monitored. 
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inertia, nor from a fire safety department that applies a compliance strategy 
instead of a deterrence strategy.
Behavior of the fire safety department and its officials
The argument that the observed enforcement policy is inefficient because 
enforcement officials are more concerned with maximizing their own inter-
ests than social welfare is supported by several observations.191
– Following the Volendam disaster, no fire safety departments seem to have 
questioned and informed decision-makers (politicians) about the need for 
enforcement. On the contrary, they seem to have seized the opportunity to 
increase budgets by making claims for fire prevention, despite some state-
ments warning against a witch hunt. The fire safety department has a vested 
interest in keeping work pressure high. This provides them with discretion to 
determine priorities, and therefore power.
– There are many problems of cooperation between the different depart-
ments within municipalities. This problem might partly be related to the 
fact that inspectors do not wish to transfer files to other departments.
– Municipal buildings are the last to be licensed, probably because the mu-
nicipality does not wish to spend money on fire safety measures, and the 
fire safety department does not want to cause ‘internal’ trouble.192
– There is no incentive for fire safety officials to complete an inspection as 
quickly as possible. They would then simply be instructed to inspect an-
other building. Officials always work at full capacity. They therefore take 
much time for inspections, for example by extensively advising on com-
pliance and fire safety. 
– Moreover, fire safety departments focus on the tasks on which they are 
directly reckoned, in this case especially the number of licences granted 
and the number of inspections. Other tasks that are less visible and eas-
ily measured are given less priority. This is acknowledged by several en-
forcement officials themselves and follows from observing the activities 
that fire safety officials carry out (reported in both the interviews and the 
policy reports). Besides, the fire safety departments (as well as the munic-
ipal organization as a whole) are opposed to the new Use Decree in which 
licences are abolished for most buildings. This opposition seems to stem 
primarily from the fact that they no longer receive legal fees for granting 
licences but have to finance inspections themselves.
– The fact that there are no inspections late at night (on Saturday) is also 
due to the fact that officials only want a 9-to-5 job. Firefighters who are on 
duty at this time apparently prefer to remain at the station. 
191 For completeness sake, these arguments are not always sufficient. The observations might 
be a signal of both efficient and inefficient policies.
192 A different explanation might be that for municipal buildings, sanctioning is problematic 
because of the high social costs. A school cannot be closed. There is therefore an important 
credibility problem.
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Conclusion: Explaining the enforcement constraints
The question is why the use of a compliance strategy is so widespread. The 
previous subsection discusses the fact that an efficient enforcement policy 
might require a limited budget and limited sanctions for enforcing fire safety 
regulation in horeca establishments. Given these limits a compliance strategy 
might be efficient. This subsection discusses an alternative explanation. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the budget and sanctions might also be lim-
ited in order to protect society against a fire safety department that is not 
concerned with maximizing social welfare, but instead tries to maximize its 
own importance. Fire safety enforcement officials are a typical example of 
what Lipsky (1980) calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’. Street-level bureaucrats 
are bureaucrats who carry out a policy and whose position is characterized 
by relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organiza-
tional authority. For this type of officials, the budget is always pressing. They 
(consciously or unconsciously) increase their own work pressure. I can not 
find unambiguous evidence that refutes this hypothesis.
12.6 Policy-making and enforcement deficits
 Social welfare would benefit from a shift to a more deterrent enforcement 
strategy, but such a shift may be difficult to realize because of the resistance of 
executive enforcement officials. Moreover, the higher level officials might not 
be interested in investing in such a shift. However, more important than the 
precise enforcement style is the fact that enforcement must in fact be carried 
out. Compliance is induced by actual enforcement actions, not by deskwork.
12.6.1 Problems with policy plans
 Almost all municipalities I visited have policy documents, plans, yearly pri-
ority programs, integral enforcement documents and meetings, etc. They 
especially began investing in these actions after the Volendam disaster. In this 
respect the national campaigns to improve (lower level) enforcement (section 
11.3) have been successful. Of course, enforcement will improve if municipal-
ities were to work more professionally. Moreover such initiatives may alert 
the whole municipal organization to the fact that enforcement is important 
and that imposing regulations is not sufficient. 
Municipalities base enforcement on a carefully thought-out plan in which 
the effects of enforcement are considered. However, it is doubtful whether 
the effects are really weighed in the enforcement plans. My impression is that 
most (municipal) enforcement programs are nothing more than an inventory 
of the existing activities with the addition of some indicators and formation. 
A real choice of priorities is rare. This is logical because a school attendance 
officer cannot just like that switch to performing fire safety inspections. 
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Occupational resettlement requires training and hence money. Furthermore, 
as discussed before and confirmed in my own analysis, there is hardly any 
knowledge about the effects of enforcement. Municipalities are therefore sim-
ply unable to formulate well-thought-out policy plans in which the effects of 
enforcement are considered. If they do formulate plans, or are forced to do so, 
municipalities can do nothing more than simply base themselves on the out-
put of previous years, on the highest perceived risks, etc. As long as adequate 
information on the effects of municipal enforcement is missing, we cannot 
force municipalities to base their policies on the effects of enforcement.
The problem is not only lack of information, but also the fact that several 
of the available instruments fail to induce municipalities to make a proper bal-
ance. The Risk Matrix (Ministry of Justice, 2002*), for example (which is part 
of programmed enforcement ), is an instrument which helps municipalities to 
calculate several risks (such as physical safety, public health, social environ-
ment, etc.) into a (total) number. Unfortunately, it ignores the effectivity. It 
therefore only helps municipalities to list the various risks, but enforcement 
should do more than that and take into consideration whether it is possible 
to reduce risk. Maybe a risk of 10% cannot be lowered any further, while a risk 
of 1% can be halved. Therefore, the Risk Matrix is unsuitable for establish-
ing priorities. A better instrument is the Table-of-eleven (Ministry of Justice, 
2004). This table is a checklist by means of which municipalities and other 
governmental bodies can estimate the workability of and compliance with 
regulations. Following this estimate, the table can be useful in determining 
the necessary enforcement effort.
It is recommendable for municipalities and for fire safety departments 
to list their enforcement task in more detail instead of simply responding to 
incidents. However, the danger is that all documents and programs turn out 
to be nothing more than paperwork, only intended to please the national gov-
ernment and the citizens. Enforcement then becomes deskwork to keep the 
bureaucrats busy, rather than a policy that is actively carried out. In any case, 
I did not observe any differences between municipalities which have much 
policy development and those that only have a little (often smaller munici-
palities). What they actually end up doing is generally speaking the same. 
This implies that most administration and policy development around fire 
safety is unnecessary and does nothing more than increase the costs.
12.6.2 Organization – Separating granting and inspecting licenses
The policy development of the past years has also implied paying attention 
to the organization of the municipal departments. This again shifts the focus 
away from actual enforcement actions to policy-making. The national policy 
is that the department which formulates the rules and policy (such as grant-
ing licenses) should be different from the one that inspects licenses and car-
ries out policies. Otherwise, a conflict of interest may arise. Some municipali-
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ties (especially the medium-sized or larger ones) have taken this idea very 
seriously, resulting in complete municipal reorganizations. At the very least, 
every municipality is expected in its policy plans to explain how they have 
taken this problem into account. However, in the practice of enforcing fire 
safety regulation, for the majority of municipalities, this is not a problem. In 
some municipalities, granting licenses has long been the responsibility of the 
Building Department, while the Fire Brigade carries out inspections. In other 
municipalities, the problem is solved pragmatically by dividing the work 
intelligently, so that an establishment is inspected by different individuals 
throughout the years. In yet other municipalities, especially smaller ones, the 
problem is simply ignored because there are too few individuals to divide the 
work. I do not think this is a real problem. Compensating for the danger of 
collusion, there is the real advantage of a single inspector for one establish-
ment being able to build a long-term relationship with an individual propri-
etor. The fear of inconsistencies is one of the major complaints of the inspect-
ed proprietors and one of the major factors which may explain the failure of 
enforcement (May and Wood, 2003).
The separation of granting and inspecting licenses seems to be a toy for 
the national government and municipal managers to keep themselves busy. 
Directly spending the resources on inspection might possibly lead to higher 
levels of compliance. Similarly, the problem of imperfect cooperation between 
different municipal departments is not solved by meetings or documents. It 
is simply something that professional employees should do. The best way to 
promote cooperation is through joint actions, rather than investing effort in 
detailed plans and starting point notes.
12.6.3 Licenses
Following the Volendam disaster, most municipalities did throw themselves 
at granting licenses . However, the usefulness of this measure is questionable. 
All requirements of the Building Bylaw have direct effect, even if no license is 
granted. For horeca establishments and most other ‘common’ buildings, it is 
not necessary to formulate specific rules in a license.193 It would probably have 
been much better if municipalities invested their time in inspections rather than 
licenses. This would imply spending more time on the streets and less at one’s 
desk and therefore contribute to higher levels of safety than granting licenses. 
The problem is that inspections have to be financed by the municipality, while 
licenses are financed through legal fees. However, this should not be an argu-
ment for a municipality which is trying to maximize social welfare. In the end, it 
should not matter who pays for the enforcement costs. 
193 The maximum number of visitors is the most important exception. However, as noted, this 
maximum is not always a problem and could possibly also be included in a general rule 
(for example maximum number of people per square meter or number of exits).
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Just at the time when most municipalities have largely caught up on the 
backlog in use licenses, the government is about to abolish the system of use 
licenses and create a national Use Decree to replace the municipal bylaws. Of 
course, a fault confessed is half redressed, but it would have been better had 
the government considered the benefits of licenses before they began urging 
municipalities to catch up on the backlog.
12.6.4 Conclusion: action program
 After the Volendam disaster, the investigating Alders Committee conclud-
ed that enforcing fire safety is something one simply must do. It is time that 
we finally began doing that which we have agreed upon. Tasks, responsi-
bilities and requirements are all regulated; now it is time to implement the 
relevant measures. “This is not the first time. Will we never learn? Trust has 
been betrayed and – let us be honest – that is not the first time either. The 
Committee has reported, as carefully as possible, on the way tasks have been 
carried out and responsibilities have been assigned. But it did not stop there: 
it has also presented us with an action program: for right now, but also for 
tomorrow. Let’s do it!” (Public version, p. 34). Enforcement of fire safety is 
only effective if enforcement officials actually go on the premises and see for 
themselves. This is not something that can be done sitting at a desk. As one 
of the interviewed official argued: “There are parties (external, private firms, 
but also municipalities), who are judged on the number of licenses. That is 
paper safety. From behind a desk. But you have to go and look, you have to 
go and inspect.”
Such claims must be supported. What matters is how often an (horeca) 
establishment is inspected and which actions are taken when something is 
wrong. Maybe more important than the precise choice of enforcement style is 
the fact that enforcement must actually be carried out.
It is striking that it is precisely the action program of the Alders Commit-
tee, which stressed the importance of ‘doing’, which led to many policy docu-
ments being produced behind desks. The examples discussed above demon-
strate that attention has been drawn away from actual enforcement actions to 
policy development, municipal (re-)organization, and granting licenses. The 
action program of the Alders Committee has induced many municipalities to 
focus on the defense of their policy and to granting licenses with the danger 
of creating only paper safety and much paperwork.
12.7 Conclusion
 This chapter analyzes whether the current municipal enforcement policies 
are most effective in inducing compliance with fire safety regulations by 
horeca proprietors. The enforcement of fire safety in horeca establishments 
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fits the model of the enforcement pyramid and of compliance strategies. It 
begins with advice, persuasion and warnings. If the proprietor is unwilling to 
comply, a more strict enforcement policy is adopted which leads in the end to 
sanctions being imposed. However, no municipality begins to enforce from 
the beginning, in the style of a policeman. They feel more comfortable in the 
role of consultant or relief worker. In conclusion, let me evaluate this policy in 
light of the summary in part I, section 10.3.
12.7.1 Deterrence
From an economic perspective the most important objective of enforcement 
is deterrence: making non-compliance unattractive by imposing sanctions. 
This objective is hardly mentioned by the interviewees and does not seem to 
be an important objective of enforcement actions. The cooperative, explana-
tory enforcement style in which sanctions are only imposed after several re-
inspections allow proprietors to postpone compliance. I think it is wise that 
(general) deterrence should receive more attention.
Deterrence can be achieved by imposing sanctions. However, there are 
several reasons why immediately punishing every violation will be ineffec-
tive and inefficient.
Failures of a deterrence strategy
 Criminal prosecution and closing of the establishment is saved for very fire-
hazardous situations. Given the available budget and the repair sanctions 
the enforcement authority is not able to enforce full compliance with the 
fire safety regulation. Therefore, a deterrence strategy might – on balance – 
increase underdeterrence because it leads to high costs of imposing sanctions 
on the non-complying proprietors. Section 8.2.1 provides a list of reasons why 
imposing sanctions is costly.
1. Imposing sanctions on minor violations might reduce deterrence for se-
rious offenses. However, for fi re safety regulation, it seems possible to 
increase sanctions on all levels. Inability to pay sanctions is only problem-
atic for a fraction of the proprietors (usually with smaller establishments) 
that have diffi culty to survive and face bankruptcy. For them, the quick 
threat of closing the establishment will help.
2. Optimal sanctioning implies that the fi re safety department treats exist-
ing fi rms with good compliance records more leniently than young com-
panies or persistent violators. This difference is acknowledged by the fi re 
safety departments. However, the analysis shows that good compliance 
records are hardly present, but that almost all proprietors somehow vio-
late a rule. The difference especially applies to proprietors that respond 
to notifi cations of restoring compliance and those that do not. More strict 
enforcement will increase compliance by all fi rms. That does not exclude 
a somewhat more lenient approach to proprietors with good compliance 
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records. The fi re safety department should use strict terms and less re-in-
spections when it detects a violation, to become more tough in the target 
group.
3. Imposing sanctions is costly if it reduces the incentive to self-report viola-
tions. This is irrelevant in my case study because self-reporting is absent.
4. Imposing sanctions is costly because there is a probability of wrongfully 
imposing these sanctions. However, these costs are not large for enforc-
ing fi re safety regulation. In general, it is quite clear whether a proprietor 
violates the rules, or not. This is supported by the fact that proprietors 
usually do not make objections to the observed violations, but only to the 
time granted to restore compliance and to the costs of the measures they 
have to take.
5. Imposing sanctions is costly if it leads to many procedures of objection 
and appeal against these sanctions. This effect of sanctions is feared by 
many enforcement offi cials. But existing evidence suggests this fear is un-
founded.
6. Imposing sanctions on every minor violation might crowd out the intrin-
sic motivation to comply and thereby, on balance, reduce compliance. 
This is a potentially strong argument. However, crowding out is probably 
prevented by fi rst issuing a warning where non-compliance is explained. 
After this warning strict enforcement should be applied. This is impor-
tant to signal that non-compliance is a serious problem, so that the moti-
vation to comply is sustained.
7. More strict enforcement is costly, when it implies that inspectors can per-
form less inspections. Given the budget, the number of violations exceeds 
the possible workload of inspectors. At least in the short run, more strict 
enforcement implies that inspectors have to spend time on prosecuting a 
violation. As a consequence, the expected sanction will be insuffi cient to 
deter. By starting with a warning they can deal with more violations and 
prevent more proprietors from becoming persistent violators. However, 
the problem is that inspectors can fi nd time by reducing the duration of 
an inspection. Moreover, this argument justifi es the use of a warning, not 
of several warnings before a sanction is imposed. 
In summary, almost all arguments do not sufficiently explain why in the case 
of enforcing fire safety regulation in horeca establishments a deterrence strat-
egy fails to induce compliance and a compliance strategy should be used. At 
least the arguments do not explain why sanctioning is such a slow process. 
The use of warnings can be defended, but there should be strict enforcement 
of the consequence of not responding to this warning .
Another reason for failure of a deterrence strategy is that fire safety regu-
lation is incomplete . Some norms are open-ended and merely constitute a 
duty to care. Not every possible situation is regulated in detail. Therefore the 
fire safety department should treat the regulations with wisdom. It has suffi-
ciently discretion to do so. It is not perfectly informed to be able to determine 
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the first-best level of precautions for every proprietor, so that some coopera-
tion between proprietors and enforcement officials is necessary. On the oth-
er hand, given the disadvantages of a compliance strategy, the question is 
whether strict enforcement of the regulation does not lead to a higher level of 
social welfare (although not first-best) than a compliance strategy.
A deterrence strategy also fails if imposing sanctions is incredible . This 
might only be true for enforcing the number of visitors. But this standard is 
also not enforced under the current compliance strategy. Moreover, a deter-
rence strategy will not work if the enforcement officials do not implement it 
because they do not like to spend time on actual enforcement actions.
Alternatives to a deterrence strategy
Several examples of targeting enforcement and adjusting standards down-
wards have been identified. For example, inspections are announced, inspec-
tions concentrate on dense horeca areas, inspections focus on a target group 
by re-inspections, inspections are at day-time, etc. Given the legal constraints, 
these measures help to achieve as much compliance as possible.
Enforcement should also be cooperative and flexible and focus on the 
most important safety problems. This is largely acknowledged by the enforce-
ment officials. However, a problem is that such a flexible enforcement strategy 
should consist of a tit-for-tat-strategy, implying flexibility to the cooperative 
proprietor, but inflexibility to the non-cooperative proprietor. If a proprietor 
does not respond to a first warning, the fire safety department should choose 
for a strict, inflexible enforcement attitude. 
12.7.2 Optimal strategies for the other objectives
Remediation
 For fire safety regulation restoring compliance is an important objective of 
inspections, especially repairing failures of technical devices. Because pro-
prietors are able to repair such failures immediately, the optimal enforcement 
policy is a deterrence strategy that imposes sanctions dependent on the level 
of repair. For example, the current enforcement policy induces proprietors to 
postpone the replacement of failing escape-route signs until they are inspect-
ed and instructed to replace them. This can be prevented by directly sanction-
ing such violations. The fire safety regulation is precisely aimed at preventing 
technical failures.
Advice
 Proprietors are not naturally informed about expected fire damage. However, 
this is not necessary. It is important that they know the regulation they have 
to comply with and the methods to comply with the regulation. This requires 
some effort by the municipality to inform the proprietors. However, gener-
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al information campaigns will serve this goal. There is no need that every 
inspection takes a long time to explain fire safety to the proprietor.
Education
 Reputational concerns do not play an important role in complying with the 
fire safety regulation by proprietors. Whether intrinsic motivation is impor-
tant, is questionable. There is no culture observed that stimulates compliance 
with the regulation. At least, the motivation to comply varies among propri-
etors. I judge that a strict enforcement of the regulation provides an important 
signal that compliance with the regulation is valued by society and therefore 
stimulates the motivation to comply.
Completion
 The objective of completion is not advocated by the enforcement officials. 
However, public inspection and sanctions contribute to private enforcement 
in a number of ways. First, proprietors have difficulty with determining 
whether their behavior is negligent. This uncertainty can be reduced by pub-
lic standards. Again, general information campaigns will suffice. Moreover, 
strict enforcement of the standards is necessary. Otherwise, proprietors can 
claim that they believed that compliance with the regulation was not consid-
ered desirable. Secondly, public enforcement is needed to impose sanctions 
in those cases where private enforcement fails because of wealth constraints. 
Again, this recommends strict enforcement of the regulation.
12.7.3 Conclusion
Every enforcement policy should be a smart combination of a deterrence and 
a compliance strategy. There is no abstract, optimal enforcement strategy. In 
the case I analyzed, for fire safety regulation in horeca establishment, society 
will benefit from a shift to a more deterrent enforcement strategy. Improving 
the share of a deterrence strategy, is desirable for all relevant objectives of 
enforcement and is therefore likely to improve the compliance of proprietors 
with fire safety regulations. I do not argue that there should only be immedi-
ate and severe sanctioning of all violations. But in the current situation the 
balance is too much to a compliance strategy. A more deterrent strategy can 
be obtained in two ways. First of all, the fire safety department should start 
with formal warnings at an earlier time. It should strictly enforce the contents 
of such warnings. Efficiency gains can be realized by reducing the number of 
re-inspections and by reducing the time spent on a (re-)inspection. Secondly, 
the legal opportunities of the fire safety department can be improved. The 
municipality should provide a better back up and follow up of the imposition 
of administrative (repair) sanctions.  The national government can consider 
the possibility of administrative fines.
Three points should be made here. First of all, although conclusions are 
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drawn from the specific example analyzed, the description of the enforce-
ment of fire safety regulations in horeca establishments matches the policy 
observed in other studies. A quick scan by order of the Alders Committee 
(2001*, subparts A) showed that this practice was and probably is common 
to enforcing fire safety in general. Other research, described in section 11.3.3, 
showed that both at the local and at the national level, such enforcement poli-
cies are quite common.194 Finally, scholars have found that in other countries, 
many enforcement agencies use cooperative rather than deterrent enforce-
ment policies too.195 The enforcement of fire safety regulations in horeca estab-
lishments is a classic example for the defense of advice, persuasion and warn-
ings. Therefore, if the analysis of this example casts doubts on the benefits 
of a compliance strategy, it also urges for caution with respect to the use of 
compliance strategies in general.
Secondly, the analysis focused on the question whether enforcement can 
induce compliance. Due to a lack of data, it was not possible to draw any 
conclusions concerning the precise level of compliance which is or can be 
enforced. I also did not discuss in detail whether the costs of the enforcement 
policy are matched by the benefits of a higher level of compliance.
Thirdly, despite the current trend to base enforcement on well-thought 
plans rather than on incidents, the policy analyzed seems primarily to be a 
response to the incident of the Volendam disaster. Instead, the government(s) 
should have used a conscious balance of the social costs and benefits to decide 
whether it was desirable to intensify enforcement. This would have allowed 
the government to defend its need for more enforcement resources. The next 
chapter examines (ex-post) the costs and benefits of the observed intensify-
ing of the enforcement policy. Despite the lack of knowledge concerning the 
effects of enforcement, a cost-benefit analysis appears to be very informative 
and useful. Such an analysis might also have been carried out ex-ante.
194 See the references in note 178 and Netherlands Court of Audit (1996*, 2002*, 2005*), 
Michiels Committee (1998*).
195 See references in note 128. The enforcement pyramid of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres 
and Braithwaite) is most popular. Most theories are based on an empirical investigation 
of occupational safety and health regulation or environmental regulation, usually at the 
national level in the United States, Australia or the United Kingdom.

13 Cost-benefit analysis of enforcement 
following the Volendam disaster
So far I have mainly evaluated the effectiveness of the increase in enforcement 
efforts for fire safety in horeca establishments following the Volendam disas-
ter. The next step is to consider whether the observed enforcement policies are 
efficient at all. Have the changes in enforcement policies following the Volen-
dam disaster improved social welfare? In order to measure the contribution 
of these policies to social welfare, we must conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Do 
the benefits of the additional enforcement efforts exceed the costs?196
13.1 The role of a cost-benefit analysis
A cost-benefit analysis aims to list all the effects of a policy intervention. Mon-
etizing these effects allows us to compare them and to evaluate whether the 
intervention makes a positive or negative contribution to social welfare.197 A 
careful analysis of the costs and benefits of an enforcement policy helps pub-
lic decision-makers to choose their priorities and to resist unjustified claims 
to take action following an incident such as the Volendam disaster. This is not 
to argue that the cost-benefit analysis should replace public decision-making. 
Cost-benefit analyses are used to improve, not replace, decision-making by 
listing the consequences of a policy and as much as possible lumping them 
together. Public decision-makers have to balance the outcome of the cost-ben-
efit analysis with the items that could not be monetized. These include at least 
the distributional consequences and the risks and uncertainties of the policy. 
Although a cost-benefit analysis can not replace decision-making, it might 
be helpful in making the balances explicit. Policy-making must often – con-
sciously or unconsciously – take unto consideration how much society wants 
to invest in preventing deaths. If we reject a proposal of a €100 million invest-
ment in occupational safety which is estimated to save 10 people’s lives, it 
means that we are not willing to give €10 million for a human life. If we accept 
a proposal of €50 million that is estimated to save 30 lives, we are willing 
to spend €1,67 million per life. A cost-benefit analysis makes these choices 
explicit. Numbers and values – such as €2 million for a life – are not used to 
make exact calculations which drive decision-making, so that a proposal that 
196 This chapter is an update of the analysis in Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2003*).
197 Boardman et al. (2001) provide a general introduction into the methodology of cost-benefit 
analysis. An introduction to cost-benefit analysis in the field of criminal law enforcement 
can be found in Cohen (2000 and 2005) or Van Velthoven (2007*).
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costs €1,999 per life is accepted and one that costs €2,001 is rejected. Instead 
we are given some idea of the order of effects.
Such cost-benefit analyses are common in other policy fields. In the Neth-
erlands, national projects concerning the infrastructure are standard submit-
ted to a cost-benefit analysis, along lines established after intensive delibera-
tion by experts. Evaluations of this practice have led to the conclusion that 
a cost-benefit analysis contributes to a more professional decision-making 
because it offers a clear understanding of the effects of intended projects. The 
European Commission has proposed a policy agenda for traffic safety based 
on a simple cost-benefit-analysis-based rule of thumb. They computed that a 
policy measure that saves 1 casualty also saves 8 severely injured, 26 slightly 
injured and 200 material-damage-accidents, as well as leading to direct eco-
nomic damage savings (medical costs, loss of productivity, material damage, 
transaction costs) of €1 million. Since smaller accidents tend to be underre-
ported and there is also non-monetary damage, this €1 million is only a lower 
bound for the actual benefits of the measure. If a policy measure costs less 
than this €1 million, it goes without saying that it is socially profitable. The 
compulsory introduction of speed limiting devices for small vehicles and reg-
ulation and enforcement of alcohol use in traffic largely satisfy this require-
ment and therefore have the highest priorities.
This example shows that cost-benefit analysis can also be helpful when the 
data are too limited to conduct a full cost-benefit analysis as is the case in the 
enforcement of fire safety regulations. If there is no definitive balance of social 
benefits and costs, a careful analysis may provide upper or lower bounds. The 
cost-benefit analysis in this thesis does not provide a definitive judgment on the 
balance of benefits and costs, but it does provide a required reduction in expect-
ed fire damage. Such analyses can be helpful in guiding public decision-making 
and may force policymakers to think before they start on a new policy, especially 
resulting from an incident such as the Volendam disaster.
13.2 Costs and benefits of intensified enforcement policies
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the enforcement policies of all munici-
palities following the Volendam disaster . The data that are used have been 
gathered as much as possible from written national sources. In order to com-
plete the data, I contacted several persons employed at other (national) orga-
nizations.198 In addition, the interviews described in chapter 12 provide sup-
portive information concerning inspections. 
In the analysis I follow the definition of horeca given by Statistics Nether-
198 These persons are named in Annex 1.2. I would like to thank them for providing the infor-
mation.
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lands (the CBS). The total number of horeca establishments equals 22,600.199 
All values are in prices of 2003.
In order to evaluate the balance of social costs and benefits, we need to 
know whether the direct and indirect costs of the additional enforcement 
efforts are lower than the benefits in the form of the damage avoided. There 
are three major items to consider: (1) the costs of the government, (2) the costs 
of the horeca sector, and (3) damage from fire.
13.2.1 Government costs from intensified enforcement
 The costs of the government relate to the granting of licenses, the inspection 
of licenses and, if necessary, the costs of imposing sanctions.
With respect to use licenses, IOOV (2002*) concluded that on 1 January 
2002 there were 179,300 buildings that should possess a use license. However, 
71% of the existing buildings did not possess a use license. There is no reason 
to assume that this backlog was initially different for horeca establishments. 
The sector organization Royal Horeca Netherlands (RHN) estimates that 80% 
of the horeca establishments need a use license. Therefore the backlog in the 
granting of use licenses at 1 January 2002 can be estimated at 12,800 estab-
lishments.200 Granting use licenses for horeca establishments requires 15 to 35 
hours working,201 so that the backlog can be estimated at 154 to 359 fte202, or 
199 According to the classification of enterprises by the CBS (SBI’93) restaurants are category 
553.01 and cafés and the like category 554. I use the number of establishments, not of 
enterprises. On January 1, 2002 the number of restaurants was 10,425 and the number of 
cafés and the like 12,150. So, the total number of establishments equal 22,575. The numbers 
are similar, albeit slightly higher, for other years. Source: CBS, Statline. See also the data of 
Bedrijfsschap Horeca en Catering [Associated Companies Hotel and Catering Industry], 
available at www.bhenc.nl .
200 22,575 * 80% * 71% = 12,823.
201 According to the ‘prevapnorms’ (see note 169) horeca establishments come in priority 3, 
2 or 1, depending on the number of visitors, which requires 10 to 20 hours for granting a 
license. Most municipalities make their own norms based on these prevapnorms (AEF, 
2002*, and the interviews). 15 to 20 hours is the most common number in the action plans 
of municipalities. Most persons involved indicate that these norms are lower bounds and 
that they have sharpened them. AVD (2004*) states that for all buildings, an average of 35 
working hours is required. Horeca establishments are average buildings.
202 Assume that the net productive working hours equal 1250 per year (as in AEF, 2002*). The 
Handleiding Overheidstarieven 2003 [Manual Government Tariff] of the Ministry of Finance 
mentions 1333 hours. AVD (2004*) argues that in practice 1200 hours is more realistic.
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€10.5 to 24.5 million.203 Making up for the backlog can be regarded as a once-
only investment with an infinite duration, so that the social costs consist of 
the interest on the investment amount. If we take the real risk-free interest 
rate of 4% that is common in the Netherlands for government investments,204 
the annual costs equal €420,000 to €980,000.
In addition to catching up on the backlog, new horeca establishments, 
approximately 660 of them205, also have to apply for a use license. Using the same 
numbers, this requires on a yearly basis 8 to 18 fte or €540,000 to €1,260,000.206
The use licenses must also be inspected regularly. There are no national 
data on the number of inspections. However, municipal policy documents, 
interviews and RHN indicate that before the Volendam disasters, there were 
hardly any regular inspections. Only at Christmas or Carnival did some 
municipalities carry out inspections. By now, most municipalities intend to 
inspect horeca establishments at least once a year in addition to the inspec-
tions at Christmas and Carnival, and during special events. This is also in 
line with the prevapnorms.207 It therefore seems fair to assume that following 
the Volendam disaster, one additional inspection is carried out per year. If all 
18,000 horeca establishments requiring a license (80%*22,500) are inspected 
203 AEF (2002*) reports an average salary scale of 8 for granting use licenses. According to 
AVD (2004*), 90% of the activities require an intermediate and 10% a higher vocational 
education level, i.e. respectively salary scale 8 and 11. The following numbers are taken 
from the Handleiding Overheidstarieven 2003 (Ministry of Finance):
 
Salary scale Salary costs 
per man-year (€)
Overhead (€) Total 
costs (€)
Cost-effective
tariff per hour (€)*
8 42,352 24,259 66,611 50
11 59,513 24,259 83,772 63
13 78,670 24,259 102,929 77
 * Based on 1333 productive hours per year.
 With this information the total costs can be calculated as 154 or 359 * (90%*66,611 + 
10%*83,772) = 154 or 359 * €68,327 = €10,513,573 or €24,531,670.
204 See Eijgenraam (2000*, pp. 63-75) and Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 29 352 nr. 1 (Letter of the 
Minister of Finance concerning evaluation of risks in public investment projects). This rate 
applied until March 2007.
205 In 2001, approximately 1200 new horeca enterprises were started, including hotels, snack 
bars, etc. In the period 1994-2005, the number of new enterprises varied from 900 to 1600, 
with an average of 1200. Given the current proportion of different types of establishments 
(22,575 establishments on 40.820 including hotels, snack bars, etc., in other words 55%), 
this implies that approximately 660 new restaurants, cafés, etc. have been set up.
206 660 * (15 to 35) / 1250 = 7.92 to 18.48 fte. With costs of €68,327 per fte this gives us €541,151 
to €1,262,685.
207 According to the prevapnorms (note 169), horeca establishments (depending on the number 
of visitors) need to be inspected 1 or 2 times a year during 2 to 3 hours. Most municipalities 
base their plans on these norms. See further AEF (2002*) and AVD (2004*). The interviewees 
mention 40-60 minutes, but exclude travel and administration time. AVD (2004*) reports 
that 3.25 hours are required on average for all buildings, including re-inspections.
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yearly for 2 to 3.25 hours this requires 29 to 47 fte annually.208 The costs are 
€1,970,000 to €3,210,000 per year.209 Note that I leave aside the inspection of 
establishments that do not need to possess a use license.
In addition to the inspections themselves, we would like to know some-
thing about the content and consequences of these inspections. To which 
extent are violations discovered? Are re-inspections needed?210 Do inspec-
tions lead to sanctions? This information is rarely available. Interviewees 
mention that real imposition of sanctions is scarce. Appellation procedures 
almost always concern license fees. AVD (2004*) indicate that based on their 
experience there is sanctioning in 1% of the cases, which requires 20 hours 
work per case. Using this figure sanctioning requires 2.9 fte or €270,000.211
Before these intensified enforcement actions were started, there were 
many national and municipal preparations and overhead. Consider the steer-
ing committees, taskforces, research reports, risk inventories, policy docu-
ments, enforcement programs , etc., as well as the technical prescriptions and 
manuals that have been written, the information campaigns, etc. Suppose 
that in all 496 municipalities, one policy maker (scale 11, higher vocational 
education) put 2 months worth of effort in the initial project development 
and that we put 25% ahead for national overhead. Suppose further that 10% 
is put on the account of horeca establishments (18,000 of the 179,300 buildings 
that should possess a use license). Using the 4% interest rate as before, the 
annual costs can be estimated at €35,000.212 Moreover, suppose that every year 
the same policy maker is busy for two weeks writing an enforcement priority 
program. These costs can be estimated at €220,000.213
13.2.2 Compliance costs for horeca proprietors
The intensified enforcement policies imply that horeca proprietors face high-
er costs of compliance with the regulations. An estimate of these costs has 
208 18,060* 1 * (2 or 3.25) / 1250 = 28.9 or 47.0. 2 to 3.25 hours is based on the references in the 
previous note.
209 Inspection is carried out by the same kind of personnel as the personnel granting licenses 
(note 203). The costs are therefore 28.9 or 47.0 * €68,327 = €1,974,380 or €3,208,367.
210 Re-inspections are only included in the 3.25 hours of AVD (2004*).
211 1% * 18,060 * 20 = 3612 hours, or 2.89 fte. According to AVD (2004*), the activities require 
50% higher vocational education level (scale 11) and 50% higher education level (scale 
13). Using the data in note 203 this implies that the costs equal 2.89 * (50%*€83,772 + 
50%*€102,929) = €269,746.
212 496 * 2/12 * €83,772 * 1.25 = €8,656,440. Of these 10% are for the horeca establishment, so 
that the costs equal 10% * €8,656,440 * 4% = 34,626.
213 496 * 1/24 * €83,772 * 1.25 * 10% = €216,411.
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been made by the RHN.214 They estimate the initial costs of catching up on the 
backlog at €28 to €52 million in the five years following the Volendam disas-
ter. If we see these costs again as an investment with infinite duration and 
apply an interest rate of 4%, the annual costs are €1,120,000 to €2,080,000. The 
regular costs are estimated at €8.4 to €15.6 million per year.215
13.2.3 Fire damage
 The objective of the intensified enforcement policies is to reduce the probabil-
ity and/or severity of fire, thus: the expected harm. To acquire an impression 
of the possibly avoidable damage, tables 13.1 and 13.2 list the total damage of 
fire in horeca establishments in the years before the Volendam disaster. Table 
13.1 shows that over the past years there were on average 348 fires per year. 
On average rather more than 2 people died in these fires, while slightly fewer 
than 25 were seriously wounded. The direct financial damage is calculated at 
€17.6 million per year on average. The other costs have to be estimated (table 
13.2). For the costs of disposal I use the estimate of the costs of a turnout of the 
Fire Brigade. For the computation of the costs of casualties (medical costs, lost 
output, non-monetary damages ) I use the best available estimates of the cor-
responding figures for traffic casualties (table 13.3). The non-monetary dam-
age is estimated according to the statistical value of life as discussed in section 
2.1.2. This leads to total costs of €2.39 million per fatality and of €0.23 million 
per wounded  All in all the annual expected damage from fire accidents can 
be estimated at €30.4 million.
214 This includes the following costs: (i) time, administrative expenses, consultation; (ii) con-
stitutional investments (building); (iii) investment in procedures (evacuation plans, exer-
cises etc.); and (iv) additional costs for adjustments to the building and for new buildings 
as a consequence of fire regulations. Legal fees are left aside because they only have a 
redistributional effect between horeca proprietors and municipalities.
215 Of course an important question is whether this estimate (by the branche itself) is realis-
tic. To compare, the administrative costs of granting a use license are estimated at €569 
on average (SIRA Consulting, 2004*). If this also applies to horeca establishments, the 
administrative expenses alone of catching up on the backlog can be estimated to equal 
18,060 * €569 = €10.3 million. The same report uses €50 as a standard for an hour work by 
an entrepreneur. If the regular annual costs only consist of time spent by the proprietor, 
this implies that he spends 9.3 to 17.3 hours per year on fire safety (€8.4 or €15.6 million / 
(18,060 * 50). That does not seem unreasonable. It also fits the general information of web-
sites on the costs of technical devices.
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Table 13.1 Number of fi res in horeca establishments 1993-2001a
Year
Number of 
fi res
Of which 
with 
damage
Damage 
(mln euros)b
Number of 
lost livesc,d
Number of 
woundedc,d
1993 400 351 20.5 3 5
1994 386 340 22.9 3 21
1995 353 300 15.2 - 19
1996 448 381 27.8 - 11
1997 408 346 15.6 - 18
1998 273 232 11.8 - 17
1999 259 231 16.1 - 15
2000 275 213 17.7 - 4
2001 329 276 10.6 14 113
Average per 
year
348 297 17.6 2.22 24.78
Average per 
fi re
- 0.85 50,500 0.00639 0.07122
a. Source: CBS (according to statements of the municipal fi re department).
b. In prices of 2003. Direct fi nancial damage. Business damage (lost turnover) is exclu-
ded. Not in millions for average per fi re.
c. Excluding fi re men in function.
d. As dead are only registered the persons that have died within one day after the fi re. 
The fi gure for 2001 is therefore in connection to the disaster in Volendam adjusted to 
14 (in stead of 8). As wounded are registered the persons that are transported to or 
admitted at hospitals. This fi gure is not adjusted.
Table 13.2 Costs per year by fi re in horeca establishments
Costs In million euros
Direct fi nancial damage a 17.6
Loss of profi ts PM
Costs fi re brigade (348 fi res for € 5,100 per turn out)b 1.8
Monetary and non-monetary costs of victims:c 11.1
– medical costs 0.23
– gross output loss 2.03
– human losses 8.83
Total 30.4
a. The average fi nancial damage according to table 13.1.
b. According to table 13.1 there are on average 348 fi res. The Brandweerstatistiek 2005 [Fire 
Brigade Statistics] of the CBS mentions that the costs per turnout in 2003 equal 
€ 5,059 (on average for all fi res). Besides these there are other costs of disposal, like insu-
rance, police-effort etc. Note that the real costs are higher because there are also in 85% 
of the cases false alarms. It is not clear how these should be ascribed to fi re damage (they 
are partly a consequence of regulation and compliance).
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c. The total costs per victim (TC) consist of medical costs M, the gross (discounted) lost 
output (GO) and the intangible loss (or: human losses, H) (De Blaeij, 2003). The human 
losses H can be estimated by the statistical value of life (VOSL). The VOSL however is 
generally assumed to consist of human losses as well as lost consumption (LC). Another 
general assumption is that wounded do not have consumption loss.
These data are not available for fi re victims, so I use the data for victims of traffi c acci-
dents reported in table 13.3. According to table 13.1 the average number of fatalities is 
2.22 and of wounded 24.78. Multiplying these numbers with the costs reported in table 
13.3 yields the costs of victims mentioned above. For instance, the total costs are 2.22 * 
2,394,942 + 24.78 * 232,653 = 11.1 million.
13.3 The balance of costs and benefits
Using the above-mentioned data we can try to compute the balance of costs 
and benefits of the intensified enforcement policies for fire safety in horeca 
establishments. Unfortunately, one crucial piece of information is missing, 
namely the relationship between the additional enforcement efforts and the 
probability and severity of fire damage . There is no source available which 
provides any useful information on this relationship. My own research did 
not provide this information either (see section 12.1). That means that it is not 
possible to give a clear indication of the balance of social benefits and costs of 
the enforcement policies following Volendam.
13.3.1 A general picture of required effectivity
We can, however, describe what the balance of benefits and costs would be 
for several hypothetical values of the effectiveness of enforcement. Table 13.4 
provides three alternatives. If the intensified enforcement effort reduces the 
expected fire damage by 25%, the policy is inefficient no matter what.216 If 
the measures reduce expected fire damage by 50% or 75%, the policy is only 
efficient if the costs are low. Under the higher estimate of the costs, the policy 
remains inefficient under an effectiveness of 75%.
Put differently, for a positive balance of benefits and costs of the addition-
al enforcement actions, the required reduction in expected fire damage after 
Volendam should be at least 43%. This figure of 43% is the lower bound for 
the required effectiveness that applies if the costs of compliance and enforce-
ment are limited to the lower estimates. If the real costs are higher, the mini-
mum required effectiveness increases correspondingly, up to 78% under the 
highest estimate.
This computation suggests that the resources spent on fire damage in 
horeca establishments since Volendam have not been socially profitable. A 
reduction of the total fire damage with more than 40% seems rather high, 
although there are no data to determine whether this is the case.
216 Leaving aside the PM posts on both the benefit and costs side.
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Table 13.3 Costs of victimsa
Costs   Per fatality Per wounded
Medical costs 6,400 8,800
Gross output loss 510,200 36,000
Human losses 1,878,300 187,800
Total 2,394,900 232,700
a. These costs are the estimates of AVV (2006*) for the costs of victims of traffi c accidents for the 
year 2003.
The numbers for wounded are those that has been taken to a hospital (which corresponds to 
the reports of fi re wounded). The intangible costs of a deadly casualty are computed with the 
estimated VOSL of De Blaeij (2003). Based on De Blaeij (2003), Wesemann et al. (2005*) advise 
to use a VOSL of €2.2 million ± 0.3 million (prices 2001). The advise for intangible cost is €1.8 
million ± 0.3 million. The intangible costs of a wounded victim is (as usually) estimated to be 
10% of those of a deadly victim.
To compare, Viscusi and Aldy (2003; values in dollars in 2000) have investigated the estimates 
in the international literature, most often based on labor market research. They fi nd an average 
of $6.7 million. The most reliable estimates are in the range of $5 to $6.2 million. Furthermore 
they report a statistical value of an injury of $20,000 to $70,000. De Blaeij (2003) conducted a 
similar literature research for traffi c safety and found an average VOSL of $4.4 million and a 
median VOSL of $3.2 million. She fi nds a median value for wounds of €220,000 (p.68).
 
Table 13.4 Costs and (potential) benefi ts of enforcing fi re safety in horeca esta-
blishments after the Volendam disaster
Costs and benefi ts In euro’s per year
Costs:
Costs of granting licences
– catching up backlog 420.000 to 980.000
– new licences 540.000 to 1.260.000
Costs of inspections 1.970.000 to 3.210.000
Costs of further actions (sanctions) 270.000
Overhead costs
– initial 35.000
– regular 220.000
Costs of horeca sector
– catching up backlog 1,12 to 2,08 mln
– regular 8,4 to 15,6 mln
Total costs 13,0 to 23,7 mln
Potential benefi ts:
(Maximum avoidable) fi re damage 30,4 mln
Balance of benefi ts and costs:
– for effectiveness of enforcement of 25%
– for effectiveness of enforcement of 50%
– for effectiveness of enforcement of 75%
–5,4 à –16,1 mln
2,2 à –8,5 mln
9,8 à –0,9 mln
250 Chapter 13
There are several arguments to suggest that 40% is quite high. First of all, 
the interviews showed that inspection revealed a high number of violations. 
Compliance on some rules (especially regarding decorations and fire extin-
guishers) has improved. However, for many other rules, non-compliance is 
still high. Moreover, this is only the result of inspections that were announced 
or by appointment and which were performed during the day. Secondly, as 
table 13.5 shows, the figures of the years 2002 to 2005 do not indicate a clear 
decline in expected fire damage. There is a decrease in the number of fires, but 
the financial damage has increased, and the number of casualties is constant. 
Upon further examination, however, the real difference in the number of fires 
is between the periods 1993-1997 and 1998-2005. Of course, the number of 
data is very small and such an analysis ignores any background information 
that might explain the number and severity of fires, but there seems to be no 
clear evidence of a substantial effect on expected fire damage of the intensi-
fied enforcement. Finally, data on the causes of fires in horeca establishments 
indicate that not all fires can be related to the behavior of proprietors. 11% of 
the fires are caused by arson; 7% by smoking; 29% by faulty/wrong use of a 
machine or product; 28% otherwise and 25% unknown.217 Complying with 
the use requirements is not likely to reduce all causes of fires, although it may 
limit the severity of a fire. 
Table 13.5 Number of fi res in horeca establishments 2002-2005a
Year
Number of 
fi res
Of which 
with damage
Damage (mln 
euros)
Number of 
lost lives
Number of 
wounded
Average 
1993-2001 per 
year
348 297 17,6 2,22 24,78
Average 
1993-2001 per 
fi re
- 0,85 50.500 0,00639 0,07122
2002 280 229 34,1 0 16
2003 303 257 38,7 0 20
2004 251 203 24,5 0 19
2005 254 202 28,8 6 8
Average 
2002-2006 per 
year
272 223 31,5 1,50 15,75
Average 
2002-2006 per 
fi re
- 0,82 115.900 0,0055 0,0579
a. Source: CBS (according to statements of the municipal fi re department). For further 
explanation see table 13.1.
217 CBS, Webmagazine February 2, 2004. The figures apply to 2002. Horeca includes hotels, 
snack bars, etc.
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13.3.2 Costs and benefits of alternatives
Table 13.4 is not the end of the story. There are several ideas for a stricter or 
more structured approach to this problem. Some municipalities inspect larger 
horeca establishments twice a year (as prescribed by Prevap for some catego-
ries). There are plans in circulation in which use licenses have only a limited 
period of validity (AVD, 2004*). According to AEF (2002*), every horeca estab-
lishment should be inspected at least 2 times a year, and an inspection should 
take 2.5 hours. A use license should be valid for only 5 years, and judging an 
application requires 20 hours. Moreover, in essence, AEF judges these norms 
to be too low. To force the proprietor to comply with the rules, 1 inspection per 
quarter and continued inspection during special events is necessary. More-
over, horeca establishments which do not need to be in possession of a use 
license should be inspected by the fire safety department on a regular basis.
The costs of these policies can be calculated. For example, if a use license 
only has a period of validity of five years, the costs of granting licenses can 
be estimated at €3.0 to €6.9 million.218 Compared to the basic scenario of table 
13.4 this implies an increase in costs of €2.0 to €4.7 million.219 To recover these 
costs alone, the expected fire damage should be reduced with 6.6% to 15%, in 
addition to the already substantial effect in table 13.4. In these percentages the 
additional costs to horeca proprietors are not taken into account. These costs 
should be included, since the additional enforcement efforts intend to cause 
a behavioral change in horeca proprietors. As the additional costs to horeca 
proprietors are higher, the required effectiveness of the policy should be cor-
respondingly higher in order to achieve a positive benefit-cost balance. Simi-
larly, if horeca establishments are inspected four times a year (every quarter), 
the additional costs would be €5.9 to €9.6 million, requiring an additional 
reduction in expected fire damage of at least 19% to 32%.220 So if these alter-
native policies are implemented, the expected fire damage should be reduced 
by more than 50% as compared to the damage before the Volendam disaster. 
Under the very strict regime of a five-year license validity period, and inspec-
tion every quarter, the expected fire damage may have to be reduced with 
125% (under the highest cost estimates) in order to be efficient. 
There are also other alternative proposals in circulation (see for example 
AVD, 2004*). One is that horeca proprietors should obtain a certification for 
their establishment by some private company, which will replace the use 
218 If use licenses have a limited period of validity and have to be renewed after five years, the 
costs are not a once-only catching up plus structured licensing of new establishments, but 
can be calculated for a cycle of five years. If all 18,060 establishments need a new license 
once per five years, this requires on average per year 18,060 * 1/5 * (15 to 35 hours) / 1250 
= 43.3 to 101.1 fte, or (43.3 to 101.1) * €68,327 = €2,961,570 to €6,910,330.
219 For the lower estimates €2,961,570 – (€420,543 + €541,151) = €1,999,876, and for the higher 
estimates €6,910,330 – (€981,267 + €1,262,685) = €4,666,378.
220 I.e. the costs of inspections of table 13.4 would be four times higher, and the additional 
costs would thus be 3 * (€1,974,380 or €3,208,367) = €5,923,140 or €9,625,101.
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license. The consequences are unknown. If the price of certification equals 
that of publicly granting of a license, and the requirements are applied in the 
same way, it makes no difference. The costs would probably be somewhat 
higher because the proprietor would then also have to inform the municipal-
ity about his certification, and public agencies would have to supervise the 
certificating companies, leading to higher overall administrative costs. On 
the other hand, due to market powers, costs might be reduced. Furthermore, 
there are proposals to not only privatize licenses, but also to let private com-
panies perform the yearly inspections (as in the motor vehicle test). This has 
of course distributional effects because now it is the proprietor, rather than the 
tax-payer, who pays for inspection. However, for the total costs and benefits, 
the effects are similar to those of certification and probably not substantial.
13.3.3 The potential savings of the Use Decree
 There is a final alternative to consider, which was already suggested by the 
Alders Committee and will be implemented in 2008. This alternative is the 
abolishment of the use license and the harmonization of the use requirements 
into a national Use Decree (by the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environ-
ment). As discussed above in section 11.2.1, all municipalities have adopted 
more or less the same requirements in their municipal Building Bylaw. Except 
for the number of visitors, the requirements are not building-specific, so they 
need not be stipulated in a specific license. If the government would have 
chosen this alternative from the beginning, it would still have been able to 
inspect and enforce the use requirements, but without having to catch up on 
the backlog in granting use licenses. By simply inspecting and enforcing the 
use requirements directly, the government could have reached the same level 
of fire damage and compliance costs at lower enforcement costs. According to 
table 13.4, this would have saved an initial investment of €10.5 to €24.5 million 
or yearly €960,000 to €2,240,000. This would at least have saved the adminis-
trative costs of licenses for horeca proprietors. It is estimated that these costs 
are €569 per application.221 Therefore, if policymakers and politicians would 
have thought better about enforcement policies and would have chosen a 
system with a national Use Decree without licenses from the beginning, they 
would have saved over €10 million for horeca establishments alone, and over 
€100 million for all buildings.222 This conclusion does not require any informa-
tion on the effectiveness of inspection and enforcement, so it could have been 
reached before new policies were initiated. It is unfortunate that the policy is 
being changed now, at a time that most buildings have been licensed (except 
the municipal buildings themselves!).
221 SIRA Consulting (2004*). The calculation applies to all buildings, not specifically to horeca 
establishments.
222 Based on the figures of 18,000 horeca establishments and 179,300 buildings.
253Cost-benefit analysis of enforcement following the volendam disaster
13.4 Comments and interpretation
The general conclusion seems clear. There is enough doubt about the effi-
ciency of the intensified enforcement policies following the Volendam disas-
ter. Unless the expected fire damage has declined substantially, probably by 
50% or more – which is unlikely – the policies do not pass a cost-benefit test. 
The resources could probably have been spent in a way that saves more lives, 
for example on traffic safety223 or on radon in houses.224 Alternatively, it might 
have been spent on other enforcement problems. The rules that have to be 
enforced are numerous and municipalities and other governmental bodies 
have to carefully select the regulations they want to enforce.225
A cost-benefit analysis is helpful in choosing such priorities. The munici-
pal fire safety policies seem especially based on the Volendam disaster. If the 
government would have conducted a cost-benefit analysis before encourag-
ing and even pressing use license policies, they would probably have con-
cluded that these policies are not efficient. Unlike what happened after the 
Volendam disaster, the government should have resisted the pressure to take 
action, at least the substantial actions that were in the end taken. 
Of course, this result should be treated with caution. Some possible con-
sequences are unknown and therefore incorporated as PM-item. Moreover, 
the outcome depends on the reliability of the data, for example the extent to 
which the statistical value of fire casualties and burns are similar to those of 
traffic accidents. The differences seem to be limited.226 Yet several important 
remarks can be made, especially with respect to the value of life as it is treated 
in a cost-benefit analysis. 
223 For example the European Commission (2000) concludes that investing in enforcement of 
alcohol use in traffic is socially desirable. See also SER (1999*).
224 See RIVM (2003*).
225 See note 173.
226 Savage (1993) compares the willingness to pay for four different hazards. He concludes 
that people are willing to pay significantly more to lower the risks of stomach cancer than 
to risks posed by automobile accidents, home fires and aviation (Sunstein, 1997). Stomach 
cancer appeared to be in a class apart from the other hazards. In terms of willingness to pay, 
cancer ranks first, followed by automobile accidents, home fires, and aviation. Note that in 
my analysis the issue is about fires happening elsewhere than at home, which might imply 
differences in ‘control’, ‘voluntariness’, and perhaps dreadfulness. These may influence 
the willingness to pay. Sunstein (1997) discusses the factors that influence the willingness 
to pay and concludes that three deserve special attention: those imposing high externali-
ties, those preceded by unusual pain and suffering, and those producing distributional 
inequity. These three are not important in fire accidents in horeca establishments. All in all, 
data for traffic accidents seem to be the best available estimate for fire accidents (see also 
Viscusi, 1993).
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13.4.1 Fires as disaster
 There is one important objection that is often raised. A disaster such as the 
Volendam disaster falls into a different category than ‘common’ accidents. 
Therefore, it is argued, a cost-benefit analysis is either unnecessary or unsuit-
able. After such tragedies, the public wants the government to do everything 
in its power to prevent such accidents from happening again, without refer-
ence to the costs and benefits. Do disasters like the Volendam, Goteborg or 
Buenos Aires fires require more stringent regulation and enforcement than 
‘common’ accidents which lead to the same expected number of casualties? 
Are lives lost in a catastrophe worth more? The calculation above assumes 
that the data from automobile accidents are fairly accurate estimates for 
human losses as a result of fire accidents. However, automobile accidents 
usually lead to one or two casualties at a time, while fire accidents in horeca 
establishments may result in catastrophes that result in a large amount of 
casualties.227 It is argued that these large consequences justify the enforcement 
policies that were observed after Volendam.
There are two issues here, both relating to the higher media attention 
that is given to disasters. First, Zeckhauser (1996) argues that to those who 
die, a catastrophe is no worse than any other accident. However, to those 
who simply read about it, it is. In all accidents resulting in death, individuals 
such as family and friends, who care about the victims, suffer pain and grief. 
However, in the case of a catastrophe, even people who are unconnected or 
only marginally connected to those who die, grieve and suffer as external 
observers from empathetic concern with the victims. This empathy arises 
because the media alert them to these accidents, while common accidents 
often remain unnoticed. This implies that the (social) costs of these disasters 
are higher and (more) individuals are willing to spend more on limiting the 
risk of disasters.
Secondly, people have difficulty estimating the expected harm from acci-
dents, especially catastrophes, biasing them to fear catastrophes more than 
common accidents.228 People treat safety as a kind of “all or nothing” matter 
and are vulnerable to a “zero risk mentality” (Sunstein, 2001a). People suffer 
from probability neglect (Sunstein, 2001b), implying that they focus on the 
worst outcome and ignore the (often small) probability of the occurrence of 
this outcome. Probability neglect occurs especially in the face of emotional, 
fearful events. Moreover, in estimating the expected harm, the availability 
heuristic is important. People assess the probability of an event by seeing 
whether relevant examples are cognitively ‘available’ (Sunstein, 2001a). Since 
more (media) attention is given to disasters, they are more ‘available’ and 
thus estimated to be more likely than common accidents. 
227 Zeckhauser (1996) provides a nice introduction to the economics of catastrophes.
228 See section 1.4.2.
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13.4.2 Statistical cost-benefit analysis versus ‘irrational’ emotions
 So people are frightened of disasters and disasters may therefore induce them 
to be willing to spend more on preventing them. This also explains why the 
public requires regulation and enforcement after a disaster. The question is 
whether public policy should be based on the objective, statistical evidence 
concerning expected (harm from) accidents, or on the public’s fear of such 
accidents. Should the government respond to intense fear that involves sta-
tistically remote risks? Or can we maintain that investments in traffic safety 
or in reducing radon in living houses are more worthwhile than investments 
in fire safety in horeca establishments?
The general argument
In general, I would argue,229 public policy should be based on facts, on accurate 
information, and not on what people think. Since people make large mistakes 
in estimating accidents and their expected harm, an efficient regulatory and 
enforcement policy is not one directly, one-to-one, based on the public’s per-
ception of priority-setting, but imposes a filter on these perceptions. More-
over, precisely because of probability neglect and other cognitive failures , 
institutional constraints are required that prevent policies and politicians 
from being based on public perceptions. An obligatory cost-benefit analysis , 
or a duty to enforce (section 9.3.1), may prevent us from basing policies on 
ungrounded fears and from responding too quickly to incidents.
However, ungrounded public fears of accidents should not be completely 
ignored. People’s fear of accidents and deaths creates real social costs, because 
the fear itself is unpleasant and because it will influence behavior so that peo-
ple will avoid certain activities or invest in precautions. Of course, if possible, 
the government should try to inform and educate people, so that they do not 
persist in their errors. However, if public fear is intractable (in the sense that 
it is impervious to efforts at reassurance), a failure to respond would impose 
costs because it would leave people feeling distressed, upset, or fearful. A 
governmental response in the form of safety regulation and enforcement can 
be socially beneficial if the benefits in terms of fear reduction justify the costs. 
Moreover, in order for public policy to be effective, public support and con-
fidence are required. Therefore, regulators and enforcement officials must be 
aware not only of the actual, but also of the perceived risks. 
Fear of fire in horeca establishments
With respect to the fire safety enforcement policies following Volendam, this 
issue does not seem to play a very important role. Of course, in the period 
directly following the tragedy, many people questioned the safety of horeca 
establishments. Moreover, many members of the municipal council asked 
229 The following arguments can be found in Zeckhauser (1996) and Sunstein (2001a and 
2001b).
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questions about the situation in their municipality. However, real feelings of 
fear and distrust were not very common after the Volendam disaster. In any 
case, declines in horeca visits as a result of the Volendam disaster are not men-
tioned anywhere. Moreover, even if people had misperceived the risk of fire 
in horeca establishments and required public policies, I am convinced that 
explanation would have been very helpful. The pressure to start enforcement 
actions came especially from governmental officials themselves (varying 
from politicians to the Alders Committee , Ministries and Fire Departments) 
and not from the common citizens.
What does matter in the case of fire safety in horeca establishments are 
public feelings of empathy with the victims. These feelings can be incorporat-
ed into the value of life, because there is a willingness to pay. Unfortunately, 
there are no data on basis of which to estimate this willingness to pay. Since 
such feelings are absent or less astute in the case of automobile accidents, they 
are not fully taken into account in the analysis above. Suppose that, in order 
to provide some understanding of the order of effects, the expected human 
losses are twice as high as in case of automobile accidents. This would imply 
that the total damage from fire rises to €39.2 million. As a result, the minimum 
required reduction in fire damage varies from 33% to 60%. That is still sub-
stantial. I am therefore of the opinion that incorporating the fact that disasters 
such as Volendam lead to many simultaneous casualties, does not invalidate 
the conclusion that it is likely that the increase in enforcement resources fol-
lowing the Volendam disaster has been inefficient.
13.5 Conclusion from the cost-benefit analysis
A cost-benefit analysis is useful in ‘rationalizing’ public policy and prevent-
ing it from being founded on unjustified perceptions. In case of disasters and 
incidents, a cost-benefit analysis is even more, and not less, helpful, precisely 
because there are cognitive failures and emotions. A cost-benefit analysis pro-
vides both the public and the decision-makers with the necessary informa-
tion about actual risks and alternative policies for reducing this risk. For the 
public, cost-benefit analysis is important because it may be an instrument in 
informing and educating individuals about actual risks and help the govern-
ment defend its priority setting. An obligatory cost-benefit analysis may be a 
credible constraint for politicians if their voters desire inefficient action.
If the government had conducted a cost-benefit analysis before pressing 
use license policies, they would probably have concluded that these policies 
were inefficient. Instead of what happened after the Volendam disaster, the 
government should have resisted the pressure to take action, at least refrain-
ing from the substantial actions they ended up taking. The argument of sec-
tion 12.5.2 is supported by the fact that fire safety departments seem to have 
seized the opportunity to increase their claims for budget. Despite the wide 
use of programmed enforcement , fire safety policies seem primarily based on 
the Volendam disaster. 
From the analysis of the municipal enforcement policies in this and the 
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previous chapter it appears that there is no adequate foundation for the cur-
rent policy. There is an endless elaboration on tasks, organization, coordina-
tion and the required number of personnel, but it remains unclear what the 
precise objective is, or the desired result. There is not even a trace of a balance 
of benefits and costs. What seems to be necessary in the field of enforcement 
is not so much a flood of policy plans , but better analyses of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of actions and measures. We therefore return to the conclusions 
of the Netherlands Court of Audit (2005*) as well as Leeuw and Willemsen 
(2006*) that enforcement has certainly been professionalized at all levels over 
the past years. However, the effect on actual enforcement and compliance 
remains unknown. “For example, enforcers do not, as a rule, know to which 
extent enforcement efforts contribute to compliance of the rules and laws and 
to the solution of the underlying problems. (…) [I]t is also unknown to which 
risks citizens are exposed at the chosen level of enforcement. Nor is it clear 
how and at what price risks can and should be reduced.” (Netherlands Court 
of Audit, 2005*, p.5) . This conclusion appears to be directly applicable to the 
municipal enforcement of fire safety in horeca establishments.
I return to this observation in chapter 16. First, however, I discuss the use 
of private enforcement.

14 Settlement of liability claims following the 
Volendam disaster
The previous chapters consider the public enforcement policy following the 
Volendam disaster and analyze whether it provides an adequate incentive 
for proprietors to comply with fire safety regulation. Section 2.3 shows that 
horeca proprietors can also be given an incentive to increase precautions as 
a result of liability claims from the victims of a fire accident. Under certain 
conditions, this may induce the proprietor to choose efficient precautions. In 
this chapter I want to examine the incentives emanating from the Dutch legal 
system. Is private enforcement by victims effective in inducing proprietors to 
take precautions against fire damage?
I do not examine the litigation process of liability claims for fire accidents 
in general. There are no data on these types of court cases, let alone settle-
ments. I focus instead on the settlement of the claims of the victims of the 
Volendam disaster. For this procedure, a lot of data can be found. Moreover, 
since it is an important case which received a lot of attention, it is likely to 
determine the perception for future cases. Therefore it is worthwhile to exam-
ine this case-study. Does the settlement of the Volendam disaster provide suf-
ficient incentive to prevent future fire accidents?
Section 14.1 presents the headlines of the litigation process of the damage 
claims of the victims of the Volendam disaster. Section 14.2 summarizes the 
payments that the different parties have made. Section 14.3 answers the main 
question whether the outcome of the litigation process provides an efficient 
incentive to take precautions. Section 14.4 concludes.
14.1 The facts
In this section I offer a general description of the settlement of the damage 
of the Volendam disaster. This information is not directly available, but can 
– with some effort – be gleaned from (annual) reports, newspaper articles, 
parliamentary documents, and websites. A detailed account of my sources is 
available upon request.
14.1.1 The Volendam disaster and the first actions
Shortly after midnight January 1, 2001, a fire broke out in café “’t Hemeltje” 
in Volendam . At that moment 356 youngsters were present. As a consequence 
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of the fire, 14 of them died and almost all others were injured, many suffering 
serious burns (almost 200 youngsters).
In the days following the disaster, an organization was set up, combin-
ing fund-raising, medical, financial, tax, legal and insurance knowledge. This 
foundation, SSNV, initiated by the inhabitants and business community of 
Volendam, was aimed at providing the casualties with the widest ranging 
help in the short, but especially the long run. In the course of the following 
years, the SSNV received donations of approximately € 7.7 million. A few 
months later, another foundation was established, the BSNV, a special inter-
est group of the victims. Almost all victims (330) were affiliated with this 
organization.
The proprietor of ’t Hemeltje, Veerman , almost immediately donated € 
22,700. After two months, his liability insurance company paid out €1,134,450, 
the full amount for which Veerman’s company was insured. Somewhat pecu-
liarly, it was continuously reported that Veerman gave up this money volun-
tarily and it should be seen as a gift. Apparently, the insurance company had 
immediately decided to pay out the insurance to get rid off the case. In any 
case, 25% of the money was donated to the SSNV, the remainder was trans-
ferred to the foundation 010101, which paid the money out to the victims.
An information and advice centre was started, later called ‘Het Anker’. 
This centre received several subsidies from the Ministry of Public Health for 
the years 2002-2004 of a total of € 1,907,641, and from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for the years 2003-2006 of € 5 million. Subsidies were also granted for 
reintegration courses, but the amount is unknown.
Shortly after the disaster, the Provincial States of North-Holland (to which 
Edam-Volendam belongs) decided to make € 453,800 available for the victims. 
This amount was available for specific needs, especially housing, that were 
not met in another way.
14.1.2 The investigating reports
On March 26, 2001, the report of the Committee Polak-Versteden was published 
which, by order of the governor of the Province North-Holland (and on the 
request of the municipality of Edam-Volendam), offered advice concerning the 
governmental lessons to be learned. More important was the final report of the 
Alders Committee on June 21, 2001, which investigated the café fire by order of 
the central government. In response to the report the government made a total of 
€23 million available for the years 2001-2006, divided as follows:230
– The Ministry of Education provided a compensation of €6.6 million for 
six years for additional personnel, tools and facilities for two schools in 
Volendam.
230 I report here the monetary consequences of the Alders Committee. The results of the inves-
tigation into the fire and the enforcement policy are reported in section 11.2.2.
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– The Ministry of Public Health paid out €10 million for four years to ‘Het 
Anker’ and to a number of health institutes.
– The Ministry of Internal Affairs paid the costs of the Alders Committee of 
€2.5 million.
– The municipality of Edam-Volendam received a compensation of €2.4 
million for the costs of assistance, memorial services, etc. as well as for 
travel and accomodation costs for family members of the victims.
– The SSNV received €1.1 million.
– The Dutch Burns Foundation received €0.45 million.
On July 4, 2002, the final report of the Committee Financial Settlement New 
Year’s Eve Fire Volendam (CFA Volendam, or CFA II) was published. CFA II 
advised the government about the support and financial compensation to the 
victims (only monetary damage was considered). The central government 
made €30.1 million available, including €4.2 million for implementation costs. 
Three kinds of support were offered:
1. A centre for reintegration and aftercare, for everyone, €5 million for a pe-
riod of fi ve years.
2. A (once-only) compensation of functional invalidity, for the victims, in 
total €17.3 million. This compensation depends on the level of invalidity, 
with a maximum of €150,000 for 100% invalidity.
3. A compensation of the costs due to injury, for victims and relatives, in 
total €3.6 million, as far as these costs were not compensated in another 
way. The maximum compensation was €20,000 for victims, and €7,500 for 
their relatives.
The committee expected that 336 victims, 1300 relatives and 1700 social/relief 
workers would make use of these resources. In addition to this arrangement, 
the SSNV financed complementary measures.
The results of the medical examinations and the corresponding payments 
were not unambiguously reported. In early 2004, the SSNV reported that 371 
decisions had been reached and that €15.5 million of the CFA-II money had 
been paid out. The SSNV herself had financed an additional €6.6 million (of 
which €391,018 had been financed by the remainder of the insurance benefit 
of proprietor Veerman). The SSNV wished to keep €1.3 million available in 
cash for future arrangements. The distribution of the victims by degree of 
severity was as follows (based on an interim report of November 2003 of 329 
decisions):
1. 50 victims fell in the most severe category with a benefi t of €135,000 – 
150,000.
2. 30 victims fell in the category with a benefit between €75,000 and 
€135,000.
3. 85 victims fell in the category with a benefit between €15,000 and 
€75,000.
4. Approximately 140 youngsters fell in the lightest category with 2-10% 
permanent invalidity and a benefi t of €1,500 – 15,000.
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In order to stimulate the youngsters to use the money for the long term (for 
instance buying a suitable house), the SSNV created a bonus arrangement. If 
someone put the money on a long-term savings account, he or she received a 
once-only bonus of 5% of the deposit. This bonus arrangement was financed 
by the interest on the account on which the CFA-II money had been paid. In 
total €784,000 were spent on bonuses. 
14.1.3 The settlement of liability claims and other legal procedures
This subsection describes the settlement of the damage claims against the 
municipality and the proprietor Veerman.
The damage claims and negotiations
 Most victims united themselves in the BSNV. Already as early as August 20, 
2001, the BSNV filed a claim to hear witnesses as part of the preliminary inves-
tigation into the liability. The intention was to hold both the proprietor Veer-
man and the municipality liable. These provisional witness testimonies were 
taken in 2001 and 2002. When questioned, the proprietor Veerman remained 
silent because of the criminal investigation that was running. In January 2002, 
the union FNV started an action on the substance against the municipality 
and Veerman on behalf of 14 victims. One of them claimed compensation in a 
procedure at the court of Haarlem. Later, the victims represented by the FNV 
joined those of the BSNV.
The municipality of Edam-Volendam rejected liability from the beginning 
and was not willing to negotiate about the claims. With respect to the claims 
against Veerman, there were many skirmishes in the following months and 
years. The main lines are as follows. In the beginning, Veerman indicated that 
he was willing to settle. Rumors are that there was talk of a settlement amount 
of €6 million under the condition that Veerman was able to exploit his proper-
ties again. Therefore, the BSNV decided to freeze the current procedures and 
to invest in an audit into the assets of Veerman. There was much debate con-
cerning the possible exploitation of the cafés by Veerman. Veerman argued 
that he needed to exploit his cafés to earn money for compensation. However, 
many victims did not like the idea of reopening the cafés. This led to Veerman 
suggesting that he could move to neighboring locations. However, the munic-
ipality (the council) was not willing to change the zoning plan. At some point, 
Veerman decided to reopen his old cafés and applied for the necessary licens-
es. The use license could not be refused, but there were procedures (including 
court cases) for the liquor and horeca license. The BSNV was so angry about 
the decision to reopen the cafés that they interrupted the settlement negotia-
tions. Moreover, they argued that Veerman was not willing to cooperate with 
the audit into his assets. In June 2003, BSNV’s lawyers summoned Veerman 
and the municipality on behalf of 214 victims united in the BSNV. They asked 
the court to convict them for the consequences of the fire. They reproached 
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Veerman the following points: (i) the Christmas decorations, installed under 
supervision of the owner, and hung everywhere, was highly flammable, and 
hung too low; (ii) the café did not comply with many fire safety requirements, 
for example with the emergency exits. The reproaches to the municipality 
were as follows: (i) despite advices they performed no inspections in the peri-
od 1994 – April 2000; (ii) they did not act upon the inspection of April 2000 
in which many failures were detected; (iii) the municipality knew about the 
Christmas decorations, but did not act upon this information despite their 
own statement that it was dangerous. The victims demanded €213 million 
compensation plus €14 million for non-monetary damages . More specifically, 
202 wounded victims demanded €1,054,115 per person for lost income and 
non-monetary damages varying from €18,750 to €150,000. In addition, 12 
parents of dead youngsters demanded €10,000, specifically for the costs of a 
funeral. In the first instance, however, the procedure was aimed at determin-
ing negligence, following which the amount of compensation should have 
been determined in a separate (and individual) procedure. At the same time, 
they made a prejudgment attachment on the properties of Veerman for €150 
million. Both Veerman and the municipality denied liability.
Criminal prosecution
Meanwhile, the owner Veerman, his daughter and the manager were being 
criminally prosecuted. On July 18, 2003, the court of Haarlem convicted Veer-
man on charge of culpable homicide, fire and causing serious physical injury, 
and condemned him to 240 hours of community service, 12 months of sus-
pended imprisonment and deprivation of the profession of horeca proprietor 
for two years. The daughter and manager were both acquitted. Both Veerman 
and the Public Prosecutor appealed against the court decision.
Settlement
 On April 22, 2004, the BSNV, Veerman and the municipality presented a draft 
settlement agreement. The headlines of the agreement were:
1. Veerman c.s. were to sell the properties of Haven 154-156 to the munici-
pality for the following amounts:
– Haven 156, which belonged to someone else, for € 907,560.43,
– Haven 154 and the horeca establishment for € 2,885,334.
 After deducting several costs including mortgage expenses, Veerman re-
ceived an amount of € 1,825,334. Of this amount € 700,000 was to be paid 
to the foundation Aftercare (see 4). The remainder, approximately € 1.2 
million, was to be paid into a frozen account of the SSNV, and paid out by 
this organization to the victims. The SSNV and BSNV would decide how 
this money should be spent.
2. The municipality and the BSNV were to set up an idealistic foundation 
that would exploit the property at Haven 154-156. In this property, there 
would be no horeca exploitation for at least 50 years.
3. Veerman gave a right to his profi t for a maximum of € 1 million until De-
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cember 31, 2012 (i.e. for ten years). Supposedly the amount would be € 
230,000.
4. The independent Foundation Aftercare was to be set up by the munici-
pality and the BSNV. The municipality was to pay €700,000 as a starting 
capital and then €40,000 annually for a period of 40 years. Veerman also 
paid €700,000 (see 1). The Foundation Aftercare was to function specifi -
cally as a safety net for future costs that would not be compensated by 
another way or by benefi ts of insurance policy.
5. The current civil procedures would be terminated.
All 340 victims had to accept the agreement. The Public Prosecutor and 
Veerman indicated that they were willing to withdraw the criminal appeal 
procedure if there was a settlement about the compensation.
On November 1, 2004, the above settlement agreement was signed by all 
parties. All legal procedures ended. 333 of the 340 members of the BSNV gave 
a mandate to the BSNV to sign the agreement. Six of the others declared that 
they did not see themselves as a victim and therefore would not apply for 
the compensation. All victims who participated in a court procedure (by the 
BSNV or the FNV) signed. Based on these results, the municipality and Veer-
man concluded that the agreement could be implemented.
Hereafter, nothing much happened. The appeals in the criminal case were 
withdrawn by both parties. The administrative procedures concerning the 
opening of the cafés were no longer relevant, and nothing was heard from 
the civil procedures. Apparently the one person who did not agree had recon-
ciled himself to the agreement.
14.2 Overview of payments
Based on the facts presented in the previous section, I made an overview of 
the payments that the different parties made. Not all the information is per-
fectly clear, but no other information was available. Most of the ‘common’ 
costs are not included, such as the costs of fire assistance and casualties, the 
costs of benefits from health, accident or social insurances, reintegration, etc. 
It is also not always known whether all the money promised was in fact paid 
out. Furthermore, it is unknown whether the price the municipality paid for 
the property of Haven 154-156 is a fair market price. Finally, the amount paid 
for lawyers and other legal support remains unknown. These amounts were 
probably paid from the received compensation.
With this in mind, table 14.1 provides the most reliable estimate of the dif-
ferent payments. In total, the different parties paid € 66.8 million. This money 
was allocated in the following way:
1. The victims received direct fi nancial compensation of € 32.2 million:
– The SSNV (also on behalf of the BSNV and foundation 010101) dis-
tributed €10.1 million. Of this amount, €2.6 million came from the 
government (after the Alders Committee 1.1, Provincial States 0.5 and 
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revenues from sale Haven 154-156 1.1), €1.4 million from Veerman 
(insurance benefi t 1.13, gift of 0.023 and profi t right of 0.23), and €6.2 
million from private donations.
– The Foundation Aftercare had €2.2 million at its disposal (0.7 from 
Veerman and 0.7 + 0.82 from the municipality).
– The damage fund CFA-II has granted €3.6 + €15.5 + €0.78= € 19.9 mil-
lion.
2. There was indirect support for the victims of a total of € 27.9 million. The 
national government provided €19.5 million in response to the Alders 
Committee for schools, health institutes, ‘Het Anker’, etc., and another €5 
for ‘Het Anker’ by CFA-II. The municipality established a foundation in 
Haven 154-156 for fi fty years, which cost €3.4 million.
3. The different transaction costs were in total € 6.7 million:
– The Alders Committee cost €2.5 million.
– The implementation of CFA-II cost €4.2 million.
Table 14.1 Overview of payments after the Volendam disaster
National government: € 52,5 million
For the period 2001-2006 (committee Alders) € 23,0 million
(especially aimed at organizations like schools, health institutes etc.)a
Provincial States € 0,5 million
CFA-II money € 29,1 million
Compensation for vicimsb € 24,1 million
Costs of implementation € 4,2 million
Bonus arrangementc € 784.000
Common benefi ts of medical expenses, social insurance, accident 
policies etc.
PM
Municipality Edam-Volendam: € 4,9 million
Once-only contribution to Foundation Aftercare € 0,7 million
Annual contribution to Foundation Aftercare, for 40 years,
€ 40.000
€ 0,8 milliond
Costs of exploitation Haven 154-156 by idealistic foundatione € 3,4 million
Common costs of assistance by police, Fire Brigade etc. PM
Private persons:f € 6,2 million
Proprietor Veerman: € 3,15 million
Insurance benefi ts donated € 1,1 million
Donation € 22.700
Net profi t sale property Haven 154-156 € 1,8 million
Right on profi t (maximal € 1 million) € 230.000
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a. There are also different incidental subsidies for ‘Het Anker’ of € 6,9 million in total. It 
is unclear whether these amounts should be counted separately. These amounts are the 
initial amounts that the government has made available. Possibly the amounts that are 
made available as a consequence of the “Committee Alders” or “CFA-II” replace the 
initial subsidies. Therefore I exclude the initial subsidies from the calculations.
b. € 25,9 million has been made available but € 24,1 is actually paid.
c. This bonus is fi nanced by the interest on the CFA-II money. It is therefore open for 
discussion whether these are really costs of the government or simply interest benefi ts 
to the victims. I take the perspective that it takes necessarily some time for medical 
examinations etc. before implementation of public damage compensation can be rea-
lised. Therefore the national government could have decided to make € 25,9 available 
by about January 1, 2004. Because it decided to donate the money already in July 2002 
it loses interest in this period. An argument in favor of this perspective is the fact that 
to the extent that victims do not make use of the arrangement, the money will (most 
likely) be returned to the government. Moreover, including the bonus implies that the 
CFA-II money is calculated in prices of 2004 as holds for most other payments in the 
table.
d. This is the net present value, calculated with an interest rate of 4% and payment at the 
beginning of the period. Note that all other values are not discounted
e. The municipality has purchased the property at Haven 154-156 for € 3,8 million. 
Assume that this is the market value. The transaction itself implies that fi nancial assets 
of the municipality decrease with € 3,8 million, while the assets of real estate increase 
with the same amount. There are however costs, because the municipality gives the 
property a specifi c destination for 50 years, so that the property does not yield any rev-
enues for the municipality during these years (no rents are paid). If we assume that an 
investment would yield a return of 4% per year, the costs are about € 150.000 per year. 
Over fi fty years the net present value is then € 3,40 million (€ 3.395.904).
f. In total the SSNV has € 7,7 million at its disposal. This includes € 391.018 of insurance 
money from Veerman (although this is more than 25%), as well as the donation of the 
national government of € 1,1 million. So the private donations can be calculated as € 6,2 
million.
Victims therefore received financial support for a total of €60.1 million. The 
largest part of this amount was paid by the national government. The propri-
etor Veerman only paid €3.15 million, but this amount includes the profit from 
the sale of his cafés at Haven 154-156. Unfortunately, it is unknown whether 
the price the municipality paid for the property is higher or lower than the 
market value. It is therefore unknown what Veerman’s real costs were.231 In the 
absence of profit from the property sale Veerman only paid €1.35 million, and 
even this sum includes the insurance benefit of €1.1 million he received.
231 The market value of the property was probably almost zero in the short run because the 
community would not allow the property to be used freely. Intuitively, a building in which 
such a disaster has taken place is very difficult to sell. If so, the €1.8 million is not a real 
contribution of Veerman , but another donation by the municipality.
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14.3 Evaluating the Volendam settlement
How must these observations be interpreted? In this section I evaluate the 
settlement process described in the previous sections.
14.3.1 The process
In the end, the damage claim was settled quite smoothly. The year 2003 was 
important. During that period, BSNV, Veerman and the municipality negoti-
ated with difficulty. Veerman did not want to say much because of the crimi-
nal lawsuit. There was also much quarreling about the reopening of Veer-
man’s cafés. On the part of the victims, uncertainty remained concerning the 
amount of money they had already received and what they should demand 
from Veerman. Therefore, in June and July 2003, civil, administrative and 
criminal court cases took place.
At the beginning of the year 2004, the situation changed. The Volendam 
community wanted to ‘move on’ and close the case. The criminal lawsuit had 
ended and Veerman had been convicted. Furthermore, the medical examina-
tions had been performed and the victims had received their money (from 
the national government and the SSNV). All this opened the way to the settle-
ment of April 2004 that was completed in November 2004.
This immediately leads to the question whether the victims and the Volen-
dam community in general had insufficient incentive to claim damages from 
Veerman. Apparently, because they had received money from the national gov-
ernment and the criminal conviction had provided the desired statement of Veer-
man’s guilt, they did not have any wish to continue the case. Before addressing 
this question, I discuss the total social harm from the Volendam disaster. 
14.3.2 Total harm
The compensation amounts discussed above provide a fair estimate of the 
monetary damage. The impression is that the mentioned damage compensa-
tions were, together with common social insurance and health care benefits, 
sufficient to cover all the material damage. There were not many unfulfilled 
desires. In this way, the total monetary damage of victims can be estimated at 
€60 million. This amount does not include the costs that were covered in some 
other way (such as the costs of hospital admission, social insurance, reinte-
gration etc.). There were also costs for ‘society’ in the form of fire brigade and 
police assistance, the transaction costs of €6.7 million, etc. On the other hand, 
there are some signals that indicate overcompensation. For example, there 
were three different arrangements for the compensation of funeral costs. Let 
us take €60 million to be the most reasonable estimate of the monetary dam-
age.
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The non-monetary damage can be estimated at €1.87 million for the dead and 
€0.19 for the seriously wounded casualties.232 Therefore, the non-monetary 
damage from the 14 youngsters who died can be estimated at €26.3 million. 
If we assume that there were 175 seriously wounded youngsters,233 the non-
monetary damage for injuries can be estimated at €32.9 million. The remain-
ing non-monetary damage of the slightly injured as well as the general social 
commotion should be considered as PM-item.
All in all, this leads to an estimate of the total social harm of the Volendam 
disaster of €119.3 million.234 
14.3.3 Evaluation of Veerman’s contribution
 The proprietor Veerman only paid €3.15 million, of which €1.1 as insurance 
benefits and €1.8 in return for the sale of his property. How should we evalu-
ate the fact that Veerman only paid a minor fraction of the total damage , even 
if we only consider the monetary damage?
If the goal of liability is only compensation or retribution, the results are 
probably not worrying. Possibly, compensation is most efficiently dealt with 
by public funds instead of private litigation. The transaction costs of public 
funds are still substantial (€4.2 million in this case), but probably lower than 
those of private litigation.235 Moreover, public compensation can be more effec-
tive because it naturally supplements the general public benefits and must 
satisfy less stringent requirements on causation and the actual occurrence of 
damage. If the goal is retribution, some ‘sufficient’ level of punishment of 
Veerman is effective. It appears that the Volendam community, including the 
victims, took the view that this punishment has been realized by the criminal 
sentence and that the additional payments of Veerman were sufficient.
Liability and the incentive to take precautions
 Economists, however also, or even mainly, ask attention for the preventive 
function of liability. Liability provides an incentive to take precautions. As a 
general rule, explained in section 2.3, this incentive is efficient if the injurer is 
232 See table 13.3.
233 I.e. the categories 1-3 named by CFA-II (p.248): (50+30+85)/308 * 329 ≈ 175.
234 If we directly estimate the damage using the figures in table 13.3, the social harm can be 
estimated at 14 * €2,394,942 + 175 * €232,653 = €74.2 million. This is an underestimation 
because the 154 (329 – 175) slightly injured are not counted, the medical costs of burns 
might be higher than those of traffic accidents, the general social costs to others than direct 
victims and relatives are not counted, etc. 
235 It is often suggested that redistributing one euro or dollar through the liability system 
costs 50 cents or even one euro or dollar. In section 15.2, I calculate that the transaction 
costs are €3750 per claim. Barendrecht (2002*) claims that liability costs about 50 eurocents 
per redistributed euro, while redistribution through damage funds and social security 
costs 20 eurocents.
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forced to pay fully for all the damage he inflicted.236 This is not what happened 
in the Volendam case. One major problem was that compensation for non-
monetary damage was only very limited, but even if we ignore this problem, 
Veerman did not fully pay for the monetary damage either. There are three 
potential explanations for this fact.
A first explanation is that the merits of the case were not so large, so that 
victims expected that the probability of the court convicting Veerman to pay 
compensation was too low, or that they would have to wait a long time before 
receiving a compensation. However, the benefits of the case were, in prin-
ciple, rather high. Since Veerman was held criminally liable, he would also be 
liable in a civil lawsuit unless he was able to present proof to the contrary.237 If 
his behavior was negligent, he would be obliged to compensate the financial 
damage plus a (less than full) compensation for the non-monetary damage if 
a victim was physically injured, meaning at the very least the direct financial 
damage to the victims of €32.2 million. Of course, a court procedure would 
take more time, but since the threat of a trial was credible, Veerman would 
probably have been willing to settle the case for a higher amount. It is also not 
true that the victims could themselves be blamed. This could only be true in 
the case of the person that lit the packet of sparklers, but he had died. So the 
merits of the case seem to be quite high.
Secondly, Veerman might have been unable to pay a higher amount of 
compensation, but this does not seem to have been the case either. Veerman 
was not completely squeezed . At the time of the Volendam disaster, he did 
possess several other properties and numerous companies and he did not 
give up these possessions. He continued to function in the Volendam com-
munity and to own several companies, as well as horeca establishments. He 
was also unwilling to cooperate in the audit into his assets. His assets were 
estimated at several tens of millions of euros. Even the company to which 
‘’t Hemeltje’ belonged had assets of at least €10 million. Therefore, although 
Veerman may have been unable to pay €32.2 million, let alone the full damage 
of €119.3 million, he could have paid substantially more than he did.
The final and most likely explanation is that the Volendam victims and 
community did not have an incentive to proceed with the case because the 
236 This is ignoring the fact that under negligence, the injurer might choose efficient precau-
tions even if the damage compensation is less than full because he then completely escapes 
liability by choosing due care. However, the gap between the compensation of €3.15 mil-
lion and the total damage of more than €100 million seems too great for this point to apply. 
Moreover, the general rule that the compensation should equal total damage is a sufficient 
(although not necessary) condition for efficient precautions under negligence too.
237 Article 161 of the Civil Procedure Code [Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering] stipu-
lates that a fact that a criminal court has declared to be proven produces imperative evi-
dence of that fact. According to Article 151, the civil court is obliged to hold imperative 
evidence as being true unless proof to the contrary is presented. Therefore, in this case, the 
fact that the criminal court convicted Veerman also provides proof of his negligence in a 
civil procedure. See also the verdict of the Dutch Supreme Court of December 12, 2003 (no. 
C02/139HR), NJ 2004/102.
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national government and other parties had provided them with sufficient 
compensation. Several factors may play a role here. A court may be unwilling 
to award any further compensation if the victims have already received full 
compensation in some other way. Therefore, the case may have clear merits 
of several millions of euros on paper, but these merits disappear if courts are 
afraid to award ‘double’ compensation. In addition, because of Veerman’s 
position in the Volendam community, the victims did not like to deal further 
or more firmly with Veerman. Veerman’s companies provided employment, 
his horeca establishments provided opportunities to go out, and he person-
ally sponsored the Football Club Volendam, the restoration of a church, etc. 
There was pressure on the part of non-victims, but also some of the victims, to 
refrain from further seizing Veerman’s assets and to close the case. This might 
have been stimulated by the fact that the victims had received all the mon-
etary compensation required to resume their lives. Put differently, by provid-
ing extensive support to the victims, the national government took away the 
incentive to claim damages from Veerman. The bill of the Volendam disaster 
was largely paid by the tax-payer. The government did not exert any effort to 
recover its expenses from Veerman. This is a bad signal to other horeca pro-
prietors who must decide about taking precautions. As a consequence, the 
incentive to take precautions is inefficient.
Thus, the instrument of liability, which looks so effective on paper (see 
section 2.3), becomes a weak tool once the government provides the victims 
with the compensation they desire. As a consequence, they do not feel the 
need to make a negligent proprietor responsible for the damages he inflicts.
14.3.4 The cocktail of incentives
It is, however, not possible to judge the incentive from liability to be insuf-
ficient without considering the other incentives at work. Even if one instru-
ment like liability is insufficient, the joint use of different instruments might 
be an effective stimulus to take precautions.
First , the insurance payment complicates matters. The insurance contract 
might provide the proprietor Veerman with an incentive to take precautions, 
by requiring that some precautions are taken. However, it is not likely that this 
will reverse the conclusions above. The insurance amount of €1,1 million was 
included in full in the contribution of Veerman of €3,15 million. This assumes 
that he has a perfect incentive to prevent the damage for which he is insured, 
because his insurance company fully controls moral hazard. Whether this is 
true, remains to be seen. It is remarkable that the insurance company paid out 
so soon, without much investigation. Apparently, it was clear that Veerman 
had fulfilled his obligations, suggesting that there might have been no such 
obligations; in which case, the contract did not provide an incentive to take 
precautions either. Alternatively, there might have been several obligations, 
but these obligations did not match those of (criminal) courts (see main text to 
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note 237) and at least failed to provide an incentive to prevent potential disas-
ters (for example because the insurance contract was aimed more at prevent-
ing monetary losses to the proprietor than damage to victims, or because it 
had a maximum payment). By including the insurance benefits in Veerman’s 
contribution, I assume that these benefits do include an incentive to take pre-
cautions. If this is incorrect (because of the arguments given), the conclusions 
are even worse with respect to Veerman’s incentive to take precautions.
Other incentives to take precautions might come from public enforce-
ment. Administrative enforcement, however, was absent. Apart from a letter 
that warned against dangerous decoration, the municipality of Edam-Volen-
dam did not undertake any action towards Veerman or his establishments. 
Criminal enforcement leads to a suspended imprisonment term of two years. 
This only creates incentives to prevent future accidents. Veerman was also 
convicted to 240 hours of community service and is not allowed to practice 
the profession of horeca proprietor for two years. These are non-negligible 
sanctions, but it is uncertain whether they are sufficient to deter. In relation-
ship to a total harm of more than €100 million it seems too small, unless his 
wage rate is really high. That public enforcement was insufficient appears 
from the fact that Veerman was judged to be in gross non-compliance by both 
the Alders Committee and the criminal court.
14.3.5 The government payments
 There is also an alternative explanation, one in which the outcome can be 
judged to be efficient.
The government is responsible for supervising the fire safety in horeca 
establishments. The municipal government is supposed to inspect the estab-
lishments, and the national government is supposed to supervise whether 
municipalities really have an active enforcement policy. It is possible to argue 
that the government caused the disaster and is responsible for its conse-
quences because it failed to adequately enforce fire safety (see for example the 
investigating report of the Alders Committee , 2001*). From this perspective, it 
would be efficient if the government had to pay for the damage, because this 
would provide it with an incentive to enforce fire safety, which will in turn 
induce proprietors to take efficient precautions.
The national government has recognized its failures and therefore 
launched a great action program to stimulate municipalities to adopt enforce-
ment policies, especially in the field of fire safety. As a result of its failures, the 
government also felt responsible for compensating the victims of the Volen-
dam disaster, and paid heavily for it, both directly and indirectly. For the 
municipality of Edam-Volendam, a similar argument applies. The investigat-
ing committees indicated that the municipality was to blame for not actively 
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enforcing fire safety. By paying for the damage, the municipality’s incentive 
to adopt an active enforcement policy was improved.238
Again, the incentive for the government to enforce compliance is only 
efficient if the government is made to pay fully for all harm. Although the 
national government in particular ended up paying a lot of compensation, 
both directly and indirectly, the non-monetary damage remains largely 
uncompensated. This is particularly noticeable when looking at the victims 
who passed away. For deadly victims, the compensation is generally at the 
most €26,700,239 while only the non-monetary damage is estimated at a mini-
mum of €1.5 million. Neither the government nor the proprietor is given an 
incentive to prevent non-monetary damage .
Another problem is that the government suffers from internal organiza-
tion problems as a result of which it does not maximize social welfare even if 
it has to fully compensate all damage (chapter 10). The monetary bill of the 
compensation is primarily paid by tax-payers. Responsible bureaucrats and 
politicians can be induced to take precautions in two ways. First, the fact that 
high compensation must be paid might hamper their career (and hence wage 
rate).  For example, the mayor of Edam-Volendam resigned as a result of the 
disaster. Secondly, they might be unable to spend money on other desired 
projects. None of the different departments will be willing to pay, and they 
will try to pass on the bill to another department. However, the incentive for 
bureaucrats and politicians to take care of efficient enforcement will prob-
ably be imperfect, even if they are forced to fully pay for all harm because 
they are only in service for a limited number of years, and therefore primarily 
interested in the short run. If they fail to adequately enforce regulations, it is 
their successors, and not they themselves, who will have to pay for it. More-
over, policy is formulated by several individuals and departments together, 
so it is not always possible to point to a single individual responsible. Note 
that the financial burden of the Volendam disaster was spread over several 
Ministries and their departments, so that no one bore the full responsibility 
238 Note that this does not imply that the government will actually be convicted and made to 
pay damages by a court. The compensation payments of the government can be seen as a 
settlement amount that the government offers because it feels responsible for the damage 
and feels that it (rather than the victims themselves) has to pay. It is questionable, if not 
unlikely, that a court would convict the government and force it to pay compensation. For 
example, in the settlement of the fireworks explosion in the municipality Enschede, simi-
lar problems played a role, but the court did not convict the municipality nor did the cen-
tral government have to pay damages. See LJN: AZ4247 (Court The Hague, December 13, 
2006, case number 170232) published on www.rechtspraak.nl. This decision is disputed by 
legal scholars. See for instance Van Maanen (2007*).
239 I.e., a parent couple of a passed away youngster receives €9,076 from the SSNV, €4,500 
from Foundation 010101 and €4,084 from the municipality (for funeral expenses). If rel-
evant, a compensation for lost income of €9,076 is available. This amounts to a total of 
€26,736. Parents and other relatives of fatalities hardly profit from the indirect compensa-
tion to schools, hospitals, etc. Maybe the organization ‘Het Anker’ can help them to come 
to terms with their sorrow.
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for inadequate enforcement. Finally, departments which fail in their duties 
are not always punished, but – on the contrary – are sometimes rewarded 
with higher budgets. The responsible inspection agencies, for instance, which 
could have prevented the Volendam disaster had they applied a more active, 
on-the-streets, strict enforcement policy, were granted higher budgets and 
increased importance following the Volendam disaster. 
In short, tax-payers are not always in possession of the right instruments 
for inducing politicians and bureaucrats to prevent the compensation claims 
they will have to pay. Many questions remain concerning the role of the 
government. Why did both the central government and the municipality of 
Edam-Volendam decide to provide almost all the required compensation to 
the victims? Why did the municipality participate in the settlement agree-
ment and bear the brunt of most costs? Why did the central government fail 
to undertake any attempt to recover its expenses from Veerman ? Was that 
because it is easier to let tax-payers pay rather than invest in such legal proce-
dures? If the reason was society-wide empathy with the victims, why could 
compensation not be left to private donations? What was the value of the 
property at Haven 154-156 for which the municipality paid €3.8 million? And 
what was the role of lawyers in the litigation process? What advice did they 
offer? Why was there no information concerning their (financial) interests?
14.4 Conclusion
Section 2.3 discusses the fact that holding an injurer liable provides an effi-
cient incentive to take precautions if the injurer is actually forced to pay for 
all the harm he causes. In the case of fire safety in horeca establishments, the 
proprietor and the government can both be viewed as injurers. However, the 
analysis of the settlement of the Volendam case shows that neither of the two 
had to pay fully for the harm done. In fact, the payment of Veerman is far 
below the harm done. From the point of view of prevention as the objective of 
liability, the result is therefore rather unsatisfactory.
First of all, non-monetary damage was not compensated but placed on 
the account of the victims themselves. Therefore, neither the proprietor nor 
the government had an incentive to prevent non-monetary damage.
Secondly, the proprietor Veerman did not have to pay any significant 
damages at all. He paid €3.15 million of the total damage of €119.3 million 
and of the total monetary damage of €60 million. Of this €3.15 million, €1.1 
million was financed by his insurance company, and another €1.8 million by 
the municipality Edam-Volendam for a property of questionable market val-
ue. There is no good explanation available for why the victims did not try to 
obtain higher damages from the proprietor, except that they no longer expect-
ed higher damages since these had already been provided by the government 
and/or that the pressure from the community to close the case was high. As a 
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consequence, the signal to horeca proprietors is that they do not have to care 
much about paying damages for fire accidents in their establishments.
Thirdly, the government paid heavily for the monetary damage . We 
have seen large increases in enforcement of fire safety in the years following 
Volendam. This might be a response to the high compensations the govern-
ment is expected to have to pay for disasters such as Volendam. However, 
the increase in enforcement effort might also result from private interests by 
the national and local governments who are able to increase their importance 
by enforcing fire safety. In this context, the previous chapter demonstrates 
that the increase in enforcement effort was not preceded by a careful analy-
sis of the costs and benefits, or of the expected accidents and compensation. 
Moreover, it is unknown whether bureaucrats and politicians are ever really 
affected by compensation claims.
The latter point demonstrates a remarkable point about the enforcement 
of fire safety. On the one hand, the enforcement of fire safety is excessive. 
The previous chapter shows that the increase in enforcement effort is not 
efficient because the benefits are (probably) low relative to the costs. On the 
other hand, the incentive for the government to enforce fire safety is ineffi-
cient, because it does not have to fully pay for all damage. This suggests that 
enforcement is insufficient. There are several explanations for this result. First, 
this chapter does not consider the costs of enforcement by the government. 
It only argues that the incentive to enforce is inadequate because the govern-
ment does not have to fully pay for all harm done. This does not suggest that 
if the government had an adequate incentive, it would increase enforcement 
effort. The government might conclude that the costs of enforcement are not 
worth the reduction in expected compensation, i.e. in social harm. Secondly, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, the increase in enforcement is inefficient 
because it focuses too much on paperwork, instead of actual contact with 
proprietors, too much on granting licenses instead of actual inspections. A 
third explanation is that the enforcement effort is inefficiently allocated. The 
enforcement of relatively small accidents and safe establishments is exces-
sive, while the incentive to prevent severe disasters as in case of Volendam is 
too low.
All in all, the proprietor is given an incentive to take precautions through 
a combination of administrative enforcement, civil and criminal liability, and 
the insurance contract. We should be careful in judging the value of all these 
instruments individually, since the combination might be an effective stimu-
lus to take precautions, even if each of the instruments is insufficient by itself. 
At least for proprietor Veerman , this mix of factors was unlikely to provide 
adequate incentives. Administrative enforcement was almost absent. Civil 
damages were limited and insurance benefits were easily paid out. It is hard 
to determine to what extent the criminal sentence of 240 hours community 
service plus the deprivation of the profession of horeca proprietors for two 
years created deterrence.
I studied the case of the Volendam settlement because there are sufficient 
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data available for this case, but not for other fire accidents. And the Volendam 
settlement is likely to affect perceptions about expected damages that propri-
etors have to pay relatively much, because it is such an important case that 
received a lot of attention. Therefore, if in the case studied, the proprietor does 
not have to pay sufficient damages, this will not induce many proprietors to 
take sufficient precautions. Moreover, many arguments for an insufficient 
incentive in this specific case, for instance the one on the insufficient award of 
non-monetary damage, will apply to private enforcement in general. There-
fore, the analysis of the case-study provides conclusions on the effectiveness 
of liability in general. It is not expected that the situation has improved a lot 
since the Volendam disaster. Only the administrative enforcement is likely to 
have been improved over the past years. Therefore, although there certainly 
is an incentive for proprietors to take some, possibly substantial precautions, 
there seem to be too many barriers for making such an incentive fully effi-
cient. 

15 Efficient enforcement in a representative 
municipality
In the previous chapters, I examine whether the current enforcement policy 
of fire safety regulation, both public and private, is efficient. Definitive con-
clusions are impossible to draw due to data problems. It is unknown how 
enforcement precisely affects proprietor’s behavior, and to which extent com-
pliance affects expected damage.
Since this information is crucial in determining the efficient enforcement 
policy, I take a different approach in this chapter. I make two simplifications. 
First of all, I focus on a hypothetical, self-made municipality. I create a case of 
a municipality and its horeca establishments, based on as much information as 
available, so that it is as representative as possible. Secondly, I assume that the 
horeca proprietor acts according to the rational choice approach of economics. 
Moreover, since the influence of moral and social concerns is unknown, I assume 
that the proprietor is only interested in financial concerns (which may include 
time). With these two steps, I can overcome the data problems. I can discuss how 
proprietors respond to enforcement and how this affects the benefits and costs of 
compliance. Of course, this is done at the expense of reality. The analysis is more 
a simulation of the effects of enforcement policies than a real empirical analysis. 
However, it allows me to establish whether a given enforcement alternative is 
promising, and what is the direction of the effects.240
I first present the case of the representative municipality, including an 
explanation of the efficient level of compliance and of the behavior of a pro-
prietor (section 15.1). Thereafter I examine different types of enforcement, 
respectively private, administrative and criminal law enforcement (sections 
15.2 through 15.4). In section 15.5, I compare the alternatives and discuss the 
simultaneous use of enforcement alternatives.
15.1 Description of the case
In this section, I present the characteristics of the representative municipality. 
This case intends to be as representative as possible. I therefore use as much 
as possible the data available from different sources.241 With the help of these 
240 This chapter is an update of Suurmond (2005*).
241 In many cases, I have had to combine data from different sources and/or to calculate esti-
mates. Here, I only briefly refer to the sources and mention the final results. An extensive 
description of the data, their sources and processing can be found in the appendix to Suur-
mond (2004*).
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data, I provide an estimate of the expected damage, the costs of compliance, 
and the costs of enforcement.
15.1.1 Horeca establishments and the municipality
The case concerns a representative, medium-sized municipality of 75,000 
inhabitants with a standard composition of the population. There are 100 
horeca establishments in this municipality, classified into 15 groups. Table 
15.1 below provides a general overview of these establishments. The estab-
lishments are opened 250 days a year.
Table 15.1 Overview horeca establishments casea
Type
# of esta-
blishments
Description sfab Annual turnover
1 10 Local bar   65   70.000
2 8 Local bar 100 125.000
3 8 Pub 125 200.000
4 4 Disco/music café 300 800.000
5 8 Café (other) 150 225.000
6 10 Pub serving food 175 300.000
7 10 Pub serving food 175 300.000
8 8 Restaurant (Dutch/French) 140 240.000
9 2 Fast food restaurant 185 700.000
10 5 Restaurant (Asian) 200 350.000
11 5 Restaurant (Asian) 100 110.000
12 8 Restaurant (Mediterranean) 175 400.000
13 4 Party / conference centre 500 400.000
14 5 Restaurant (luxury, special) 250 500.000
15 5 Restaurant (other) 100 225.000
a. Sources: Several reports by the Association of the Catering Industry, to name Horeca 
in numbers 2003; Drinking in the Dutch Catering Industry (2001); Dining in the Dutch 
Catering Industry (2002); Trendreport Catering Consumer 1998-2000. With these publi-
cations, combined with data of the CBS (Statline), calculations can be made on the num-
ber and type of horeca establishments in a municipality, the average sales fl oor area, the 
average annual turnover, the number of visits per type of establishment and the average 
spending per visitor.
b. sfa = sales fl oor area
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15.1.2 Compliance costs
 In order to estimate the compliance costs and expected damage in each cat-
egory of establishments, I divide the use requirements into two groups:
1. Technical requirements. These include all requirements relating to the ser-
vicing, maintenance and correct functioning of technical devices (espe-
cially requirement number 2, 3 and 4 on page 187). These must be carried 
out approximately once a year. The costs of compliance with these re-
quirements are several hundreds of euros per year, in money and in time 
that has to be spent on maintenance, check-up, etc. I assume that half of 
these costs is related to problems that arise during the year, for example 
an escape-route sign light that fails and has to be replaced. The other half 
relates to costs that are made at the beginning of the year, and which guar-
antees compliance during the whole year, for example the inspection of 
fi re extinguishers.
2. Number of visitors. These requirements require continuous attention on 
the part of the proprietor during the use of the building (especially re-
quirements 1, 5 and 6 on page 187). I estimate these costs by considering 
the number of visitors. In the course of a year, a proprietor has for several 
days a year the possibility to admit more visitors than allowed. This in-
cludes periods such as Carnival, New Year’s Eve, the weekends before 
Christmas, rental for private parties, soccer matches, etc. If the propri-
etor complies with the maximum number of visitors, he will miss the ad-
ditional turnover which could be gained during these days by allowing 
more visitors. I assume that for all horeca establishments, there are three 
days a year on which it is generally known that they can admit more visi-
tors than allowed, divided over two days of Carnival and a one-day local 
event. The other days fall on weekend evenings which are not known in 
advance (100 potential days).
The estimated costs of compliance per type of establishment are reported in 
table 15.2. Based on this distinction the proprietor is able to choose between 
four strategies with respect to compliance:
Stv: Comply with both the technical prescriptions and the number of visi-
tors.
St: Only comply with the technical prescriptions.
Sv: Only comply with the number of visitors.
Sn: Not comply with any of the requirements.
280 Chapter 15
Table 15.2 Overview of costs of compliance per establishmenta
Type sfab
max. # 
visitorsc
# days 
visitorsd
Costs per day 
visitorse
Costs visitors 
(per year)
Technical costs 
(per year)f
1 65 110 2 60 120 250
2 100 160 5 105 525 300
3 125 200 5 140 700 500
4 300 425 20 375 7500 700
5 150 200 5 150 750 400
6 175 300 5 125 625 400
7 175 300 5 125 625 500
8 140 225 4 150 600 600
9 185 250 2 75 150 500
10 200 250 3 150 450 800
11 100 175 3 100 300 400
12 175 300 2 300 600 500
13 500 800 20 110 2200 1000
14 250 400 4 150 600 800
15 100 150 5 125 625 300
a. Costs are in euros.
b. sfa = sales fl oor area.
c. This is an estimate based on the sfa. The maximum number of visitors can never exceed 
twice sfa.
d. This is the number of days the proprietor has the possibility to admit more visitors than 
allowed.
e. This is the additional profi t (per day) the proprietor is able to receive if he admits more 
visitors than allowed. This is estimated on the basis of data on the expenditures per 
visitor per visit (Suurmond, 2004*), adjusted with taxes and profi t margin. I assume an 
excess of 10-15%.
f. These are the costs of compliance with the technical requirements. Based on the estima-
te of RHN of the structural costs of the (merely technical) use requirements, these costs 
are on average €410 to €760 per year per establishment. Also based on the time needed 
for inspection and servicing several hundreds of euros is realistic.
15.1.3 Expected damage
The expected damage can be divided into three components. In section 13.2.3, 
I provided data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) about the number of fires, 
financial damage and number of victims (table 13.1).242 These can be used to 
provide some average information on the expected damage. The data show 
that in the period 1993-2001, there were on average 348 fires a year, which 
242 See also table 13.5.
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together caused €17.6 million of financial damage, 2.22 fatalities and 24.78 
seriously wounded victims. A very rough estimate of the probability of a fire 
per day is 61.5929 *10-6.243
1. Monetary damage to the building.244 This damage is likely to be related to 
the sales floor area. The financial damage equals on average €720 per year 
per establishment, or €4 per m2 sales floor area per year. 
2. The damage resulting from fatalities. This damage consists of medical costs, 
output loss and non-monetary losses. Per fatality, these costs are estimat-
ed at €2,395,000.245 The number of (fatal and non-fatal) victims is likely to 
be related to the number of visitors. In a horeca fi re, an average of 0.006 
people die. Per establishment this is on average 98.3284*10-6 per year. 1 in 
250 million visits to an horeca establishment results in someone’s death.
3. The damage to (seriously) wounded victims. Likewise, this damage consists 
of medical costs, output loss and non-monetary losses, in total €232,600 
per victim. In a horeca fi re, an average of 0.071 people is wounded. Per 
establishment, this implies an average of 0.0011 per year. 1 in 22 million 
visits to an horeca establishment results in someone getting wounded.
The magnitude of the expected damage depends on the extent to which the 
proprietor complies with fire safety regulations. For all four strategies of the 
proprietor, I have made an estimate of the probability of a fire and the corre-
sponding damage in terms of financial damage and the number of casualties. 
This enables me to determine the total expected damage in euros per strategy, 
as shown in table 15.3.246
243 I.e., 348 fires / (22,600 establishments * 250 days).
244 In addition, there is also monetary damage due to the loss of profit following a fire. Because 
of a lack of data, this factor is ignored here. Moreover, since this loss mostly concerns the 
proprietor, it is not fundamental to the enforcement problem (section 2.2).
245 See table 13.3.
246 Amounts for individual establishments are rounded off to the nearest ten euros, for the 
total to the nearest hundred of euros. In the remainder of this chapter – if not mentioned 
otherwise – money sums refer to the number of euros per year.
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Table 15.3 Overview of costs and damage per establishment per year in eurosa
Type Nr
Costs 
tech-
nical
Costs 
visitors
Stv 
dam.
St
dam.
Sv 
dam.
Sn 
dam.
Stv 
total
St
total
Sv 
total
Sn 
total
1 10 250 120 160 170 460 470 530   420 580 470
2 8 300 525 570 670 7980 8160 1390   970 8510 8160
3 8 500 700 1210 1400 13350 14370 2410 1900 14050 14370
4 4 700 7500 660 1860 3970 6320 8860 2560 11470 6320
5 8 400 750 850 1100 9910 10040 2000 1500 10660 10040
6 10 400 625 1630 2390 12320 13370 2660 2790 12950 13370
7 10 500 625 630 700 2200 3000 1750 1200 2820 3000
8 8 600 600 1660 1780 3230 3390 2860 2380 3830 3390
9 2 500 150 710 730 1000 1030 1360 1230 1150 1030
10 5 800 450 1880 2000 3140 3310 3130 2800 3590 3310
11 5 400 300 1130 1550 2430 2980 1830 1950 2730 2980
12 8 500 600 1250 1300 6780 6820 2350 1800 7380 6820
13 4 1000 2200 1070 1160 4770 5040 4270 2160 6970 5040
14 5 800 600 1820 2620 14180 15090 3220 3420 14780 15090
15 5 300 625 800 840 1040 1080 1720 1140 1660 1080
Total 49.200 88.100 105.000 131.200 620.800 663.300 242.300 180.400 708.800 663.300
a. Explanation:
dam. = damage.
Total. = compliance costs (technical plus visitors) plus damage.
The grey highlighted cells indicate for each type of establishment which strategy leads 
to the lowest sum of damage plus compliance costs.
15.1.4 The efficient level of compliance
Table 15.3 also provides the costs of compliance of table 15.2. Table 15.3 shows 
that, even if the enforcement costs are ignored, it is not efficient for all propri-
etors to comply with all requirements. For a large proportion of the propri-
etors, it suffices if they comply with only the technical requirements (St). For 
two types of proprietors, it is optimal if they do not comply with any require-
ment (Sn).
Suppose we construct an indicator for the level of compliance. Every pro-
prietor (100 in total) who complies with a group of requirements (technical 
requirements and number of visitors), is counted as one unit, so that the level 
of compliance varies from 0 (no one complies with any requirement) to 200 
(every proprietor complies with all requirements). The first-best level of com-
pliance then equals 113 and consists of 73 proprietors who comply with the 
technical requirements (compliance level 1), 20 proprietors (type 6, 11 and 14) 
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who comply with both groups of requirements (compliance level 2), and 7 
proprietors (type 9 and 15) who do not comply with any requirement (com-
pliance level 0). See table 15.4. In this optimum, the costs of compliance are 
€57,500, with an expected damage of €119,400, in total €176,800.
Tabel 15.4 Expected damage plus costs of compliance
Optimum Without enforcement
Expected damage 119.400 663.300
Compliance costs 57.500 0
Total 176.800 663.300
Level of compliance 113 0
 I assume that in this municipality each proprietor acts according to the ratio-
nal choice approach of economics. A proprietor decides about his level of 
compliance by maximizing his utility. I assume that proprietors are risk-neu-
tral and only care about their own level of wealth. Under these assumptions, 
proprietors are expected to minimize their costs of compliance and the costs 
of possible sanctions. These assumptions allow me to focus on the impor-
tance of the effect of enforcement on compliance. Abstracting from other fac-
tors does not mean that they do not exist. However, by assuming risk neu-
trality, I am able to focus on the monetary costs instead of specifying a utility 
function. We know that if proprietors are risk-averse their choices will be 
drawn away from the uncertain to the more certain alternatives. In this case, 
it is likely to increase their level of compliance because a fire and a sanction 
are risky alternatives, the probability of which can be reduced by choosing a 
higher level of compliance. Assuming that moral and social motivations to 
comply are not important has a similar function. It is uncertain whether they 
are important to proprietors if there is public enforcement. As discussed in 
section 2.2, they are unlikely to survive if there is no public enforcement. If 
someone is never called to account for norm-violating behavior, the norms 
are likely to be destroyed. In a market setting where violating behavior results 
in higher profits, this tendency is strengthened. Abstracting from moral and 
social motivations relieves me from the problem of monetizing these factors. 
If it appears that moral or social motivations to comply are relevant, they are 
likely to increase the level of compliance, because they make non-compliance 
a less attractive alternative. 
The analysis of this case is a kind of benchmark. Here enforcement has 
‘maximal’ effect on compliance, because the proprietor only considers his 
costs of compliance and the costs of sanctions. Different risk attitudes and 
other factors than costs of compliance and sanctions are likely to complicate 
matters so that the effect of enforcement lies somewhere between no effect 
and maximal effect. If the influence of these complicating matters is so great 
as to reduce the effect of enforcement to zero, enforcement will no longer be 
an interesting alternative as it only leads to costs and no effects. In the other 
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cases, enforcement does have some effect and the analysis in this chapter 
throws light on the effect an enforcement policy has, the magnitude of this 
effect and whether an enforcement policy is efficient.
According to this set-up, if there is no enforcement, all proprietors will choose 
a level of compliance of zero. As discussed in section 2.2, if there is no public 
enforcement, it is likely that (in the end) no one will comply. In that case, there 
will be no costs of enforcement or of compliance, but the expected damage 
will be rather high, i.e. €663,300. Comparing this figure with the optimum of 
€176,800, we see that there is much scope for improvement of social welfare 
by increasing the level of compliance. However, this requires enforcement 
costs to be made, so that we need to consider whether the increase in the level 
of compliance is worth the costs of enforcing this level of compliance. This 
is the subject of the next sections. In this analysis, we can distinguish three 
major enforcement methods: by victims (private – or civil – enforcement), 
by the municipal Executive (Mayor and Aldermen, administrative enforce-
ment), or by a Public Prosecutor (criminal enforcement).
15.2 Private law enforcement
 One of the enforcement possibilities is to leave it to the victims. If they suf-
fered damage, victims can file a claim for damages against the proprietor. If 
the proprietor is forced to pay damages, he will consider this when reaching 
a decision about his level of precautions for preventing fire damage. He will 
balance the costs of compliance and the damage he is expected to compen-
sate.
As explained in section 2.3, we expect that the incentive from liability is 
only efficient if (1) courts enforce efficient levels of compliance in a predict-
able way, (2) insurance companies can control moral hazard problems, (3) 
the magnitude of liability involves full compensation for both monetary and 
non-monetary losses, (4) the proprietor is able to pay damages, (5) litigation 
costs are not a barrier for efficient litigation and settlement. These issues are 
discussed below, sometimes in a combined way.
15.2.1 Enforcing efficient levels of compliance through liability
The level of due care
 The proprietor is obliged to pay damages if he fails to take sufficient precau-
tions. What is meant by sufficient precautions is determined by the judge. A 
proprietor acts unlawfully if he violates a statutory duty or a rule of unwrit-
ten law pertaining to proper social conduct, or if he otherwise violates a visi-
tor’s rights. In determining whether (insufficient) precautions result in dan-
ger, the judge is expected to balance the probability and severity of damage 
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and the costs of taking precautions.247 However, the extent to which the judge 
is able to determine efficient precautions depends on the information he has 
concerning any given individual case. If there is no information available (ex-
post) about the individual efficient compliance level of a proprietor, the judge 
can only determine a general rule for all proprietors. Moreover, it is possible 
that the judge sets levels of due care which differ from the most efficient lev-
els. This would, of course, lead to inefficient results. I discuss the following 
three levels of due care which can be set by the judge:248
NLT: The standard is to comply with the technical requirements.
NLTV:  The standard is that the proprietor has to comply with both the tech-
nical requirements and the number of visitors. It implies that the 
judge follows the statutory standard.
NLES:  The standard is that the proprietor has to comply if the costs of com-
pliance are smaller than the reduction in expected damage. The pro-
prietor has to choose the efficient level of precautions where the sum 
of expected damage and compliance costs is the lowest. Table 15.3 
defines this level for each proprietor.249 
Besides these forms of negligence liability (NL) I provide the results for the 
alternative  strict in which strict liability (SL) is chosen, so that the proprietor 
is always obliged to pay damages, irrespective of his level of precautions. 
Under strict liability, visitors can always claim their damages. Under negli-
gence, no claims are filed, and no enforcement costs made, if the proprietor 
has satisfied the standard. If there is a fire, the behavior of the proprietor (the 
precautions he has chosen) is generally quite easily apparent. Which precau-
tions are acceptable to the judge is a matter that becomes clear after a few 
trials.
The compensation claim
 Under the existing law, a negligent proprietor is primarily obliged to com-
pensate property damage. For losses other than property losses, the injured 
person is entitled to a fair compensation if he suffered physical injury. This 
implies that, in principle, only the medical costs and funeral costs are compen-
sated to the relatives of fatalities. Other casualties receive a limited amount 
of non-monetary compensation. More specifically, this leads to victims being 
entitled to the following damage compensation:
– Medical costs and funeral costs are fully compensated, €6,400 for each 
fatality and €8,800 for each wounded.
247 HR 5 November 1965, NJ 1966, 136 (Kelderluik-arrest).
248 Strictly speaking, there is also the alternative of only prescribing the standard of the 
number of visitors. However, as can be deduced from table 15.3, this standard is a subop-
timal standard for all proprietors together and it is therefore ignored.
249 This standard can be extended to include the enforcement costs. This might be relevant if 
the proprietor does not pay all damages so that he is likely to choose inefficient precau-
tions despite efficient standard-setting (see tables 15.5 and 15.7). Therefore, lowering the 
standard might not alter the behavior of the proprietor but save enforcement costs.
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– Loss of income (output loss) to relatives is only compensated if they were 
financially dependent on the dead person, and is therefore estimated 
at 1/3 of the real loss of €510,200.250 For other victims, the entire loss of 
€36,000 is recoverable.
– Non-monetary losses are not recoverable in case of fatalities. Wounded 
victims receive a compensation of €20,000.251
– In total, relatives are entitled to €176,500 of damages if someone dies, 
while victims that are wounded are entitled to €64,800 of damages.
Furthermore, I use the following data:
– The enforcement costs equal €3750 per claim.252
– If the claim is awarded, the enforcement costs have to be paid in full by 
the proprietor.
– On average, 95% of the claim is awarded. The claim is settled for 95% of 
the claim for damages plus enforcement costs (more in section 15.2.4) This 
percentage is lower than 100% because there might be discussion about 
the victim’s own fault, about the magnitude of damage and the extent to 
which this damage was caused by the fire.253
– The proprietor himself must pay the financial damage he suffers. In sec-
tion 15.2.3, I discuss this assumption.
Analysis under current law
All in all, under strict liability, the proprietor expects to pay a compensation 
of 95% * (€176,500 + €3750) = €171,200 per fatality, and 95% * (€64,800 + €3750) 
= €65,100 per wounded. Consider for example a proprietor of type 10. Under 
Sn, he would expect 0.000012 fatality per day and under St 0.0000082. Mak-
ing costs of compliance for technical requirements of €800 per year yields a 
reduction in the expected compensation of (0.000012 – 0.0000082) * 250 days * 
€171,200 = €161. Similarly, there is a reduction in wounded casualties of €704 
and in monetary damage to the building of €340. All together, making costs 
for technical precautions is more than profitable for the proprietor.
Under the negligence rule, a proprietor of type 10 may escape compen-
sation claims completely by making costs of technical compliance of €800. 
He then saves on fatalities 0.000012 * 250 days * €171,200 = €514. In total, he 
would avoid costs of €3100 by complying with the technical requirements.
In a similar way, each proprietor’s behavior can be determined under 
250 This is due to the fact that most visitors are youngsters who still live at home and are not 
permanently engaged to a partner.
251 Based on ANWB, Smartengeldgids 2003. This report contains compensation amounts which 
judges have awarded to burn victims. In addition on p. 24/25, there is a general table for 
compensation for different classes of injuries.
252 This estimate is based on Weterings (1999*). He estimates the transaction costs for the set-
tlement of injury claims, i.e. the costs of (1) the pre-claim stage, (2) the determination of 
liability, (3) the medical examination, and (4) the determination of the damage.
253 In any case, the magnitude of this percentage has little impact, as long as it remains above 
60%.
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the different liability systems. Table 15.5 provides an overview. It shows that 
under strict liability the enforcement costs are higher than under the negli-
gence rule. The reason is – as mentioned before – that under strict liability, vic-
tims can always claim damages. Under the negligence rule, most proprietors 
end up complying with the standard, and hence no litigation occurs. Victims 
have to bear the damage themselves. However, under both strict and negli-
gence liability, the enforcement costs are very low compared to the expected 
damage and compliance costs. The enforcement costs are only made if there 
is a fire and this fire results in casualties. The probability of such an event is 
very small.
Table 15.5 Liability under current compensation schemes
SL NLT NLTV NLES
Expected damage 171.300 142.500 155.300 142.500
Compliance costs 30.400 40.200 35.400 40.200
Subtotal 201.700 182.700 190.700 182.700
Enforcement costs 990 150 550 230
Total 202.700 182.800 191.300 182.900
Level of compliance 60 78 70 78
The different liability systems force a substantial number of proprietors to take 
precautions, although the level of compliance is significantly less than 113. The 
reason is that proprietors only have to compensate a very small amount of the 
damage to victims. They take into account only a part of the social harm they 
cause. For example, under the current compensation scheme, no proprietor will 
comply with the maximum number of visitors, neither under strict liability nor 
under negligence with full compliance as the standard. Moreover, under NLTV, 
the level of compliance is lower than under NLT. Under NLT, it is beneficial for 
proprietors of type 8 to comply with the technical requirements to escape liabil-
ity (costs of compliance of €600, no compensation of €610), but this incentive 
is insufficient under NLTV where they have to comply with both standards. In 
these cases, choosing Sn (paying compensation of €610) is more profitable than 
choosing St (costs of compliance of €600 plus paying compensation of €24, in 
total €624) or Stv (costs of compliance of €1200, no compensation).
The incentive to comply is higher under negligence than under strict lia-
bility, because under a negligence rule, proprietors can escape liability com-
pletely by complying with the standard. This is reflected in the fact that in 
table 15.5 the level of compliance under negligence is higher than under strict 
liability. Since there is underdeterrence, a stronger incentive to comply is ben-
eficial for social welfare. If there is too little information about individual pro-
prietors, applying technical requirements as the standard level of care is the 
best alternative. The existing enforcement costs arise from proprietors of type 
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1, 9, 10 and 15 who do not comply with this standard, so that there are litiga-
tion costs in case of casualties as a result of fire.
If there is sufficient information to determine an individual standard for 
every type of proprietor, social costs are higher when the efficient standard is 
applied to each proprietor than when the technical requirements are the stan-
dard for everyone. The reason is that under NLES, proprietors of type 6, 11 
and 14 do not comply with the maximum number of visitors. Therefore, the 
enforcement costs are higher, while the level of compliance remains the same. 
The enforcement costs can be avoided by lowering the standard for type 6, 11 
and 14 to the technical requirements. In this way, the maximal feasible level of 
compliance of 78 can be obtained without enforcement costs, so that a social 
welfare of €182,700 results.
Predictability and efficient standards
 The analysis above assumes that judges apply optimal standards given their 
information and that victims are fully aware of the standards that are applied 
by the judge. If judges set their standards in a predictable way, it is likely that 
victims will be able to estimate their chances of obtaining compensation cor-
rectly. However, in general, standard-setting is surrounded by uncertainty, as 
was discussed in section 2.3.1. In these cases, proprietors may choose higher 
levels of compliance in order to be sure that they escape liability. Since there 
is currently under-compliance, this would improve social welfare. However, 
if uncertainty is high, proprietors may also decide to decrease their level of 
compliance because making compliance costs would not lead to a sufficiently 
large reduction in compensation.
The problem of uncertainty is unlikely to be important in the present case. 
As discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5, there are three sources of uncertainty. 
First, there might be uncertainty about the level of due care . It might not be 
easy for judges to determine the efficient level of precautions. However, table 
15.5 shows that in the case of fire safety, all proprietors applying the standard 
of technical requirements would lead to an almost identical result, and at the 
very least not a worse one. The second source of uncertainty is the actual level 
of precautions taken by a proprietor. If judges misperceive this level, it might 
affect compliance and litigation. However, in general after a fire (that resulted 
in damage), it is quite easy to check which level of compliance the proprietor 
had chosen. There are witnesses and a technical investigation by firemen and 
technical police departments. The final source of uncertainty is that propri-
etors are unsure which precautions to take. As explained in section 12.4.1, 
proprietors generally know the rules very well – or they ought to. Under the 
negligence rule, they also know how to escape compensation. The only prob-
lem might be that under strict liability, proprietors do not know how much 
compliance will pay off in terms of reduction in compensation.
289Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality
15.2.2 The magnitude of liability
 The previous subsection showed that if victims cannot obtain full compensa-
tion for damage, proprietors have insufficient incentive to prevent damage. 
If the compensation award increases, proprietors are more inclined to make 
compliance costs. Especially the non-monetary damage is to a large extent 
excluded from compensation.
However, there is a bill under consideration by the parliament to award 
compensation for emotional loss (loss of affection) to the relatives of fatalities 
and of victims with severe and permanent damage.254 The idea is that rela-
tives will receive a fixed amount of hedonic damages as set by an Implement-
ing Order. The figure under consideration is €10,000 per entitled person. The 
amount of compensation paid under this regime is shown in column 3 of table 
15.6. As can be seen in table 15.7, the effect of compensating hedonic damages 
in this way is very limited. Under SL and under NLTV, there is one addi-
tional type of proprietor who would increase compliance. For the remaining, 
the proposal for compensating hedonic damages in this way is insufficient 
from the perspective of prevention and unlikely to yield significant effects.  In 
order to do so, the compensation for non-monetary damage would have to be 
based on real human losses, as estimated by the willingness to pay.
Table 15.8 shows that, if compensation is equal to the full damage to vic-
tims, an efficient outcome might result. Under such a compensation system, 
full output loss and full non-monetary damage is compensated (see column 
4, table 15.6). If there is no information about individual proprietors, the best 
result is obtained under strict liability. As follows from section 2.3.3, this will 
induce proprietors to choose optimal levels of compliance. The resulting 
enforcement costs are limited. Under the negligence rule, the same standard 
would have to be applied to each proprietor (either NLT or NLTV), resulting 
in higher total costs. If there is information about each proprietor’s individual 
optimal standard, a first-best outcome of €176,800 will result if judges apply 
this standard (NLES). Since proprietors have to compensate the full damage, 
every proprietor will comply with this standard. Therefore, no victim will be 
able to claim damages and no enforcement costs will be made.
254 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 781, nrs. 1-3. This bill has been approved by the Second 
Chamber, but it is held up in the First Chamber. See for a discussion Suurmond and Van 
Velthoven (2005*).
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Table 15.6 Overview of compensation awards (in euro’s)
Currenta Hedonicb Fullc
per fatality:
Medical costsd 6.400 6.400 6.400
Output losse 170.100 170.100 510.200
Human losses 0 15.000 1.878.300
Total 176.500 191.500 2.394.900
per casualty:
Medical costs 8.800 8.800 8.800
Output lossf 36.000 36.000 36.000
Human lossesg 20.000 27.500 187.800
Total 64.800 72.300 232.700
a. Current means: A compensation to which victims and their relatives are entitled accor-
ding to current law. To relatives of fatalities only the medial and funeral costs are paid, 
and to casualties only a limited amount of non-monetary compensation.
b. Hedonic means: A compensation as it would be if the current proposal for compensa-
ting emotional loss is passed. See Kamerstukken II 2002/2003, 28781, nrs. 1, 2 and 3. In 
this bill it is proposed to compensate relatives of fatalities or of severe and permanent 
wounded victims a fi xed amount of €10.000 per entitled person. The circle of entitled 
persons is limited to spouses/partners, parents of children underaged or living at home, 
or these children themselves. Therefore I assume that per fatality of casualty there are 
on average 1,5 entitled relatives that may claim hedonic damages. For wounded victims 
there may be hedonic damages if there is severe and permanent injury, which anyhow 
corresponds to a functional loss of 70% or higher. I assume that half of the victims are 
victims that fall into the category of the bill. All together this means that the hedonic 
damages equal €15.000 per fatality and €7500 per casualty.
c. Full means: A compensation in which relatives and victims can claim the full damage 
from the proprietor. The amounts in this column correspond to those of table 13.3.
d. I assume that medical costs (that include funeral costs) can be completely claimed from 
the injurer. This is likely to be an over-estimation.
e. The loss of income, i.e. the gross output loss, is under current law only awarded to 
relatives if they were economically dependent of the victim. I assume that under current 
and hedonic 1/3 of the output loss can be claimed.
f. I assume that for wounded casualties the whole income loss is recoverable, for example 
because this whole loss is on account of the victim.
g. Also under current law wounded casualties are entitled to a compensation for pain 
and suffering that increases with the severity of the injury. I use an estimate of €20.000, 
based on ANWB, Smartengeldgids 2003.
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Table 15.7 Liability with hedonic damages
SL NLT NLTV NLES
Expected damage 155.300 142.500 142.500 142.500
Compliance costs 35.400 40.200 40.200 40.200
Subtotal 190.700 182.700 182.700 182.700
Enforcement costs 870 150 390 230
Total 191.600 182.800 183.100 182.900
Level of compliance 70 78 78 78
Table 15.8 Liability with full damage compensation
SL NLT NLTV NLES
Expected damage 119.400 131.200 117.600 119.400
Compliance costs 57.500 49.200 60.000 57.500
Subtotal 176.800 180.400 177.500 176.800
Enforcement costs 460 0 120 0
Total 177.300 180.400 177.600 176.800
Level of compliance 113 100 120 113
15.2.3 Ability to pay damages and insurance
 The analysis so far assumes that the proprietor is able to pay for all the dam-
age he causes. This is generally not the case. This section discusses the impor-
tance of wealth constraints and of insurance.
Wealth constraints
The amounts that must be compensated to victims or their relatives can be 
rather high, especially if full compensation is chosen. Proprietors will prob-
ably be unable to pay for these damages, and the effect of liability will hence 
be weakened.255 The extent to which this problem is of actual relevance is 
questionable. There are some local proprietors who exploit and possess sev-
eral horeca establishments (and often other property too), as for instance the 
proprietor Veerman in Volendam (section 14.3.3). Since they possess these 
buildings, they are likely to have sufficient assets too. Other proprietors pos-
sess only one establishment. Whether that building is sufficient to guarantee 
255 In fact, an important factor is left behind in this case, because I only focus on expected 
damage. However, in reality, there are probably several, possibly dozens, of casualties 
together.
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that damages will be paid is unclear. It all depends on the type of building 
and the type of accident. Moreover, these proprietors often have a high mort-
gage on the building. A final category of proprietors concerns those who rent 
the establishment from a brewery, investment holding or some other concern. 
These proprietors are not likely to have large assets at their disposal.
In all instances, the problem is whether the proprietor himself or the pro-
prietor’s corporation is held liable. In the latter case, the possession of build-
ings and other assets in a different corporation does not guarantee sufficient 
wealth to be able to pay for the damages. See section 2.3.6.
An example of limited wealth
Suppose, as an indication of what might happen, that half of the proprietors 
have insufficient assets to pay for damages. More specifically, suppose that 
each uneven type of proprietor has a level of wealth that is so problematic 
that the proprietor reduces his level of compliance with 1 point (unless it is 
already zero). Table 15.9 shows how this would affect the level of compliance 
and the total costs.
If the asset constraint is binding for half of the proprietor types, the level 
of compliance will also be approximately halved: 35 to 43. Many proprietors 
will choose Sn. The total costs to society increase substantially because the 
expected damage is much higher.
Insurance
 A solution to the possible wealth constraints is obligatory liability insurance. 
Whether this will induce proprietors to take efficient precautions depends on 
whether insurance companies are able to handle the moral hazard problem 
(section 2.3.2). They must be able to ensure that proprietors take some pre-
cautions, which is problematic if the insurance company pays for the dam-
age resulting from insufficient precautions. If proprietors suffer from wealth 
constraints, supervision ex-post will not do. However, insurance companies 
do require for instance that certificates be sent in for fire extinguishers, fire 
detection alarms, etc. Moreover, the additional costs might be limited. In the 
current situation, insurance companies also have to act as supervisor, because 
proprietors are generally insured for their financial damage.
In this case, I assume that proprietors are risk-neutral and do pay for their 
own financial damage. However, the outcome would be the same if propri-
etors were risk-averse and insured for financial damage, and if insurance 
companies could control the moral hazard problem. Controlling the moral 
hazard problem seems to be possible at a reasonable cost as far as the technical 
requirements are concerned, as these are quite easily observable and do not 
vary from day to day. On the other hand, the requirement for the number of 
visitors depends on the daily behavior of the proprietor and is therefore less 
easy to control (only ex-post). However, compliance with this requirement is 
generally not efficient and not required by judges, and should therefore also 
not be required by insurance companies. I therefore assume that insurance 
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companies are able to control the moral hazard problem. The costs might not 
be negligible (compare public inspections, section 13.2 and 15.3), but also not 
unreasonably high.
Table 15.9 Liability under limited wealth (current law)a
Type Number
Limited 
assets?
Choice 
under SL
Choice 
under NLT
Choice
under NLES
1 10 Yes Sn Sn Sn
2 8 No St St St
3 8 Yes Sn Sn Sn
4 4 No St St St
5 8 Yes Sn Sn Sn
6 10 No St St St
7 10 Yes Sn Sn Sn
8 8 No Sn St St
9 2 Yes Sn Sn Sn
10 5 No Sn Sn Sn
11 5 Yes Sn Sn Sn
12 8 No St St St
13 4 Yes Sn Sn Sn
14 5 No St St St
15 5 Yes Sn Sn Sn
Level of compliance 35 43 43
Expected damage 369.200 356.400 356.400
Compliance costs 17.200 22.000 22.000
Subtotal 386.400 378.400 378.400
Enforcement costsb 2.800 2.200 2.300
Total 389.200 380.600 380.700
a. See the main text for more explanation. If the proprietor has limited assets, he chooses 
a level of compliance that is one point below the level that he would choose absent this 
constraint.
b. It is assumed that litigation costs are always realised, because victims are able to claim 
some damages and it is worthwhile to try to obtain this amount (although less than 
absent wealth constraints). The problem is only that this amount is insuffi cient to take 
precautions. For example, suppose that a victim is able to obtain €10.000 to €20.000.
Finally, it can be demonstrated that if proprietors do not pay for the financial 
damage (for example because they are insured and insurance companies do 
not control moral hazard), the level of compliance under current law is 10 to 
20 points lower. This does lower the incentive to take precautions, but to a 
limited extent. Only the decisions of proprietors of type 11 and 13 and some-
294 Chapter 15
times of proprietors of type 7 and 8 are affected by their own financial dam-
age. Under full compensation, it only matters for proprietors of type 1 under 
strict liability who chooses Sn instead of St.
15.2.4 Litigation costs and the incentive to file a claim
 The analysis in the previous subsections assumes that a victim is able to claim 
the compensation he is entitled to. I do not analyze the incentives for victims 
to claim damages. I implicitly assume that each legitimate claim is settled 
against 95% of the claim for litigation costs of €3750, and an illegitimate claim 
is not filed (or settled for €0, against costs of €0). There is no financial barrier, 
nor any other constraints on claiming damages.
Are victims able to claim damages?
As discussed in section 2.3.7, a settlement can only be obtained if the victims 
are able to go to court should the injurer fail to pay. If a proprietor knows that 
– in the end – a victim is unwilling or unable to go to court, he will not agree to 
a settlement, and hence will also not feel the need to take precautions to pre-
vent damage. Victims will not go to court if the costs of a trial fail to outweigh 
the expected compensation, or if they are unable to advance the money.
Table 15.10 shows the costs of a trial faced by a seriously wounded victim. 
The different costs are:
– Court fees.
– Costs of a lawyer: the contribution if the victim uses the system of legal 
aid , and otherwise the (full) commercial price.256
– The remaining costs that the lawyer makes for the victim, including costs 
of conducting official proceedings, calling in witnesses, experts, etc.
– The remaining (opportunity) costs of the victim, such as costs of travel-
ling, time, etc.
If there is a strict order for litigation costs, the victim bears costs of €7,290 
to €10,430 if he loses. On the other hand, there is a compensation award of 
€64,800 if he wins. The victim expects to benefit from a trial as long as the 
probability that he receives his claim is at least 11-16%. Therefore access to 
the court seems to be sufficiently guaranteed. This holds as long as victims 
are not too risk-averse, do not face credit constraints if they are not entitled to 
legal aid or do use legal aid if they are entitled to it, and are willing to claim 
compensation from the proprietor.
256 An alternative not explicitly analyzed here is that involving a victim who is insured 
against legal expenses. On the one hand, his situation is comparable to that of a victim 
who is entitled to legal aid . On the other hand, the position of the insurance company that 
decides about the proceedings is that of a ‘No Legal Aid’ victim who bears full costs. In 
addition, several personal injury firms operate on a ‘no cure no pay’ basis. However, this 
is only possible as long as a claim is settled. Since the focus here lies on the incentive to go 
to trial, I ignore ‘no cure no pay’.
295Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality
Table 15.10 Litigation costs for a casualty under current law (euro’s, 2004)a
Lowest Legal 
aidb
Highest Legal Aidc No Legal Aidd
Victim:
– Own contributione / lawyerf 89 761 1911
– Court feesg 109 219 1426
– Remaining costs lawyer PM PM PM
– Remaining costs victim PM PM PM
Total victim 200 980 3340
Total victim plus injurerh 3540 + PM 4320 + PM 6680 + PM
Total victim plus injurer if 
PM = €3750i
7.290 8.070 10.430
– Costs of legal aidj 756 84 -
– Costs of civil law suitk 469 469 469
Total social costsl 6.980 6.980 8.040
a. The table refers to a claim of €64.800 to which a casualty is entitled under current law
b. I.e. those who are entitled to legal aid and have to pay the lowest nonzero contribution.
c. I.e. those who are entitled to legal aid and have to pay the highest contribution.
d. I.e. those who are not entitled to legal aid, but have to pay their own trial costs.
e. See Legal Aid Act.
f. The number of hours that a lawyer spends on a case can be estimated at 9 hours, based 
on the paid legal aid cases. The commercial lawyers tariff is €212.
g. Court fees on January 1, 2004 (see Civil Cases Fees Act). If someone is entitled to legal 
aid, he is also entitled to a deduction in court fees.
h. I assume that the injurer is not entitled to legal aid and that his lawyer spends as much 
time and money on the case as the victim’s lawyer. So the injurer faces the same costs 
as a victim who is not entitled to legal aid.
i. An estimate about the remaining trial costs is missing. These costs largely consist of 
the costs of calling in experts, so correspond to the costs of settling the case. Therefore 
I use the estimate of Weterings (1999) of €3750 that was used in section ??? as the esti-
mate for the remaining costs for both parties. These are at least the costs that have to be 
made for a settlement as well as for a trial.
j. On January 1, 2004 the remuneration equals €93,84 per hour. The costs for the govern-
ment (society) equal 9*€93,84 minus the contribution.
k. In Suurmond (2004*, table B4.2) I calculate the costs for an average civil law case at €469.
l. These are the total social costs that are spent on courts and legal assistance by victims, 
injurers and the government. Court fees do not count, because they are expenses for 
victims and injurers, but income for the government. That these costs are smaller than 
the total costs for private parties stems from the fact that the court fees for ‘No legal 
Aid’ are higher than the estimated costs of an average law suit. The problem is not 
important because the aim is to give an impression of the magnitude of the trial costs 
and to discuss whether or not the incentive to fi le a claim is effi cient.
Trial or settlement and the social costs of litigation
 In a court case, the social costs are at least €6,980. These costs can be decreased – 
and social welfare therefore increased – if the victim and the proprietor agree to 
settle the dispute outside the court-room. The victim and the proprietor save at 
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least the court fees, and at least part of the cost of lawyers, so that settlement can 
also be in their best interest. If the cost of a settlement is €3,750 (as assumed in 
section 15.2.1), they can jointly save approximately €3,540 (Lowest Legal Aid) 
to €6,680 (No Legal Aid ). If both agree that the probability of compensation is 
95%, the minimal settlement range lies between €61,215 and €68,505.257 The 
settlement amount in section 15.2.1 (€65,100) lies within this range. Therefore, 
the assumption that the claim is settled for a compensation of €65,100 against 
settlement costs of €3,750 is reasonable given the threat of a trial. The crucial 
assumption here is that courts apply efficient standards. In that case, the prob-
ability of 95% that compensation must be paid by a non-compliant proprietor 
(and 0% by a compliant one) is realistic and agreed on by both parties.
Some comments
Of course this calculation is a simplification. First, I assume that the victim 
does or does not receive compensation. In general, the dispute is not only 
about whether or not the victim receives compensation, but also about the 
level of compensation. The importance of the analysis above is that it shows 
that the trial costs are manageable as compared to the magnitude of the com-
pensation claim, so that the victim can credibly threaten to go to court if there 
is a serious dispute about the compensation claim. This also applies to dis-
putes about the magnitude of the claim.
A related point is that I assume that the level of litigation costs does not 
depend on the magnitude of the claim . This is unlikely and a simplification 
of the true nature of enforcement costs. In general, the higher the claim, the 
higher the expenses individuals will be prepared to make obtaining or escap-
ing the claim. For example, if there is compensation of hedonic losses, a dis-
cussion might arise concerning who is entitled to this compensation. Alterna-
tively, full compensation of losses might lead to more compensation claims or 
to more trials so that the enforcement costs will rise and the outcome will pos-
sibly be inefficient.258 Moreover, the higher the victim’s litigation expenses, 
the higher the expected compensation. The probability of 95% might depend 
on the level of enforcement costs.
It may also be that the litigation costs per claim depend on the number 
of victims. For example, in the Volendam disaster, approximately 300 people 
257 The victim with lowest trial costs will want at least 95%*€64,821 – 5%*€7,290 = €61,215. The 
proprietor will not want to pay more than 95%*(€64,821 + €7,290) = €68.505.
258 However, it can be shown that in the current case an increase in enforcement costs under 
full compensation of damage will have little effect. Given the high compensation and 
probability of award, enforcement costs can rise tremendously before the victim refrains 
from a claim. For the proprietors too, the enforcement costs have little impact on the level 
of compliance. Only under strict liability might some proprietors choose more than first-
best precautions in order to save on litigation costs, if the enforcement costs become larger 
than €147,000 per claim under full compensation. Below this amount, the only effect of a 
multiplication of litigation costs will be the same multiplication of enforcement costs in 
table 15.8.
297Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality
jointly settled their case with the proprietor and the municipality (section 
14.1). If there are multiple victims, questions of negligence have to be decided 
only once, and a lawyer may realize economies of scale by representing sev-
eral victims. This is likely to reduce the litigation costs per victim.
All in all, the crucial assumption is that courts do apply efficient stan-
dards so that for legitimate claims the probability that a victim receives com-
pensation is high (95%) relative to the litigation costs, but that illegitimate 
claims do not stand a chance. Only if this relationship fundamentally changes 
will the conclusions be different. In general, there is no reason to assume that 
standard-setting by Dutch courts is inefficient. Moreover, although specify-
ing the damage does require the costs of (medical) experts, the compensation 
to which a victim is entitled is clearly defined. Therefore, a probability of 95% 
is not necessarily unrealistic. Besides, the effect is limited as long as the prob-
ability is higher than 30%.259
15.2.5 Concluding on private enforcement
The analysis of liability claims by victims shows that a reasonable level of 
social welfare is obtained. The level of enforcement costs is low because 
enforcement occurs only once a fire has taken place. Some potential problems 
have been dismissed. Definitive conclusions concerning some other prob-
lems could not be drawn. Whether private enforcement really leads to an effi-
cient result depends on (1) an adequate compensation award that reflects full 
losses, (2) sufficient assets available on the side of the proprietor, (3) efficient 
standard-setting by courts.
15.3 Administrative enforcement
Let us now turn to administrative enforcement. Under administrative 
enforcement, enforcement takes place at a time when damage can still be pre-
vented (act-based).
15.3.1 Administrative enforcement in general
Under administrative enforcement, the municipality is able to induce the pro-
prietor to comply by imposing a duty under penal sum or administrative 
coercion, or by threatening to close the establishment for a short or longer 
259 In case of strict liability, under current law, the level of compliance remains 60 as long as 
the probability is 80%. Between 64% and 79% it drops to 47 (proprietors of type 4, 11 and 
13), a level at which it remains until a probability of 28% is reached. Under NLES the levels 
of compliance are the same. The difference is only that it drops from a level of 78 to 47.
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period . For example, a proprietor of type 1 can be forced to make the tech-
nical compliance costs of €250 if he is charged a penal sum of €250 and the 
municipality realizes a probability of apprehension of 100% with respect to 
the forfeiture of the penal sum. The proprietor will be better off making com-
pliance costs (costs €250) than violating the technical requirements (costs of 
more than €250). I assume that the municipality is able to impose sufficiently 
high penal sums (or otherwise close the establishment).
A drawback of this type of administrative enforcement is that the propri-
etor is only confronted with a sanction once a violation has been discovered. 
The proprietor has an incentive to be in non-compliance as long as he is not 
inspected. Once inspected, the proprietor has a sufficient incentive to com-
ply, for instance because there is a 100% probability of re-inspection and the 
proprietor forfeits a sufficiently high penal sum if he is still (or again) in non-
compliance. 
15.3.2 Costs of enforcement and level of compliance
Let us start by analyzing the policy currently implemented in most munic-
ipalities. Each establishment is inspected once a year on technical require-
ments. As a consequence, all proprietors comply with the technical require-
ments after a first inspection and realize the corresponding costs. AVD (2004*) 
provides the necessary information about the enforcement costs (see section 
13.2.1):
– On average an inspection requires 3.25 hours, including re-inspection 
and paperwork. The hourly tariff is €51.30. 
– In 1% of the cases, it is necessary to actually impose penal sums and other 
sanctions. This procedure requires on average 20 hours of work, with an 
hourly tariff of €70.260
I assume that these costs apply to the inspection of technical requirements as 
well as the number of visitors. Both requirements can be inspected simultane-
ously in the course of one inspection.
With respect to compliance with the requirements, the following applies:
1. The technical requirements:
– Half the time, this concerns expenses on technical devices that have 
to be fi xed every year, but are then certainly in compliance for a whole 
year. Examples are the impregnation of decorations or the yearly cer-
tifi cation of fi re extinguishers. If there is at least one annual inspec-
tion, the proprietor is forced to realise these costs every year and the 
level of compliance is 1.
260 For convenience and due to lack of data, I refrain from including the costs of these proce-
dures for the proprietor, such as the costs of objection and appeal, a lawyer, etc. In practice, 
this does not seem to happen. The proprietor uses these procedures if the costs are lower 
than the resulting expected reduction in penalties.
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– The other half concerns expenses on devices that may break down 
during the year. If that happens, the proprietor is obliged to repair the 
device, but he may decide to wait and only repair once he is forced to 
do so. For example, the proprietor can choose to annually replace the 
lamps of the escape-route signs, but he can also choose to wait until 
they fail and then possibly decide to replace them. In the fi rst case, or 
if the proprietor immediately replaces the lamps, there is full compli-
ance (level 1). However, under administrative enforcement, the pro-
prietor is better off waiting and replacing only once an enforcement 
offi cial has ordered him to do so (under threat of penalties). The lamps 
may fail the day after the inspector has come, so that compliance dur-
ing the next year is (almost) zero. Only after the next inspector’s visit 
a year later will the proprietor comply again. The lamps may also fail 
a day before the inspector comes, so that compliance is (almost) 1. On 
average, then,  compliance by the proprietor is 0.5.
– All in all, in case of an annual inspection, the expected level of compli-
ance with the technical requirements equals 0.5*1 + 0.5*0.5 = 0.75. For 
multiple inspections per year, it can be calculated in a similar way, 
assuming that the lamps will not break down more than once a year.
2. The number of visitors. This can be enforced by clearing the establish-
ment on site whenever a violation of the number of visitors is discovered. 
Therefore, on days when there is an inspection, the level of compliance is 
1. On days when there is no inspection, the proprietor will be in violation 
(the level of compliance is zero), so that an average compliance level can 
be calculated.261
From table 15.3, we can deduce that if the municipality is unable to distin-
guish between different types of proprietors (because it lacks the informa-
tion to do so), it is inefficient in inspecting the number of visitors, even if we 
ignore the costs of enforcement. Moreover, it appears that inspection of any 
type of proprietor is inefficient if it is only aimed at enforcing the number of 
visitors. The costs of inspection (€181262) are higher than the potential benefits 
of an increase in compliance with the number of visitors requirement. Only 
inspecting the number of visitors decreases social welfare. However, given 
that there is an inspection of the technical requirements, it may be efficient 
to use this inspection to also enforce the number of visitors for proprietors 
of type 6, 11 and 14. In that case, the inspection of the technical requirements 
should take place during a day (evening) when there is a possible excess of 
the number of visitors. The marginal costs of inspecting the number of visi-
tors would then be zero.
261 The level of compliance equals the number of days the number of visitors is complied with 
divided by the potential number of days this requirement might be violated. For example, 
if a proprietor of type 6 complies 2 days with the maximum number of visitors, the level of 
compliance equals 2 / 5 = 0.4.
262 The costs of an inspection are 3.25*€51.30 + 1%*20*€70 = €181
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15.3.3 The result under administrative enforcement
If all proprietors are inspected once a year on the technical requirements, this 
leads to a level of compliance of 75 and a corresponding level of social welfare 
of €331,500, divided into €18,100 worth of enforcement costs, €49,200 worth of 
costs of compliance, and €262,200 worth of expected damage. See table 15.11.
If an establishment is inspected more frequently than once a year, pro-
prietors will sooner replace the escape-route signs and other devices, so that 
the expected damage will be reduced. The question is whether this reduc-
tion in expected damage compensates for the increase in enforcement costs. 
Table 15.11 shows the level of social welfare for different numbers of annual 
inspections. It appears that it is optimal to inspect establishments three times 
a year.
Table 15.11 Administrative enforcement – technical inspections
Number of inspections per 
establishment
0 1 2 3 4
Expected damage 663.317 262.217 197.700 175.528 164.442
Costs of compliance 0 49.200 49.200 49.200 49.200
Subtotal 663.317 313.417 246.900 224.728 213.642
Costs of inspections 0 16.673 33.345 50.018 66.690
Costs of imposing sanctions 0 1.400 2.800 44.200 5.600
Enforcement costs 0 18.073 36.145 54.218 72.290
Total (social welfare) 663.317 331.489 283.045 278.945 285.932
Level of compliance 0 75 88 92 94
If the municipality is informed about the expected damage and costs of com-
pliance of each type of proprietor and knows a proprietor’s type, proprietors 
will not have to be inspected with the same frequency. For each type of pro-
prietor, an optimal number of inspections can be determined. Table 15.12 
contains the results under this assumption. Column 2 contains the results 
when only the technical requirements are inspected. For types 9 and 15, Sn 
is optimal, so that no inspection will always be best. For types 1 and 10, no 
inspection is also optimal because the costs of inspection do not balance out 
the reduction in expected damage minus the costs of compliance. For other 
types, the optimal frequency varies from 1 to 4. A total number of 233 inspec-
tions is optimal.
For proprietors of type 6, 11 and 14, it is optimal to perform inspections on 
days when they might violate the number of visitors. This will not affect the 
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enforcement costs, but will lead to a reduction of expected damage plus costs 
of compliance of about €3400.263
Table 15.12 Administrative enforcement – Specifi c info
Optimal per establishment 
only technical
Optimal per establishment 
including visitors
Expected damage 181.696 173.835
Costs of compliance 40.200 44.700a
Subtotal 221.896 218.535
Costs of inspections 38.847 38.847
Costs of imposing sanctions 3.262 3.262
Enforcement costs 42.109 42.109
Total (social welfare) 264.005 260.644
Level of compliance 70 79 
Number of inspections 233 233
a. This consists of € 40.200 of technical compliance costs and € 4500 of costs for comply-
ing with the number of visitors (proprietors of type 6, 11 and 14).
15.3.4 Concluding on administrative enforcement
The analysis above shows that it is possible to reduce the expected damage 
from fire in horeca establishment by means of administrative law enforce-
ment. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that proprietors will 
wait until there is a real threat of sanctions. Therefore, the proprietor will 
only comply with the requirements if there are sufficient inspections, which 
involves substantial enforcement costs.
If the enforcement costs rise, the efficient level of compliance will be 
reduced. This is apparent for example from the fact that it is not efficient to 
inspect only for the number of visitors. In addition, it is not efficient to inspect 
on the technical requirements for proprietors of type 1 and 10, while St is effi-
cient for them in the absence of enforcement costs.
The disadvantage of administrative enforcement is the expectant compli-
263 The three commonly known days on which excessive numbers of visitors can be expected 
are the two days of Carnival and one day for a local event six months later. Since only 
inspecting the number of visitors is inefficient, inspection only takes place on two of these 
days. Inspecting on both Carnival days is unlikely to improve technical compliance, 
because the probability that the lamps fail that day is negligible. For proprietors of type 
11, it is optimal to have just 1 inspection, which should take place at a time when there is a 
possible excess of the number of visitors.
 The level of compliance for the number of visitors for proprietors of type 6, 11 and 14 
respectively is 0,40, 0,33 en 0,50.
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ant behavior of the proprietors. The extent to which this behavior shows up 
depends on the extent to which compliance with the technical requirements 
can be postponed or requires continued attention.264
15.4 Criminal enforcement
The expectant behavior of proprietors under administrative law enforcement 
can be prevented by immediately punishing their behavior with a criminal 
fine.265 If the fine is high enough, the proprietor will choose to immediately 
replace the failing lamps of escape-route signs, thus fully complying with the 
technical requirements.
15.4.1 Conceivable policy: a fine of €250
Such a criminal law enforcement policy is not currently implemented, but it is 
actually possible.266 If we consider similar offences, a fine of €250 is a realistic 
assumption for the magnitude of the fine.267 This fine could be levied per 
detected violation of the technical requirements or the number of visitors.
The enforcement costs of criminal law enforcement
The corresponding enforcement costs consist of the costs of apprehension 
and detection, the costs of conviction and the costs of execution.
264 I assumed a ratio of 50%-50% for annual and continued attention. To compare, if 1 inspec-
tion of the technical requirements would suffice to guarantee compliance with the techni-
cal requirements for a whole year, a level of compliance of 100 could be achieved with 
enforcement costs of €18.100. Social welfare would be €198.456 (expected damage of 
€131.200 and compliance costs of €49.200).
265 Another alternative is the use of an administrative fine. I did not discuss the use of an 
administrative fine in the previous section, because its effect is similar to that of a criminal 
fine. For a proprietor, it probably makes little difference whether he has to pay a fine of one 
kind or another. Analyzing the different enforcement costs would not much improve our 
understanding. If an administrative fine is not immediately imposed, but is preceded by 
warnings, its effect is similar to that of a penal sum and the result would be similar to that 
discussed in the previous section.
266 According to article 12.1 of the model Building Bylaw (VNG, 2002*), violation of the use 
requirements is a criminal act and is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
four months or by a fine of the third category.
267 For example, according to the fines database of the Public Prosecutors Office, violations 
of closing times by proprietors are punished with a fine of €125, noise pollution by horeca 
establishments with a fine of €75, and violations of the Licensing and Catering Act (for 
instance selling alcoholic beverage to minors) with fines of €400 to €500.
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The costs of apprehension are those of police resources.268 These can be 
estimated at €65 per hour including administrative support, training, accom-
modation, etc.269 An inspection requires half an hour of police-effort.270 I 
assume (again) that the probability of detection is 100%. In case of an inspec-
tion, possible violations can be established with certainty.
The costs of conviction are more difficult to determine. There are two 
alternatives. Based on average figures for criminal disposals, the picture is 
as follows:271 The costs for the police of making a report of the offence are 
0.25 hour (15 minutes) at €65. Of these reports, 94% is dealt with by the Public 
Prosecutors Office (PPO) and 6% through a trial. If the case is dealt with by 
the PPO (costs €745), it will involve a transaction in 82% of the cases and a 
dismissal in the remaining 18%. If the case is dealt with in a court (costs of the 
government: €1360272) the probability of conviction is 95%. The proprietor 
then spends €848 on a lawyer (i.e. four hours at an hourly rate of €212). The 
total conviction costs thus equal 0.25*€65 + 94%*€745+6%*(€1360 + €848) = 
€850. The proprietor has a probability of 80% of paying a fine of €250 and a 6% 
probability of paying a lawyer, on average 80%*€250 + 6%*€848 = €250.
There are several problems with this estimate. First, the conviction costs 
are rather high relative to the fine of €250. Moreover it only takes the average 
disposal as given, without providing an analysis of these probabilities. For 
example, why is not every case settled by transaction, especially given that 
the probability of detection is 100% and that there is little room for discussion 
concerning offenses? Why is it beneficial for the proprietor to refuse a trans-
action? Why does the PPO dismiss some cases? I therefore consider another 
268 I use average police figures. Enforcement could be delegated to special officers (so-called 
boa: special investigating officer) instructed with the enforcement of Economic Offenses. 
On the one hand, these officials may be cheaper because they can be lower skilled. On the 
other hand, they may be more expensive, because they have to be more specialized.
269 According to table 4.8 from Kerncijfers van de Nederlands Politie 2002 (Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, see www.politie.nl), the average costs per fte equal €51,996. This document 
also states that 79.3% of the personnel are primary personnel. The total costs of the police 
force consist of 77.7% personnel costs and 13.3%  accommodation, transport, communica-
tion, ICT, etc. Therefore,, the total annual costs per fte equal €51,996 * 1/0.793 * 1/0.777 = 
€84,387. With approximately 1300 productive hours in a year (see note 202), the hourly 
tariff is €65.
270 This estimate is based on the average time that the fire department now spends on inspec-
tions (section 12.2) which largely corresponds to the 3.25 hours of AVD (2004*). Recall that, 
in this case, administrative support etc. is incorporated in the tariff and not in the number 
of hours for inspection and that there is no need for re-inspections under criminal law 
enforcement. Moreover, there is usually less time for explanation. On the other hand, if 
they are not carried out by special officers (note 268), police inspections may require the 
presence of fire safety officials.
271 CBS, Rechtspraak in Nederland 2002. The data refer as much as possible to the Economic 
Offenses Act. The time spent on writing a report and the time spent by lawyers is my own 
estimate.
272 I.e., costs of PPO of €745 plus the costs of a criminal court case, computed as in table 15.10 
for civil law cases.
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alternative, which is particularly relevant for small fines. In this alternative, 
the conviction (plus execution) costs equal €100, without any costs for the 
proprietor. There is always a transaction of €250.
The costs of the collection of fines are €7 for a transaction and €37 for a fine 
imposed by a court, on average €9.273
The relevant information
 The proprietor will comply with the regulations if his costs of compliance 
are lower than the expected sanction. The magnitude of the sanction is €250. 
Therefore, the relevant question concerns the socially optimal number of 
inspections (probability of apprehension), so that the efficient sanctioning 
risk can be realized. The answer depends on the available information. There 
are three possible situations with corresponding policy alternatives (in addi-
tion to the no-inspection option)274:
1. Perfect information: for every type of proprietor, the enforcement offi cials 
have the correct information about the expected damage, the costs of 
compliance for the technical requirements and the number of visitors. 
Moreover, they know a proprietor’s type. As a result, they are able to de-
termine for every type of proprietor which requirements are enforced and 
how many inspections are carried out.
2. Compliance costs information: for every type of proprietor, the enforcement 
offi cials know the costs of compliance of (at least) the technical require-
ments and they know a proprietor’s type. They therefore have to enforce 
the same level of compliance at each proprietor, and therefore decide to 
enforce only the technical requirements.275 They are, however, able to 
vary the number of inspections for proprietors.
3. No information: the enforcement offi cials have no information available 
that might help to vary enforcement. They therefore have to enforce the 
same level of compliance and have to inspect each proprietor with the 
same frequency.
In situations 1 and 2, a sanctioning risk is realized for every type of proprietor. 
For example, a proprietor of type 3 will comply with the technical require-
ments if there are at least 2 inspections per year: costs of compliance of €500 
273 Source: Justitiebegroting 2004, part 03 Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau. Based on the figures dis-
cussed before, the average costs equal (94%*82%)/83%*€7.06 + (6%*95%)/83%*€37.23 = €9.11.
274 It is possible to think of one other alternative, namely that the enforcement officials do 
know the expected damage, but are not informed about the costs of compliance. In this 
situation, they also have to enforce the same level of compliance and will choose to enforce 
the technical requirements for all proprietors. They are not able to realize a sanctioning 
risk that differs between proprietors so the outcome is as under “no information”.
275 As discussed above, it is not efficient – in the absence of specific information – to enforce 
only the number of visitors. This is always second-best to only enforcing the technical 
requirements. Moreover, enforcing both requirements can only be efficient if the enforce-
ment costs for ‘everyone St’ are much higher than for ‘everyone Stv’. This is unlikely to be 
the case.
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versus a sanctioning risk of at least 2 * €250 ≥ €500. The costs of a proprietor of 
type 4 are €700, so that he will comply if there are at least 2.8 inspections per 
year. In situations 1 and 2 it is optimal either to make the sanctioning risk so 
large that a proprietor complies, or to refrain from inspections altogether. In 
both cases, no fines are imposed and no conviction and execution costs real-
ized. The only enforcement costs are the costs of inspection. This is different 
in situation 3. If, for instance, there are 2 inspections per year, a proprietor of 
type 3 will comply with the technical requirements, but a proprietor of type 4 
will not. If a proprietor of type 4 is inspected (2 times a year is the expectation) 
there is an offence detected and he will have to pay a fine with corresponding 
enforcement costs as a consequence. In which case the distinction between 
the high (I) and low (II) conviction costs is relevant.
Which situation is most realistic may vary. Of course, over the years, 
enforcement officials can find out about the relevant costs and benefits and a 
proprietor’s type. However, the situation within an establishment might not 
be stable and there is turnover in the enforcement personnel. The enforce-
ment officials I interviewed (section 12.2), in any case, indicated that they 
only generally know the costs of compliance.
The results of a fine of €250 
The results are reported in tables 15.13, 15.14 and 15.15. Table 15.13 describes 
the result for the different situations. When the enforcement officials have per-
fect information, a level of compliance is enforced for every proprietor, which 
minimizes the sum of the expected damage and the costs of compliance. This 
implies that proprietors of type 9 and 15 are not inspected at all. Proprietors 
of type 6, 11 and 14 are also inspected on the number of visitors, but only on 
the three generally known days. It is not efficient to also inspect on the other 
100 weekend days that these proprietors may be in violation of the maxi-
mum number of visitors. This would require so much funding in terms of 
enforcement costs that social costs would rise on balance. Therefore, the level 
of compliance of 108 is somewhat smaller than the first-best optimum of 113. 
For none of the proprietors are the enforcement costs so high that it becomes 
efficient to enforce a lower lever of compliance with the technical require-
ments than the social optimum in table 15.3.
If the enforcement officials only have information about compliance costs, they 
will enforce the technical requirements for everyone. There is no inspection of 
the number of visitors for proprietors of type 6, 11 and 14, and proprietors of 
type 9 and 15 are also inspected for compliance with the technical requirements. 
Table 15.14 shows the expected number of inspections on the basis of which a 
proprietor will choose to comply with the technical requirements. In total, the 
enforcement officials choose to perform 197 inspections. This should induce all 
proprietors to comply with the technical requirements.
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Table 15.13 Criminal enforcement with fi ne € 250
No enfor-
cement
Perfect info
Info com-
pliance costs
No info
Expected damage 663.300 123.400 131.200 131.200
Costs of compliance 0 54.200 49.200 49.200
Subtotal 663.300 177.600 180.400 180.400
Costs of inspection 0 6.100 6.400 13.000
Costs of convictiona 0 0 0 0
Enforcement costs 0 6.100 6.400 13.000
Total costs 663.300 183.700 186.800 193.400
Level of compliance 0 108b 100c 100d
Number of inspections 
(of which visitors)
0
(0)
187b
(4,5)
197c
(0)
400d
(0)
a. Including costs of execution of sanctions.
b. For proprietors of type 9 and 15 the regulations are not enforced. Table 15.14 shows 
how many inspections have to be performed to induce the (other) proprietors to com-
ply with the technical requirements. For proprietors of type 6, 11 and 14 the number of 
visitors are enforced on the three generally known days. This requires a probability on 
such a day of respectively 0.5, 0.4 and 0.6 (costs per day divided by €250). The level of 
compliance is equal to the number of the days they comply divided by the total num-
ber of potential days. For all other type of proprietors only the technical requirements 
are enforced.
c. See table 15.14. The number of inspections is the same as under perfect information 
plus the inspections for type 9 and 15. For type 6, 11 and 14 the required number of 
inspections for the technical requirements is larger than for enforcing the number of 
visitors on the three known days. The number of inspections for these types can there-
fore not be lowered compared to perfect info.
d. Table 15.15 shows which number of inspections is optimal in these situations.
If the enforcement officials have no information, it is efficient to inspect so 
many times that every proprietor will comply with the technical require-
ments. Therefore, the magnitude of the conviction costs is irrelevant. Table 
15.15 explains this result. If the number of inspections per establishment 
increases, the costs of inspections rise. The effect on the costs of conviction 
is twofold. On the one hand, there are more proprietors who choose to com-
ply, so that fewer fines have to be imposed. On the other hand, the probabil-
ity of apprehension increases, so that non-complying proprietors are more 
frequently fined. On balance, the conviction costs decrease almost over the 
entire range. We might expect that this increase in costs of inspection and 
decrease in costs of conviction would lead to an optimal level of compliance 
that is smaller than 100. This is not the case, however, because the decision to 
comply is determined by the compliance costs compared to the sanctioning 
risk. The higher the costs of compliance, the more inspections are required 
to enforce compliance. In this case, for proprietors with high costs of compli-
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ance, expected damage can be reduced so much that it is socially desirable 
for them to comply with the requirements, even if it implies high costs of 
enforcement and proprietors of type 9 and 15 being also forced to comply. 
To illustrate: a proprietor of type 15 has compliance costs of only €300. He 
will therefore choose to comply (inefficiently) for a relative low probability of 
inspection. From a social point of view, it is optimal to increase the number of 
inspections so much that all proprietors, also those with high costs of compli-
ance, comply with the technical requirements.
In all three situations, it is possible to induce proprietors to comply by 
criminal law enforcement. 
Table 15.14  Number of required inspections for technical requirements under 
fi ne € 250
Type #
Technical 
compliance 
costs
Minimum # 
of required 
inspections
per year
Enforcement 
costs per year
Total social 
costs per year
1 10 250 1,0 33 450
2 8 300 1,2 39 1010
3 8 500 2,0 65 1960
4 4 700 2,8 91 2650
5 8 400 1,6 52 1560
6 10 400 1,6 52 2840
7 10 500 2,0 65 1270
8 8 600 2,4 78 2460
9 2 500 2,0 65 1300
10 5 800 3,2 104 2910
11 5 400 1,6 52 2000
12 8 500 2,0 65 1860
13 4 1000 4,0 130 2290
14 5 800 3,2 104 3530
15 5 300 1,2 39 1180
Total  100 49.200 197 6.400 186.800
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Table 15.15a Result for 3-I: no information, high conviction costs
Number of 
inspections
Level 
of com-
pliance
Expected 
damage
Costs 
of com-
pliance
Sub
total
Costs of 
inspec-
tion
Costs 
of con-
victiona
Enfor-
cement 
costs
Total 
social 
costsFrom To
0,0 1,0 0 663.300 0 663.300 0 0 0 663.300
1,0 1,2 10 660.300 2.500 662.800 3.300 77.200 80.500 743.300
1,2 1,6 23 599.200 6.400 605.600 3.900 79.300 83.200 688.800
1,6 2,0 46 410.700 15.600 426.300 5.200 74.100 79.300 505.600
2,0 2,4 74 246.200 29.600 275.800 6.500 44.600 51.100 326.900
2,4 2,8 82 233.400 34.400 267.800 7.800 37.100 44.900 312.600
2,8 3,2 86 215.600 37.200 252.800 9.100 33.600 42.700 295.500
3,2 4,0 96 146.700 45.200 191.900 10.400 11.000 21.400 213.300
4,0 Infi nite 100 131.200 49.200 180.400 13.000 0 13.000 193.400
Table 15.15b Result for 3-II: no information, low conviction costs
Number of 
inspections
Level 
of com-
pliance
Expected 
damage
Costs 
of com-
pliance
Subtotal
Costs of 
inspec-
tion
Costs 
of con-
victiona
Enfor-
cement 
costs
Total 
social 
costsFrom To
0,0 1,0 0 663.300 0 663.300 0 0 0 663.300
1,0 1,2 10 660.300 2.500 662.800 3.300 9.000 12.300 675.100
1,2 1,6 23 599.200 6.400 605.600 3.900 9.200 13.100 618.800
1,6 2,0 46 410.700 15.600 426.300 5.200 8.600 13.800 440.200
2,0 2,4 74 246.200 29.600 275.800 6.500 5.200 11.700 287.500
2,4 2,8 82 233.400 34.400 267.800 7.800 4.300 12.100 279.900
2,8 3,2 86 215.600 37.200 252.800 9.100 3.900 13.000 265.800
3,2 4,0 96 146.700 45.200 191.900 10.400 1.300 11.700 203.600
4,0 Infi nite 100 131.200 49.200 180.400 13.000 0 13.000 193.400
15.4.2 Trading off the probability of inspection and the magnitude of the fine
 The previous subsection demonstrates that proprietors can be forced to com-
ply with the regulation by means of criminal enforcement. Therefore, a sanc-
tioning risk is required that exceeds the costs of compliance. For the techni-
cal requirements, this can be realized with a fine of €250 and – in case of no 
information – four inspections per establishment per year. However, the same 
sanctioning risk can also be realized with a fine of €500 and two inspections 
per year. In both cases, the sanctioning risk is €1000 so that all proprietors are 
better off complying with the technical requirements. In the second alterna-
tive, however, the costs of inspection are halved as the number of inspections 
is halved. The costs of conviction remain unchanged as there is still no propri-
etor who violated the requirements and therefore no sanctions are imposed. 
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On balance, doubling the fine will lead to halving the costs of inspection. Since 
the level of compliance and therefore the expected damage and the costs of 
compliance remain unchanged, this implies that social welfare is improved. 
Table 15.16a-d shows the result for fines of €75, €250, €500 and €4500.276 277
Table 15.16a Criminal enforcement: perfect info
Fine € 75 € 250 € 500 € 4500
Expected damage 133.900 123.400 123.400 123.400
Costs of compliance 45.700 54.200 54.200 54.200
Subtotal 179.600 177.600 177.600 177.600
Costs of inspection 13.100 6.100 3.400 400
Costs of conviction 0 0 0 0
Enforcement costs 13.100 6.100 3.400 400
Total social costs 192.700 183.700 181.000 178.000
Level of compliance 88 108 108 108
Number of inspections
(of which visitors)
402
(2,7)
187
(4,5)
104
(2,5)
13
(0,3)
Table 15.16b Criminal enforcement: info compliance costs
Fine € 75 € 250 € 500 € 4500
Expected damage 131.200 131.200 131.200 131.200
Costs of compliance 49.200 49.200 49.200 49.200
Subtotal 180.400 180.400 180.400 180.400
Costs of inspection 14.500 6.400 3.600 400
Costs of conviction 0 0 0 0
Enforcement costs 14.500 6.400 3.600 400
Total social costs 194.900 186.800 183.900 180.800
Level of compliance 100 100 100 100
Number of inspections 447 197 109 13
Results
Table 15.16a shows that, if there is perfect information, raising the fine will 
result in the same level of compliance, at lower enforcement costs. With a fine 
of €4500, it is still unprofitable to inspect the number of visitors outside the 
276 On January 1, 2004, €4500 is the maximum for fines of the third category (article 23 Crimi-
nal Code).
277 The expected sanctioning risk equals for fines of €75, €500 and €4500 respectively 80%*€75 
+ €50 (i.e. 6%*848) = €110; 80%*€500 + €50 = €450; 80%*€4500 + €50 = €3650. Under low con-
viction costs of €100, there is always a transaction for, respectively, €75, €500 and €4500.
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three known days. Only if the fine is raised further, to for example €15,000, 
is it is efficient to create a probability of inspection that induces proprietors 
of type 6 and 14 to comply with the number of visitors on all days.278 Then a 
level of compliance of 113 is realized at minimal enforcement costs. However, 
this would require a substantial change in the legal environment.
Table 15.16c Criminal enforcement: no info I (high conviction costs)
Fine € 75 € 250 € 500 € 4500
Expected damage 131.200 131.200 131.200 131.200
Costs of compliance 49.200 49.200 49.200 49.200
Subtotal 180.400 180.400 180.400 180.400
Costs of inspection 29.500 13.000 7.200 900
Costs of conviction 0 0 0 0
Enforcement costs 29.500 13.000 7.200 900
Total social costs 209.900 193.400 187.600 181.300
Level of compliance 100 100 100 100
Number of inspections 909 400 222 27
Table 15.16d Criminal enforcement: no info II (low conviction costs)
Fine € 75 € 250 € 500 € 4500
Expected damage 131.200 131.200 131.200 131.200
Costs of compliance 49.200 49.200 49.200 49.200
Subtotal 180.400 180.400 180.400 180.400
Costs of inspection 43.300 13.000 6.500 700
Costs of conviction 0 0 0 0
Enforcement costs 43.300 13.000 6.500 700
Total social costs 223.700 193.400 186.900 181.100
Level of compliance 100 100d 100 100
Number of inspections 1.333 400 200 22
It is also possible to consider a lower fine. A fine of €75 might be more realistic 
in the eyes of the parties concerned. The estimate of €250 was a not-so-conser-
vative estimate of comparable fines. Especially in the beginning, a mild start 
might be favored, since fines are currently not in use. In addition, a potential 
administrative fine (a question under debate) would probably be more in the 
order of €75 than €250.
278 For proprietors of type 6 it is beneficial to always enforce the number of visitors beginning 
with a fine of €9925, and for those of type 14 beginning with €11.485. For proprietors of type 
11, there are only 3 days on which there is a potential excess of the number of visitors.
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If the fine is €75, it will be too little to force proprietors of type 6 and 14 to 
comply with the maximum number of visitors. Their costs of compliance of €125 
respectively €150 are so high that they are always better off non-complying, even 
if the probability of inspection is 100%.279 Moreover, proprietors of type 1 have 
to be inspected so frequently that it is inefficient to enforce the technical require-
ments for these proprietors. Therefore the level of compliance drops to 88.
In situations involving other than perfect information the effects are com-
parable. If the fine is increased the enforcement costs decrease and social wel-
fare is improved (tables 15.16b-d). In case of no information, the efficient level 
of compliance remains 100.
Comments
An increase in the fine and a decrease in the number of inspections such that 
the sanctioning risk is unchanged will improve social welfare. This is along 
the lines discussed in the theoretical part (especially section 3.2, following 
Becker, 1968). There are some important comments on the recommendation 
to impose as high a fine as possible and correspondingly as low an inspection 
rate as possible.
A fine that exceeds the assets of a proprietor is ineffective. The proprietor 
will only take into account the part of the fine he is able to pay. As explained in 
section 15.2.3, the constraint on the assets is not likely to be so high that propri-
etors will be unable to afford €4500. For much higher fines, this may become 
problematic. One solution would be to replace fines by imprisonment. If we 
are willing to impose imprisonment sentences severe enough to deter propri-
etors from non-compliance, the costs of executing the imprisonment sentences 
in question will not be realized. It is doubtful, however, whether there is enough 
willingness to do so at present. If we are willing to impose only small impris-
onment sentences, which do not sufficiently deter, the outcome is likely to be 
worse: high costs of enforcement without any effect on the level of compliance.
Several factors were abstracted from in this case, which might in practice 
be relevant to some extent. A maximal fine and a minimal probability might 
have consequences in terms of wrongly punishing proprietors who are not in 
violation , as well as on the effects of informal sanctions , or the valuation of the 
risk of sanctions by proprietors.
It might be useful not only to punish offences with fines, but also to 
instruct proprietors to restore compliance. If criminal enforcement is ade-
quately carried out, this will be irrelevant because proprietors will choose the 
optimal level of compliance. However, if, for some reason, proprietors choose 
inefficient compliance, it might be useful to supplement the sanction with an 
instruction to restore compliance.
279 For proprietors of type 11, it remains optimal to inspect on the three generally known 
days. The costs of compliance are €100, so that the probability of inspection should equal 
€100/€110 = 91%. This requires costs of €30. The total costs of €100 + €30 = €130 are lower 
than the reduction in expected damage of €138.
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Harm-based criminal enforcement
So far, I only discussed act-based criminal enforcement. However, it is also possi-
ble to sanction proprietors after some damage has occurred . This requires much 
lower enforcement costs. Suppose for example that after a fire has occurred and 
it appears with 100% certainty that the proprietor has not complied with the 
technical requirements, a fine of €50,000 can be imposed. For Sn, the sanctioning 
risk is equal to the yearly expected probability of a fire * €50,000. For example, 
for a proprietor of type 1, this is equal to 0.00825*€50,000 = €410. This is higher 
than the costs of compliance of €250, so that a proprietor of type 1 will comply 
with the technical requirements. With a fine of €50,000, all proprietors will com-
ply with the technical requirements except those of type 4 and 13. Raising the 
fine further will also deter them from violating the technical requirements. If the 
assets are insufficient, imprisonment might be helpful, as described above. The 
other problems are the same as under liability: the proprietor must be able to 
estimate the probability that he will have to pay such a high fine.
15.4.3 Concluding on criminal law enforcement
Choosing to enforce fire safety regulations by means of criminal law enforce-
ment is a good alternative. With relatively low enforcement costs, good results 
can be obtained. It is best to choose rather high fines as this will allow for more 
limited costs of inspection. If the information of enforcement officials is lim-
ited, they must enforce the same level of compliance for each proprietor. This 
might be valued as ‘unfair’ or ‘disproportionate’ by some of the proprietors.
A word of warning in order: Criminal enforcement is only a good alterna-
tive if it is implemented in the right way. Otherwise, it is better to completely 
refrain from enforcement. In the short term, it is not expected that fines will 
exceed €250. Moreover, the police and the Public Prosecutors Office show little 
interest in the enforcement of fire safety in horeca establishments and clearly 
choose other priorities. Nevertheless, if they are forced and provided with the 
financial resources to inspect all establishments once per year and to impose 
fines of €250 if necessary, this will only induce proprietors of type 1 to comply. 
For all other proprietors, the sanctioning risk is too small to enforce compliance 
with the technical requirements. As a consequence, such a policy will lead to a 
level of compliance of only 10 with €660,300 of expected damage and €2500 of 
costs of compliance (see table 15.15). The corresponding enforcement costs are, 
depending on the high or low costs of conviction, €80,500, respectively €12,300, 
so that the total costs are €743,300, respectively €675.100. Irrespective of the 
precise costs of conviction,, society is better off if the police and Public Prosecu-
tors refrain from enforcement, so that the social costs are only €663,300.
It turns out (especially from table 15.16a) that proprietors cannot be induced 
to comply with low fines. The problem is similar if the budget for inspections is 
insufficient to realize an adequate sanctioning risk (given the magnitude of the 
fine). In such circumstances, a higher level of compliance might be obtained by 
313Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality
not immediately punishing violations (the so-called compliance strategies dis-
cussed before). For example, in such cases, warning the proprietor first might 
lead to a better outcome as demonstrated for administrative law enforcement in 
section 15.3. Other alternatives were discussed in sections 8.2 and 12.4. However, 
these alternatives only improve social welfare given the magnitude of the fine. 
Social welfare could be improved much more by simply increasing the fine.
Table 15.17 Overview of alternative enforcement methods
Table 15.17a Overview of damage and compliance costs
Level of compliance 0% (0) 100% (200) First-best (113)
Expected damage 663.300 105.000 119.400
Costs of compliance 0 137.300 57.500
Total 663.300 242.300 176.800
Table 15.17b Results under civil law enforcement (total social costs)
Current damagesa Full damages
Strict liability 191.600 177.300
Negligence rule ± 183.000 176.800 to 180.400
Table 15.17c Results under administrative enforcement (total social costs)
Annual inspection 331.500
Three inspections per year 278.900
Optimal per establishment 260.600 to 264.000
Table 15.17d Results under criminal law enforcement (total social costs)
Fine € 75 192.700 to 223.700
Fine € 250 183.700 to 193.400
Fine € 500 181.000 to 187.600
Fine € 4500 178.000 to 181.300
Infi nite high fi ne 176.800
a. results under hedonic damages are comparable.
15.5 Enforcement alternatives compared
In the previous sections I analyzed the consequences of different methods 
of enforcement. It turns out that in all three alternatives, a better result can 
be achieved than in the absence of enforcement, at least if an enforcement 
policy is properly implemented. Without enforcement, the total social costs 
are €663,300. Under the private law enforcement approach, the social costs 
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will vary from €176,800 to €191,600. With administrative enforcement, results 
of €260,000 to €331,500 can be achieved. Finally, criminal law enforcement 
involves social costs of €176,800 to €223,700. Therefore, in all three cases, sub-
stantially lower total social costs can be achieved than under a no enforce-
ment policy (see table 15.17). These results are obtained when, given the mag-
nitude of the sanctions, the efficient enforcement policy is carried out. If an 
inefficient policy is chosen, the total costs will of course be higher.
15.5.1 The optimal enforcement policy
Table 15.17 shows a preference for harm-based enforcement, as under liabil-
ity . Private enforcement is only effective if there are no barriers for victims 
to claim damages from the proprietor, if the proprietor is able to pay dam-
ages and if the proprietor has sufficient information about the possibilities 
for preventing damage. A harm-based criminal enforcement approach is the 
best alternative if the assets of the proprietor are insufficient and additional 
imprisonment is necessary.
If a harm-based enforcement policy is ineffective because a high sanction 
is not possible or one of the other problems is persistent, an act-based enforce-
ment policy must be chosen . Under act-based enforcement, a lower sanction 
will suffice to induce compliance. Moreover, detailed knowledge on the part 
of proprietors concerning the relationship between ex-ante precautions and 
ex-post sanctions is not required. A criminal law enforcement policy leads to 
an efficient result, provided that there is sufficient (political) willingness to 
make the sanction and the budget for inspections. Only if the willingness to 
immediately impose these sufficiently high sanctions is absent is an adminis-
trative enforcement policy a good alternative.
It is also possible to choose a combination of different enforcement meth-
ods. An obvious example is the joint use of private and criminal harm-based 
enforcement. Criminal enforcement may be used as a supplement to private 
enforcement if imprisonment is needed to create an adequate sanctioning 
risk, or if public investigation and prosecution is required to create an ade-
quate probability of sanctions. Criminal enforcement can also be used to pun-
ish more severely deliberate offences and/or gross negligence. Such a joint 
use of civil and criminal enforcement will induce proprietors to comply by at 
least one of the two methods. Once proprietors comply, the enforcement costs 
will be relatively low and so will the social cost. The only condition is that the 
proprietor has sufficient information ex-ante about ways of prevent (ex-post) 
damage.
The benefits of supplemental administrative enforcement are that a 
municipality is able to close an establishment if the proprietor perseveres in 
the violation. An injunction to use the establishment might also be imposed 
by a criminal (and even civil) court but this is likely to require much more 
time and effort. However, as demonstrated, if a criminal enforcement policy 
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is adequately carried out, proprietors will not choose non-compliance, at least 
not persistently, and such closure will never be necessary.
Let me discuss two additional reasons for administrative enforcement as 
a supplement to harm-based enforcement.
15.5.2 The problem of information and act-based enforcement as supplement 
 If a proprietor does not have sufficient information about ways of prevent-
ing damage, a harm-based approach (a combination of private and criminal 
enforcement) will probably lead to an inefficient level of compliance because 
the proprietor will be unable to properly balance the costs and benefits of 
compliance. It might then be optimal to choose for act-based enforcement. 
If administrative law enforcement is chosen, it will lead to relatively high 
enforcement costs because many inspections will be needed to reduce the 
social costs. Under administrative enforcement, proprietors can postpone 
compliance. This disadvantage can only be reduced by inspecting more often. 
It might therefore be optimal to choose a combination of private and admin-
istrative enforcement. Administrative enforcement can be used to provide 
proprietors with the relevant information, so that then private enforcement 
can be used (if necessary supplemented with criminal enforcement). Suppose 
that one annual inspection, for example before Christmas or during Carnival, 
suffices to inform the proprietor about the requirements and possible compen-
sation claims. These inspections might be announced and preceded by letters 
and brochures. This will induce proprietors to take the correct level of precau-
tions under liability. Under strict liability and current damages it would lead to 
social costs of €220,800, of which €171,300 of expected damage, €30,400 of costs 
of compliance, and €19,100 of enforcement costs (€18,100 of administrative 
inspections, table 15.11, and €1000 of private litigation, table 15.5). Similarly, 
under the negligence rule with efficient standards, the total costs are €201,000 
(table 15.18). This is a better result than under administrative enforcement 
alone: €260,000 at the best (table 15.12). Since the objective of enforcement is 
specifically to advise and inform, an administrative enforcement policy might 
be more appropriate than a criminal enforcement policy. Besides, in case of 
serious violations the municipality can close the establishment.
This is the usual defense of the use of administrative enforcement. How-
ever, the fact that a joint use of ex-ante administrative enforcement and ex-
post private enforcement can solve the problem of insufficient information is 
only valid under the following two conditions. First of all, it must be the case 
that information cannot be provided in any other way. As discussed in section 
12.4.1, it might very well be possible to provide the necessary information by 
means of general information campaigns. This is likely to be much cheaper 
than an annual inspection on site. Private organizations such as insurance 
companies, advice and certification firms, etc. can also do at least part of the 
work in this respect. Moreover, enforcement officials and municipalities often 
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stress that administrative enforcement is a leading factor of vital importance, 
rather than supplemental to private enforcement. Secondly, this result is only 
valid if there is no willingness to impose criminal act-based sanctions. Suffi-
ciently high criminal fines would achieve a higher level of social welfare.
Table 15.18 Joint private and administrative enforcement under information 
problems (current law)
Strict liability (SL)
Negligence, effi cient 
standards (NLES)
Expected damage 171.300 142.500
Costs of compliance 30.400 40.200
Subtotal 201.700 182.700
Private enforcement costs 990 230
Public costs of inspection 16.700 16.700
Public costs of conviction 1.400 1400
Enforcement costs 19.100 18.300
Total social costs 220.800 201.000
Level of compliance 60 78
15.5.3 The problem of wealth and act-based enforcement as supplement
 The joint use of private and administrative enforcement is also useful if, for 
some reason, a criminal enforcement policy fails and some but not all propri-
etors have insufficient assets to pay damages (section 10.2.2).280 Insufficient 
assets make private enforcement ineffective, but administrative enforce-
ment alone might be expensive. Administrative enforcement with one annu-
al inspection may force all proprietors to comply at least with the technical 
requirements which have to be restored once a year and for which an annual 
inspection suffices. Under administrative enforcement, proprietors with insuf-
ficient assets will take at least some precautions. Additional private enforce-
ment induces those proprietors that have sufficient assets to take higher pre-
cautions. They will – depending on the specific liability rule – comply with all 
technical requirements and possibly also with the number of visitors.
As demonstrated in section 15.2.3, the total social costs will be €380,600 
(level of compliance of 43) if there is private enforcement under a negligence 
rule with the technical requirements as the standard (NLT) and if all uneven 
types of proprietors have insufficient assets. Under administrative enforce-
ment (where asset problems are absent) the total costs are at least €264,000 
(level of compliance of 70) or €278,900 (level of compliance of 92). The joint 
use of an annual inspection under administrative enforcement and private 
280 Or, similarly, if not all victims always claim damages.
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enforcement under a negligence rule with the technical requirements (NLT) 
will lead to lower total costs. Under this approach, the level of compliance will 
be 86 with total social costs of €255,900. These consist of €187,500 of expected 
damage, €49,200 of compliance costs and €19,200 enforcement costs (€18,100 
for one annual public inspection and €1,100 for litigation costs against propri-
etors with limited assets who are sometimes found to be in non-compliance) 
(see table 15.19). This result can be further improved by varying the public 
inspections per establishment or by choosing different liability rules.
15.5.4 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the costs and benefits of several enforcement alterna-
tives based on a necessary abstraction from reality due to lack of more accu-
rate data. An important simplification is that the requirements and therefore 
the level of compliance, the use of sanctions, etc. are reduced to two groups. 
Furthermore, I simply assume that proprietors are rational, risk-neutral 
wealth maximizers. By using all available data sources, I have made as real-
istic an estimate as possible of the costs and benefits of enforcement. These 
provide relevant and actual understanding of the effects of enforcement.
The analysis shows that it is indeed worthwhile to invest in enforce-
ment. Harm-based enforcement, both private and criminal, should be used 
as much as possible. In general, a more strict enforcement policy of higher 
compensation awards or higher public sanctions will improve social wel-
fare. Currently, enforcement takes place primarily through administrative 
enforcement. Municipalities usually choose an annual inspection which is 
announced beforehand. This can be defended if administrative enforcement 
is especially a supplement to private enforcement. However, it is not clear 
why private enforcement fails. Information problems do not seem sufficient-
ly severe to justify the intensive use of administrative enforcement. Potential 
wealth problems are more easily solved by criminal enforcement. Moreover, 
the supplemental function of administrative enforcement is not disseminated 
by the government. The role of the government (municipalities) is stressed. 
It grants licenses and bears responsibility for fire safety. The efforts follow-
ing the ‘Volendam’ disaster also create the impression and expectation that 
the government takes responsibility for the enforcement of fire safety, while 
according to the analysis here, the role of public enforcement is primarily 
informative and supplemental. The analysis shows that social welfare will 
be higher if harm-based enforcement is more important and if a more strict 
enforcement policy with higher compensation or fines is used.
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Table 15.19 Joint private and administrative enforcement under limited wealth 
(current law)
Type Number
Limited 
assets?
Choice under 
NLTa
Choice under 
optimal admin. 
aloneb
Choice under 
joint usec
1 10 Yes Sn Sn St (0,75)
2 8 No St St (0,92) St (1,00)
3 8 Yes Sn St (0,94) St (0,75)
4 4 No St St (0,92) St (1,00)
5 8 Yes Sn St (0,94) St (0,75)
6 10 No St St (0,94) St (1,00)
7 10 Yes Sn St (0,88) St (0,75)
8 8 No St St (0,88) St (1,00)
9 2 Yes Sn Sn St (0,75)
10 5 No Sn Sn St (1,00)
11 5 Yes Sn St (0,75) St (0,75)
12 8 No St St (0,92) St (1,00)
13 4 Yes Sn St (0,88) St (0,75)
14 5 No St St (0,94) St (1,00)
15 5 Yes Sn Sn St (0,75)
Level of compliance 43 70 86
Expected damage 356.400 181.700 187.500
Compliance costs 22.000 40.200 49.200
Subtotal 378.400 221.900 236.700
Enforcement costsd 2.200 42.100 19.200
Total 380.600 264.000 255.900
a. Liability under the negligence rule with the technical requirements as the standard, with 
damages as under current law. See table 15.9.
b. Administrative enforcement with the optimal number of inspections on technical requi-
rements (table 15.12, second column). This is the best result under administrative enfor-
cement. If this outcome is worse than a joint use, this will be true for all results under 
administrative enforcement. To compare, under enforcing St for each proprietor, total 
social costs are €331.489 for one inspection per year (St, 0,75 for each proprietor) and 
€278.942 for three inspections per year (St, 0,88 for each proprietor) (table 15.11).
Here choosing St means that they choose St but only in as far as they do not postpone 
compliance until they are inspected. In parentheses the specifi c level of compliance.
c. A combination of administrative enforcement with inspection once per year and negli-
gence liability with technical requirements as the standard (under current law). If the 
wealth of a proprietor is larger than his technical compliance costs, he can be forced to 
choose a level of compliance of 0,75 (table 15.11). Proprietors who have suffi cient assets 
anyway will choose the same as under NLT, i.e. St completely (compliance level 1,00).
d. It is assumed that litigation costs are realised if a proprietor non-complies even if he had 
insuffi cient assets.
16 Conclusion
On 1 January 2001, a fire broke out in café “’t Hemeltje”, in the municipality 
Volendam, killing 14 and wounding approximately 300 youngsters. This acci-
dent drew widespread attention to the Dutch municipal enforcement policies 
in general, and to fire safety regulation in particular. This thesis attempts to 
assess the effects of the resulting increase in enforcement actions. The cen-
tral question is: What is an effective and efficient enforcement policy for fire 
safety regulation in the catering industry, i.e. in horeca establishments, in the 
Netherlands?
The typical situation to which this question applies is one in which the 
proprietor of a bar, restaurant, discotheque or similar establishment is both the 
establishment’s manager and its owner. At any one time, there may be from 50 
to 250 people present in the establishment, but the number of visitors varies. On 
several days of the year, the number of people whishing to visit the establish-
ment might be higher than allowed. The proprietor is expected to comply with 
the use requirements concerning fire safety, including the following: (1) escape-
routes and emergency exits must be kept free at all times; (2) furnishings and 
decorations must be correctly hung and impregnated; (3) escape-route signs 
must be clearly visible and burning; (4) fire extinguishers must be clearly indi-
cated, ready to hand and annually certified; (5) candle lights, trash, ash-trays, 
etc. must be used safely; (6) the maximum number of persons allowed may not 
be exceeded; (7) the remaining use requirements, for example those concerning 
technical devices or evacuation plans, must be adhered to.
The optimal enforcement policy for fire safety regulation in horeca estab-
lishments is analyzed in two parts. In part I, this policy is described by analyz-
ing the economic literature on the enforcement of safety standards at firms. In 
part II, I collect and analyze the data concerning the actual enforcement poli-
cies. I summarize the conclusions of part I and part II in, respectively, sections 
16.1 and 16.2. I conclude the analysis by describing the efficient enforcement 
policy in section 16.3. Finally, in section 16.4, I reflect on the description of 
the efficient enforcement policy in section 16.3 by considering the questions 
requiring further answers.
16.1 Summary part I: theory
The enforcement of fire safety regulation can basically be organized in three 
ways. Under private enforcement, enforcement is left to the victims of the 
harm. Liability rules enable visitors to require compensation for their dam-
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age. Under administrative enforcement, regulation is enforced by munici-
palities through a system of licenses, inspections, administrative sanctions , 
etc. Such administrative sanctions are based on the expected harm. Finally, 
public prosecutors can prosecute an offense, so that a criminal law sanction 
can be imposed on a proprietor failing to meet the use requirements. In part I, 
I analyze, on the basis of the economic literature, the conditions under which 
the different enforcement methods are effective in inducing compliance and 
are efficient in reducing the total social costs of compliance and enforcement.
More specifically, I extend the overview of the economic literature on 
administrative enforcement and/or the use of informal enforcement actions 
in general. The standard economic model stresses the importance of pun-
ishing firms in order to deter them from committing a violation. In practice, 
however, many enforcement authorities, especially when operating under 
administrative enforcement, seem to apply more cooperative, informal, 
advisory enforcement policies, the so-called compliance strategies , to be distin-
guished from deterrence strategies . In part I, I analyze the economic literature 
with a focus on the need for and the effects of policies of advice, persuasion 
and warnings. Under what conditions is a compliance strategy more effective 
than a deterrence strategy? This analysis is valuable because an economic 
(literature) review of these policies has not, so far, been available. It is impor-
tant to confront economic models with the actual enforcement policies. More-
over, other disciplines do extensively debate optimal enforcement strategies. 
Adding the economic perspective to this discussion is valuable for several 
reasons. The economic perspective more explicitly focuses on the interactions 
between the characteristics of offenders and the enforcement actions. Econo-
mists are good at calling attention to the general effects of enforcement, the 
conditions for effective enforcement and the constant balancing of the ben-
efits and costs of enforcement.
16.1.1 The need for public enforcement
Chapter 2 describes the enforcement problem. There are two relevant prob-
lems for the enforcement of fire safety regulation in horeca establishments. 
First, are visitors and proprietors provided with the optimal level of com-
pensation for losses (risk-spreading)? If they are risk-averse, they will have 
a preference for certainty concerning their level of wealth or income, thus 
requiring compensation for monetary losses. However, since wealth is more 
valuable when someone is in good health, the optimal level of compensation 
is lower than the monetary losses. Secondly, do proprietors take the socially 
optimal level of precautions to prevent fire damage? The socially optimal level 
of precautions balances the (marginal) costs of taking precautions and the 
(marginal) benefits of a reduction in expected harm.
Since generally individuals are able to obtain compensation by insuring 
themselves, the analysis focuses on the incentive to take precautions. Propri-
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etors might choose some precautions voluntarily, but for a number of rea-
sons, they are unlikely to take sufficient precautions . First of all, visitors are 
not informed about the expected damage and therefore unable to force the 
proprietors to take precautions. Secondly, there are hardly any other effects of 
(non-)compliance for the proprietor’s reputation. Moreover, in general, such 
effects would only appear if there is a public detection of non-compliance. 
Thirdly, the intrinsic motivation to comply with the rules and to prevent dam-
age is not likely to survive if there is no enforcement of the rules. A lack of 
enforcement stimulates a culture in which compliance is seen as unimport-
ant. Fourthly, insurance companies are helpful in stimulating compliance 
with the requirements concerning technical devices, but they are unable to 
control the daily behavior of proprietors, including issues such as keeping 
emergency exits free, being attentive, etc. Moreover, they will only try to pre-
vent the losses to the proprietor that do generally not include the losses to 
visitors. Finally, proprietors have difficulty estimating expected harm from 
fire because this information is rather complex and technical in nature, and/
or because they are cognitively constrained and therefore insufficiently aware 
of the importance of fire safety regulation and of compliance with the regula-
tion. They are therefore likely to underestimate the probability of fire.
Due to all of these reasons, the level of precautions is very low if there 
is no enforcement of the regulations. Given the magnitude of the damage, 
it is therefore worthwhile to consider making enforcement costs in order to 
increase compliance. The enforcement costs of obtaining a higher level of 
precautions should be weighed against the balance of compliance costs and 
expected damage.
16.1.2 Private enforcement by liability rules
 Victims are able to claim compensation for their damages from the proprietor 
based on the liability rules of the Civil Code. Section 3 of chapter 2 discusses 
the fact that private enforcement by victims is only effective if injurers are 
really forced to internalize all the harm they inflict. Therefore private enforce-
ment by visitors is only effective under the following conditions:
1. Most of the harm done must consist of monetary damages , or, if there 
are non-monetary damages, courts must be able and willing to award 
adequate compensation for these damages . A complication lies in the fact 
that awarding non-monetary damages provides the victim with ineffi -
cient compensation. Buying ‘negative insurance’ is generally not pos-
sible.
2. The injurer must have suffi cient wealth to pay for the damages or should 
be fully insured for liability. Higher damages than the available assets do 
not further stimulate precautions . If the injurer is insured, insurance com-
panies should be able to easily monitor and enforce precautions. Other-
wise, the outcome will be ‘reasonable’, but not fi rst-best. Monitoring costs 
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directly decrease social welfare. Indirectly, the injurer will choose partial 
insurance and less than fi rst-best precautions.
3. Courts and injurers must have suffi cient information about possible ac-
cidents so that courts are able to enforce socially optimal levels of pre-
cautions and injurers are able to anticipate on the courts’ decisions. This 
might be problematic especially when courts deviate from the regulatory 
standards in determining negligence. Uncertainty about the law, or about 
the facts, has two opposing effects. The injurer increases the level of pre-
cautions in order to reduce the probability that he will be found negligent, 
but decreases it because the benefi ts of precautions are lower. Hence, such 
uncertainty might create both under- and overdeterrence.
 Being held liable gives the injurer an optimal incentive to acquire infor-
mation about taking precautions. However, problems might arise if the 
acquisition of information has the characteristics of a public good because 
it concerns technically complicated issues.
4. Victims must have suffi cient access to the legal system, so that the prob-
ability of sanctions is suffi ciently high. Therefore, victims must be able to 
identify the injurer and the costs of claiming damages must be suffi ciently 
low to fi nd it worthwhile to fi le a claim . Otherwise, the injurer will not be 
inclined to take precautions. 
 If these conditions are not satisfied, the injurer will choose less than effi-
cient precautions. Under the negligence rule, some of the conditions dis-
cussed are less severe, especially when it functions perfectly. If the injurer 
chooses to be non-negligent, he will not have to pay damages.
16.1.3 Public law enforcement
In chapters 3 to 9, I examine public law enforcement policies. Building on 
Becker (1968), an economic analysis of law enforcement leads to the follow-
ing results: (1) a higher expected sanction decreases the level of non-compli-
ance, (2) costly non-monetary sanctions should only be used when costless 
monetary sanctions are used to the maximum, (3) decreasing the probability 
of detection and increasing the magnitude of the sanction might keep deter-
rence constant but save on enforcement costs, hence it is socially desirable.
The empirical challenge is that these results are not commonly observed 
in practice, especially not for regulatory crime. This is referred to as the ‘Har-
rington Paradox ’: (for environmental regulation) (1) the frequency of inspec-
tion is low; (2) even if a violation is detected, penalties are hardly ever imposed 
and are rather low (sometimes even lower than the costs of compliance); yet 
(3) the level of compliance seems to be pretty high. The review of public law 
enforcement analyzes the reasons the economic literature provides for the 
absence of sanctions, at least immediate sanctions. These reasons can be used 
to defend compliance strategies.
In chapter 3, I analyze the conventional economic literature which focus-
323Conclusion
es on the costs of enforcement, the detection technology and on the available 
information. If prosecution and punishment are costly, extreme sanctions are 
inefficient if the marginal social costs of sanctions increase or the marginal 
private costs of sanctions decrease. If full information is available concerning 
all relevant benefits and costs, it is possible to sanction only inefficient non-
compliance. Otherwise, a sanction must be made dependent on the available 
information, for example on the level of harm. An expected sanction that is 
equal to the harm caused results in the first-best level of precautions.
Sometimes, the enforcement authority can observe who caused the dam-
age without any (additional) effort, for example in the case of a fire accident. 
In other cases, investments in detection are required. Because of the costs of 
detection, some underdeterrence is desirable. If enforcement is carried out 
by means of specific enforcement (investigation), the enforcement authority 
will be able to observe a violation and its harm, but it will have to invest in 
detecting the injurer. By lowering the probability of investigation and increas-
ing the sanction, enforcement costs can be saved and deterrence can be held 
constant (as long as the sanction does not exceed wealth or other constraints). 
On the other hand, if enforcement is carried out  by means of general enforce-
ment (monitoring), detection of non-compliance will only occur once a firm 
is inspected. Under monitoring, it is not optimal to impose maximum sanc-
tions because the expected sanctions should increase with harm (marginal 
deterrence). If the maximum (monetary) sanction is not known to the enforce-
ment authorities (before detection), the probability of detection must be high 
enough to deter firms with low wealth. Therefore, the sanction on firms with 
higher wealth should not be maximal.
In chapter 4, I focus on offenses that can be repeated or can last over sev-
eral periods of time. If the penalty is optimal for the first offense, there is no 
reason to increase the sanction in the case of a second (identical) offense. Only 
if there is underdeterrence might it be optimal to impose lower sanctions for 
first offenses in later periods. This might be done for example by being tough 
on young companies that have just been established as well as on firms that 
have a record of violation, while punishing existing companies that have 
good compliance records only moderately. Another reason for increasing 
sanctions is that an offense reveals valuable information to the enforcement 
authority about the firm’s willingness or ability to comply.
In many situations, especially with respect to offenses by firms, (non-)
compliance is not a discrete event, but rather a continuing state of affairs (Vel-
janovski, 1984) lasting for several periods of time until it is ended deliberately 
or naturally. If the enforcement authority detects a violation, it can take action 
to restore compliance by imposing so called ‘repair sanctions’ such as a duty 
by penal sum or administrative coercion. 
Chapter 5 extends the analysis by considering whether it is optimal to 
increase detection for repeated offenses . Immediate and equal punishment 
of all offenses is not a good idea if the level of enforcement resources and 
the magnitude of the sanction are sufficiently restricted and therefore fail to 
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implement optimal deterrence. If the expected sanction is too low, it is opti-
mal to target enforcement resources. The optimal targeting strategy is one in 
which enforcement depends on past compliance (state-dependent enforce-
ment policies; Harrington, 1988), for example in the form of issuing warn-
ings . By tolerating a given level of non-compliance, or by sometimes tolerat-
ing non-compliance, the enforcement authority ‘buys’ or ‘negotiates’ at least 
partial compliance . 
Chapter 6 considers the uncertainty concerning standards and expected 
harm. If the law is complete and perfectly predictable, a strict enforcement 
policy will be efficient – provided that the expected sanction is large enough 
(Xu and Pistor, 2002) . If, however, standards are uncertain, more flexible 
enforcement might be required. Public inspections might be needed to inform 
firms about the standards and the optimal compliance techniques, so that 
enforcement is aimed at advice, in addition to or instead of deterrence. Coop-
erat ion might be needed to buy or negotiate precautions not included in the 
regulation in exchange for tolerating violations of other standards. Moreover, 
enforcement is hampered by the incentive of firms to try to escape sanctions. 
Informal enforcement might on balance achieve higher levels of compliance 
than the strict punishment of every offense, especially when legal procedures 
are costly for enforcement authorities.
Chapter 7 analyzes the effects of informal sanctions and intrinsic motiva-
tion to comply on the optimal enforcement policy. Informal sanctions and 
intrinsic motivation make compliance more attractive. However, they also 
impose limits on the deterrent effect of (formal) enforcement. First, infor-
mal control may only work if there is some public enforcement, limiting the 
possibilities of reducing detection. Secondly, informal control strengthens 
the effectiveness of public enforcement, when informal control depends on 
the proportion of firms complying. Therefore, public enforcement must be 
strong and strict enough to sustain a compliance culture. Thirdly, informal 
control weakens the effectiveness of public enforcement, while formal control 
diminishes the intrinsic motivation to comply. Especially for low sanctions, 
an increase in formal control might therefore decrease compliance. If informal 
sanctions and intrinsic motivation depend on the compliance rate, the dete-
rioration and recovery of compliant behavior are not asymmetric processes.
Chapter 8 summarizes the literature so far by discussing the use of com-
pliance strategies. A compliance strategy can be beneficial when regulation is 
incomplete or when sanctioning is costly. If regulation is incomplete , coop-
eration and advice may be more effective than strict, legalistic enforcement. 
If the enforcement authority does not have sufficient powers to enforce full 
compliance, imposing sanctions on every violation may be an expensive pro-
cess. Under such circumstances informal standards, warnings , self-reporting , 
advice and negotiation might be helpful.
The benefits of alternative enforcement actions also depend on the incen-
tives for enforcement officials . Chapter 9 considers the role of the enforcement 
authority as a strategic player with its own objectives and incentives. Since 
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law-enforcers are human beings, they are not necessarily seeking efficient 
enforcement, but may have different, even counterproductive, objectives. Of 
course, this may harm social welfare. However, the one-sided objectives of 
law-enforcers – including a strict enforcement of all violations – may be bene-
ficial for several reasons. First, a social welfare-maximizing law-enforcer may 
be unable to commit itself to an efficient enforcement policy. Social welfare 
may be improved if law enforcers are instructed to enforce violations regard-
less of the individual circumstances. Secondly, social welfare may be better 
served by a biased, political regulator than an independent judge, because 
the first is more inclined to investigate and acquire the necessary informa-
tion of a case. Furthermore, if the enforcement resources are insufficient to 
ensure optimal deterrence, the enforcement officials can confine their efforts 
to maximizing compliance or minimizing expected harm. The optimal level 
of discretion that is granted to the enforcement authority balances the prob-
lem of commitment and of private interests with the flexibility required to 
evaluate the desirability of enforcement (due to incomplete law and insuf-
ficient resources).
Chapter 10 concludes part I. It concludes on several distinctions that can 
be made between the different enforcement methods, such as the stage of 
intervention (harm-based, i.e. ex-post , or act-based, i.e. ex-ante ), the type 
of sanction (administrative or criminal ) and the initiating party (private or 
public). Moreover, it argues why there should be a joint use of enforcement 
methods. Criminal law enforcement might be needed as an ultimum reme-
dium. Regulation and liability might be combined to reduce uncertainty or 
wealth problems. Chapter 10 also concludes by providing a scheme for decid-
ing whether a deterrence or a compliance strategy should be used. However, 
without filling in the analysis with actual data on fire safety in horeca estab-
lishments, the optimal enforcement policy can not be described. 
16.1.4 A compliance or deterrence strategy
 It is important to limit the distinction between deterrence and compliance 
strategies to a distinction between the enforcement styles. The style describes 
what an enforcement authority will do when it detects a violation. A deter-
rence style is a style in which every violation is immediately punished and 
the enforcement authority bases its decisions solely on its own information. 
A compliance style is a style in which the enforcement authority might forego 
some violations (for some time) when this induces the firm to reveal impor-
tant information necessary for enforcement.
Whether a deterrence or a compliance style is optimal, does not (directly) 
follow from the rationality of firms or individuals, the voluntary willingness to 
comply or the level of ignorance about the regulations. Moreover, the enforce-
ment style should not be confused with what might be called the objective 
of enforcement. In regulatory enforcement of firms maximizing social wel-
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fare may include several intermediate (not mutually exclusive) enforcement 
objectives: deterrence (signal that non-compliance does not pay), remediation 
(restore compliance), advice (inform about compliance), education (create 
voluntary compliance), and completion (supplement private enforcement). 
A different question is which enforcement style does achieve an objective the 
best. My assertion is that there is no relationship whatsoever between objec-
tives and strategies. There is no necessary relationship between the objec-
tive of deterrence and a deterrence style, or between other objectives and a 
compliance style. Each of the objectives can be served by both a deterrence 
and a compliance style. It is important to start with identifying the objective 
of enforcement and to subsequently examine which enforcement style can 
best achieve this objective. Which style is optimal, is not related to the objec-
tive, depends on the specific conditions and can not be stated in general. The 
current literature does not sufficiently acknowledge the difference between 
firms’ characteristics, enforcement objectives and enforcement styles.
Deterrence
Under deterrence (the focus of most economic literature) the objective is to 
induce compliance by making non-compliance unattractive. The deterrent 
effect of enforcement relies critically on the expectation by potential offenders 
that a detected offense will consistently be prosecuted (Fenn and Veljanovski, 
1988). Under a compliance style, the firm is able to delay compliance or to 
negotiate a lower level of compliance.
 However, a deterrence style assumes that enforcement authorities are 
granted sufficient resources to enforce compliance. In practice, they are usu-
ally not, so that there is serious underdeterrence and the maximum achiev-
able compliance rate is a partial compliance rate. It might then not be optimal 
to directly impose severe sanctions because such sanctions might – on bal-
ance – increase underdeterrence . In such cases, it is optimal to target enforce-
ment on some subgroup of the population. The best targeting scheme is one 
that depends on past compliance, for example by issuing warnings . Another 
possibility is to adjust the standard downwards and to enforce some informal 
standard.
Because law is incomplete , a deterrence style that legalistically enforces 
the legal standard to the letter will not induce the first-best level of precau-
tions if the enforcement authority is imperfectly informed and/or is granted 
insufficient discretionary powers. If there is uncertainty about the standards 
and the compliance methods, a cooperative, flexible enforcement style can be 
efficient. The firm will be required to reduce the most important safety prob-
lems in exchange for reduced sanctions for minor violations.
A final reason why a deterrence style may fail is that enforcement officials 
are insufficiently interested in pursuing deterrence and in consistently sanc-
tioning every violation.
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Remediation
Remediation implies that enforcement is aimed at restoring compliance. For 
example, repairing a technical device that causes non-compliance or clean-
ing-up the environmental harm resulting from some emission. If offenses are 
purely accidental and if it is impossible to make enforcement dependent on 
the level of remediation, a strategy of warnings is efficient . If, however, it is 
possible to sanction insufficient remediation and/or insufficient prior pre-
vention of failures, a deterrence style that imposes sanctions dependent on 
the level of remediation or prevention is efficient. It is hard to think of any 
example in which offences are truly accidental and in which sanctions cannot 
be made dependent on the level of remediation. 
Advice
Advice implies that the objective of enforcement is to ensure that the firm is 
sufficiently informed about all the benefits and costs of (non)compliance, the 
standards that apply and the least costly method to create compliance. If the 
firm is able to acquire the relevant information at a reasonable effort, sanc-
tions for non-compliance provide the incentive to inform oneself. Especially 
under technically complicated regulation, the costs might be unreasonably 
high. If all firms lack the same kind of information, general information cam-
paigns will be sufficient to inform them. If the law is (very) incomplete , so 
that an individual firm cannot learn from others, it might be efficient for pub-
lic inspection to have advice as its objective, characterized by speech, expla-
nation and cooperation.
Education
 Enforcement may also have as objective the stimulation of norms and val-
ues that enhance compliance. Public inspection may be needed to main-
tain, strengthen or even create norms and to realize the costs and benefits of 
norms.
Public inspection might be necessary to detect offences and to realize the 
costs of norm-violation (especially for informal social sanctions ). If the costs 
of norm-violation depend on the level of compliance in the relevant popula-
tion, public enforcement through sufficient deterrence is needed to prevent 
a breakdown in compliance and norm-subscription. Norm formation can 
occur by observing that non-compliance is punished, or by observing that 
compliance is valued positively. Imposing sanctions can crowd out the intrin-
sic motivation to comply.
Completion
 Another objective of public enforcement is to supplement private enforce-
ment. First, public enforcement might be needed as advice to reduce the 
uncertainty concerning the levels of due care or to prevent cognitive failures . 
Public enforcement might also be needed when private enforcement fails to 
deter efficiently because of wealth constraints or litigation barriers. In gener-
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al, a strict enforcement policy is needed to induce the privately underdeterred 
firms to take precautions.
16.2 Summary part II: empirical analysis
In part II, I conclude on the enforcement of fire safety regulation in horeca 
establishments by collecting and analyzing the data concerning actual 
enforcement policies. Let me summarize the main results.
16.2.1 Empirical analysis: data and methods
Ultimately, balancing the costs and benefits of enforcement is an empirical 
matter. Therefore, in part II, I focus on analyzing the enforcement policy for 
fire safety regulation in horeca establishments making use of actual data. 
The problem with analyzing actual enforcement policies is finding or collect-
ing the right data on compliance and the benefits of compliance. I try to do 
so in a number of ways. First, and quite uncommonly for an economist, I 
have conducted interviews to acquire insight into actual enforcement poli-
cies. A disadvantage of such qualitative research is that it is more difficult to 
verify the results. Conclusions concerning the effects of enforcement do not 
directly follow from a statistical analysis but follow from the verbal interpre-
tation of the researcher. Another problem with such interviews is that they 
are time-consuming. However, given the lack of other tangible data, inter-
views with enforcement officials are necessary to collect data on enforcement 
policies, their effects and the interaction between enforcement officials and 
proprietors. Unfortunately, these data could not be complemented with the 
impressions and opinions of proprietors. In chapter 12, I use these interviews, 
together with the available reports and other written material, to determine 
whether the municipal enforcement policies in the years following the Volen-
dam disaster are effective in inducing compliance. In particular I investigate 
whether the observed use of a compliance strategy is justified given the argu-
ments identified in part I. 
Secondly, I combine bits and pieces of available evidence into a cost-ben-
efit analysis of the increase in enforcement efforts following the Volendam 
disaster. A cost-benefit analysis attempts to list all the effects of a policy inter-
vention. Monetizing these effects allows them to be compared and to evaluate 
whether the intervention leads to a positive or negative contribution to social 
welfare. Due to lack of more reliable data, the analysis does not lead to a clear 
figure of thé balance of costs and benefits (and its alternatives), but only to a 
more general rule on the required effectiveness of enforcement.
Thirdly, in order to gain insight into the settlement of claims for compen-
sation, I carry out a case-study of the settlement of the Volendam disaster. The 
problem here is that there are simply not enough compensation claims and 
329Conclusion
not enough knowledge concerning these claims to carry out a more general 
analysis. We must of course be careful in extending any conclusion from a 
single case-study to the more general problem. However, this case-study is of 
particular interest since it received relatively much attention and is therefore 
likely to have a relatively large influence on proprietors’ (and victims’) future 
expectations. Sources of information are newspapers, parliamentary docu-
ments, (committee) reports, websites, etc.
Finally, I construct a representative, hypothetical municipality based on 
all available data. Assuming that the proprietor of a horeca establishment is a 
risk-neutral wealth-maximizer, I analyze the effects of different enforcement 
policies. Of course, the disadvantage of such an analysis is that it abstracts 
from reality. However, without such an abstraction, it becomes impossible to 
further analyze the effects of enforcement on compliance. The simulation of 
enforcement policies provides insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of 
possible enforcement policies.
Such analyses do not answer all questions. Further research is required to 
provide unambiguous answers to the question of which level of compliance, 
and hence which level of enforcement resources, is desirable. However, I am 
convinced that it is more worthwhile to invest in (improving) these analyses 
than in extending our theoretical models. These are essential steps in further 
analyzing enforcement policies.
16.2.2 Public enforcement between 2001 and 2007
In chapters 11 to 13, I analyze the public enforcement policy of the period 
2001-2007. This period begins with the Volendam disaster and ends with the 
introduction of the national Use Decree and the abolishment of the use licens-
es mid 2008.
Enforcement deficits and action programs
During the 1990s and early 2000s, large ‘enforcement deficits’ were detected 
in many fields of administrative enforcement, thanks to academic pressure, 
government policy reports and several important disasters. From the nation-
al level municipalities were stimulated to professionalize their enforcement 
policies by adopting ‘programmed enforcement ’. This was to guarantee that 
enforcement would proceed according to plan and not to incidents. Different 
committees (for example the Alders Committee that investigated the Volen-
dam disaster) formulated major action plans to improve enforcement policies 
and regulations. These initiatives also affected the enforcement of fire safety 
regulation by municipalities (chapter 11).
The municipal enforcement policy for fire safety regulation
In 2001, there was a backlog in granting use licenses for more than 70% of the 
buildings. This backlog was accompanied by a personnel shortage for the 
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granting as well as inspection of licenses. In almost no municipality was there 
a systematic and adequate inspection of the licenses. In most municipalities, 
a good foundation of the enforcement policy was lacking. After 2001, there 
was a major increase in municipal fire safety enforcement effort, especially 
with respect to horeca establishments. Municipalities started to eliminate the 
backlogs in use-licenses and to regularly inspect the licensed buildings.
Once a license is granted, there are three different types of inspections: 
periodical inspections, special actions (during events like Carnival), or inspec-
tions following a complaint or report. The sanctions that a municipality can 
impose are a penal sum, administrative coercion or a (partial or temporary) 
closing of the establishment. As described in chapter 12, bars and restaurants 
are generally inspected once a year (barring re-inspections). Bars and some 
restaurants in the centre of the city often face an additional inspection during 
special events or feast periods. Municipalities usually begin with informal 
notifications and re-inspections. Formal sanctions are hardly ever imposed.
A Harrington Paradox?
These observations do not lead to a Harrington Paradox . The level of compli-
ance is not unexpectedly high relative to the expected sanction. Enforcement 
officials do find many minor violations during first inspections. Inspections 
in which the report contains no failures at all make up less than 10% of all 
cases. In more than 50% of the cases, the enforcement officials announce re-
inspection. This is a logical consequence of the fact that proprietors are not 
punished, but only warned that sanctions might follow in the future. The 
enforcement policy is in line with the state-dependent targeting scheme (Har-
rington, 1988). In the first instance, violators are not punished, but moved to a 
target group in which they are more closely monitored by means of re-inspec-
tions until they comply. In response, proprietors choose to delay compliance 
until they are inspected. In the end, the municipality manages to induce com-
pliance. The only important point for proprietors is that they should not will-
ingly and deliberately create a fire-hazardous situation. For such behavior, 
there is a credible threat of sufficiently high sanctions so that proprietors are 
deterred from these major violations. As a consequence, the actual imposition 
of sanctions is hardly observed.
A compliance strategy?
 Most scholars would argue that the field of fire safety in horeca establish-
ments is a classic example of a field in which enforcement authorities should 
primarily apply a compliance strategy and not a deterrence strategy. More-
over, the enforcement officials themselves argue that they do use and should 
use a policy of advice, persuasion and warnings. They claim (1) that inspec-
tion is needed to explain to the proprietor his failures and the danger of non-
compliance (as a result of ignorance); (2) that inspection is needed to restore 
compliance and fire safety (rather than punishing violations); (3) that inspec-
tion is needed to persuade the proprietor that compliance is socially and 
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morally desirable (because most proprietors are willing to comply); (4) that 
explanation and cooperation are more effective than sanctions (because of the 
severe legal requirements); (5) that they choose to be cooperative as long as 
the proprietor is seen to be cooperative too; and (6) that inspection is only a 
random indication while fire safety is the personal responsibility of the pro-
prietor.
Upon further examination (chapter 12), these different claims have been 
found to be usually unfounded. On the contrary, most arguments imply that 
in the current situation, the balance should be shifted towards a more deter-
rent strategy . The arguments do not sufficiently distinguish between the 
‘objective’ of enforcement and the ‘enforcement style’. For example, the fact 
that proprietors are willing to comply or that they fail to comply because of 
mistake or misinformation does in itself not provide a sufficient argument in 
favor of a compliance strategy.
The use of a compliance strategy is so widespread because it is difficult to 
realize a more deterrent strategy for two reasons. First, the fire safety depart-
ment is not allowed to impose direct fines on non-compliance. A compliance 
strategy is applied because capacity constraints and the necessity to reserve 
enforcement resources for the most severe offenses do not allow for higher 
enforcement budgets and more severe sanctions. The point here, however, 
is that within the legal framework, the fire safety department is able to be 
stricter by sooner imposing sanctions than in the current situation. The num-
ber of re-inspections can be reduced. The fire safety department can save time 
by reducing advice, explanation and persuasion during a (re)inspection. Sec-
ondly, a compliance strategy is used when enforcement officials are not nec-
essarily interested in higher deterrence, but might derive more pleasure from 
advising and persuading non-compliant proprietors. This could be mitigated 
by limiting their discretion but that is hardly an option in enforcing fire safety 
regulation.
A cost-benefit analysis
 In chapter 13, I analyze the (overall) benefits and costs of intensified enforce-
ment policies of fire safety regulation for horeca establishments following the 
Volendam disaster. The annual costs of the additional enforcement actions 
and additional compliance are estimated at €13.0 to €23.7 million. The poten-
tial savings are a total damage of €30.4 million per year. Hence, the required 
reduction in expected fire damage for a positive balance of benefits and costs 
is at least 43%. This figure of 43% is a lower bound that applies if the costs of 
compliance and enforcement are limited to the lower estimates. If the real 
costs are higher, the minimum required effectiveness increases correspond-
ingly, up to 78% under the highest estimates. It is unlikely that the expected 
fire damage has decreased with more than 40%. This leads to the conclusion 
that the enforcement policies for fire safety in horeca establishments follow-
ing the Volendam disaster have been and/or are inefficient.
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Conclusion on the action programs
The analysis of the municipal enforcement policies shows that there is no 
adequate foundation for the current policy. There is an endless elaboration on 
tasks, organization, coordination and the required number of personnel , but 
it remains unclear what is the precise objective and the desired result. There is 
not even the beginning of a balance of benefits and costs (see also Nether-
lands Court of Audit, 2005*, and Leeuw and Willemsen, 2006*). Despite the 
wide use of programmed enforcement , the fire safety policies seem primarily 
based on the Volendam disaster. For example, the introduction of the national 
Use Decree without use licenses immediately after the Volendam disaster 
would have saved over €10 million for horeca establishments alone, and over 
€100 million for all buildings. Now, use licenses have been abolished just after 
we have exerted a major effort to grant one to most buildings. It is striking 
that specifically the action program of the Alders Committee leads to many 
policy documents that are produced behind the desk. Attention for actual 
enforcement actions is drawn away to policy development, municipal
(re)organization, and granting licenses. Compliance is induced not by desk-
work, but by actual enforcement actions.
16.2.3 Evaluating the settlement of the Volendam disaster
In chapter 14, I examine the outcome of the damage claims of the victims 
of the Volendam disaster. It was estimated that victims received financial 
support for a total of approximately €60 million, largely paid by the national 
government. The proprietor Veerman paid €3.15 million at most. The total 
damage to the victims, including non-monetary damage , was estimated at 
almost €120 million. There is no valid explanation for why the victims did not 
try to obtain higher damages from the proprietor. The only explanation that 
cannot be refuted is that victims no longer expected higher damages because 
the government had already provided these, stimulated by the pressure from 
the community to close the case. As a consequence, the signal to horeca pro-
prietors is that they do not have to care much about paying damages for fire 
accidents in their establishments. The financial bill of the Volendam disaster 
was largely paid by the tax payer. Moreover, since the non-monetary losses 
remain largely uncompensated, neither the proprietors nor the government 
have any incentive to prevent these damages.
16.2.4 Enforcement in a representative municipality
The analysis of the actual enforcement actions shows that important short-
comings exist. The question then is whether alternative policies will be more 
effective and efficient. In chapter 15, I combine and develop the available data 
to examine the annual costs of enforcement in a representative municipality. 
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According to the set-up, all proprietors choose to non-comply if there is no 
enforcement, in which case, there are no costs of enforcement or compliance, 
but the expected damage is rather large: €663,300. In the absence of enforce-
ment costs, the best result would be a level of compliance of 113 (on a scale 
of 0 to 200) with total costs of €176,800 (costs of compliance of €57,500 and an 
expected damage of €119,400). It turns out that all three possible enforcement 
alternatives can lead to a better result than refraining from enforcement, if, 
that is, it is properly executed.
The analysis of liability claims by victims shows that a reasonable level 
of social welfare is obtained (total costs varying from €176,800 to €191,600). 
The level of enforcement costs is low because enforcement is only carried out 
once a fire has taken place. Victims have sufficient access to the legal system. 
Whether private enforcement really leads to an efficient result depends on 
(1) an adequate compensation award which reflects full losses, (2) sufficient 
assets available on the side of the proprietor, (3) efficient standard-setting by 
courts.
It is also possible to reduce the expected damage by means of adminis-
trative law enforcement. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that 
proprietors will postpone compliance until there is a real threat of sanctions. 
Therefore administrative enforcement requires substantial enforcement costs 
and results in total costs of €260,000 to €331,500.
Choosing to enforce the fire safety regulation by means of criminal law 
enforcement is a good alternative. Good results can be obtained with rela-
tively low enforcement costs (total costs of €176,800 to €223,700). Higher fines 
allow a reduction in the costs of inspection. If the information available to 
enforcement officials is limited, they must enforce the same level of compli-
ance for each proprietor. This might be seen as being ‘unfair’ or ‘dispropor-
tionate’ by some of the proprietors. Moreover, fines should be high enough 
to induce proprietors to comply (not lower than €250). Otherwise, it is better 
to completely refrain from enforcement or to try to obtain a higher level of 
compliance by not immediately punishing violations (the so-called compli-
ance strategies).
The analysis shows a preference for harm-based enforcement , both pri-
vately and criminally. The benefits of harm-based enforcement are the low 
enforcement costs. A harm-based criminal enforcement approach is the 
best alternative if the assets of the proprietor are insufficient and additional 
imprisonment is necessary. The other problems with harm-based enforce-
ment are not of major importance or can be mitigated by adding (a low level 
of) ex-ante administrative enforcement. The role of ex-ante (administrative) 
enforcement is primarily informative and supplemental. The major incentive 
to comply can be created by ex-post enforcement.
The analysis confirms that full compliance is not efficient. Enforcing com-
pliance with the technical devices that require periodical attention is more 
worthwhile than enforcing compliance with the number of visitors and other 
regulations that require continued attention.
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16.3 Enforcing fire safety in horeca establishments
The central question of this thesis is: What is an effective and efficient enforce-
ment policy for fire safety regulation in horeca establishments? Now it is time 
to answer this question.
16.3.1 The efficient enforcement policy
The conclusions on the optimal enforcement policy for fire safety regulation 
in horeca establishments are the following.
First of all, some level of enforcement is required to stimulate proprietors 
to take precautions to prevent fires. Without enforcement, there would be 
insufficient voluntary compliance (chapters 2, 12, 15). Visitors are not much 
concerned with fire safety nor do other reputation al effects play a role. More-
over, refraining from enforcement sends a signal that compliance with the 
regulation is not important. Therefore, the motivation of the proprietor to 
comply will disappear. In addition, note that insurance companies cannot 
induce sufficient compliance. They are especially helpful in creating compli-
ance with the standards concerning technical devices, but they cannot real-
ly control the daily behavior of the proprietor which is also part of the use 
requirements. Moreover, currently, insurance does not cover the non-mone-
tary damage to visitors. Proprietors themselves are interested in preventing 
their own (financial) losses, but are not sufficiently interested in preventing 
damage to visitors and therefore not sufficiently interested in for instance 
keeping emergency exits free.
Secondly, to stimulate proprietors to take precautions we need some 
public money, but not too much. We should spend some public money 
because private enforcement alone is not likely to induce efficient compli-
ance. Because of cognitive failures and because of the technical nature of fire 
safety, some information is needed to stress the importance of fire safety and 
explain the standards (chapters 12 and 15). But this does not necessarily mean 
that money should be spent on inspections. It should be spent on informa-
tion campaigns to make proprietors aware of fire safety (regulation). More-
over, we should not spend too much money on fire safety regulation in horeca 
establishments, because there are other social problems that have a higher 
need of public resources (chapter 13). Full compliance with all standards and 
especially enforcing full compliance with the standards is too costly.
Thirdly, the enforcement policy should rest on a smart combination of 
all possible enforcement methods. No single enforcement method is likely 
to create sufficient deterrence, but all methods together may induce efficient 
compliance (chapters 14 and 15). Ex-ante action is needed to make proprietors 
aware of fire safety (regulations). This is partly done by insurance companies, 
but additional action is required by fire brigades, who are the most likely 
candidates for the information campaigns. Ex-ante administrative enforce-
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ment is also needed to create deterrence for those proprietors who display 
very high and broad levels of non-compliance. The establishments of these 
proprietors can be closed by a municipality (chapter 12). This does not imply 
that a municipality needs to perform regular and time-consuming inspec-
tions in all establishments, but rather that it can benefit from the activities of 
other enforcement officials. If enforcement officials in the domain of environ-
mental regulation, public order, hygiene, etc. detect serious non-compliance 
or if the municipality notices other signs of non-compliance, the municipality 
can start enforcement procedures. Moreover, the municipality can perform 
joint actions, involving different enforcement officials, in which fire safety is 
part of the (quick) inspection. Preferably, these actions should be carried out 
during periods of full use.
Deterrence can especially be achieved by means of ex-post enforcement, 
a combination of private and criminal enforcement (chapter 15). Private 
enforcement provides an incentive to take precautions because the proprietor 
will have to compensate the victims for their monetary losses (and a small 
amount for non-monetary losses) if he behaves negligently by failing to com-
ply with the standards. In principle, this is likely to work because victims 
know the proprietor who has to pay damages and they expect sufficiently 
large damages to spend on litigation, and because the proprietor is usually 
able to pay for a significant proportion of the damage. The problem that the 
standards are unknown or uncertain is solved by means of the ex-ante actions 
described above. Supplementary criminal enforcement is needed to improve 
deterrence through the threat of imprisonment. This is especially helpful if 
the proprietor is unable to pay damages and/or if there are significant non-
monetary damages.
Note that the enforcement style for public enforcement (either ex-ante or 
ex-post) should be primarily deterrent (chapter 12). This is important because 
a strict enforcement policy provides an incentive to restore technical failures 
as soon as possible and to acquire information concerning the standards, 
because it signals that compliance with the regulation is important, and 
because it creates (additional) deterrence by imposing sanctions on offences. 
A compliance style will only allow the proprietor to delay compliance and 
await real enforcement actions. There are only two important comments on 
the use of a deterrence style. Given the limited resources and sanctions the 
municipality needs to target its enforcement actions (1) on the most serious 
offences, and (2) on repeated offences . It might do so by enforcing some infor-
mal standards and (especially under ex-ante enforcement) by starting with a 
warning .
16.3.2 Comparing the efficient policy with actual enforcement policies
The description of the optimal enforcement policy has some important impli-
cations for the current policy.
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First, in the current policy, ex-ante administrative enforcement plays a 
central role (chapters 11 and 12). It is promoted as the most important method 
for creating compliance. All municipalities inspect or intend to inspect all 
establishments regularly, that is at least once, often twice a year. They take 
their time for these inspections. There are however two problems. First, these 
inspections are relatively costly (chapters 13 and 15). It is more efficient to rely 
on ex-post enforcement and/or accept that some fire damage may result by 
cutting back the intensive ex-ante inspections. As described, ex-ante adminis-
trative enforcement should be used (only) for important signals of non-com-
pliance and in close collaboration with other enforcement actions. A second 
problem with ex-ante administrative inspections is that these inspections and 
their subsequent sanctions do not easily create deterrence because of their 
informal, repairing character (chapter 12). After detecting non-compliance, 
the municipality should be stricter in starting enforcement actions.
Secondly, the analysis shows that it is necessary for the invested resources 
to become available for actual enforcement actions. It seems that many initia-
tives and action programs of the past years primarily led to more deskwork 
and paper-safety instead of actual field-work and real safety improvements 
(chapters 12 and 13).
A third remark concerning actual enforcement policies concerns the use of 
private enforcement through litigation. Relying more on private enforcement 
is only beneficial if victims really do claim their damages from a negligent 
proprietor. Otherwise, it will fail to create sufficient deterrence. The incentive 
for victims to claim damages is removed by a government that does largely 
compensate the victims. The (national) government should only do so, if it 
tries to recoup the compensation it pays from the proprietor (chapter 14).
With respect to criminal enforcement , it should be noted that there is cur-
rently little attention for enforcing fire safety in horeca establishments by the 
Public Prosecutor and the police officials. Only in case of a severe accident 
such as the Volendam disaster are resources spent on this problem (chapters 
12 and 14). Moreover, for criminal sanctions there is a heavier burden of proof , 
because it is important to have a more direct causal relationship between the 
acts (precautions) and the damage. Therefore, it is likely that there will be 
underdeterrence of accidents that result in relatively small harms. This is not 
necessarily a problem since we mostly want to prevent the major disasters, 
and the acts that clearly result in danger.
16.3.3 Further remarks on enforcing fire safety 
There are three relevant remarks on the recommendations for the most effec-
tive and efficient policy.
First, the description of the efficient enforcement policy of fire safety reg-
ulation applies to horeca establishments and cannot necessarily be extended 
to other sectors. The question however is whether it is possible to have dif-
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ferent policies for different sectors. For example, in more complex organiza-
tions than horeca establishments, ex-post enforcement, especially criminal 
enforcement, might not work well because of the diffused responsibilities. In 
such cases, intensive ex-ante administrative enforcement might be needed. 
That means that each sector has its own enforcement policy. It must be clear 
to the sector which policy applies to them. That horeca proprietors are not 
intensively exposed to ex-ante administrative enforcement should not lead 
them to believe that they can get away with non-compliance, as they will 
be subjected to ex-post enforcement. The question is whether such different 
enforcement policies for different sectors are feasible and credible.
Secondly, the current enforcement policy can be further improved by 
enlarging the legal possibilities (chapters 12 and 15). If public enforcement 
was to apply higher fines, or administrative fines, a higher level of compli-
ance is feasible. However, it remains to be seen whether higher fines are desir-
able. First of all, such solutions improve ex-ante enforcement, but I argue 
that intensive ex-ante inspections are unnecessary. Another problem is that 
enforcing fire safety regulation necessarily requires a lot of discretion (chap-
ter 12). As the analysis reveals, fire safety enforcement officials also use this 
discretion to promote their own interests and status. This incentive should be 
restrained by limiting the possibilities they have in enforcing fire safety. Pro-
prietors who feel they have been treated ‘unfairly’ or ‘disproportionately’ are 
likely to use court proceedings to claim their right. Hence, higher sanctions 
might be very costly without really leading to higher levels of precautions. 
Moreover, the analysis revealed (chapters 12 and 15) that imposing fines is 
only efficient if these fines are high enough. Fines of less than €100 will only 
be counterproductive. A more promising way to improve compliance by 
changing the legal environment, is to increase the award for non-monetary 
losses, especially for fatalities. This will improve the effectiveness of private 
enforcement.
Finally, it is important to note that the analysis has of course some impor-
tant limitations concerning the analysis of the accident problem. For example, 
the analysis of obligatory insurance for proprietors, the use certification or 
private periodical tests, the optimal method of compensating victims, the 
complications of principal-agency problems in more complex horeca orga-
nizations, limited liability etc. is insufficient to provide founded conclu-
sions concerning these issues. However, I do consider these issues of minor 
importance. For example, obligatory insurance can not be expected to really 
improve compliance as long as the proprietor is only obliged to pay a small 
part of the damages (especially when it concerns non-monetary damages).
16.4 Further research to the enforcement of regulatory crime
In short, this section states that further empirical analysis to the enforcement 
of regulatory crime is needed.
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16.4.1 The economic perspective
In practice, theories from the socio-legal sciences are very popular with 
enforcement authorities, witness examples like the enforcement pyramid, 
responsive regulation, best-practices, etc. (Van de Bunt et al., 2007*). This is 
often very useful. This thesis provides an overview of the economic analysis 
of enforcement, which uses the assumption of rationality of potential offend-
ers to examine the effects of enforcement. In many respects, this leads to simi-
lar recommendations for the optimal enforcement policy. Economists do not 
necessarily favor harsh, deterrent, legalistic enforcement, but have broadly 
investigated the conditions that determine the optimal policy, i.e. the most 
welfare-enhancing policy. Advice , persuasion and warnings , compliance 
strategies , have their merits for economists too. The conclusions about opti-
mal enforcement policies do not always deviate much from those of other 
disciplines.281 A difference is that the economic analysis more explicitly focus-
es on the interactions between characteristics of offenders and enforcement 
actions. Moreover, economists continuously require attention to the balance 
of the benefits and costs of enforcement. This is not only a point of theoretical 
interest, as shown in the analysis of actual enforcement policies.
May be it is possible to further integrate the different perspectives on 
compliance and enforcement. But possibly the best method to integrate is 
by investigating actual enforcement policies instead of trying to provide one 
theory.
16.4.2 The optimal enforcement style
My analysis shows that in the field of fire safety regulation in horeca estab-
lishments the use of a compliance style is questionable. Most arguments for 
applying this style are incorrect. Moreover, the analysis reveals two impor-
tant general conclusions regarding the discussion on compliance styles. First, 
the scope of compliance styles is rather small. Only in rather exceptional cas-
es will a properly applied deterrence style not work. Compliance styles are 
restricted to specific situations in which enforcement authorities have limited 
powers and limited information. In general, welfare will increase more by 
increasing these powers (provided that discretion can be controlled) than by 
using a compliance style.
Secondly, most arguments in the literature in favor of a compliance style 
are in fact arguments for why a deterrence style fails. However, the question 
should be whether a compliance style would really be better. For example, a 
compliance style might signal that norms are unimportant and hence destroy 
intrinsic motivation, or it may remove the incentive to acquire information 
281 For instance, Van de Bunt et al. (2007*) provide critical comments to enforcement pyramid 
that are similar to mine concerning compliance strategies.
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about the standards that apply. The arguments for a failure of a deterrence 
style are not sufficient to support a compliance style. It is important to inves-
tigate the failures of a compliance strategy. The optimal enforcement policy 
should balance the failures of a deterrence and a compliance strategy.
For economists there is an important lesson too. The conventional eco-
nomic literature advises to trade off as much as possible the probability of 
detection and the magnitude of the sanction. In practice, however, enforce-
ment authorities are often underfinanced making them unable to achieve the 
socially optimal level of deterrence. This has important implications for the 
enforcement problem. If there is a (serious) inefficient level of underdeter-
rence, the optimal enforcement policy might be different from that under the 
socially optimal level of (under)deterrence. In such situations so called com-
pliance strategies can be more effective. Economic recommendations on opti-
mal enforcement policies will improve if they take into consideration these 
actual constraints on policy.
16.4.3 Remaining questions
Further research should not only examine the failures of a compliance strat-
egy, but should also focus on the relationship between administrative law 
enforcement and a compliance strategy. Sometimes, the use of administra-
tive enforcement implies the use of a compliance strategy . But this might not 
be a necessary consequence. In some cases, administrative enforcement also 
uses direct fines instead of ‘repair’ sanctions. On the other hand, criminal law 
enforcers such as policemen are not only punishing, but often use warnings, 
cooperation and informal enforcement, for example when interacting with 
local youngsters in the neighborhood. Indeed, most literature on compliance 
strategies simply follows from the application of (criminal) fines. However, 
the usual metaphor implies a link between a policeman and a deterrence 
strategy. If the difference between administrative and criminal enforcement 
is not the enforcement style, what does characterize the difference? Why are 
there two types of public enforcement? Is there only a difference between the 
institutions that are responsible for enforcement (a public prosecutor versus 
administrative bodies)? Or are there more fundamental differences? Usual 
explanations focus on the difference between the magnitude of the sanction 
and the corresponding burden of proof . However, it is easy to provide exam-
ples of high administrative sanctions (for instance in competition law) or of 
low criminal sanctions (for instance in public order). There is no literature 
available that convincingly and in detail analyzes these questions (see chap-
ter 10).
Furthermore, it became apparent that there remains much to be said on 
the relationship between norms and enforcement, despite the growing lit-
erature on norms and motivation . What is the relationship between public 
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enforcement and (private) norms? Does public enforcement strengthen or 
destroy these norms?
Another important question is how to provide public (enforcement) offi-
cials with incentives to behave in the interests of society. These officials can 
make or break an enforcement policy. They should enforce in a professional, 
adequate way. How is this behavior guaranteed? Can governmental liability 
for insufficient enforcement help? Can fines on overdue decisions improve 
procedures? Should enforcement departments receive benefits from sanc-
tions? What’s more: to which extent is and should enforcement be affected 
by public fears for disasters, by lobby groups or by the enforcement officials 
themselves?
Finally, we need empirical analyses to improve our understanding 
of actual behavior patterns. There is still relatively little knowledge on the 
explanation for regulatory crime (Lott, 2000; Huisman and Beukelman, 2007*; 
Voermans, 2007*). Why do some firms comply? Why do others choose to non-
comply? Moreover, there is much to be learned about the effects of enforce-
ment on compliance. Economic textbooks and bibliographical works are full 
of basic theories on law enforcement. But to what extent can these be applied 
to actual enforcement problems? How strong is the influence of sanctions on 
(non)compliance? How does the number of inspections affect compliance? 
For such questions data collection and empirical analysis are essential.
16.4.4 The importance of data collection
The problem of data collection is to find or develop data on the benefits 
of enforcement: what is the level of compliance and how does it affect the 
expected damage? This problem is not easily solved for the field of admin-
istrative enforcement. Especially for situations of ex-ante enforcement, it is 
difficult to detect relationships between (ex-ante) enforcement actions and 
(ex-post) benefits from compliance. Even the relationship between (ex-ante) 
enforcement actions and (ex-ante) compliance is difficult because the level 
of (non)compliance cannot be measured using the victim reports. Moreover, 
when compliance concerns a level of precautions rather than an activity, it 
might be more difficult to measure compliance. This means that in analyz-
ing the widespread use of administrative regulation and enforcement much 
work needs to be done as we have little actual knowledge on the relationship 
between enforcement, compliance and their benefits and costs.282 
This thesis tries to collect data in different ways and  applies different 
analyses. Of course, as sketched, these analyses do not answer all questions. 
Further research is required to provide unambiguous answers to the question 
282 Similar observations have been made by Leeuw and Willemsen (2006*), Netherlands 
Court of Audit (2005*) and Voermans (2007*) for the Netherlands and by Macrory (2006b) 
for the United Kingdom.
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of which level of compliance, and hence which level of enforcement resourc-
es, is desirable. However, I am convinced that it is worthwhile to begin with 
analyses such as the one in this thesis. It is important by now not only to 
improve the theoretical models of enforcement problems, but to demonstrate 
that these models actually provide insight into real enforcement problems. 
This is especially of interest since there is no abstract, optimal mix of enforce-
ment instruments. Each problem requires its own solution. We know the basic 
conditions for the effectiveness of an enforcement method. But we know little 
concerning actual compliant behavior and the actual effects of enforcement 
actions .
This limited knowledge makes it all the more remarkable that the govern-
ment has and should have so many and so clear ideas on what we should do. 
So many tools, instruments, programs and priority plans are produced, but 
these priorities are unlikely to have been chosen on the basis of an adequate 
balance of benefits and costs. Enforcement responses are usually inspired by 
disasters such as the one in Volendam or by the private ideas of bureaucrats, 
rather than as a result of a (tentative, best-available) balance of benefits and 
costs and of careful consideration on the effective way in which instruments 
can be used. But we do not have to reconcile to this situation. The analysis 
in this thesis shows that despite important limitations on the available data, 
policy-makers can actually investigate and plan their enforcement policies 
more thoroughly. Although these analyses do not provide decisive answers, 
they do provide insights into the line of reasoning and the direction of the 
conclusions.
 

 Appendix 1 Interviews and interviewees
Section A1.1 of this appendix provides some background information on the 
interviews with enforcement officials in thirteen municipalities described in 
chapter 12. Section A1.2 provides a list of persons and organizations that were 
helpful in the cost-benefit analysis of chapter 13.
A1.1 Interviews in 13 municipalities
A1.1.1 The selection of municipalities
Sixteen municipalities were selected beforehand, from four Fire Department 
Regions, in order to create a representative selection of all Dutch municipali-
ties with more than 15,000 and less than 250,000 inhabitants and with at least 
20 horeca establishments.283 The four largest municipalities were excluded 
because they have a different organizational structure (with more or less 
independent submunicipalities). The smallest municipalities with small 
horeca establishments were excluded because for them enforcing fire safety 
at horeca establishments is simply not important enough, or may be dealt 
with in a different way. 
The selection of the Regions was made in such a way as to ensure a geo-
graphical spread that includes at least a region where Carnival is celebrated, 
one that is relatively rural and one that is relatively urban. In each Region, 
four municipalities were chosen: one larger city, one smaller village and two in 
between. The following thirteen municipalities were willingly to cooperate:
1. Amersfoort (Am)
2. Coevorden (Cv)
3. Driebergen – Rijsenburg (DR)
4. Haarlem (Ha)
5. ‘s Hertogenbosch (or: Den Bosch) (HB)
6. Hoogeveen (Ho)
7. Midden-Drenthe (MD)
8. Oss (Os)
9. Schijndel (Sc)
283 This excludes the four largest municipalities and the 176 very small ones. On January 
1, 2003, the Netherlands contained 489 municipalities, of which 309 had between 25,000 
and 250,000 inhabitants. Of these, 46 municipalities have fewer than 20 horeca establish-
ments.
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10. Sint-Oedenrode (Oe)
11. Soest (So)
12. Zandvoort (Za)
13. Zeist (Ze)
Table A1.1 provides summary information about these municipalities. The 
selection contains several (very) touristy municipalities (especially Za and 
Cv). Several city centers have a monumental character (Ha and especially 
HB). The municipalities in Drenthe especially consist of several smaller vil-
lages. Most apparent is that the selection does not contain real university or 
college towns.
Table A1.1 General information on the selected municipalitiesa
Mun.
Fire Department 
Region
Number of 
inhabitants
Number of  
horeca
Area (Km^2)
Urbani-
zationb
MD Drenthe 32,800 44 342 5
Cv Drenthe 36,000 61 297 5
Ho Drenthe 53,300 59 128 3
Za Kennemerland 16,900 92 32 3
Ha Kennemerland 147,100 294 29 1
Oe NO-Noord-Brabant 17,000 26 64 4
Sc NO-Noord-Brabant 23,400 32 42 4
Os NO-Noord-Brabant 76,200 126 102 3
HB NO-Noord-Brabant 132,500 263 85 2
DR Utrechtsland 18,600 21 26 3
So Utrechtsland 44,800 39 46 3
Ze Utrechtsland 59,800 70 49 3
Am Utrechtsland 131,200 174 63 2
Subtotal (13) 789,600 1301 1305
NL 15-250 (309)c 12,375,400 17,821 25,090
NL total (489) 16,192,500 25,762 33,780
a. Source: Horeca in numbers 2003 and CBS, Statline. Data concern January 1, 2003.
b. The extent of urbanization is measured by CBS based on the address density in the 
neighborhood on a scale of 1 (very urban) to 5 (rural).
c. Total for all municipalities in the Netherlands (NL) with inhabitants between 15,000 and 
250,000. In parentheses the number of municipalities.
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A1.1.2 The interviews
The interviews were conducted with a basically unstructured list of questions 
(but with several more structured questions).284 The research covered the fol-
lowing subjects, with some questions to illustrate:285
1. Basic fi gures such as the number of inhabitants and horeca establishments, 
the political and fi nancial situation, the regional (fi re safety) networks, etc.
2. Organisation and method of operation. Which departments are involved with 
fi re safety? Is there any help from outside? What is the number of personnel?
3. Regulation and policy. Is the model Bylaw of the VNG (Association of Dutch 
municipalities) applied? Are there policy and/or action plans? What are 
the policy priorities? Who developed the priorities and who is respon-
sible for monitoring them? How are the rules made known? How long 
has the municipality worked in this way (Volendam disaster?)? What is 
the general impression of horeca proprietors? How do they characterize 
their style of enforcement?
4. Licensing. Which horeca establishments need a license? How many are 
licenced? Which requirements are added in the licence? What is the use of 
licensing? Is there an impression of the costs of licences for proprietors?
5. Inspections and violations. What is the policy and priority for the number of 
inspections? How often, in 2003, have inspections been carried out? How 
intense, at what time? How are establishments selected? Is there a pre-
sumption of violation? Which requirements were the focus of inspection? 
How large is the probability of detection? Are there differences between 
inspectors? How often is everything all right? How often do you detect 
a violation of one of the requirements identifi ed? Are there differences 
between types of establishment? Why are the rules violated? How often is 
there discussion with the proprietor about a violation? Which standards 
are enforced?
6. Sequential actions and sanctions. What happens if a violation is detected? 
How is the proprietor informed? Can and do proprietors contest deci-
sions? What is the role of informal sanctions? Which solutions are found? 
How often have formal sanctions been imposed? For each type of viola-
tion, how large is the probability and magnitude of sanctions?
7. Other items. To which extent should other effects (employment, municipal 
interests) be taken into account? Is there a problem with contradictory 
requirements? What is the role of insurance companies? Is it possible to 
introduce a certifi cation system as for automobiles? Is is possible to say to 
which extent the (expected) damage decreases as a result of your actions? 
How many fi res has the municipality observed? Do horeca establish-
284 See Hagan (2005), especially chapter six, on the methodology of interviews, including a discus-
sion on the advantages and disadvantages of interviews. See also Bijleveld (2006*, chapter 7).
285 The interviews were conducted in Dutch. The translations are mine.
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ments create a fi re-safe profi le? What is the importance of the administra-
tive fi ne? Is it possible to enforce full compliance?
8 Eight propositions on which the interviews were asked to indicate whether 
they agree on a fi ve-point scale.
The basic figures for topic 1 can be found in the written sources. For topics 2 
and 3, there are usually also some reports and other written materials avail-
able. Of course, the main focus of the interviews was on topics 3, 5 and 6.
The questions asked depend on the person interviewed. Sometimes an 
interview dealt with all topics because the interviewee(s) was involved in 
policymaking, granting licenses, inspection and sanctioning. In other munici-
palities, I interviewed different persons with different tasks so that the ques-
tions of course varied.
Furthermore, all interviews were recorded.286 Respondents were told that I 
would report on who had been interviewed, but the results will not be related 
to a specific municipality. This was no problem for anyone. Most of them had 
no objection to full disclosure. The municipalities that did not cooperate gave 
time-constraints as the reason.
Before beginning the interviews, I accompanied a fire safety inspector of 
the Fire Brigade in Leiden one afternoon visiting a number of horeca estab-
lishments. I also had contact with Mr. R. (Rene) Hagen of the Netherlands 
Institute Physical Safety Nibra, and Mrs. Y. (Yolanda) van Setten of the VNG 
(Association of Dutch Municipalities).
A1.1.3 List of persons interviewed in 13 municipalities
The following persons were interviewed in the thirteen municipalities. I am 
very grateful to them for their cooperation.
Amersfoort
30 March 2004 ing. J. (Jan) Hazeleger
 Hoofd afdeling Veiligheid, Brandweer Amersfoort
 [head safety department, Fire Brigade Amersfoort]
Coevorden
9 March 2004 dhr. J. (Jaap) de Koning
 plaatsvervangend commandant Brandweer Coevorden
 [deputy chief Fire Brigade Coevorden]
 dhr. A. (Anthony) Bergman
 medewerker preventie Brandweer Coevorden
 [assistant prevention Fire Brigade Coevorden]
286 Although one recording is of bad quality.
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Driebergen-Rijsenburg
24 May 2004 dhr. T. (Ton) Leppers
 medewerker preventie
 [assistant prevention]
Haarlem
11 March 2004 dhr. T. (Tom) Bersee
 Handhavingsregisseur (concernstaf)
 [enforcement director]
22 March 2004 dhr. W. (Wim) de Zwart
 Hoofd Bureau Preventie (en: wnd. Hoofd preventie en   
preparatie), Brandweer Haarlem
 [head prevention office, Fire Brigade Haarlem]
 Dhr. C. (Carlo) Giezen
 Inspecteur preventie, Brandweer Haarlem
 [inspector prevention, Fire Brigade Haarlem]
 Mevr. B. (Bettina) Zevenbergen
 Juridisch medewerker afdeling Preventie, Brandweer   
Haarlem
 [legal assistant prevention office, Fire Brigade Haarlem]
‘s-Hertogenbosch
25 March 2004 dhr. J. (Jo) Peters
 handhavingsregisseur
 [enforcement director]
 dhr. M. (Michel) Thijssen
 hoofd afdeling Preventie Brandweer (fungerend com-
mandant)
 [head prevention department fire brigade, acting chief]
 dhr. N. (Nico) de Feiter
 hoofd Bouwen (sector Stedelijke Ontwikkeling)
 [head building department]
7 July 2004 mevr. C.T. (Carolien) Reitsma
 officier preventie Brandweer ’s Hertogenbosch
 [officer prevention, Fire Brigade ’s Hertogenbosch]
Hoogeveen
24 March 2004 dhr. R. (Rob) Tiemes
 handhavingsregisseur
 [enforcement director]
 dhr. K. Lubbinge
 dhr. Peters
 Inspecteurs Preventie, Brandweer Hoogeveen
 [inspectors prevention, Fire Brigage Hoogeveen]
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Midden-Drenthe
5 April 2004 dhr. J. (Jan) Zinger
 medewerker Brandweer / Brandpreventie
 [assistant Fire Brigade / Fire Prevention]
Oss
16 March 2004 dhr. P.J.J.M. Verspeek
 Brandweercommandant
 [fire chief]
 dhr. F.A.M (Freddy) Peters
 dhr. N. (Niek) van Boven
 medewerkers preventie / proactie
 [assistants prevention / proaction]
Schijndel
30 June 2004 dhr. B. (Bert) van Doorn
 dhr. L.A.M. (Marcel) Vervoort
 preventiemedewerkers Brandweer Schijndel
 [assistants prevention Fire Brigade Schijndel]
Sint-Oedenrode
23 June 2004 dhr. H. (Harrie) van Dijk
 medewerker Bouwen en Wonen
 [assistant Building and Living]
Soest
1 July 2004 Dhr. H. (Harrie) Tolboom
 medewerker preventie Brandweer Soest
 [assistant prevention Fire Brigade Soest]
Zandvoort
8 March 2004 Dhr. S. (Sander) Boon
 Officier Brandweer Zandvoort, afdeling Preventie
 [officer Fire Brigade Zandvoort, prevention department]
Zeist
10 June 2004 dhr. J. (Jouke) van Dijk
 Hoofd preventie Brandweer Zeist
 [head prevention Fire Brigade Zeist]
 dhr. J. (Johan) van der Bruggen
 coördinator T&H Brandweer Zeist
 [supervisor inspection and enforcement Fire Brigade Zeist]
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A1.2 List of persons with additional information
The following persons and organizations provided information that was 
used in the analysis of chapter 13 (a cost-benefit analysis of the enforcement 
policies after Volendam). I thank them for this information.
dhr. J.L.M. Boek  Ministry of Justice, Expert Centre Law Enforcement 
dhr. W. van Oppen NCP, National Centre for Prevention
dhr. A. Stuivenberg IOOV, Public Order and Safety Inspectorate
dhr. M. van der Velden AEF, Andersson Elffers Felix
dhr. H. Veldkamp and 
dhr. J. Weges Netherlands Institute Physical Safety Nibra
dhr. P. de Wolf Koninklijk Horeca Nederland (Royal Horeca NL)

 Samenvatting [Summary in Dutch]
   Handhaving van brandveiligheid in de horeca.
Een economische analyse.
INLEIDING
Tijdens de nieuwjaarsnacht van 1 januari 2001 breekt er brand uit in café “’t 
Hemeltje” in de gemeente Volendam. Op dat moment zijn er zo’n 300 men-
sen aanwezig, voornamelijk jongeren. Het is een korte maar hevige brand. 
Uiteindelijk overlijden er 14 personen en zijn er vele gewonden, waarvan 
ongeveer 200 ernstig. De commissie Alders concludeert dat de naleving en de 
handhaving van de brandveiligheid ernstig tekortschoot. De uitbater Veer-
man had gezorgd voor een gevaarlijke situatie doordat nooduitgangen en 
vluchtwegen waren geblokkeerd, er veel te veel bezoekers waren toegelaten 
en de kerstversiering niet voldeed aan de brandveiligheidseisen. Maar ook 
de gemeente droeg schuld. Zij had onvoldoende toezicht uitgeoefend op de 
naleving van de brandveiligheidsvoorschriften. In 1998 al stelde de Commis-
sie Michiels vast dat de overheid ernstig tekort schoot in het handhaven van 
de door haar gestelde regels. In reactie hierop hebben gemeenten de afgelo-
pen jaren veel geïnvesteerd in het professionaliseren van hun handhavings-
beleid. Met name voor de handhaving van de brandveiligheid is er extra per-
soneel aangesteld om vergunningen te verlenen en controles uit te voeren.
Vraagstelling
Dit proefschrift probeert de effectiviteit en efficiëntie te bepalen van deze 
handhavingsacties. De centrale vraag is: Wat is een effectief en efficiënt hand-
havingsbeleid voor de brandveiligheid in de horeca? De handhaving van de 
brandveiligheid kan in beginsel op drie manieren worden uitgevoerd: pri-
vaatrechtelijk, bestuursrechtelijk of strafrechtelijk. In deel I analyseer ik op 
grond van de economische literatuur onder welke voorwaarden de verschil-
lende handhavingsmethodes effectief zijn in het vergroten van de naleving 
en efficiënt in het terugdringen van de totale kosten van naleving en handha-
ving. Meer in het bijzonder presenteer ik een overzicht van de economische 
literatuur over het gebruik van informele, coöperatieve handhavingsacties. 
Onder welke voorwaarden zijn advies, overtuiging en waarschuwing effec-
tiever dan bestraffen?
Het afwegen van de kosten en baten, het bepalen van de relevante 
omstandigheden en restricties, het vormgeven van de juiste mix van handha-
vingsmethodes e.d. is uiteindelijk een empirische kwestie waarvoor concrete 
data nodig zijn. In deel II van dit proefschrift analyseer ik de handhaving 
van de brandveiligheid in de horeca in Nederland. Horeca is in dit proef-
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schrift gedefinieerd als restaurants, cafés, bars, discotheken, partycentra 
e.d., en omvat geen hotels en ook geen snackbars of kleine afhaaltentjes. De 
horecabaas moet voldoen aan de gebruiksvoorschriften voor de brandveilig-
heid, zoals het vrijhouden van (nood)uitgangen en vluchtwegen, het correct 
ophangen van versiering, het goed laten functioneren van de vluchtwegaan-
duiding, blusmiddelen, etc., en het beperken van het aantal bezoekers tot het 
maximum toelaatbaar aantal personen.
Achtergrond
Dit proefschrift analyseert het handhavingsbeleid vanuit een economisch 
perspectief in navolging van Becker (1968). Die heeft zich gebogen over een 
verstandige inzet van de middelen aan criminaliteitsbestrijding, waarbij de 
kosten van handhaving worden afgewogen tegen de bate van de afschrikking 
die daarmee bereikt wordt. Een risiconeutraal persoon wordt afgeschrikt van 
het plegen van een delict door een verwachte boete die minstens zo groot is 
als zijn persoonlijk gewin. Als opsporing geld kost en het opleggen van een 
sanctie niet of nauwelijks (zoals bij een boete), dan worden de handhaving-
skosten geminimaliseerd door een zo hoog mogelijke sanctie op te leggen 
(beperkt door bijvoorbeeld het vermogen van de crimineel) en een (zo laag 
mogelijke) pakkans die voldoende afschrikking genereert.
Deze analyse is in de literatuur ook toegepast op de handhaving van 
bestuursrechtelijke regelgeving. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de regulering van 
markten, het milieu, arbeidsomstandigheden, consumentenveiligheid, etc. 
Desondanks is de analyse van bestuursrechtelijke handhaving beperkt van 
aard. De bestaande literatuur bestudeert voornamelijk de strafrechtelijke 
handhaving van de zwaarste overtredingen van de regels, of op zijn minst de 
bestraffing door middel van boetes. Maar de kleinere, minder serieuze over-
tredingen maken het leeuwendeel uit van de overtredingen. En (strafrechte-
lijke) sancties worden vaak voorafgegaan door pogingen om de overtreding 
ongedaan te maken en/of te beëindigen.
Het onderzoek naar bestuursrechtelijke handhaving verdient ook aan-
dacht van de economische literatuur omdat deze wijze van handhaving op het 
eerste gezicht in tegenspraak is met het standaard economische model. Het 
standaard model benadrukt het belang van het bestraffen van bedrijven om 
hen af te schrikken van het plegen van een overtreding. Echter, in Nederland 
en diverse andere West-Europese landen zijn bestuursorganen als gemeenten 
niet bevoegd om boetes op te leggen, laat staan gevangenisstraf. De belangrijk-
ste sancties zijn de last onder dwangsom, de last onder bestuursdwang en de 
intrekking van een vergunning. Dergelijke sancties bepalen dat een bedrijf in 
de gelegenheid wordt gesteld om de overtreding te beëindigen en de schade te 
herstellen. Als het bedrijf daar niet aan voldoet, wordt overgegaan tot executie 
van de dwangsom, bestuursdwang of intrekking van de vergunning. In de 
praktijk gaan er vaak diverse (informele) waarschuwingen aan deze sancties 
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vooraf. Vanuit economisch perspectief lijken deze praktijken het afschrikken-
de effect van handhaving te schaden. Echter, in de niet-economische literatuur 
wordt vaak beargumenteerd dat een dergelijke handhavingsstijl, ook wel com-
pliance strategy genoemd, effectiever is dan de deterrence strategy die door 
economen wordt voorgestaan. In een compliance strategie handelt de hand-
haver niet als een ‘politieman’, maar als een ‘consultant’. Handhaving vindt 
niet plaats door bestraffing maar door het individu of het bedrijf te overtuigen 
van het belang van naleving en door te onderhandelen over de geëiste voor-
zorgsmaatregelen. Naleving wordt bereikt door coöperatief gedrag van zowel 
de handhaver als het bedrijf. Dit coöperatieve gedrag wordt bedreigd door het 
opleggen van (strenge) straffen. Formele sancties worden gereserveerd voor 
hardnekkige overtreders. Een compliance strategie veronderstelt niet dat er 
rationele keuzes worden gemaakt, maar erkent dat overtredingen het gevolg 
zijn van foutieve inschattingen, onwetendheid en/of incompetentie. De mees-
te mensen zijn ten principale bereid tot naleving, maar incompetent om dit 
te realiseren of van mening dat in bepaalde gevallen naleving onredelijk is. 
In dit proefschrift wordt gezocht naar een economische verklaring voor deze 
handhavingspraktijken. Waarom kiezen handhavers voor een coöperatieve 
handhavingsstijl en leidt dat inderdaad tot een hoger nalevingsniveau? Wat 
zijn de effecten van bestuursrechtelijke sancties op de naleving? 
SAMENVATTING DEEL I - THEORIE
Waarom handhaving nodig is
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft het handhavingsprobleem. De maatschappelijke doel-
stelling van handhaving is de optimale preventie van ongevallen, oftewel het 
creeëren van een prikkel tot het nemen van voorzorgsmaatregelen. Die voor-
zorgsmaatregelen uiten zich in het naleven van de gebruikseisen.
Bij afwezigheid van handhaving zullen horecaondernemers uit zichzelf 
onvoldoende voorzorgsmaatregelen treffen. Horecabezoekers beschikken 
over te weinig informatie om bij hun locatiekeuze rekening te kunnen hou-
den met de mate waarin de ondernemer de brandveiligheidsvoorschriften 
naleeft. Ook andere reputatie-effecten van (niet-)naleving zijn nauwelijks 
waarneembaar. Het is niet waarschijnlijk dat de intrinsieke motivatie en 
bereidheid tot naleving onverkort overeind blijft als er geen enkele publieke 
handhaving van de regels is. Afwezigheid van handhaving stimuleert een 
cultuur waarin niet-naleving onbelangrijk wordt gevonden. Verzekerings-
maatschappijen zijn primair geïnteresseerd in het beperken van het mate-
riële verlies voor de ondernemer, en niet in het (immateriële) leed voor de 
bezoekers, en zijn niet in staat om alle voorzorgsmaatregelen onder controle 
te houden. Tot slot, horecaondernemers onderschatten de mogelijke schade 
omdat de informatie daarover complex van aard is en vanwege cognitieve 
beperkingen moeilijk te verwerken.
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Aansprakelijkheid, private handhaving
Private handhaving door slachtoffers op grond van de aansprakelijkheids-
regels is alleen effectief als de daders daadwerkelijk gedwongen worden de 
schade die zij veroorzaken in hun beslissing te internaliseren. Daarom gelden 
de volgende voorwaarden:
1. De schade bestaat (vooral) uit materiële schade. In geval van immateriële 
schade moeten rechters in staat en bereid zijn om deze schade op ade-
quate wijze te compenseren.
2. De dader moet over voldoende vermogen beschikken om de schade te 
kunnen vergoeden, dan wel (volledig) zijn verzekerd, waarbij verzeke-
ringsmaatschappijen de voorzorgsmaatregelen van de horecaonderne-
mer kunnen controleren.
3. Rechters en daders moeten over voldoende informatie beschikken over de 
mogelijke schade, zodat rechters het efficiënte voorzorgsniveau kunnen 
handhaven en daders in staat zijn te anticiperen op de jurisprudentie.
4. Slachtoffers moeten voldoende toegang hebben tot de rechter, zodat de 
kans op schadevergoeding voldoende groot is. Slachtoffers moeten de 
dader gemakkelijk kunnen aanwijzen en de kosten van de rechtsgang 
moeten voldoende laag zijn.
Publieke handhaving: Een compliance of een deterrence strategie?
In hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 10 analyseer ik publiek handhavingsbeleid. De sug-
gestie die uitgaat van de analyse van Becker (1968) is dat hoge verwachte 
straffen leiden tot een hoog nalevingsniveau. In de praktijk lijkt er sprake te 
zijn van wat (soms) bekend staat als de Harrington Paradox (naar Harrington, 
1988): ondanks een lage pakkans, lage veroordelingskans en bescheiden sanc-
ties, lijkt het nalevingsniveau redelijk hoog. Ik analyseer welke argumenten 
de economische literatuur aandraagt voor de afwezigheid van sancties, of in 
elk geval van onmiddellijke oplegging van sancties. Wat is de waarde van een 
compliance strategie?
In de discussie over compliance en deterrence strategieën lopen vaak 
allerlei verschillende onderscheidingen door elkaar heen. Het kenmerkende 
verschil tussen beide strategieën is het verschil in de handhavingsstijl, waar-
mee bedoeld is de vraag hoe een handhaver reageert op de ontdekking van 
een overtreding (hoofdstuk 8). Een deterrence strategie is een stijl waarbij 
elke overtreding onmiddellijk wordt bestraft. Een compliance strategie is een 
coöperatieve stijl waarbij de handhaver bepaalde overtredingen (tijdelijk) 
kan gedogen om zo het bedrijf een prikkel te geven noodzakelijke informa-
tie aan de handhaver bekend te maken. Welke handhavingsstijl optimaal is, 
hangt niet af van de rationaliteit, de moraliteit of de bereidheid tot naleving 
van de ondernemer. In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat compliance strategieën 
ook voor rationele en/of winstmaximaliserende ondernemers efficiënt kun-
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nen zijn. Aan de andere kant: de veronderstelling dat ondernemers morele 
overtuigingen hebben, is onvoldoende voor de stelling dat een deterrence 
strategie niet werkt. Het is van belang eerst het doel te onderscheiden dat met 
handhaving bereikt moet worden (hoofdstuk 10). Vervolgens is de vraag met 
welke handhavingsstijl dit doel het beste bereikt kan worden. Welke opti-
maal is, hangt af van de omstandigheden en kan niet in zijn algemeenheid 
omschreven worden.
Het doel van afschrikking
Bij afschrikking (de focus van de meeste economische literatuur) is het doel 
om naleving te bevorderen door overtreding onaantrekkelijk te maken. 
De dreiging met sancties geeft het signaal dat overtreding niet loont. Als 
afschrikking het doel is, dan is primair een deterrence strategie aangewe-
zen. Het afschrikkende effect van handhaving is wezenlijk afhankelijk van 
de verwachting van potentiële overtreders dat een geconstateerde overtre-
ding consequent wordt vervolgd en bestraft. Bij een compliance strategie is 
de ondernemer in de gelegenheid om naleving uit te stellen of een lager nale-
vingsniveau ‘uit te onderhandelen’.
De wet is incompleet
Als de wet compleet is en in zijn toepassing perfect voorspelbaar, is een 
strikt handhavingsbeleid efficiënt. De regels kunnen dan letterlijk en tame-
lijk bureaucratisch worden gehandhaafd. In werkelijkheid is de regelgeving 
noodzakelijkerwijs incompleet (hoofdstuk 6). Open normen laten onduide-
lijkheid bestaan. Specifieke standaarden zijn nooit volledig. De regels bevat-
ten zowel voorschriften die te streng zijn als voorschriften die niet ver genoeg 
gaan. Een deterrence strategie waarbij de wettelijke regels precies en strikt 
worden gehandhaafd, zal daarom niet leiden tot het optimale niveau van 
voorzorgsmaatregelen. Een vorm van compliance strategie kan dan effec-
tief en efficiënt zijn. Twee kanttekeningen zijn daarbij van toepassing. Als de 
handhavers over voldoende discretionaire bevoegdheden en over voldoende 
informatie beschikken, dan kunnen zij per geval de juiste standaard bepalen 
en deze vervolgens strikt handhaven (hoofdstuk 6). Bovendien, (de plicht 
tot) een strikte handhaving van de standaard, dwingt de wetgever onnodig 
onduidelijke regelgeving te vermijden (hoofdstuk 9).
Het opleggen van sancties brengt kosten met zich mee
Zelfs als met zekerheid gesteld kan worden dat een overtreding inefficiënt 
is, kan een deterrence strategie contraproductief zijn omdat het opleggen 
van sancties geld en andere kosten met zich meebrengt (hoofdstuk 8). Daar-
bij gaat het uiteraard om de directe kosten van het opleggen en uitvoeren 
van een straf. Maar ook om de kosten en gevolgen van het veroordelen van 
onschuldigen en van het ontkennen of verbergen van overtredingen (par. 6.2) 
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of van het uithollen van de intrinsieke nalevingsbereidheid (par. 7.4). Een 
deterrence strategie is ook kostbaar als niet alle overtredingen gelijk zijn en 
het bestraffen van elke geconstateerde overtreding de totale afschrikking ver-
mindert. Het verhogen van de sanctie voor lichte overtredingen is kostbaar 
als dit de afschrikking voor zwaardere overtredingen vermindert (marginale 
afschrikking, par. 3.2). En de sanctie voor zelf-gemelde overtredingen moet 
lager zijn dan die voor niet-gemelde (par. 3.4). Ook is in situaties van serieuze 
onderafschrikking het optimale handhavingsbeleid gebaseerd op de nale-
vingsgeschiedenis (par. 4.1 en 5.3).De handhaving is dan streng voor degenen 
met een slechte geschiedenis en/of degenen die een waarschuwing hebben 
gehad, maar relatief licht voor de anderen. Het verhogen van de sanctie voor 
de laatste groep vermindert de afschrikking voor de eerste groep.
Een deterrence strategie kan leiden tot hoge sanctiekosten omdat elke 
overtreding moet worden bestraft. Maar dit probleem ontstaat alleen als het 
handhavingsbudget te klein is om volledige naleving af te dwingen (zie bij-
voorbeeld de paragrafen 7.5, 5.3, 4.1). Bij volledige naleving zijn er geen kos-
ten van het opleggen van sancties. Als er geen maximum is voor de hoogte 
van de sanctie, kan er altijd volledige naleving worden afgedwongen met een 
minimale inzet aan handhavingsbudget langs de tradeoff van Becker (1968). 
Als de maximale sanctie wel gelimiteerd is, dan moet de pakkans voldoende 
groot gemaakt worden om afschrikking te realiseren. En dus is er voldoende 
handhavingsbudget nodig. Als de combinatie van de sanctie en het budget 
onvoldoende is om volledige naleving te realiseren, kan een compliance stra-
tegie de onderafschrikking verminderen. De handhavingsautoriteit profi-
teert als de regels beter worden nageleefd. Bedrijven profiteren als zij lagere 
sancties krijgen opgelegd of soms ‘mogen’ overtreden. Bij volledige naleving 
is een dergelijke tradeoff niet mogelijk.
Gebrek aan afschrikkingsbelang bij handhavers
Een deterrence strategie kan ook mislukken omdat handhavers onvoldoende 
belang hebben bij het realiseren van afschrikking en in het consequent bestraf-
fen van elke overtreding (hoofdstuk 9). Dat kan leiden tot geloofwaardig-
heidsproblemen. Als de handhaver of de handhavingsautoriteit onvoldoende 
belang heeft bij het afschrikken van toekomstige overtredingen, zal het geen 
middelen willen opofferen voor de huidige handhavingszaken. Het kan ook 
zijn dat handhavers meer geïnteresseerd zijn in hun eigen carrière of in hun 
eigen (gemoeds)rust dan in het daadwerkelijk aanpakken van overtredingen.
Alternatieven voor een deterrence strategie
Als een deterrence strategie er onvoldoende in slaagt om overtredingen af 
te schrikken, zijn er diverse alternatieve handhavingsmogelijkheden, die in 
meer of mindere mate lijken op een compliance strategie.
1. Als slechts een gedeeltelijke naleving haalbaar is, is het optimaal om de 
handhavingsinzet te richten op een subgroep van de potentiële daders en 
de overtredingen in de resterende groep te gedogen. Daardoor zal ten-
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minste deze eerste subgroep de regels volledig naleven. De beste aanpak 
is die waarbij de handhaving is gebaseerd op de nalevingsgeschiedenis, 
bijvoorbeeld door middel van waarschuwingen (paragraaf 5.3, 4.1 en 
4.2). Bij een eerste overtreding volgt een waarschuwing waarna er sprake 
is van strikt toezicht op de naleving.
2. Als de wettelijke standaard niet gehandhaafd kan worden, is het door-
gaans optimaal om de standaard naar beneden aan te passen en deze in-
formele standaard te handhaven (paragraaf 6.2 en 5.2). Elk bedrijf leeft 
dan de regels gedeeltelijk na. Er is geen sprake van een strikte handha-
ving van de letter van de wet, maar wel is het model van Becker (1968) 
toepasbaar op het handhaven van de informele standaard.
3. Als er ten gevolge van incomplete regelgeving wederzijdse onzeker-
heid bestaat over de regels en de nalevingsmogelijkheden, dan kan een 
coöperatieve, flexibele handhavingsstijl efficient zijn. Van het bedrijf 
wordt geëist dat deze de grootste veiligheidsproblemen aanpakt in ruil 
voor lagere sancties op lichte vergrijpen. Deze flexibiliteit is wederzijds 
voordelig (paragraaf 6.1). Het bedrijf zal proberen de handhaver ervan te 
overtuigen dat naleving onredelijk is. De handhaver zal het bedrijf ervan 
proberen te overtuigen dat niet-naleving niet loont.
De andere handhavingsdoelen
Naast afschrikking kunnen andere handhavingsdoelen worden onder-
scheiden. Ook hiervoor geldt dat het mogelijk is om te bepalen onder welke 
omstandigheden een deterrence of een compliance strategie voor dit doel 
gewenst is.
Herstel
Herstel houdt in dat handhaving gericht is op het ongedaan maken van de 
overtreding, bijvoorbeeld door het repareren van een technisch mankement 
of het opruimen van de schade (zie hoofdstuk 4). Als het mogelijk is om onvol-
doende herstel te observeren en te bestraffen, dan is een deterrence strategie 
efficiënt die sancties oplegt die afhankelijk zijn van de mate van herstel. Dit 
geeft het bedrijf de juiste prikkel om in herstel te investeren in plaats van af te 
wachten totdat de handhaver er iets van zegt. Bovendien geeft het de juiste 
prikkel om te investeren in het voorkómen van mankementen. Alleen als er 
sprake is van volledig onvoorzienbare mankementen én sancties niet afhan-
kelijk gemaakt kunnen worden van de mate van het uitgevoerde herstel, is 
het beter om te beginnen met waarschuwingen. Maar het is moeilijk om daar-
bij een voorbeeld te bedenken.
Advies
Advies houdt in dat handhaving gericht is op het informeren van het bedrijf 
over alle relevante baten en kosten van naleving, de regels die van toepas-
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sing zijn en de beste manier om aan de regels te voldoen. Als de ondernemer 
in staat is om de relevante informatie tegen redelijke kosten te verzamelen, 
geeft het opleggen van de juiste sancties de ondernemer de efficiënte prikkel 
om informatie te verzamelen. Wanneer de ondernemer hiertoe niet in staat 
is, of alleen tegen hoge kosten, zoals bij technisch ingewikkelde regelgeving, 
is advies van belang. Als alle bedrijven min of meer dezelfde informatiepro-
blemen hebben, dan zijn algemene voorlichtingscampagnes voldoende om 
bedrijven van informatie te voorzien. Als de regels te incompleet zijn, zodat 
de geëiste voorzorgsmaatregelen per bedrijf te veel verschillen, dan is het 
wellicht efficiënt als inspecties gebruikt worden om bedrijven van advies te 
voorzien. Dit vereist een soort compliance strategie waarin een inspectie – 
in elk geval in eerste instantie – wordt gekenmerkt door uitleg, overleg en 
samenwerking.
Opvoeding
Handhaving kan ook gericht zijn op het stimuleren van normen en waar-
den die de naleving vergroten. Publieke handhaving kan nodig zijn om het 
normbesef te handhaven, te versterken of zelfs te creëren (hoofdstuk 7). Om 
de kosten van informele, sociale sancties (reputatieschade) te realiseren, 
kan inspectie door overheidsorganen nodig zijn. De publieke bestraffing 
kan dan relatief laag blijven, maar over het algemeen moeten overtredingen 
bestraft worden, en wel meteen. Publieke handhaving kan nodig zijn om te 
voorkomen dat het geloof in de norm, en daarmee de bereidheid tot nale-
ving, afneemt. Als goedwillende bedrijven zien dat deze overtredingen niet 
bestraft worden, zullen ze gaan denken dat naleving blijkbaar niet belangrijk 
gevonden wordt en zal hun geloof in de norm afbrokkelen. Daarvoor kan een 
deterrence strategie nodig zijn gericht op het bestraffen van overtreders, of 
een meer coöperatieve handhavingsstijl gericht op het uitspreken van waar-
dering richting de nalevers.
Completering
Een ander doel van publieke handhaving is het aanvullen van private hand-
having. Publieke handhaving kan gebruikt worden om de onzekerheid over 
de vraag wat ‘voldoende’ voorzorg is weg te nemen of om bedrijven en hun 
werknemers met hun cognitieve beperkingen bewust te maken van de gevol-
gen van private handhaving. Hierbij heeft publieke handhaving advies als 
doel, zoals boven beschreven. Ook is publieke handhaving nodig om private 
handhaving aan te vullen in het creëren van een efficiënt niveau van afschrik-
king. Private handhaving kan gehinderd worden door bijvoorbeeld beper-
kingen aan het vermogen of barrières voor slachtoffers. In deze gevallen is 
afschrikking het doel. In het algemeen is een strikt handhavingsbeleid nodig 
om de bedrijven die middels het privaatrecht worden onderafgeschrikt, te 
dwingen tot meer voorzorgsmaatregelen.
359Samenvatting [summary in dutch]
SAMENVATTING DEEL II – EMPIRISCHE ANALYSE
Publieke handhaving tussen 2001 en 2007
Handhavingstekorten en actieprogramma’s
Gedurende de jaren negentig en aan het begin van deze eeuw zijn er serieuze 
handhavingstekorten vastgesteld op vele gebieden van de bestuursrechte-
lijke handhaving, als gevolg van wetenschappelijke analyses, overheidsrap-
porten en ernstige rampen. Vanuit de landelijke overheid werden gemeenten 
gestimuleerd om hun handhaving te professionaliseren, bijvoorbeeld door 
het toepassen van ‘programmatisch handhaven’. Dit moet garanderen dat 
handhaving volgens plan verloopt, in plaats van ad hoc en incidentgericht. 
Verschillende commissies, zoals de commissie Alders, hebben geleid tot 
actieprogramma’s om het handhavingsbeleid en de regelgeving te verbete-
ren. Deze initiatieven zijn ook van grote invloed geweest op de handhaving 
van de brandveiligheid door gemeenten (hoofdstuk 11).
Het gemeentelijke handhavingsbeleid brandveiligheid
In 2001 was er een achterstand in het verlenen van gebruiksvergunningen 
voor meer dan 70% van de gebouwen (IOOV, 2002). Deze achterstand ging 
gepaard met een personeelstekort voor zowel het verlenen als het handha-
ven van de vergunningen. In bijna geen enkele gemeente vond systematische 
en adequate inspectie van de vergunningen plaats. In de meeste gemeenten 
ontbrak een goede onderbouwing van het beleid. Na 2001 hebben gemeenten 
fors geïnvesteerd in het handhaven van de brandveiligheid, met name ook 
in horecagelegenheden. Gemeenten zijn begonnen om de achterstanden in 
gebruiksvergunningen weg te werken en bedrijven periodiek te inspecteren.
Ik heb interviews afgenomen met handhavingsambtenaren in dertien 
gemeenten om inzicht te krijgen in de daadwerkelijke handhavingsacties. Ik 
gebruik deze interviews om te onderzoeken of het beleid van de laatste jaren 
effectief is in het afdwingen van naleving; en met name of het gebruik van 
een compliance strategie effectief en efficiënt is volgens de literatuur uit deel 
I. Zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 12 worden cafés en restaurants doorgaans 
jaarlijks gecontroleerd (afgezien van hercontroles). Horecagelegenheden in 
het centrum of in een uitgaansgebied krijgen vaak ook nog een controle tij-
dens een speciale gebeurtenis of tijdens de feestdagen of carnaval. Gemeen-
ten beginnen doorgaans met informele waarschuwingen en hercontroles. 
Formele sancties zoals een dwangsom, bestuursdwang of een (tijdelijke) 
intrekking van de vergunning worden zelden opgelegd.
Een Harrington Paradox?
Deze waarnemingen betekenen niet dat er sprake is van een Harrington 
Paradox. Het nalevingsniveau is niet onverklaarbaar hoog in relatie tot de 
verwachte sanctie. Handhavers vinden vele kleine(re) overtredingen bij een 
eerste controle. In minder dan 10% van de gevallen wordt er bij een controle 
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geen enkele tekortkoming geconstateerd. In meer dan 50% van de gevallen 
kondigen de handhavers hercontrole aan. Dit is een logisch gevolg van het feit 
dat horecaondernemers niet worden bestraft, maar alleen worden gewaar-
schuwd dat in de toekomst mogelijk sancties volgen. Het handhavingsbeleid 
is in overeenstemming met het targeting schema dat Harrington (1988) aan-
beveelt. In eerste instantie worden overtreders niet bestraft, maar verplaatst 
naar een target groep waarin ze strikt worden gemonitord door hercontroles 
net zolang tot ze (weer) naleven. In reactie kiezen horecaondernemers ervoor 
om naleving uit te stellen totdat ze gecontroleerd worden. Uiteindelijk sla-
gen gemeenten erin om naleving af te dwingen. Voor horecaondernemers is 
het van belang om geen grove handelingen na te laten of te plegen, waar-
van iedereen weet dat deze een brandgevaarlijke situatie creëren. In derge-
lijke gevallen is er de geloofwaardige dreiging van voldoende grote sancties 
(mogelijk strafrechtelijk) zodat horecaondernemers hiervan worden afge-
schrikt. Hierdoor komt de daadwerkelijke oplegging van sancties nauwelijks 
voor.
Een compliance strategie?
De handhavers van de brandveiligheid in de horeca zelf geven aan dat zij 
gebruikmaken van advies, overtuiging en waarschuwingen (een compliance 
strategie) en betogen zij dat dit ook de beste aanpak is. Ze beweren (1) dat 
inspecties nodig zijn om aan de horecaondernemer uit te leggen wat er mis 
is en wat het gevaar is van niet-naleving (vanwege onwetendheid); (2) dat 
inspecties nodig zijn om overtredingen te beëindigen en daarmee de brand-
veiligheid te herstellen (en niet zozeer om overtredingen te bestraffen); (3) dat 
inspecties nodig zijn om de horecaondernemer ervan te overtuigen dat nale-
ving gewenst is (omdat de meeste horecaondernemers bereid zijn tot nale-
ving); (4) dat uitleg en samenwerking effectiever zijn dan sancties (vanwege 
de juridische procedures daarvan); (5) dat ze zich flexibel opstellen zolang 
de ondernemer dat ook doet; en (6) dat inspecties maar een momentopname 
zijn en dat brandveiligheid vooral de eigen verantwoordelijkheid is van de 
ondernemer. 
Nader onderzoek naar deze beweringen aan de hand van de literatuur 
uit deel I (hoofdstuk 12) laat zien dat deze argumenten over het algemeen niet 
juist zijn. Sterker nog, de meeste houden in dat in de huidige situatie meer 
nadruk zou moeten liggen op een deterrence strategie. De genoemde bewe-
ringen maken onvoldoende onderscheid tussen het doel van inspecties en 
de handhavingsstijl. Dat horecaondernemers bijvoorbeeld bereidwillig zijn 
of dat ze overtreden uit onwetendheid of per ongeluk, is op zichzelf onvol-
doende reden om een compliance strategie te kiezen. Binnen de (juridische) 
mogelijkheden is de gemeente in staat om strikter te handhaven door sneller 
over te gaan tot het opleggen van formele sancties in plaats van te (blijven) 
waarschuwen. Tijd kan bespaard worden door minder nadruk te leggen op 
advies, uitleg en overtuiging tijdens een (her)controle.
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Een kosten-batenanalyse
In hoofdstuk 13 onderzoek ik de baten en kosten van de intensivering van 
het handhavingsbeleid in horecagelegenheden na / in reactie op de Volen-
dam-ramp. De jaarlijkse kosten van de additionele handhavingsacties en de 
additionele naleving worden geschat op €13,0 tot €23,7 miljoen. Het bedrag 
dat maximaal bespaard kan worden, is de gemiddelde totale schade  door 
brand in de horeca voorafgaand aan de beleidsintensivering. Deze schade 
kan geschat worden op €30,4 miljoen per jaar. Om tot een positief saldo van 
baten en kosten te komen is dus een reductie in de verwachte schade vereist 
van minstens 43%. Deze 43% is een ondergrens, uitgaande van de laagste 
schatting van de kosten van naleving en handhaving. De minimaal vereiste 
effectiviteit kan oplopen tot 78% als de werkelijke kosten hoger zijn. Het is 
onwaarschijnlijk dat de verwachte schade van brand met meer dan 40% is 
gedaald.
Conclusies over de actieprogramma’s
De analyse van het gemeentelijke handhavingsbeleid laat zien dat een goede 
onderbouwing van het huidige beleid ontbreekt. Er wordt uitgebreid gefi-
losofeerd over taken, organisatie, coördinatie en inzet van fte’s, maar in het 
midden blijft wat nu precies het beoogde doel is. Zelfs van een begin van een 
afweging van middelen en doelen, en van kosten en baten, is dan ook geen 
sprake. Ondanks het (inmiddels) wijdverspreide gebruik van programma-
tisch handhaven lijkt het brandveiligheidsbeleid primair een reactie op de 
Volendam-ramp. Introductie van het Gebruiksbesluit direct na de Volendam-
ramp zou bijvoorbeeld €100 miljoen hebben bespaard. Nu worden gebruiks-
vergunningen afgeschaft juist op het moment dat we een grote inspanning 
hebben geleverd om alle gebouwen van een vergunning te voorzien. Het is 
opvallend dat juist het actieprogramma van de commissie Alders leidt tot 
zoveel beleidsdocumenten en ander bureauwerk. Aandacht voor daadwer-
kelijke handhavingsacties gaat verloren aan beleidsontwikkeling, gemeente-
lijke reorganisaties en het afgeven van vergunningen.
Evaluatie van de schadeclaims van de Volendam-slachtoffers
In hoofdstuk 14 onderzoek ik de afwikkeling van de schadeclaims van de 
slachtoffers van de Volendam-ramp. Deze casestudy is waardevol omdat de 
afwikkeling van de Volendam-ramp relatief veel aandacht heeft getrokken en 
daarom waarschijnlijk ook van grote invloed is op de perceptie van horecaon-
dernemers en andere betrokkenen.
De slachtoffers van de Volendam-ramp hebben naar schatting finan ciële 
ondersteuning gekregen ter grootte van €60 miljoen, grotendeels betaald 
door de Rijksoverheid. De horecabaas Veerman heeft hooguit ruim €3 mil-
joen betaald. De totale schade voor de slachtoffers, inclusief de immateriële 
schade, kan geschat worden op bijna €120 miljoen. Er is geen goede reden 
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waarom slachtoffers niet geprobeerd hebben een grotere schadevergoeding 
van Veerman te krijgen. Blijkbaar verwachten zij geen hogere schadevergoe-
dingen meer omdat de overheid daar al ruimschoots in voorzien heeft, daar-
bij gestimuleerd door de Volendamse gemeenschap om de zaak af te sluiten. 
Het gevolg is echter dat het signaal richting horecaondernemers is dat zij zich 
niet zoveel zorgen hoeven te maken over het betalen van de schade van brand 
in hun gelegenheid. De financiële rekening van de Volendam-ramp wordt 
grotendeels betaald door de belastingbetaler. Bovendien, omdat de imma-
teriële verliezen grotendeels niet gecompenseerd worden, hebben zowel de 
horecaondernemers als de overheid geen goede prikkel om deze verliezen te 
voorkomen.
Handhaving in een representatieve gemeente
De analyse van bestaande handhavingsactiviteiten laat zien dat er belangrijke 
tekortkomingen zijn. De vraag is of andere beleidsopties effectiever en effici-
enter zijn. In hoofdstuk 15 verzamel en combineer ik de beschikbare gegevens 
om de jaarlijkse kosten van handhaving in een representatieve, hypotheti-
sche gemeente te onderzoeken. In deze gemeente worden de laagste kosten 
van verwachte schade en nalevingskosten behaald bij een nalevingsniveau 
van 113 (op een schaal van 0 tot 200) met totale kosten van €176.800 (nale-
vingskosten €57.500 en verwachte schade €119.400). Ik simuleer de effecten 
van diverse handhavingsmethodes onder de veronderstelling dat de horeca-
ondernemer een risiconeutrale winstmaximaliseerder is. Op basis van deze 
veronderstelling kiezen alle ondernemers ervoor om de regels niet na te leven 
als er geen handhaving is. Er zijn dan geen kosten van handhaving of nale-
ving, maar de verwachte schade is tamelijk hoog: €663.300. Alle drie de basale 
handhavingsmethodes zijn in staat om een beter resultaat te realiseren, als het 
beleid tenminste goed wordt uitgevoerd.
De analyse van aansprakelijkheidsclaims door slachtoffers laat zien dat 
via private handhaving een redelijk maatschappelijk welvaartsniveau bereikt 
kan worden: de totale kosten variëren van €176.800 tot €191.600. De handha-
vingskosten zijn beperkt omdat handhaving alleen plaatsvindt als er brand 
is geweest. Slachtoffers hebben voldoende toegang tot de rechter. Of private 
handhaving werkelijk tot efficiëntie leidt hangt af van (1) een adequate ver-
goeding die op de volledige schade is gebaseerd, (2) voldoende vermogen bij 
horecaondernemers, en (3) efficiënte toepassing van het criterium van ‘vol-
doende’ voorzorgsmaatregelen door de rechters.
Het is ook mogelijk om de verwachte schade te reduceren door middel 
van bestuursrechtelijke handhaving. Echter, het nadeel van deze aanpak is 
dat horecaondernemers naleving zullen uitstellen totdat er de werkelijke 
dreiging van executie van sancties is. Bestuursrechtelijke handhaving vereist 
daarom aanzienlijke handhavingskosten en resulteert in totale kosten van 
€260.000 tot €331.500.
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Strafrechtelijke handhaving van de brandveiligheid is een goed alterna-
tief. Met relatief lage handhavingskosten kunnen goede resultaten worden 
geboekt (totale kosten €176.800 tot €223.700). Hogere boetes maken het moge-
lijk het aantal inspecties te verminderen. In elk geval, boetes moeten hoog 
genoeg zijn om naleving af te dwingen (hier: minstens €250). Anders is het 
verstandig om helemaal af te zien van handhaving of om naleving te bereiken 
door niet elke overtreding onmiddellijk te bestraffen.
De analyse laat zien dat er een voorkeur is voor schadegerelateerde hand-
having (ex-post), zowel met behulp van privaatrecht als van strafrecht. Een 
strafrechtelijke handhaving is daarbij het beste alternatief als het vermogen 
van de horecaondernemer onvoldoende is en vervangende gevangenisstraf 
nodig is. De andere problemen met schadegerelateerde handhaving zijn niet 
zo groot of kunnen opgelost worden door aanvullend een beetje te investe-
ren in bestuursrechtelijke handhaving ex-ante. De rol van bestuursrechtelijke 
handhaving is vooral informerend en aanvullend. De voornaamste prikkel 
tot naleving kan worden gerealiseerd door middel van ex-post handhaving.
HANDHAVING VAN DE BRANDVEILIGHEID IN DE HORECA
Het optimale handhavingsbeleid
De hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift is: Wat is een effectief en efficiënt hand-
havingsbeleid voor de brandveiligheid in de horeca? Mijn antwoord op deze 
vraag laat zich in vijf punten samenvatten.
Ten eerste: enige vorm van handhaving is nodig om horecaondernemers 
te stimuleren tot het nemen van voorzorgsmaatregelen. Zonder handhaving 
zullen zij kiezen voor onvoldoende naleving (hoofdstuk 2, 12, 15). De prikkel 
die uitgaat van bezoekers, verzekeringsmaatschappijen of ondernemers zelf, 
is onvoldoende.
Ten tweede: om horecaondernemers te stimuleren tot voorzorgsmaatre-
gelen zijn publieke middelen nodig, maar wel in beperkte omvang. Publie-
ke middelen zijn nodig om de horecaondernemers te informeren over het 
belang van brandveiligheid en uit te leggen welke regels gelden (hoofdstuk 
12, 15). Dit geld moet niet aan inspecties worden besteed, maar vooral aan 
voorlichtingscampagnes om horecaondernemers bewust te maken van bra
ndveiligheid(svoorschriften). Bovendien, gelet op een doelmatige besteding 
van de publieke middelen is een beperkte investering in brandveiligheid in 
de horeca verstandig (hoofdstuk 13).
Ten derde: het handhavingsbeleid moet bestaan uit een slimme combina-
tie van alle handhavingsmethodes (hoofdstuk 14, 15). Ex-ante is er actie nodig 
om horecaondernemers bewust te maken van brandveiligheid. Bestuursrech-
telijke handhaving ex-ante is nodig voor die ondernemers die de regels ern-
stig of vaak blijken te overtreden. De horecagelegenheden van deze onder-
nemers kunnen gesloten worden door de gemeente op het moment dat zij 
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signalen krijgt van bijvoorbeeld andere handhavers (milieu, openbare orde, 
etc.).  Daarnaast kan de gemeente gezamenlijke handhavingsacties organise-
ren waarbij brandveiligheid onderdeel is van een (vlugge) inspectie.
Ten vierde: afschrikking kan met name gerealiseerd worden door ex-post 
handhaving met een combinatie van privaatrechtelijke en strafrechtelijke 
handhaving (hoofdstuk 15). Private handhaving werkt in principe goed, 
omdat slachtoffers de dader kennen en voldoende schadevergoeding ver-
wachten om de kosten van het indienen van een claim te rechtvaardigen, en 
omdat de meeste horecaondernemers een substantieel deel van de schade 
kunnen betalen. Aanvullende gevangenisstraf middels het strafrecht is nodig 
als de ondernemer niet in staat is te betalen of als het aandeel van de immate-
riële verliezen te groot is.
Ten slotte is het goed om expliciet op te merken dat de handhavingsstijl 
voor publieke handhaving (zowel ex-ante als ex-post) primair een deterrence 
strategie is (hoofdstuk 12). Dit volgt uit een analyse van de genoemde doe-
len van handhaving. Een compliance strategie geeft de horecaondernemer de 
gelegenheid om met de naleving te wachten totdat er inspectie plaatsvindt of 
zelfs tot er daadwerkelijk sancties worden aangekondigd. Dit blijkt met name 
uit het uitstellen van het herstel van mankementen aan de technische instal-
laties. Voor advies zijn algemene voorlichtingscampagnes voldoende. Een 
strikt handhavingsbeleid geeft de horecaondernemer een prikkel om zich-
zelf te informeren over brandveiligheidsregels. Bij opvoeding is het probleem 
dat de huidige compliance strategie een cultuur stimuleert waarbij naleving 
niet belangrijk wordt gevonden en tot de verantwoordelijkheid van de over-
heid wordt gemaakt. Wel dient een deterrence strategie zodanig uitgevoerd 
te worden dat de motivatie van de bereidwillige horecaondernemers om de 
regels na te leven niet wordt ondermijnd. Ook voor de aanvullende rol van 
(bestuursrechtelijke) handhaving is vooral een deterrence strategie nodig als 
het gaat om het ingrijpen bij horecaondernemers die middels privaatrech-
telijke en strafrechtelijke handhaving onvoldoende worden afgeschrikt. Een 
kanttekening bij het gebruik van een deterrence strategie is van belang. Gege-
ven de beperkte middelen en sancties moet de gemeente zijn inspecties en 
sancties richten op de meest ernstige overtredingen en op herhaalde overtre-
dingen. Dat kan door het handhaven van een informele standaard en (met 
name bij ex-ante handhaving) door te beginnen met een waarschuwing.
Opmerkingen bij het handhaven van de brandveiligheid in de horeca
In het huidige beleid speelt bestuursrechtelijke handhaving ex-ante een cen-
trale rol. Die uit zich in de frequentie en relatief lange duur van inspecties. Er 
zijn echter twee problemen met deze inspecties. Ten eerste, deze inspecties 
doen een relatief groot beroep op de schaarse publieke middelen (hoofdstuk 
13 en 15). Het is efficiënter om te vertrouwen op ex-post handhaving en/of te 
accepteren dat er brandschade ontstaat, door het terugdringen van de inten-
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siteit van de inspecties. Ten tweede, deze inspecties en bijbehorende sancties 
creëren weinig afschrikking vanwege hun informele, herstellende karakter 
(hoofdstuk 12).
Het huidige beleid kan verder verbeterd worden door de juridische 
mogelijkheden uit te breiden (hoofdstuk 12 en 15), bijvoorbeeld door toepas-
sing van hogere boetes of van bestuursrechtelijke boetes. Dergelijke moge-
lijkheden vergroten wel het gevaar dat de handhavers hun discretionaire 
bevoegdheden gebruiken voor hun eigen belangen. Bovendien, een kleine 
boete van bijvoorbeeld €100 werkt alleen maar contraproductief, omdat deze 
te laag is om substantieel bij te dragen aan de naleving. Een optie die wel veel-
belovend is om de naleving te vergroten, is het vergroten van de vergoeding 
voor immaterieel leed. Dit verbetert de werking van het privaatrecht.
Uiteraard zijn de beleidsaanbevelingen beperkt door de reikwijdte van 
het onderzoek. De beschrijving van het effectieve en efficiënte beleid is van 
toepassing op de horeca en kan niet zomaar worden toegepast op andere sec-
toren. Voor andere sectoren is mogelijk een ander soort beleid efficiënt. De 
vraag is echter of verschillen in handhavingsbeleid haalbaar en geloofwaar-
dig zijn. Verder is er slechts beperkte aandacht besteed aan bijvoorbeeld de 
analyse van een verplichte verzekering tegen brandschade voor horecaon-
dernemers, het gebruik van certificering en private keuringen, de optimale 
wijze van vergoeding van slachtoffers, de complicaties van principaal-agent 
problemen in ingewikkeldere horecabedrijven, beperkte aansprakelijkheid, 
etc. Maar deze zaken zijn in beginsel van ondergeschikt belang. Als het bij-
voorbeeld gaat om een verplichte verzekering, dan is deze alleen effectief en 
efficiënt als de horecaondernemer tevens verplicht wordt werkelijk de gele-
den schade te vergoeden, met name waar het immaterieel leed betreft.
AFSLUITING
De (basale) economische theorie over handhaving staat in ieder tekstboek. 
Maar in hoeverre kan deze worden toegepast op actuele handhavingsproble-
men? Empirische analyses zijn nodig om ons begrip van naleving en hand-
having in de praktijk te verbeteren. Er is nog relatief weinig kennis om de 
regelovertreding door bedrijven te verklaren. Welke achtergrondkenmerken 
verklaren het nalevingsgedrag van bedrijven? Hoe groot is de invloed van 
sancties op de naleving? Hoe beïnvloedt het aantal inspecties de naleving? 
Voor zulke vragen is dataverzameling en empirische analyse essentieel. We 
weten inmiddels tamelijk veel over de output van handhavingsorganisaties 
(hoeveel inspecties, sancties etc.), maar weinig over de outcome: In hoeverre 
leidt die output tot betere naleving en tot een lagere verwachte schade? In 
dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd met diverse methodes bij te dragen aan 
het vergroten van deze kennis. Deze analyses geven geen definitief ant-
woord op alle vragen. Verder onderzoek is nodig om eenduidige antwoorden 
te krijgen op de vraag welk nalevingsniveau en daarmee welk niveau van 
366 Samenvatting [summary in dutch]
handhaving(skosten) gewenst is. Ik ben ervan overtuigd dat het waardevol 
is deze analyses verder uit te bouwen. De analyse in dit proefschrift laat zien 
dat, ondanks belangrijke beperkingen aan de beschikbare data, beleidsma-
kers in staat zijn om hun handhavingsbeleid beter te onderbouwen. Alhoe-
wel die analyses geen doorslaggevend bewijs opleveren, laten ze wel zien in 
welke richting de conclusies gaan.
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